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PRINCIPLES 


o  # 


NATURAL  AND   POLITIC 

LAW. 


iH  tira  ro  LU  ME  s  J 


•ooaeseaoooooaoo«eoeaooaooooM«o<n»e 


By  J.  J.  BURLAMAQUI, 

C-outfSELlOR  OF  State,    and  latz  professor  of  natural  an6 
CIVIL  LAff  AT  Geneva. 


•«oocoM«o«o(»oa«e«acMaso«o«Maooaa 

.A 


TRANSLATED^  INTO  ENGLISH  BY    MR.   NUGENT* 
THE    FOURTH   EDITION,    REVISED    AND    CORRECTED. 

BOSTON: 

Printed  ^r  JOSEPH  BUMSTEAD,  for  JOHN  BOTLE,  marl- 
^  BOROUGH-STREET,  BENJAMIN  LARKIN,  cornHill^ 

><\  4ND  JAMES  WHITE,  cqurt-sti-ht, 

^f^  M.DCC.XCII. 

6q 


ttfftttfftffttffttfffftfttttitttf  ri  ^,  .  ^ 


T    O 


Dr.  MEAD. 


SIR, 

J^  O  intrude  in  this  manner  upon  your  time,  {o  ufe- 
fully  employed  in  the  dudes  of  your  profefTion,  would 
expole  me  in  fome  meafure  to  blame,  were  it  upon  a  lefs 
important  occafion  than  that  of  recommending  the  follow- 
ing woik  to  your  generous  protection.  The  dignity  of 
the  fubjeft,  which,  handled  by  other  pens,  has  been 
thought  worthy  of  being  infciibed  to  the  moft  illuftrious 
perfonages  of  the  laft  and  prefent  age,  will  plead,  1  hope, 
ibme  excufe  for  an  addrefs,  which  is  defigned  not  fo  much 
to  interrupt  your  occupations,  as  to  avail  itlelf  of  the  fanc- 
don  of  your  name  in  inti-oducing  this  work  to  the  public. 
And  indeed  a  nobler  fubjeél  1  could  not  û:k€\:  for  the  fa- 
vour of  your  acceptance,  than  that  which  fo  nearly  relates 
to  the  moral  duties  of  lifc,  and  the  foundation  of  human 
contentment  and  happinefs  i  a  fubjed:  moreover  illufbrated 
by  one  of  the  ableft  mailers  of  the  prefent  age,  whofe  ex- 
traordinary ability  andfldll  in  curing  the  diforders  of  the 
mind,  may  be  compared  very  aptly  to  yours  in  rem^oving 
thoie  of  die  body.  One  of  the  principal  encouragements 
1  had  to  diis  addiefs,  is  the  near  reladon  between  the 
following  Vy'ork,  and  thofc  elevated  fentiments  with  which 
you  have  been  always  inlpired.  Such  an  admirable  fy{~ 
ten)  of  moral  precepts,  fuch  noble  maxims  of  true  Chrif- 

S  33  S3  "'"^ 


%l 


DEDICATION. 

rian  policy,  and  liir.h  excellent  rules  for  the  government  of 
,our  lives,  cannot  but  be  acceptable  to  a  gentleman,  who, 
in  the  whole  tenor  of  his  conduft,  has  been  an  illuftrious 
example  of  thofe  rules  and  maxims  which  are  here  moft 
judicioufly  eftabliilied.  A  very  good  opportunity  this  of 
entering  upon  the  encomium  of  thofe  virtues  which  have 
fo  eminently  diftlnguifhed  you  at  the  head  of  your  profef- 
fion  ;  but  the  little  value  any  commendations  of  mine 
would  have,  the  apprehenfion  I  fhould  be  under  of  being 
fufpedted  of  adulation,  and  the  danger  1  fhould  incur  of 
offending  your  modefty,  obliges  me  to  wave  any  attempt 
of  tliis  nature.  However,  i  cannot  help  taking  notice  of 
t]iat  true  magnificence  with  which  you  have  at  all  times 
contributed  to  the  advancement  of  learning,  and  whereby 
you  have  juftly  acquired  the  title  of  patron  and  proteftor 
of  letters.  In  facfl,  the  extenfive  blefTings  that  fortune  has 
bellowed  upon  you,  have  been  employed  not  as  inftru- 
ments  of  private  luxury,  butas  means  of  promoting  thofe 
arts,  which  have  received  an  additional  luflre,  fince  they 
have  flione  fo  confpicuoufly  in  your  perfon.  Your  friend- 
iliip  and  correfpondence  have  been  courted  by  the  greateft 
inen  of  the  prefent  age  ;  and  your  houfe,  like  that  of  Atti- 
cus,  has  been  open  to  the  learned  of  all- orders  and  ranks, 
who  unanimoufly  refpeét  you,  not  only  as  a  fupreme  judge 
of  learning  and  wit,  but,  moreover,  as  an  arbiter  eleganti- 
arura^  and  mafter  of  finifhed  urbanity.  Your  colleftion 
of  valuable  curiofities  and  books,  wherein  you  have  rival- 
led the  magnificence  of  fovercigns,  is  the  admiration  and 
talk  of  all  Europe,  and  will  be  a  lading  monument  of  your 
love  of  literature.  The  polite  reception  you  have  always 
given  to  the  learned  cf  foreign  nations  has  rendered  your 
name  h  refpedable  abroad,  that  you  are  never  mentioned 
but  v;ith  cxprefTions  denoting  the  high  idea  they  entertain 
cfyourfingular  munificence.  Thele,  Sir,  are  not  partic- 
ular fentiments  of  mine  ;  they  are  the  fentiments  of  the 
public,  whofe  voice  I  utter  ;  they  are  the  fentiments  of 
your  learned  friends  abroad,  which  I  have  been  defired  to 

repeat; 


DEDICATION. 

repeat  to  you  upon  a  late  occafion,  together  with  their 
compliments  of  thanks  for  the  marks  they  have  received 
of  your  great  and  difinterefted  civility.  It  is  with  plea- 
fure  I  embrace  this  opportunity  of  executing  my  com- 
million,  and  of  declaring  in  this  public  manner  the  pro- 
found refpefl  and  efteem  with  which  I  have  the  honour 
of  fubfcribing  myfelf,  ^ 

SIR, 

Your  mofl  humble  and 
Obedient  Servant, 

THOMAS  NUGENT. 


Grafs  Infif 
June  4,  174S. 


^^*o«tX'<:oocc<>Mico\;>ocoo&c«.>accc<}QOCCo30JoocdowscK^:>«oS^ 


THE 


TRANSLATOR 


TO         THE 


READER. 


HE  ûiahcr  cf  thsfcUô-vhig  vjcrk,  M.  J.  J.  Burla. 
fntiqui^  "doas  dejcendedfrùm  cne  ofibofe  nobis  families  cf  Luc- 
ca^  which ^  U'^on  thsir  embracing  the  Protefrant  reUgicn^  zvere 
chtlged  abcîit  two  centuries  ago  to  take  foelter  in  Gensva. 
His  filhe-r  was   cmnfellcr  aad  Jecreîary  cf  fate-,   hoiicur,s 
i^-hich  arâ  frequently  conferred  in  that  city  upcn  Juch  as  acquit 
thir.ijeyjâs  zvcrthily  cf  a  p-cfejjcrfmp  in  the  academy^  -partie- 
ularly  thauf  la\Ji\  thefiiiefl  -ivilhc-ut  doubt  to  form  ablejudg- 
e-,   r,îagifiraîes^  and  fiatefnen.      '■The  Jen,  upon  his  return 
fycm  his  travels^  -vsas  iinrnediatcly  ncminated prcfeffor  cfthis 
fijnce^  in  -ivhich  pcfi  he  continued  a  ccr/iderable  number  cf 
j^oSy  till  the  republic  thought  proper  to  rennmerate  his  kng 
r;:d  Cuiinent fer-viceSy  by  rd'fmg  him  to  ihefrine  dignity  as  his 
fa' her.      x'Le  great  reputation  he  acquired  in  his  profcjfcrfjtpy 
vj.'is  kfi  Giving  to  his  irnmerfe  ernditicn^  in  ivhich  he  equalled 
if  net  excelled  all  his  predecfpjrs,  thcin  to  the  qnlchiefs  cf  his 
u:;derjlandii]gy    the  ckarnejs  cf  his  ideas  ^  his  found  and  judi- 
cicus  viezvs  in  thefudy  (fjurifprudence,  and  ejpecially  to  the 
fiiidlty  cf  his  Principles  cv,  natural  laiv  and  cii:il  gycernw.ent. 
With  regard  to  the  ccccfon  of  his  publifoing  thcfe  Piinciplcfs, 
he  clfewes  hlmjelf  in  his  preface,  that  it  ivas  in  feme  me-jfure 
ic  comply  v:l:h  tbei<vpcr:iiniîy  cf  his  friends^  but  chiefly  to  pre- 
vent 


To   the   Reader.  vii 

vent  his  reputation  from  being  injured  by  a  p-ecifitate  ir/ipref- 
fionfrom  any  of  thcfe  imperfcEî  and furreptitious  copies  u-hicb 
had  been  handed  about  by  his  pupils,  ^he  public  indeed  had 
flattered  themfehes  a  long  time  with  the  hopes  of  feeing  a  com- 
plete cour/e  of  the  law  of  nature  and  nations  from  this  eminent- 
hand  ;  but  his  occupations  a'nd  infirmity  cbliged  him  ■  tofruf- 
trate  their  expédiât  ions,  lloix^ever^  as  a  good  intrcdutlicn  to 
this  fcience  was  extremely  zvantedy  he  thought  proper,  till  hs 
could publifld  his  larger  work,  to  favour  us  with  the  follozving 
Principles i  being  convinced  that  in  this,  as  in  every  other 
branch  of  learning,  the  mofi  ejfential  part  is  the  laying  of  a 
proper  and  f olid  foundation.  In  fa£i,  we  daily  cbferve  that 
mofl  errors  in  life  proceed  rather  from  wrong  frinciples,  then 
from  ill- drawn  confequences. 


M,  Burlamaqui  isfo  modefi  as  to  confider  theje  principles^: 
as  calculated  only  for  young  people,  who  are  dcfircus  cf  being 
initiated  into  the  ftudy  of  of  natural  lazv;  and  y  ci  we  may-- 
venture  to  affirm  it  as  a  performance  cf  general  utilityy  b.-H 
efpecially  tojuch  as  have  had  the  misfortune  cf  negle5ting  this 
fcience  in  their  younger  days,  his  a  performance  that  nwfi 
certainly  be  allowed  to  have  the  merit  of  an  original  underta- 
king, by  our  author's  afcending  always  to  the  firfl  -principles ^ 
by  his  illuftrating  and  extending  them,  by  his  ccnnetiiug 
them  with  each  other,  and  by  exhibiting  them  frequently  in  a 
new  light.  But  his  ftngular  beauty  conftfis  in  the  alliance  he 
Jo  carefully  points  out  between  ethics  andjurifprudence,  reli- 
gion and  politics,  after  the  example  of  Plato  and  Tully,  and 
the  other  illufirious  mafters  of  antiquity.  In  effe5i,  thejejci- 
ences  have  the  fame  bafis,  and  tend  to  the  fame  end  -,  their 
hufinejs  is  to  unravel  the  Jyftem  of  humanity,  or  the  plan  cf 
providence  with  regard  to  man-,  and  fin  ce  the  unity  cf  this 
Jyftem  is  an  unqueftionable  point,  Jo  Joon  as  writers  ajcend  to 
the  principles,  in  order  to  view  and  contemplate  the  whole,  it  is 
impojftbk  but  they  allfiooula  meet. 

Our 


viii  To  the  Reader. 

Our  author's  method  has  nothing  of  the Jcholajlic  turn. 
Infiead  of  Jiarting  new  difficulties^  he  prevents  them  by  the 
manner  of  laying  his  thefts  ;  inflead  of  difputitjg^  he  reconciles. 
Far  from  purfuingany  idle  or  too  fuhtli  ideas.,  he  follow  s  na- 
ture fiep  by  fiepy  and  derives  his  arguments  from  fenje  and  ex- 
perience. His  thoughts  he  unfolds  with  the  greatefl  perfpicu- 
ity  and  order  i  andhisflyleis  pure,  clear,  and  agreeable,  Juch 
as  properly  becomes  a  dida5iic  work.  In  fine,  he  has  the  hon- 
cur  of  prejerving  the  character  of  a  Chrifiian  philofopher,  by 
inculcating  the  valour  we  ought  tofet  upon  the  light  of  reve- 
lation, a  light  which  Jo  advantageoufly  affifis  the  feeble  glim- 
merings ofreajon  in  the  high  and  important  concerns  of  our 
civil  and  religious  duties. 


s^Sêî^ 


THE 


Author's   Advertifement. 


rr'HIS  treat'ife  on  the  Principles  of  Natural  Law,  is  an  introduc-' 
tion  to  a  larger  luork^  or  to  a  complete  fyjiem  of  the  law  of  nature 
and  nations^  which  fome  time  or  other  I  propy'cd  to  publifo.  But 
having  met  with/everal o!//Jru£Iions  in  my  attempt,  through  a  variety 
of  occupations,  and  principally  from,  my  indifferentjiate  of  healthy  I 
had  almojî  lo/ijight  of  my  original  defign.  Being  informed  however 
that  fome  manufcript  copies  of  the  papers  I  had  drawn  up  for  my  own 
private  ufe,when  I  gave  leâiures  of  jurifprudence,  were  multiplied 
and  got  into  a  number  of  hands,  I  began  to  apprehend  lejl  this  work 
fnould  be  publijhed  againfl  my  will.,  in  a  very  imperfcét  and  mangled 
condition.  This  induced  nie  at  length  to  yield  to  the  folicitations  of 
[everaUf  my  friends^  by  communicating  the  following  effay  to  the  public. 
Dubious  whether  I  /hall  ever  be  able  tofinijh  the  larger  work,  I  have 
endeavouredto  give  fuch  an  extent  to  thcfe  Principles,  as  may  render 
them  in  fome  meafure  ferviceabk  to  fuch  as  are  defirous  of  being  initi- 
ated into  the  knowledge  of  the  law  of  nature.  As  for  thofe  who  are 
Tnafiers  of  this  fubje^î.,  the  prefent  work  is  not  deftgneâ  for  them:  my 
view  will  be  fufficiently  fulfilled,  if  it  Jhould  prove  tf  any  utility  tfi 
yeung  beginners  in  the  fiudy  of  this  important  fience , 


CONTENTS. 


Vol.  I. 

PART     I. 

General  Principles   of  Right. 


O 


CHAP.    I. 

F  the  nature  of  man  confidcrcd  with  regard  to  right  :  of  the 
underftanding,  and  whatever  is  relative  to  this  faculty. 

Page    I 
Sec^^i .  Deftgn  of  this  zvork  :  what  is  meant  by  natural  law»       ibid . 

2.  ïVe  hiufî  ckduce  the  principles  of  this  fcietice  from  the 

nature  and  ft  ate  of  man.  2 

3.  Definition  of  man  j  what  hi;  nature  is.  ibid. 

4.  Digèrent  aSîions  of  man  :  which  are  the  ohjeSi  cf 

right  ?  _  ^3 

5.  Principal  faculties  of  the  foul.  ibid. 

6.  The  under/landing  'j  truth.  4 

7.  Principle.     The  under /landing  is  naturally  right.       ibid. 

8.  In  tvhat  manner  percept  ion  j  attcntioJiy  and  examen, 

are  formed.  5 

9.  Evidence  y  probability.  ibid. 

10.  Of  the  fenfes,  the  inmgination.^  and  memory.  6 

1 1 .  The  perfection  of  the  underjianding  conft/ls  in  the 

knowledge  of  truth.     Two  objiacles   to    this  per- 
feSlion^  ignorance  and  error.  ibid. 

12.  Different  forts  of  error,     i.  Error  of  the  law,  and 
of  the  fa£l.      2.  Voluntary  and  involuntary.      3. 
Effential  and  accidental.  7 

CHAP. 


CONTENTS. 

Page. 

CHAP.     ir. 

Continuation  of  the  principes  relative  to  the  nature  of" 
man.     Oi  will  and  libeity. 

Sect.   I.  Theivill.     TFhat  happinefi  andgocd  conp,/îs  in.  8 

2.  Infl'inSis^  inclinations^ pufjions .  9 

^3.  Liberty  :  in  what  it  cQnjijh.  lO 

4.  Ufe  of  liberty  in  our  judgment  luith  refpelîî  to  truth.  1 1 

5.  Liberty  has  its  exercife^  even  in  regard  to  things  that 

are  evident.  ibid- 

Objeâîion.  1 2 

Ânfiver.  ibid. 

6.  Ufe  of  liberty  with  regard  to  good  and  evil.  ibid. 

7.  lyith  regard  to  indifferent  things.  ^  13 

8.  IVhy  the  exercife  of  liberty  is  rejiraintdto  non-evident 

truths^  and  pariicular  goods.  '  ibiJ. 

9.  The  p7-ij)f  of  liberty  draiunfrom  our  inward fenfc^  is 

fuperior  to  any  other.  1 5 

I  o.    Hovj  coma  it  that  liberty  has  been  contcjled.  1 6 

1 1 .  Actions  are  voluntary,  and  involuntary  j  _//v^,  necef- 

fary^f  and  ccnjlrained.  1 7 

12.  Our  faculties  help  one  another  reciprocally.  19 

13.  Of  reafon  and  virtue.  ibiti. 
J  4.  Caufcsofthediverfityiueobferveintheconduilofmen.  20 
1 5.   Reafy.i  has  it  always  in  her  power  to  renunn  mi/lrejs.    ibid. 

CHAP.     HI. 

That  œ.an  thus  confiitnted,  is  a  creature  cnpable    of  moral 
direclion,  and  accountable  for  liis  actions. 

Se6l.    r.  Man  is  capable  of  direBion  in  regard  to  his  conduct.       21 

2.  He  is  account  able  for  his  anions  :  they  can  be  imputed 

to  him.  ibid. 

3.  Principle  of  imputability.      We  mufl  not  confound  it 

with  itnpu:ation.  22 

C  H  A  P.      ÎV. 

Further  inquiry  into  what  relates  to  human  nature,  by  confid- 
ering  the  different  ftates  of  inan. 

Se£l.    I.  Definition.      Divifion.  23 

2.  Primitive  and originaljiates.  ibid, 

I.  Stalt 


CONTENTS. 

Page. 

I.  State  of  man  with  regard  to  Go  J.  23 

^c£\.   3.  2.  State  ofjocicty.  24, 

4.  3.  State  of  j'ohtude.     4.   Peace  :  war.  ibid. 

5.  State  of  man  with  regard  to  the  goods  of  the  earth.         25 

6.  Àdvtntitious  fiâtes.     I.  Family.  2.  A'farriage.         ibid. 

7.  3.   Preaknefsofînanathisbirth.  /^.  Natural  dépend- 

ance cf  children  on  their  parents.  26 

8.  7hejhte  of  property.  ibid. 
—SSiÇ.  Ctviijlate  of  government.  ibid. 

I  o.  The  civHJîate  and  property  of  goods  give  rife  to  fever  al 

adventitious  liâtes.  27 

11.  True  idea  oj  the  natural  Hate  of  man.  ibid. 

12.  Difference  betxveen  original  and  adventitious Jiatts.    ibid. 

CHAP.    V. 

That  man  ought  to  fquare  his  condu6l  by  rule  i  the  method  (>f 
finding  out  this  rule }  and  the  foundation  of  the  right  in  general. 

Stdl.   I.  Dffinitionofa  rule.  28 

.  _^  2.  It  is  not  convenient  y  that  man  /IjQuld  live  without  s 
'"■  "■       rule.  -  -Û  iw.v'jiiiino:)  jil^,- :.ibid. 

3.  A  rule  fuppofes  an  end^  an  aim.  .  29 

4.  The  ultimate  end  of  man  is  happinefs.  ibid, 

5.  It  is  thefyfiem  of  providence.  30 

6.  T"/?^  ir//f/?rf  i?/  happinefs  is  effential  to  man-,  and  infepar- 

ablefrom  reafon.  ibid, 

7.  Self-love  is  a  principle  that  has  nothing  vicious  ifj 

itfelf  ibid. 

8.  Jl^Jan  cannot  attain  to  happinefs  hut  by  the  help  of 

reafon.  3  r 

9.  Reafon  is  therefore  the  primitive  rule  of  man.  32 
10.  ff^hat  is  right  in  general  ?                                          ibid, 

CH  A  P.    VI, 

General  rules  of  con^u£l  prefcnbed  by  reafon.     Of  the  nature  and 
firft  foundation  of  obligation. 

^e^.   I.  Reafon  gives  us  feveral rules  of  condu5i.  33 

2.  Firjl  rule.     T 0  make  a  right  dtfîin£îicn  between  good 

and  evil.  ibid. 

3.  Second  rule.     True  happipefs  cannot  tonfifi  in  things 

lnci*>fij}(r.t  with  the  nature  and  fiate  ofv.cn.  35 

Seit, 


G  O  N  TEN  T  ^. 

Page» 
Ssfl.  4.  7 bird  rule.     To  compare  toc  preferît  and  the  future 

together,  35 

Fourth  rule.  ibid. 

Fifth  rule.  ibid. 

5.  Sixth  rule.     To  give  the  goods  that  excel  mo/}  the 

-     preference.  ^6 

6.  Seventh  rule.     Jnfome  cafes  pcjfibility  otily^  and  for  a 

much  flrongcr  reajon  probability,  ought  to  determine 
us.  ibid. 

7.  Eighth  rule.     To  have  a  relijhfor  true  goods  37 
9.  Our  mind  acquiefces  naturally   in  thofe  maxims,  and 

they  ought  to  influence  our  conduct.  ibid, 

g.  Of  obligation  generally  confidered.  38 

10.  Obligation  may  be  more  or  lefsflrong.  39 

11.  Dr.  ClarkU  opinion  on  the  nature  and  origin  of  obli- 

gation, ibid, 

12.  Monjieur  Barheyrac' s  opinion  concerning  this fuhjeÛ.     40 
13*  ^""Jo  forts  of  obligations  i  internal  and  external.  4 1 

CHAP,    vir. 

Of  right  confidered  as  a  faculty,  and  of  the  obligation  thereto 
correfponding. 

SeiSl.  I.  The  ivord  right  is  taken  in  feveral particular  fenjes, 

which  are  all  derived  from  the  general  notion  42 

2.  Definition  of  rightf  confidered  as  a  faculty.  ibid. 

3.  Ire  mufi  take  care  to  diflinguijh  between  aftmple 

power,  and  right.  43 

/  74.  General  foundation  of  the  rights  of  man»  44 

y  5.  Right  produces  obligation.  ibid. 

\6.  Right  and  obligation  are  two  relative  terms.  ibid. 

\j.  At  what  time  man  is  fufceptible  of  right  and  obligation.  45 

a.  Several  forts  of  rights  and  obligations.  ibid. 

CHAP.     VIII. 

Of  law  in  geneiral. 

3c(?t.   I .  As  man  by  nature  is  a  dependent  being,  the  laiv  ought 

to  be  the  rule  of  his  actions.  4& 

2.  Definition  of  law.  ibid. 

3.  fFhy  laiv  is  diflned:i  rule  çtekt'ibeâ.  49 

4.  IVhat  is  underflood  by  fovertign,  fûvereignty,and  the 

ritht  of  commanding  ibid. 

^  '  CHAP. 


CONTENTS. 

Page. 
C  H  A  P.     IX. 

Of  the  foundation  of  fovereignty,  or  the  right  of  commanding. 

Se6l.   I.   Firjl  remark.     The  quejîion  is,  in  regard  to  anecef- 

far  J  fovereignty,  51 

2.  Second  remark.     There  is    neither  fovereignty  nor 

neceffary    dépendance    between     beings     perfe^ly 
equal.  ibid. 

3.  Different  opinions   on  the  origin   and  foundation  of 

fovereignty.  52 

4.  Examen  of  thofe  opinions,     i.  The  fole  fuperiority  of 

power  is    infufficient    to  found  a  right  of  com- 
manding ibid. 

5.  2.  Nor  the  fole  excellence  or  fuperiority  of  nature.  54 

6.  3.  Nor  the  fole  quality  of  creator.  ibid. 

7.  True  foundation  of  fovereignty -^  power,  wifdom,  and 

good  nefs  joined  together.  55 

8.  Explication  9 four  opinion.  56 
g.   JVe  mnjl  not  feparate  the  qualities  which  form  the 

right  of  fovereignty.  58 

10.  Definition  of fubjeSiion.  Foundation  of  dépendance.  59 

1 1 .  The  obligation   produced  by  law,,  is  the  moft  perfect 
that  can  be  imagined.  ibid. 

12.  Obligation  is  internal  and  external  at    the  fame 
time.  60 

CHAP.     X. 

Of  the  end  of  laws;  of  their  charaiSler,  differences,  &c. 

Se6t.   I.  Oftheendoflaws^eiiherinregardtothefubjeâïyOrin 

refpe£i  to  the  fovereign.  61 

— •"  2.   The  end  of  laws  is  not  to  lay  a  reftraint  upon  liberty^ 

but  to  direSl  it  in  a  proper  manner.  62 

3.  Examen   of  what  Puffendorf  fays    concerning  this 

fubjeSt.  ibid. 

4.  Of  the  dijîinâïion  of  law  into  obligatory,  and  that   of 

fimplepermiffvjn.  63 

Ji*.5.  The   opinion   of  Grotius  and  Puffendorf  upon  this 

fubject.  ibid. 

6.  The  rights  which  men  enjoy  infociety^  are  founded  en 

this  per miffion.  64 

7.  The  matter  of  laws.  ibid. 

'  Sea. 


CONTENTS. 

Page. 
Scâ:.  8.  Internai  conditions  of  a  law  i  that  it  lepojjibk^  ufeful, 

atuljufi.  64. 

9.  External  conditions  of  law  ;  that  it  le  made  known  j 

and  accompanied  with  a  fanSJion.  65 

10.  Whether  the  promife  of  recompence  is  equally  capable, 

as  the  comminution  ofpunijhmcntj   to  ccn/îitute  the 
fanSïion  of  laiu.  66 

1 1 .  TFho  thcfe  are  whom  tht  law  obliges. 

Ofdifpenfation.  67 

1 2 .  Of  the  duration  of  laws.,  and  how   they  are   ejlah- 

lijhed.  ibid. 

13.  How  many  forts  of  laws.  68 

CHAP.  xr. 

Of  the  morality  of  human  a£lions. 

Se6l.   I.   In  what  the  morality  of  aâîions  confi/îs.  69 

2.  Aoîions  are.,  i.  either  commanded,   or  forbidden^  or 

permittei.  ibid. 

3.  Remarks  tn  permitted  anions.  70 

4.  2.  Actions  are  good  or  ju/l,  bad  or  unjufl.,  and  indif- 

ferent, ibid. 

5.  Conditions  reqnifite  to  render  an  aSlion  morally  good.       71 

6.  Of  the  nature  ofbador  unjufl  aSiions.  ibid. 

7 .  All j lift  anions  are  equally juji  j  but  unjufî  allions  are 

more  or  lefs  unjufî.  72 

8.  Efjential  char a£itr  of  unjufî  anions.  ibid. 

9.  Of  indifferent  aSîions.  73 

10.  Divifon  of  good  and  bad  aSîions.  ibid. 

1 1 .  Of  ju/iice  and  its  different  kinds.  74 

12.  Of  the  relative  ejlimations  of  moral  anions.  75 

13.  Morality  is  applicable  to  perfons  as  well  as  aâîions.  7  6 


P  A  R  T  II. 

Of  the   L  A  w   of  N  A  T  U  R  E. 

CHAP,    I. 

XN  what  the  law  of  nature  confifts,  and  that  there  is  fuch  a 
thing.     Firft  confiderations  drawn  from  the  exiftence  of  God 

and  his  authority  over  us. 

Sea. 


CONTENTS* 

Pagf. 
StSt»   1.  s  ubj  e^  (f  this  fécond  part.  77 

2.  IFhether  there  are  any  natural  Jaws.  78 

3.  Oftheex'iJlenceojGod.  ibid. 

4.  Fir  ft  proof.     The  neceffttj  of  a  felf-exiflint  and  intel- 

ligent being.  ibid. 

5.  ^if  niujl   not  feek  for   this   being  in  this  material 

world.  79 

6.  Second  proof.     The  neccfftty  oj  a  fir/l  mover.  80 

7.  Third  proof.     The  Jirticturey   or der^  and  beauty  of 

the  univerfe.  ibid. 

8.  The  world  is  net  the  effeSî  of  chance.  8  P 

9.  //rV  not  eternal.  ibid. 

10.  God  has  a  right  to  prefcribe  laws  to  man.  82 

11.  This  is  a  confequejice  of  his  power,  wifdom,   and 
goodnefs.  *  83 

CHAP.     II. 

That  God,  in  confequence  of  his  authority  over  us,  has  a£lualTy 
thought  proper  to  prefcribe  to  us  laws  or  rules  of  condu6l. 

Ssft.   I.  God  exercifes  his  authority  over  us ^  by  prefer ibing 

laws  to  us.  84 

2.  Firfl  proof  drawn  from  the  very  relations  of  which  we 

have  been  fpeaking.  ibid. 

3.  Stxond  proof  drawn  from  the  end  zvhich  God  prcpo- 

fed  to  hinifelfwith  refpe^  to  man^  and  from  the  necef- 
fity  of  moral  laws^  to  accompli/})  this  end.  85 

4.  Confirmation  of  the  preceding  proofs.  86 

5.  Third  proof,  drawn  from  the  goodnefs  of  God.  8  7 

6.  Fourth  proofs  drcnun  from  the  principles  ofconduol 

which  we  aiîually  find  within  ourf elves.  ibid. 

7.  Thefe  principles  are  obligatory  of  themf elves.  88 

8.  They  are  obligatory  by  the  divine  will^  and  thus  become 

real  laivs.  ibid. 

CHAP.    III. 

Of  the  means  by  which  we  difcern  whatis  jufl  and  unjuft,  or  wha 
is  di(5lated  by  natural  law  ;  namely,  i .  moral  inflindt,  and  2.  reafon* 

Sî^.  I,  Firfl  rneans  of  difcerning  moral  g«od  and  evil)  naîrifly-t 

inftin^  or  inward  fenfe,  89 

2.  Examples.  9c 

3  Whence  thefe  fenfations  proceed.  ibid» 

4.  Of  what  îfe  they  are  to  us*  <)i 

Sea. 


CONTENTS. 

Sefl.  5.  OhjeSîlon  :  tbefe  pnjatiins  are  net  found  in  ail  men. 
Ânfwer  :  i.  frc  find  f orne  tractas  of  them  among  th: 
mojijavage  people.  g  I 

6.  2.  fre  mufi  âiflinguifl)  between  the  natural Jiate  of 

man^  and  that  of  his  depravation.  Ç2 

7.  3.   If  there  be  any  menjlers  in  the  moral  order^  they 

are  very  rare,  and  no  confeqtience  can  be  drawn 
from  them.  ibid. 

S.  Second  means  of  dfcerning  moral  good  and  evil  \  which 

is  reafon.  ibid. 

9.  Firjl   advantage  of  reafon  in  refpe^  to  in/iinSÎ -y  it 

ferves  to  verify  it.  93 

10.  Second  advantage  :  it  unfolds  the  principles^  and  from 

thence  infers  proper  confequencc s .  '        ibid. 

1 1 .  Third  advantage  :  reajon    is  an  univerfal  meansy 
and  applicable  if  all  cafes.  94. 

CHAP.    IV. 

Of  the  principles  from   whence  reafon  may  deduce  the  law  of 

nature, 

Se(3.   r.  From   whenci  are  we  to  deduce  the  principles  of  the 

law  of  nature  ?  94 

2.  Preliminary      remarks»      What  we  underjiand  by 

principles  of  natural  law.  9  5 

3.  Charaiîer  of  thofe  principles.  ibid. 

4.  Whether  we  ought  to   reduce  the  whole  to  onefingle 

principle.  96 

5.  Man  cannot  attain  to  the  knowledge  of  natural  laws ^ 

hut  by  examining  his  yiatureyconflitution^ancljlate.  ibid. 

6.  Three  fiâtes  of  man.  97 

7.  Religion  :  principle  of  the  natural  lawSj  that  have  God 

for  their  objeà.  98 

8.  Confequences  of  this  principle,  ibid. 

9.  Self-love  :  the  principle  ofthoje  natural  laius  which 

concern  ourfelVes.  99 

l€.  ^Natural laws  derived  from  this  principle.  100 

11.  Manismadeforfociety.  ibid. 

12.  I.  Society  is  ahfolutely  neceffary  for  man,  loi 

13.  2.  Man  by  his  conflitution  is  very  fit  for fociety.  1 02 

14.  3.  Our  natural  inclinations  prompt  us  to  hok  ouT 

for  fociety.  1 03 

c  Sea, 


CONTENTS. 

Sucl.   15.   SoLtahility.     Pi-bictpks  of  natural  laws  relative  to 

other  men.  1 04. 

16.  Natural  laws  ivhich  fiow  fro7nfociabiîity.  ibid. 

1.  7  he  public  good  ought  akvays  to  he  the fupreme  rule.  105 

2.  The  fp'irïî of fociahiTxty  ought  to  he  untverfal.  ibid. 

3.  To  elf erve  a  natural  equality.  ibid, 

4.  Ts  preferve  a  benevolence  eventowardi  our  enemies. 
Self-defence  is  perrnittedy  revenge  is  not.  ibid. 

17.  Particular  confequences.  106 

18.  T>6f/}  three  principles  have  all  the    requifite  tha- 

raSîers.  1 07 

ig.  Remarks  on  Puffendorfsfyfiem.  ibid. 

20.  7/;»^   critics    haw  carried  their   ce  n  fur  es   too  far 

againji  him  in  this  refptSl.  ibid. 

21.  Of  the  connexion  between  our  natural  duties.  108 
'12.  Of  the  oppofition    that  fomctimes  happens  between 

thife  very  duties.  log 

23.  Natural lavj  obligatory,  and  natural  law  (j/fimple 

permiflion.     General  principle  of  the  latv   ef 
permiffion.  IiO 

24.  T-wo  fpecies  of  natural  law  j  one  primitive^  the  other 

fecandary.  ibid, 

CHAP.     V. 

That  natural  laws  have  been  fufficiently  notified  ;  of  their  proper 
charadleriftics,  the  obligation  they  produce,  &c. 

5ecl.  I.   God  has  fufficiently  notified  the  laws  of  nature  to  man.    1 1  r 

2.  Men  may  ajjijl  one  another  in  this  rcfpeH.  112 

3.  The  manner  in  which  the  principles  of  the  laws   of 

nature  have  been  ejiablijljed^  is  afrejh  proof  of  ths 
reality  of  thofe  laws.  ibid. 

4.  Natural  laws  are  the  effcSî  of  the  divine  goodnefs .         1 13 

5.  The  laws  of  nature  do  not  depend  on  arbitrary  inlii- 

tution,  ibid. 

I.  Our  opinion  is  not  very  wide  from  that  of  Grotius.  114 
'y.  The  effeSî  of  the  lavo  s  of  nature^  is  an  obligation  of 

conforming  our  conduct  to  them.  1 1 5 

8.  Natural  laws  are  obligatory  in  refpeSf  to  all  men.  116 

9.  Grotius* s  opinion  with  regard  to  divine^  pefitivey 

and  uyiiverfallaiv.  ibid. 

10.  Natural  laws  are  immutable^  and  admif  of  no  dif- 

penfation.  '  117 

H,  Of  the  eternity  of  natural  law$,  ibid. 

CHAP. 


CONTENTS. 

C  H  A  P.     VI. 

Of  the  laws  of  naticns. 


Pag;. 


S^ù.  I .  How  civil  focicties  are  formed.  1 1 9 

2.  The  civiijhtj  does  net  dejlroy^  hut  improve  thejhte 

of  Mature.  ibid. 

3.  True  ideas  of  civil fociety.  1 20 

4.  States  are  conf.derid  under  the  notion  of  moral  fcrfons,  ibic*. 
4.    What  is  the  law  of  nations,  ibid. 

6.  Certainty  of  this  law.  12 1 

7.  General  principle  oj  the  law  of  nations  ;  what  polity 

conjijls  in.  ibid. 

8.  Inquiry  into  Grctius^s  opinion  concerning  the    lazv 

of  nations.  ibid. 

9.  Two  forts  of  law  of  nations ',  one  of  nc ce (j]ty  and  ob- 

ligatory by  itflfi  th^  other  arbitrary  and  convin- 

tirnsl.  12-5 

10.   Vjtof  the  foi  egolng  remarks.  \\i\a. 

CHAP.     VII. 

Whether  there  is  any  morality  of  at^ions,  any  obligation  or  duty, 
antecedent  to  the  law  of  nature^  and  independent  of  the  idea  cf 
a  legiflator. 

Se£l.  I.  Different  opinions  of  ethic  writers  zuhh  refpeSî  to  the 

jirjl  principle  of  morality.  124 

2.  Principles  relating  to  this  qiieflicn.  12  ; 

3.  Three  rules  of  human   a^ions^i.    Moral  fenfc.  2. 

Re  a  fan.   3.   The  divine  will.  126 

4.  Thrfe  three  principles  ought  to  be  united.  127 

5.  Of  the  primitive  cai/fe  of  obligation.  ib  f. 

6.  j^U  rules  are  of  then  fives  obiig/itory,  ibic'. 

7.  Obligation  jnay  he  more  or  lefsjirong.  I2!> 

8.  Reafon  alone   is fuffcient  to  vnpofe foms  obligation  çyi 

man.  1 29 

9.  Objeâiion.     Nobody  can  oblige  himf elf.  13  r 

10.  Ânfiver.  ibid. 

11.  Afrejh  olje£ïion.  136 

12.  Duty  maybe  taken  in  a  lofe  orjirijf fetife.  ibid. 

13.  Reftdt  of  ivhat  has  been  hitherto  faid.  13?, 
J  4.  This  manvcr  ofejloblijhing  morality  does  not  ivechiVi 

thefyfiem  of  natural  law.       ,  1 3  ^ 

15»  Grotius^i  opinion  examitied,  131, 

,      Sea! 


CONTENTS. 

Page. 

Secl.  i6.   In  order  to  have  a  perfc£îf}Jîem  of  morality^  we/hould 

join  it  with  religion.  ibid. 

CHAP.    VI1Î. 

Confcquences  of  the  preceding  chapter  :  reflciSlions  on  the  diftinc- 
tions  of  juftice,  honefty,  and  utility. 

SeiSl .   I .  There  is  a  great  deal  of  ambiguity  and  mi  flake  concern- 

ing  this  fuljcâî.  135 

2.   Ofjtijlice^  honcjly^  utility^  trder^ar.d fitnefs.  ibid, 

3-  y^'jl^^'^i   hone/iy^  and  utility,  are  di/iinet  things.,  and 

mujl  net  be  confounded.  1 36 

4.  But  though  they  are  dijlinû,  yet  they  are  naturally 

conneSïed.  ibid. 

5 .  Whether  an  adion  is  jufl^  hecaufe  God  commands  it?   137 

6.  In  lohat  the  beauty  of  virtue  and  the  perfection  of 

man  confifls.  ibid, 

CHAP.    IX. 

Of  the  application  of  natural  lav;s  to  human  allions  j  and  firft  of 

confcicnce. 

S:£l.   I .  What  is  meant  by  applying  the  havs  to  human  aSJions.  1 38 

2.  Whc7t  is  confcience.  139 

3.  Ccnfcience  Juppcfcs  a  knowledge  of  the  law-  ibid. 

4.  Firfl  rule.  14O 

5.  Second  and  third  rules.  ibid. 

6.  Antecedent  andfubfequcnt  confcience.     Fourth  rule.  141 

7.  Subfcquent  confcience  is  either  quiet^  or  uneafy.  1 42 

8.  Decijive  and  dubious  confcience.     Fifth,  fixth^   and 

feventh  rule.  1 43 

9.  Scrupulous  confcience.  Eighth  rule.  144 
10.  R'ght  and  erroneous  confcience.  Ninth  rule.  ibid. 
lï.  Demorjirative  and  probable  confcience.     Tenth  rule.  145 

CHAP.     X. 

Of  the  merit  and  demerit  of  human  ?.6\ions  ;  and  of  their  imputa- 
tion relative  to  the  laws  of  nature. 

Stcl.   I.  Dl/linflion  of  imputability  and  imputation.     Of  the 

nature  of  a  moral caufe,  146 

Sedl. 


CONTENTS. 

Scâ.  2.   Of  the  nature  of  imputation.     It  fupfofes  a  knoivkdge 

of  the  law  as  well  as  of  the  fait.  147 

3.  Examples.  ibid. 

4.  Principles.      I.  fVe  ought  not  to  infer  aSlual  impu- 

tation from  impittabiliiy  only.  148 

5.  2.  Impittationfuppofes  feme  connexion   between  the 

anion  and  its  confequenees.  ibid, 

6.  3.   Foundation  of  merit  and  demerit,  1 49 

7.  In  what  merit  and  demerit  corftfls.  150 

8.  4.  Merit  and  demerit  have  their  degrees  \  and fo  has 

hnputation.  ibid, 

C).  5.   Imputation  is  either  fnnple  or  efficacious.  1511 

10.  6.  Effects  of  one  and  the  other.  ibid. 

I  jf,.  7 .  Ifthofi  who  are  cancer ned-,  do  not  impute  an  aâîion^ 

it  is  fuppofednot  to  have  been  committed.  152 

12.  3.  Difference  between  the  imputation  of  good  and 
bad  allions,  ibid, 

CHAP.     XI. 

Application  of  thofe  principles  to  different  fpecies  of  allions,  in 
order  to  judge  in  what  manner  they  ought  to  be  imputed. 

.Se(fl.   I.  What  actions  are  ailually  imputed?  152 

2.  Anions  offuch  as  have  not  the  ufe  ofreafon.  15^ 

3.  Of  what's  done  in  drunkennefs.  ibid. 

2.  Of  things  impoffible.     Of  the  want  of  opportunity.  ibid. 

3.  Of  natural  qualities.  ibid. 

4.  Of  events  produced  by  external caufes.  154 

5.  Of  what  is  done  through  ignorance  or  error.  ibid. 

6.  Of  the  effe£i  of  temperament^  habits^  or  pajjions.  ibid. 

7.  Of  forced  actions.  155 

8.  Forced  actions  are  in  themf elves  either  good,  had^y  or 

indifferent.  156 

9.  JVhy  a  bad  action^  though  forced,  may  he  imputed.         157 

10.  Puffendorfs  o-pinion.  158 

1 1 .  Of  actions  in  which  more  perfons  than  one  are  concerned.   159 
i2.  Three  forts  of  moral  caufts  \  principal  \  fuhaltern  ^ 

and  collateral.  1 60 

13.  Application  ofihefe  di/Ii  net  ions.  1 62 

CHAP.    XII. 

Of  the  authority  and  fan£lion  of  natural  laws  ;  and  i.  ofthegood 
and  evil  that  naturally  and  generally  follow  from  virtue  and  vice. 

Se£t. 


CONTENTS. 

Sc£{.    I.    ÎFhat  is  meant  hy  the  authority  of  laturaî  lau- s.  163 

2.  The  cbfcrvance  of  natural  laws  forms  the  happinefs 

of  man  and  fociety ,  164 

3.  Explications  on  the  Hate  of  the  qnefiion.  ibid. 

4.  Proof  of  the  abovcfnentioned  truths  hy  reafon.  165 

5.  Proofs  hy  experience,    i.   Virtue  is  of  itfelf  the  prin- 

ciple of  inward  fatisfaction  ;  <7«â^  vice  a  principle  of 
difquit  t  and  trouble.  ibid. 

6.  Of  external  goods  and  evils  y  which  are  the  confequence 

of  virtue  and  vice.  1 66 

7.  Thefe  different  effects  of  virtue  and  vice   art  Jiill 

greater  atnsng  thofe  who  are  invefied  with  power 
and  authority.  ibid* 

8.  Confirmation  of  this    truth   by  the    confcjlon  of  all 

nations.  167 

g.  Confirmation  of  the  fame   truth  by  the   ahfurdity  of 

the  contrary.  ibiJ. 

1 0.  Anfiwer  to  fB?ne  particular  objections.  1 68 

1 1 .  The  advantage  ahvays  ranges  itfelf  on  the  fide  of 

virtue  ;  and  this  is  the  firjl  fonction  of  the  laws 

of  nature.  169 

12.  General    difficulty   draivn  from    the    exceptions^ 

which  render  this  firji  fanction  infffcient.  1 70 

The  goods  and  evils  of  nature  and  fortune  are 
diftribiited  unequally.,  and  not  according  to  each 
perfon's  merit.  '-^'  '''■''  ibid. 

The  evils  produced  by  injuflice  fall  as  well  upm  the 

innocent  as  the  guilty.  ibid. 

Sometimes  even  virtue  itfelf  is  the  caufe  cfperfe- 
cution.  ibid. 

1 3.  The  means  which  human  prudence  employs  ta  remedy 

thofe    difordersy  are  like  wife  infiffcient.  1 7  I 

14.  Thediffîcultypropofedyîsofgreatconjequence.  172 

CHAP.    xiir. 

Proof  of  the  immortality  of  the  foul.     That  there  is  2  fanction 
properly  fo  called  in  refpc^l  to  natural  lav/S. 

Seifl.   I   State  of  the  quedion.  172 

2.  Divifion  of  opinions.     How  it  ispoffbU  to  know  the 

will  of  God  in  refpect  to  this  poini,  173 

3.  jyhether  the  foul  is  i}mn:rtal  ^  ibid. 

Sea, 


CONTENTS. 

s  éd.  4.  Firjî  proof.     The  nature  of  the  foul feemsinùreî'f  dif- 

tinct  from  that  of  the  body.  ibid. 

^.  Death  does  not  thcnfore  neceffarily  imply  the  annihila- 
tion of  the  foul.  1 74. 

6.  Objection.     Anfwer.  175 

7.  Confirmation  of  the  preceding  truth.     Nothing  in  na- 

ture is  annihilated.  ibid. 

8.  Second  proof.     ^  he  excellency  of  the  foul.  ibid. 

9.  Confnnatioiis.     Our  factdties  are  always  fifceptible 

of  a  greater  decree  of  perfection.  1 76 

10.  Objection.     Anfiver.  177 

1 1 .  Third  proof  drawn  frcm  our  natural  difpofitions  and 

defires,  ibid. 

I  2.  77><:  fanction  of  natural  laivs  will  Jheiv  itfelf  in  a 

future  life.  178 

1 3 .  Fijjiprcof  drawn  from  the  nature  of  man  confidercd 

on  the  moral  fide.  ibid. 

14.  Secondproof  drawn  from  the  perfections  of  Godf         179 
\^.  The  objection  drawn  from  the  prefent  [late  of  things 

fermes  to  prove  the  fentiment  it  oppofes.  ■   18 1- 

16.   The  belief  of  afuturejl  ate  has  been  received  by  all 

nations.  1S2 

CHAP.    XIV. 

That  the  proofs  we  have  alledged  havefuch  a  probability  and  fît- 
nefs,  as  renders  them  fufficient  to  fix  our  belief,  and  to  deter- 
mine our  conduct. 

Seel.   I.  The  proofs  we  have  given  of  the  fanction  of  natural 

laws  are  fufficient.  182 

2.  Objection.     Theje  proofs  contain  no  more  than  a  prob- 

ability orfitnefs.     General  anfwer.  183 

3.  What  is  meant  by  a  probability  or  ft  nefs.  ibid. 

4.  General  foundation  of  this  manner  of  reafoning,  1 84 

5.  Tfhis  kind  offitnefs  is  veryfirong  in  refpect  to  natural 

law.  ibid . 

6.  Thisfitnefs  has  different  degrees.     Principles  to  judge 

of  it.  185 

7.  Application  of  thefe principles  to  our  fubject,  ibid. 

8.  Comparifon  of  the  two  oppofitefyfîems.  ibid. 

9.  The  fyfiem  of  the  fanction   of  natural  laws  is  far 

preferabk  toihioppofittfyflem,  186 


CONTENTS. 

$c£t.  10.  Objection,     jltjfwey.  187 

1 1 .  Of  the  influence  which  thrje  proofs  ought  to  have 
over  our  conduct.     We  Jhould  act  in  this  world  on 

the  foundation  of  the  belief  of  a  future  fiate .  ibid. 

12.  It  is  a  nece^ary  co7ifequ£nce  of  our  nature  andfiate.   188 

13.  Reafon  lays  us  under  an  oMigation  offo  doing.  189 

14.  his  a  duty  that  God  himfelj  impofss  en  us.  ibid. 

15.  Conclufion.  190 

16.  That  which  is  already  probable  by  reafon  oniy^  is  fct 

in  full  evidence  by  revelation,  ibid. 


Vol.   II. 
PARTI. 

Which  treats  of  the  original  and  nature  of  civil  fociety,  of  fuve- 
reignty  in  general,  of  its  peculiar  character,  modifications,  and 
effential  parts. 

C  H  A  P.     I. 

/CONTAINING  fome   general   and  preliminary  réfections^ 
which fervc  as  an  introduction  to  this  and  thefolhuiiug  parts,  ibid. 

CHAP.     II. 

Of  the  original  of  civil  fscieties  in  fact .  1 9  7 

CHAP.     Hi. 

Of  the  right  of  amvenicncies  zvith  regard  to  the  inflitutisn  of 
civil  foci  et)'^  and  the  necejfity  of  a  fuprcme  authority  ;  of  civil 
liberty^  that  it  is  far  preferable  to  natural  liberty^  and  that  the 
civiljiate  is  of  all  humanfliitesthe  mofl perfect ^  the  mofl  rea- 
fonablci  and  confequently  the  naturaljlate  of  man.  199 

CHAP.     IV. 

Oj  the  effential  conjlitution  of  flat  es  ^  and  of  the  manner  in  which 

they  are  fanned.  206 

CHAP.    V. 

Ofthtfovereign^fovereignty^  and  tbefubjects»  21 Z 

C  H  A  P.     VI. 

Ofthf  imtmdiate fourct^  afid  foundation  offoverdgnty,  216 

CHAP* 


CONTENTS. 

Page. 
CHAP.    VII. 

Of  the  ejfcntial  charaSlers  of  fovereignty ,  its  tnodif  cations,  extent-, 

and  limits,  ,220 

1.  Ofthecharaélersoffovereiguty.  ibid. 

2.  Of  abfolute  fovereignty.  224 

3.  Of  limited foveriignty.  .  226 
4-  Of  fundamental  la^jos.  228 
5.  Of  patrimonial,  and  tfufruSitiary  kingdoms,  232 

CHAP.     VIII. 

Ûf  the  parts  offo^oereignty,  6r  of  the  different  ejfential  rights  'which 
it  includes.  233 


Part   ii. 

In  which  are  explained  the  different  forms  of  government,  the 
ways  of  acquiring  or  lofmgfovfreignty,  and  the  reciprocal  du- 
ties of  fovereigns  and  fubjefts. 

C  H  A  P.    I. 
Of  the  various  forms  nf government .  236 

CHAP,     II. 

An  ejojf  on  this  quefiion.  Which  is  the  beft  form  of  government  ?  244 

CHAP.    ni. 

Of  the  different  nvays  ef  acquiring  fovereignty.  254 

1.  Ofconqueft.  ibid. 

2.  Oftheeleélioncffovereignt.  256 

3.  OfthefucceJJiontothecro'wn.  z^j 

C  H  A  P.    IV. 

Of  the  different  nvays  of  hftngfovereignty.  263 

CHAP.     V. 
Of  the  duties  effubjtas  in  general.  26e 

CHAP.     VI. 

Of  the  inviolahle  rig  ht  s   offovereignty,  of  the  depofng  offovereigns, 
fftht  ahufi  offovereignty  f  and  of  tyranny,  269 

d  CHAP. 


CONTENTS. 

Page. 
C  H  A  P.    VU. 

Of  the  duty  offo'vereig^s,  2  7  y 


PART     III. 

A  more  particular  exajnination  of  theeflential  parts  of  fovereignty, 
or  of  the  different  rights  of  the  fovereign,  with  refpeft  to  the 
internal  adminiftration  of  the  ftate,  fuch  as  the  legiflative  power, 
the  fupreme  power  in  matters  of  religion,  the  right  of  infliél- 
ing  punifhments,  and  that  which  the  fovereign  has  pver  the 
Bona  Reifuhlica,  or  the  goods  contained  in  the  commonwealth. 

CHAP.    I. 

Of  the  legijlati've poller,  çnd  the  cii-illaiis  fwhich  arife  frcm  it.         289 

CHAP.    n. 

Of  the  right  of  judging  of  the  doilrines  taught  in  the  fate  :  of  the 
care  luhich  the  fovereign  ought  to  take  to  form  the  manners  of  his 
fubjeéis.  2j8 

CHAP.    Ill, 

Of  the  porter  of  thefo-vereign  in  matters  of  religion.  500 

CHAP.     IV. 

Ç)f  the  ponuer  of  the  fovereign  over  the  lives  and  fortunes  of  his  fuh~ 
je£is  in  criminal  cafes.  307 

CHAP.    V. 

Of  the  povL'er  offovereigns  over  M^Bona  Reipublicas,  or  th:  goods 
contained  in  the  commoKVjeali h .  320 


PART     IV. 

In  which  are  confidered  the  different  rights  of  fovereignty  with 
refpedl  to  foreign  fiâtes  ;  the  right  of  War,  and  every  thing  re- 
lating to  it  J  public  treaties,  and  the  right  of  ambalfadors. 

CHAP.    I. 

Pfnvar  in  general,  andfrjî  of  the  right  of  the  fovçreign,  in  this 
rfpiiit  ever  hisfubjeSis.  33 1 

C  H  A? 


CONTENT  S- 

Page. 
ÇHAP.    ir. 

Ofthecaufesofiuar.  337 

CHAP.     III. 
Of  the  different  kinds  of  war.  3  ^8 

CHAP.    IV. 

Of  thofe  things  tvuhich  ought  tp precede  lAiar.  358 

CHAP.     V. 

General  rules  toincw  fwhat  is  allcvwable  in  nioar^  36i^. 

CHAP.    VI. 

Of  the  rights  'which  nvargi^ves  over  the  perfons  of  the  enemy  t  and  of 
their  extent  and  hounds.  368 

CHAP.    VII. 

Of  the  rights  of  nvar  over  the  goods  of  an  enemy.  375 

CHAP.  vni. 

Of  the  right  cffovereignty  (if  quired  over  the  conquered.  3^4 

Of  neutrality.  38a 

CHAP.    IX. 

Of  public  treaties  in  general.  3^0 

CHAP.    X, 
Of  compails  made  vjith  an  enemy.  ^9^ 

CHAP.     XL 

Of  compaHs  vjith  an  enemy,  ivhicb  do  not  put  an  end  to  tie  nvar.         4c  2 

CHAP.    Xll. 

Of  compaéls  made,  during  the  voar,  by  fulordinate pci^ers ,  as  generals 
of  armies,  or  other  commanders.  40-1 

CHAP.     XIII. 
Pfcompaâls  made  luith  an  enemy  by  private  perfons.  4 1  o 

CHAP.    XIV. 
Of  public  compaâls  ivhiçhput  an  end  to  luar.  4 1  r 

CHAP.     XV. 
Of  the  right  of  ambaffadcrs.  413 


THE 

PRINCIPLES 

O  F 

NATURAL      LAW. 


PART     I. 

General  Principles  of  Right* 


CHAP.    I. 

Of  the  Nature  of  Man  confedered  with  regard  to  Right  :   Oftht 
Underflanding^  and  whatever  is  relative  to  this  Faculty. 

!•    «&        fvJvi ^Y  dcflgn   is   to    inquire   into   thofi  rules  Defl„„  „f 

which  nature  alone  prefcribcs  to   man,  in  this  work  s 
order  to   conduct   him    fifely  to  the  end,  What  is 
uhich  every  one  has,  and  indeed  oui^ht  to  "'""^  ^T 

ave,  m  view,  namtly,  true  and  lolid  hap-  ^^^^ 
pinefs.  The  fyftcm  or  aiTemblageof  thefe 
rules,  conlidered  as  fo  many  laws  impodd 
by  God  on  man,  is  generally  diltmguifhed  bv  the  name  of  Nat- 
ural Lavj.  This  fcience  includes  the  mod  important  principles 
of  morality,  jurifprudence,  and  politics,  that  is,  whatever  is  mod 
interefling  in  refpedl  as  well  to  man  as  to  focieiy.  There  can 
be  nothing  therefore  more  deferving  of  the  application  of  a  rational 
being,  of  a  being  that  has  its  perfedion  and  felicity  ferioufly 
A  at 


-  ihe   P  R  I  X  C  I  P  L  L  s    cf 

at  heart.  Ajwfi  knowledge  of  the  maxims  we  ought  to  ftllow 
in  the  courft:  of  lite,  is  the  princi|ial  objc6l  of  wifdom  ;  and  vir- 
tue confiUs  ill  puitini^  thtm  conlbiitly  in  prad'tice,  without  being 
ever  diverted  liom  fj  nolle  a  puifuit. 

We  »ru!t  1 1 .  T'ne  idea  of  Rigft,  and  much  mort"  that  of  Natural  Right, 
tk-'.ucethe  gre  undoubtedly  relative  to  the  nature  of  man.  It  is  trom  this 
'f'lHs  fd-  "'^^"''^  therefore,  Irom  the  ccnftituiion  and  ftale  cf  man,  that  wc 
en.e   from  ^^e  to  deduce  the  principles  ct  tiiis  fcience. 

the-  naLure  l^he  word  Right  (Droit*)  in  its  origiiîal  fignification,  comes 
and  ftattoi"  fj-orn  the  verb  d:r:g:>,  whi  h  implies,  to  conduct  a  pcrfon  to  fome 
°^^'^'  ,  certain  end  by  the  ihortelt  road.  Ri^hs  the  r.^îcre,  in  its  proper 
and  mort  general  lenfe,  and  that  to  which  all  the  others  niufl:  be 
reduced,  is  whatever  directs,  or  is  properly  dirtCiLd.  This  being 
prem;l-d,  the  firil  thing  we  have  to  examine  \?,  whether  man  is 
I'ufciptible  of  direction  and  rule  in  rcfpe6t  to  his  actions.  That 
we  may  attempt  this  with  a  greater  probability  of  fuccefs,  we  are 
to  trace  matters  to  their  very  origin,  and  afcending  as  high  as  the 
nature  and  conllitution  of  man,  we  mufl  there  unravel  the  princi- 
ple of  his  a6lions,  and  the  fcveral  liâtes  that  properly  belong  to 
him,  in  order  to  dem.)nlh-ate  afterwards  in  what  manner,  and  how 
far,  he  is  fiifceptible  of  dirc6lion  in  his  conduit.  This  is  the 
only  method  of  knowing  what  is  right,  and  what  is  not. 

D  finition  ^^^'  ^''^^"  '^  an  animal  endowed  with  underflanding,  and  rea- 
of  man  ;  f-^'H  ;  a  being  compofed  of  an  organized  body,  and  a  rational  foul, 
wiiat  his  Wi'.h  regard  ^o  his  body,  he  is  pretty  iimilar  to  other  animals, 

nature  «s.  having  the  fame  orgôn«,  properties,  and  wants.  This  is  a  living 
body,  organized  and  compofed  of  feveral  parts  ;  a  body  that  moves 
of  itlclt,  and  feeble  in  the  commencement,  increafes  gradually  ia 
its  progrefs  bv  the  help  of  nourilhraerf,  till  it  arrives  to  a  certain 
period,  in  which  ir  appears  in  its  flower  and  vigour,  frotn  whence 
it  infenhbly  declines  to  old  age.  which  coi  duel.-  it;  t length  to  dif- 
fohition.  This  is  the  ordinary  coiirfe  of  human  life,  unlefs  it  hap- 
pens to  be  abridged  by  fofre  malady  f>r  accident. 

But  man,  btfides  the  marvellous  difpofition  of  his  body,  has 
likewife  a  rational  foul,  which  emin(^nily  difcriminates  him 
from  brutes.  It  is  by  this  noble  part  of  himfelf  that  he  thinks, 
and  is  capable  of  formint;  jult  ideas  of  the  diftlrcnt  objects  that 
occur  to  him  ;  of  comparing  ihcni  together  :  of  iriferring  from 
known  principles  unknown  truths  j  of  pafîing  a  folid  judgment 

on 


•  riif  e'yiiiology   given  here  by   the   Author   wa*  iuttuded  ocly   for  the 
FrcDch  •woid  Droit. 


N  A  T  U  R  A  L    L  A  W.  ^ 

on  the  mutual  fitncfs  or  a'];r<'emcnt  of  things,  a.>  well  as  on  the  rela- 
tions they  bear  to  us;  of  clohheratingyn  hat  is  proper  or  iniorop- 
cr  to  be  done  ;  and  of  determining  co.ifeqiicntly  to  aft  on-  way 
or  oth:r.  The  mind  recolltfts  uhjt  iî  paît,  j  i^ns  it  with  tha 
pref.^n!,  and  exten  is  its  views  to  fiitUriiy.  It  is  capable  oi  pene- 
trating into  the  caufes.'progref-;,  and  confeqiience  of  tilings,  and 
of  difcovering,  as  it  were  at  one  glance,  the  intire  courf^  ol  life, 
■which  cniblcf.  it  to  lay  in  a  ftore  of  fuch  things  as  are  neceiTiry 
for  making  a  happy  career.  Bjfides,  in  all  this,  it  is  not  fiibj  ci 
to  a  conilant  feries  of  uniform  and  invariable  ()j).-ratir)ns,  but  finds 
itfclfat  liberty  to  ail  or  not  to  ail,  to  fufpend  its  aétionsand  mo- 
tions, to  diredl  and  matiage  them  as  it  thinks  proper. 

IV.  S'lch  is  the  gs^^î'^'il  i<^"2  we  arc   to  f  jrrn  of  the  nnture  of  D-ffercnt 
man.     What  rcfults  froni  hence  is,  ih-it  there  ai^;    fcvcral  fjrts  of  a'-^">iis  of 
human  actions  ;  fome  are  purely  fpiritual,  as  to  think,  to  reficôt,  "yj"^]^  ^^^ 
to  doiibc,  Sec.  others  are  merely  corporeal,  as  to  breathe,  to  grow,  thofe  that 
&c.  and  foine  there  are  that  may  be  called  mixt,  in  v\  hich  the  foul  are  the  ob- 
and  body  have  both  a  fliare,  being  produced  bv  their  joint  contiir-  .'"^  "'^ 
rtnce,  in  confeqiience  of  the    union  which  God  ha^  efbblifhed    '''^'"' " 
betv/een  thefe  two  conRitucnt  parts  of  man  ;   fuch  as  to  fpeak,  to 

Viork,  &c. 

Thofc  actions  which  cither  in  their  origin  or  direction  depend  on 
the  foul, are  called  lium  m  orvolimtary  ;  all  the  reitarc  termed  mere- 
ly phyfical.  The  foul  is  therefore  the  jirinciple  ol  human  aifions; 
and  thefe  acSlions  cannot  be  the  ohjecl  of  rule,  but  inafmiich  as 
they  are  produced  and  directed  by  thofe  noble  faculties  with  wliich 
man  has  been  enriched  by  his  Creator.  Hence  it  is  necell-iry  ta 
enter  into  a  particidar  inquiry  concerning  this  fubjecff,  and  to 
examine  clofcly  into  the  faculties  ^nd  operations  ot  the  foul,  in 
order  to  difcovcr  in  what  manner  they  concur  to  the  produ6iion 
ofhuman  a6tions.  This  *vill  help  us,  at  the  fame  t  m':-,  t'>  un- 
fold the  nature  of  thefe  aérions,  to  alfure  ourfelves  v.h^th.T  they 
arc  really  fufceptible  of  rule,  and  how  far  they  are  fubjcct  to 
humati  command. 

V.  Let  man  reflecl   btit  ever  fo  little  on  himfclf,  fcnfe  and 
experience  v/iil  foon  inform  him,  that  his  foul  is  an  agent,   wiiofe  l''''^ Jp»' 
adivity  difplays  itfslf  by  a  leries   of  different  opcraion'?  ;  which  ths^foul'.  *' 
having  been  diilinguifhed  by  f?parate  names,  are  likewife attribu- 
ted to  d'.fR-rent   facuUits.     'Ilis  chief  of  thefe  faculties  are  the 
underfianding,  will,  and  liberty.     The  foul  is,    indeed,   a  fimpb 

being  ;  but  this  does  not  hinder  us,  when  we  r.tiejd  to  its  difi-er- 

ent 


T^he  Principles  of 


wit  ways  of  operating,  froQi  confidering  it  as  a  fubjecl  in  which 
dilf;;reiit  powers  of  airting  rf^fide,  and  frcm  giving  diiiercnt  denom- 
inations to  ihefe  powers,  irvve  ctjnfider  the  thing  in  this  man- 
ner, we  lliall  find  ir  will  give  a  greater  cxac^nefs  and  perfpicuity 
to  our  ideas.  J-et  us  remember  therefore,  (hat  thefe  faculties  are 
nothing  elic  but  the  different  powers  of  a£ting  inherent  in  the 
mind,  by  means  of  v\hich  it  perfoniîsall  ils  operations. 

The  un-  yj^  T'hç  principal  faculty  of  the  foul,  that  which  coiiftitutes  the 

bff-^t"  "h  f^n^2f"^nf^^  P^i^f  oî'Wi  being,  and  fcrves,  as  it  were,  for  its  intrinfic 
light,  is  the  underftanding.  We  may  define  it  that  faculty  or 
power,  by  which  the  mind  perceives,  ?nd  forms  ideas  of  things,  in 
order  to  come  at  the  knowledge  of  truth.  Truth  may  be  taken 
here  in  two  fignifications  ;  either  for  the  nature,  ftate  and  mutual 
relations  of  things  ;  or  for  the  ideas  agreeable  to  this  nature.  Hate 
?.nd  relations.  To  have  a  knowledge  therefore  of  truth,  is  to  per- 
ceive things  fuch  as  they  are  in  tbenTelves,  and  to  form  ideas 
CORcerning  them  conformable  to  their  nature. 


Prindpu.         VII.  "VVe  muft  therefore  fet   out  v.ith  acknowledging  as  a  fixt 

.-^erftand-     ^^^  unconteflable  principle,  that  the  human  underftanding  is  natur- 

ing  is  na-    ally  right,  and  has  within  itfelf  a  ftrength  fufficient  to  arrive  at  the 

turally         knowledge  of  truth,  and  to  difiinguifh  it  from  error  ;  efpecially  iii 

Ç'S^-^  things  wherein  our  refpective  duties  are  concerned,  and  which  are 

requifite  to  form  man  fora   virtuous,  honourable,  and  quiet  life  ; 

provided,  however,  he  employs  all   the  care  and  attention  that  lies 

in  his  power. 

Senfe  and  experience  concur  to  convince  us  of  the  truth  of  this 
principle  ;  which  is  the  hinge,  as  it  were,  v>herecn  the  whole  fyfiem 
of  humanity  turns.  It  cannot  be  called  in  queftion,  without  fap- 
plng  the  foundation,  andintlrely  fubvertiiig  the  whole  Hrudtureof 
focitty  ;  becaufethis  would  be  annulling  all  manner  ofdiftinclion 
between  truth  and  error,  and  between  good  and  evil  ;  and  by  a 
natural  confequence  of  this  fubverfion,  we  flîouîd  find  ourfelves 
reduced  to  the  neceauty  of  doubting  of  every  thing  ;  which  is  the 
bigheft  pitch  of  human  extravagance. 

"rhcf^  v<'ho  pretend  that  reaion  and  its  faculties  are  depraved  in 
fuch  a  manner,  as  to  be  no  longer  capable  of  fjrving  as  a  fure  and 
faithful  guide  toman,  either  in  refpc£t  to  his  duties,  or  particularly 
with  regard  to  religion  :  do  not  refiecfi:  thiit  tliey  have  adopted  for 
the  bafis  of  their  f)ftem,  a  principle  deifruétive  of  all  truth,  and 
confequently  of  religion.  Thus  we  fee  that  the  facred  fcripture,  far 
'         ■  fro:n 


NaturalLaw.  5 

from  cftablifhing  any  fuch  maxim,  afTures  u«,  *  that  when  the  Gen^ 
tiles  which  have  not  the  law,  dt  by  nature  the  things  confaimd  in  the 
law  ;  thefe  having  not  the  laxv^  are  a  law  to  them/elves.  fVhich 
Jhew  the  ivork  of  the  law  written  in  their  hearts,  their  confcienct 
alfo  bearing  witnefs. 

True  it  is,  that  a  bad  education,  vicious  habits,  and  irregular 
paffions,  may  ofFufcate  the  mind  j  and  that  negledt,  levity,  and 
prejudices,  precipitate  men  frequently  into  the  grofF^ft  errors  in 
point  of  religion  and  morals.  But  this  proves  only  that  men  may 
make  a  bad  ufe  of  thiir  reafon,  and  not  that  the  natural  redlitude  of 
the  faculties  is  fubverted.  What  we  have  flill  to  fay,  concerning 
this  point,  will  help  to  fet  it  in  a  clearer  light, 

Vlir.  Let  us  proceed  now  to  a  clofer  inquiry  into  the  opera-  in  what 

atlons  of  the  underftanding.    The  perception,  or  view  and  know-  manner 

ledije  of  thin2'=;,  is  commonly  formed  by  the  concurrence  of  two  pe''"P''on. 

o  D  '  A  1    •  •  attention 

a6lions  ;  one  from   the  object,  and    is  the  impreflîon  which  this  ^^^  ej^.' 

objeél  makes  on  us;  the  other  from  the  mind,  and  is  properly  a  men  are 

glance,  or  fimpie  view  of  the  foul,  on  the  objecSl  it  is  defirous  of  formed» 

knowing.    But  as  a  firft  view  is  not  always  fufficient,  it  is  neceflary 

that  the  mind  fhould  apply  itfelf  for  fome  time  to  a  ferious  confid- 

eration  of  the  objeél,   to    the  end  it  may  acquire  a  juft  knowledge 

©f  things,  and  form  thereof  cxa£l  ideas.     This  application,   with 

which  the  foul  continiies  to  view  the  objeâ  in    order    to  know 

it  well,  is  called  attention  ;  and  if  it  turns  itfelf  different  way?,  to 

confider  the  objecSl  on  all  fides,  this  is  termed  exanien  or  inquiry. 

We  may  therefore   affirm,  that  the  perception  or  knowledge  of 

things  depends  intirely,  in  refpedt  to  the  mind,  on  its  natural  vigor 

and  attention, 

IX.  It  is  by  thefe  helps,  drawn  from  his  own  fund,   that  man  Evidence 
attains   at  length   a  clear  and   diftin£t  knowledge  of  things,   and  Prcbabili- 
their  relations  ;  as  alfo  of  idea<i,  and  the  conformity  of  thofe  ideas  ty- 
to  their  originals  ;   in  {hort,    that  he  acquires   the   knowledge  of 
truth.     We  give  the  name  of  evidence,  to  this  clear  and  dirt inft 
view  of  things,  and  of  their  mutual  relations  ;  a  point  to  which  we 
fhould  be  particularly   attentive.       For  this   evidence  being    the 
elFential  chara6leririic  of  truth,  or  the  fure  mark  whereby  one  can- 
not help  diftinguifning  it,  the  confequence  is,  that   it  necefTarily 
produces  fuch  an  internal  convi6lion,  as  forms  the  higheft  degree 
of  certainty.     It  is  true  that  all  objeéts  do  not  prefent  themfelves 

with 

*  Rom.  ii.  14.  i^. 


û  The  Principles*?/' 

with  fo  flrong  a  light,  and  that  notwithft«nding  the  great  care  and 
application  a  man  may  uG',  al!  th^t  he  is  frequently  able  tor.tt.iin.  \% 
only  agliinmeiing  light,  which,  accorciin^  lo  it^  ilr.ngih  tr  wcalc- 
nclVjproduccsfiifFeieiitdcgreesofprohrthilit)  and fccn:ing  truth.  But 
thismaftbe  abf.;Kitely  the  cafe  of  cv,  ry  bt-inc:,  uhi.fc  faculties  are 
limited  :  it  is  fufficient  that  man,  in  refpedt  to  his  diflination  and 
ftate,  is  capable  of  knowing  with  certainty  thole  things  v-hich 
concern  his  perfection  and  h.sppinefs  ;  and  tnorec<ver,  th^t  he  is 
able  to  dininguiCi  between  probability  and  cviucnce,  «s  al(o  be- 
tween the  different  de:^rees  of  probabili.y,  iti  order  to  proportion 
his  afTent  to  thofe  diftcrences.  Now  a  perfon  need  but  enter 
never  fo  littl;  into  himCrlf,  r.nd  reflect  on  the  operations  of  his 
mind,  to  be  convinced,  beyond  any  poflibility  of  doubt,  that  man 
is  really  pofTeflTed  of  this  difcernment, 

Of  tlic  feu-      y^    T\\t  iQ.Vi{z^^  takcH  from  the  f^nGtlve  faculty,  the  imagination 

înueina-     *'*^^°'  ^^'^  '"^  meiTiOpy,  muil  be  all  reduced  to  the  uiiderllandinj^^. 

lioii,  snd      In  facl,  the  fenfes,  coiifidered  in  this  manner,  are  nothing   elle  but 

n^emory.     the  underftanding  itfelf,  as  it  makes  ufc  of  the  fenfes  and   organs 

ot   the   body,  to  perceive  corporeal  obj.-cts.       The  imagination 

likewifc  is  nothing  but  the  underflanding,  as   it  perceives  abfent 

obje£ls,  not  in  thciT.felvcs,  but  by  their  image^  formed  in  the  brain. 

The  memory,  in  fine,  is  no  more  than  the  underftanding,  confid- 

ercd  as   poffelled  of  the  faculty  of  retaining  the  ideas  ii    forms  of 

thing?,  and  capable  of  rcprcfei.ting  them    (■>  itfelf  uhenever  there  is 

occafion  ;  advantages  that  principally  dEpi;r.d  on  the  care  wc  take 

in  repeating  frequently  thofe  ideas. 


TV' 


per-  XI.  From  r.'htit  has  been  hitherto  faid  with  regard  to  the  under? 
ftftion  of  fianding,  it  follows,  that  the  obj;d  of  this  f.iculty  of  the  foul  is 
fir  fi-r'^''  truth,  with  all  tiie  aâ:s  and  means  that  lead  us  to  it.  Upon  this 
confias  ill  fuppcfition,  the  pcrfe(ft!on  of  the  i;nderrtanding  ccnfifts  in  the 
the  know.,  knovvledge  of  truth,  this  being  the  end  lor  which  it  is  defigntd. 
}ecf,e  of  There  are  two  thing?,  among  others,  oppofite  to  this  i)erfe6lion, 

^1?  ,  -  ignorance  and  error,  which  are  two  maladies,  as  it  were,  of  the 
cles  to  this  tTimd.  Ignorance  is  no  more  than  a  privation  ot  loeas  or  know- 
perfedion,  ledge;  but  error  is  a  I'.onccriformity  or  oppofiiion  of  our  ideas  to 
ignorance  {;-g  nature  and  (late  of  things.  Error  being  tliercfove  the  fubvcr- 
and  error.  ^^^^  of  truth,  is  much  more  oppof.te  to  it  than  ignorance,  which  is 
a  kind  of  rr.edium  between  truth  and  error. 

It  is  to  be  obferved  here,  that  we  do  notfpcakof  the  und.?rfland^ 
ing,  truth,  ignorance,  and  error,  purely  to  know  wlut  thefc  things 
are  in  themfdves  j  cur  main  dcfign  is  to  confider  them  as  princi- 
ples 


N  A  T  U  R  A  L    L  A  W.  '7 

pies  of  our  atSlions,  In  this  light,  ignorance  and  error,  though 
naturally  diibni\  from  oni  another,  are  generally  mixt,  as  it  were 
an  1  confounJcil  ;  inlomuch,  that  whatever  is  faiJ  of  one,  ought 
cqiilly  to  be  applied  to  the  other.  Ignorance  h  frequently  the 
ciuf::  of  error  ;  but  whether  joineJ  or  feparate,  they  follow  the 
fa  ne  rule?,  and  proJuce  tlie  fame  effecl  by  the  influence  they  have 
over  our  actions  or  omifli  >ns.  Perhaps,  were  we  to  examine  into 
things  exi'^tly,  error  only,  properly  fpeaking,  can  be  looked  upon 
as  a  principle  of  action,  anJ  not  fimple  ignorance,  which  being 
nothing  more  of  «É'elf  than  a  privation  of  ideas,  cannot  be  produc- 
tive of  any  thing. 

XII.  There  are  feveral  forts  of  ignorance  and  error,  whofe  Differer.t 
diffirent  divifions  it  is  proper  for  us  to  obferve.      I.  Error  ccnfid-  forts  of  er- 
erM  in  refp-^iSl  toitsobjrcl,  is  either  of  the  law  or  of  the  fad.     2.  ro"of',jjJ' 
With  re:;ard  to  its  origin,  ignorance   is   voluntary  or  involuntary,  ]aw,  amiof 
error  is  vincible  or  invincible.      3.  In   relation  to  the  influence  of  the  faft. 
the  error  on  a  particular  affair  or  action,  it  is  cfteemed  elfential  or  *•    '^'''"o- 

•  I      ^  ,  •^  tary  and 

acc;^^lental.  involunta- 

Error  ii  of  the  law  or  fa<£t  according  as  people   are  miftaken  ry.  3.  EC 
either  in  refpcift  to  the  difpofition  of  the  law,   or  in  regard  to  a  fa6l  fential  and 
that  is  not  fuificiently  knovvn.      For  inftance,  it  would  be  an  error  sca-eatal. 
of  the  law,  were  a  prince  to  fuppofe  himfelf  intitltd  to  declare  war 
againfla  neighbouring  (Vate,  only  becanf^  it  infenfibly  increafes   in 
ftrength  and  power.     Sjch  was  likewife  the  error  fo  common  for- 
merly among  the  Greeks  and  Rom  in?,    that  it  was  allowable  fof 
parents  to   expofe  their  children.     *  On  the    contrary,  the  idea 
Abimelech  hid  of  Ssrah  the  wife  of  Abraham,  by  taking  her  for 
an  unm\rried  perfon,  was  an  error  of  the  fa6t. 

The  ignorance  a  perr()n  lies  under  through  his  own  fault,  or  an 
error  contracted  by  negleirt,  and  which  might  have  been  avoided 
by  ufng  all  poflîb'e  care  ?.ni  attention,  is  a  voluntary  ignorance,  or 
a  vincible  and  furmountable  error.  Thus  the  polytheifm  of  the 
Pagans  was  a  vincible  error  ;  for  they  had  only  to  make  a  right  ufe 
of  their  reafon,  in  order  to  be  convinced  that  there  was  no  necef- 
{ity  for  fuppofing  a  plurality  of  gods.  The  fame  may  be  f^^id  of  au 
opinion  edablirhrd  amoiig  mod  of  the  ancients,  that  [-iracy  was 
lawful  againft  thofe  with  whom  there  v.'as  no  treaty  fubfifting,  and 
that  it  was  allowable  to  confider  them  as  enemies.  Ignorance  is 
involuntary,  and  error  invincible,  when  they  are  fuch  as  could  nei- 
ther have  been  prevented  nor  removed,  even  by  all  the  care  and 

endeavours 

•  Sec  another  exanipU  in  S:,  Matthew,  chap.  xt.  4«  5, 


8  7he  Principles  of 

endeavours  that  are  morally  pofTible  ;  that  i?,  judging  of  there 
according  to  the  conftitution  cf  human  things,  and  of  common 
life.  Thus  the  ignorance  of  the  chriftian  religion,  under  which 
the  people  of  America  laboured,  before  they  had  any  communica- 
tion v.'ith  the  Europeans,  was  an  involuntary  and  invincible  igno- 
rance. 

In  fine,  we  underftand  by  aneffrntial  error,  that  whofe  obje£l 
is  fome  neceflary  circumftance  in  the  affair,  and  which  for  this  very 
reafon  has  a  direft  influence  on  the  action  done  in  coi.fequence 
thereof;  infomuch,  that  were  it  not  for  this  erroi^the  cc^ion  v/ouM 
never  have  been  done.  Hence  this  is  denominated  likewife  an 
efficacious  error.  By  neceflary  circumRances,  we  are  to  under- 
ftand  thofe  which  are  necefTarily  required,  either  by  the  very  nature 
of  the  thing,  or  by  the  intention  cf  the  agent,  formed  at  the  proper 
time,  and  made  known  by  fuitable  indications.  It  was  thus,  for 
inflance,  an  cflential  error  in  the  Trojans,  at  the  taking  of  their 
town,  to  (hoot  their  darts  againft  their  own  people,  miftakingthem 
lor  enemies,  becaufe  of  their  being  armed  after  the  Greek  manner. 
Again  ;  a  perfon  marries  another  man's  wife,  fuppcfing  her  to  be 
a  maid,  or  not  knowing  that  her  hufband  is  ftill  living  :  this  regards 
the  very  nature  of  the  thing,  and  is  ofcourfe  an  eflential  error. 

On  the  contrary,  accidental  error  is  that  which  has  no  neceflary 
connexion  of  itfelf  with  the  aff'^ir,  and  confequently  cannot  be  con- 
*  îîdered  as  the  realcaufe  of  the  a^Slion.     A    perfon  abufes  or  infults 

another,  taking  him  for  fomebody  elfe,  or  becaufe  he  fuppofes  the 
,  prince  is  dead,  as  it  had  been  groundlefly  reported,  &c.     Thefe  are 

errors  merely  accidental,  which  fubfilt  indeed  in  the  mind  of  the 
agent,  and  have  accompanied  him  in  the  a6lion,  but  cannot  be  con- 
fidcied  as  its  real  caufe. 

It  is  likewife  obfervable,  that  thefe  different  qualities  of  ignorance 
or  error  may  coticur,  and  be  found  united  in  the  fame  cafe.  It  is 
thus  an  error  of'h^  fact  maybe  citner  eflential  or  accidental  ;  and 
both  the  one  and  the  other  may  be  either  voluntary,  or  involuntary, 
vincible  or  invincible.  So  much  may  fuflice  for  what  regards  the 
underflanding.  Let  us  proceed  now  to  examine  into  the  other 
faculties  of  the  foul,  which  concur  alfo  to  the  produdlion  of  hucnaa 
actions. 

CHAP.    II. 

Continuation  oftht  principles  relative  to  the  nature  of  man,      O/wiU 
and  liberty» 
TÎ1C  Will.  I.   T 
What  hap-      JLt  was  not  fufficiçnt,  purfuanî   to  the  views  of  the  Creator, 

pineft  and  that 


NaturalLaw.  9 

that  the  human  mind  fhouldbe  pofTcfTed  of  the  faculty  of  know-  jco»^^  "»• 
ing  things,  and  of  forming  thereof  ideas  ;  it  was  likewife  requifite   ^ 
it  (houlii  be  endowed  with  an  adlive  principle  to  fet  it  in  motion, 
and   with  a  power  whereby  man,  after  knowing  the  objedls  that 
occur  to  him,  fhould  be  capable  of  determining  to  a£l  or  not  to  a6t, 
according  as  he  judges  proper.     This  faculty  is  what  we  call  the 

will. 

The  will  is  therefore  nothing  elfe  but  that  power  of  the  foul,  by 
which  it  is  determined  of  itfelf,  and  by  virtue  of  an  adive  principle 
inherent  in  its  nature,  to  feck  for  what  is  agreeable  to  it,  to  a<5l 
after  a  certain  manner,  and  to  do  or  to  omit  an  a6lion,  with  a  view 
of  happinefs. 

By  Happinefs  we  are  to  underftand  the  internal  fatisfa£lion  of  the 
mind,  arifing  from  the  poffefTion  of  good  :  and  by  good  whatever 
is  fuitable  or  agreeable  to  man  for  his  prefervation,  perfection, 
conveniencv,  or  pleafure.  The  idea  of  good  determines  that  of 
evil,  which,  in  its  moft  general  fignification,  implies  whatever  is 
oppofite  to  the  prefervation,  perfection,  conveniency,  or  pleafure 
of  man. 

II.  Inftindls,    inclinations,  and  paffions,    are  reducible  to  the  TnftirKSs, 
will.     Inftindts  are  fentiments  excited  in  the  foul  by  the  wants  of  '"dma 
the  body,  which  determine  it  to  provide  immediately  sgainfl:  them.  ^°^^^  ***  * 
Such  are  hunger,  thirff,  the  averfion  for  whatever  is  hurtful,  &c. 
The  inclinations  are  a  propenfity  of  the  will,  which  leads  it  rather 
towards  fome  forts  of  objeCls  than  others,  but  in  an  even  tranquil 
manner,  a  manner  fo  proportioned  to  all  its  operations,  that  inlfead 
of  obftru6ting  or  interrupting,  it  generally  facilitates  them.        As 
for  the  paillons,  they  are,  indeed,  in  the  fame  manner  as  the  inclina- 
tions, motions  of  the  will  towards  certain  obje<ft«,  but  motions  of 
a  more  impetuous  and  turbulent  kind,  motions  that  difpoflefs  the 
foul  of  its  natural  tranquility,  and  hinder  it  from  diredling  properly 
its  operations.     Then  it  is  that  the  paflions  become  moft  danger- 
ous diftempers.     The  caufeofthe  paffions  is,  generally,  the  allure- 
ment of  fome  fenfible  good,  which  folicits  the  foul,  and  impels  it 
with  too  violent  an  imprefîîon. 

It  is  eafy  to  conceive,  by  what  has  been  here  faid,  that  the  in- 
clinations, paflions,  and  inftinfts,  have  a  very  great  affinity  with 
one  another.  They  are  all  alike  propenlities  or  motions,  which 
have  frequently  the  fame  objc6ls  ;  but  there  is  this  difference  be- 
tween thefe  three  fpecies  of  motions,  that  inftinCls  are  necefTiirily 
the  fame  in  all  men,  by  a  natural  confequence  of  their  conltitution, 
and  of  the  union  between  the  body  and  the  foul  3  whereas  the  in- 

B  clinations 


X o  Tie  Principles  of 

clinations  and  pafiions,  particularly  confidcrcd,  have  nothing  recef- 
fary  in  their  nature,  and  are  furprifingly  different  in  different  men. 
Let  us  make  an  obfcrvation  here,  which  falls  in  very  naturally  : 
it  is  that  we  often  give  the  name  of  Heart  to  the  will,  con- 
fidcred  as  fufceptible  of  the  forementioned  motions  ;  and  the  reafcm 
of  this  in  all  probability  iç,  becaufe  thefe  motions  were  fuppofed  to 
have  their  feat  in  the  heart. 

Liberty  :         III.  Such  is  the  nature  of  the  foul,  that  the  will  not  only  a£ls 
in  what  ic   always  fpontaneoufly,  that  is,  of  its  own  proper  motion,  of  its  own 
accord,  and  by  an  internal  principle  ;  but  liktwife,  that  its  determi- 
nations are  generally  accompanied  with  liberty. 

We  give  the  name  of  liberty  to  that  force  or  power  of  the  foul, 
whereby  it  modifies  and  regulates  its  operations  as  itpleafes,  fo  as 
to  be  able  to  fufpend,  continue,  or  alter  its  deliberations  and  aérions  j 
in  a  word,  fo  as  to  be  capable  to  determine  and  aft  with  choice, 
according  as  it  thinks  proper.  It  is  by  this  excellent  faculty,  that 
man  has  a  kind  of  command  over  himfelfand  his  actions  :  and 
as  he  is  hereby  rendered  alfo  capable  of  conforming  to  rule,  and 
anfwerable  for  his  condudl:,  it  is  therefore  neceffary  to  give  a  further 
explication  of  the  nature  of  this  faculty. 

Will  and  Hberty  being  faculties  of  the  foul,  they  cannot  be  blind 
or  deftitute  of  knowledge;  but  necel]arily  fuppofe  the  operation 
of  theunderfîanding.  Howisitpoflibleinfa£tto  determine,  fufpend, 
or  alter  our  refolutions,  unlefs  we  know  what  is  proper  for  us  to 
chufe  ?  It  is  contrary  to  the  nature  ofsn  intelligent  and  rational  being 
to  aft  without  intelleftion  and  reafon.  This  reafon  may  be  either 
fuperficial  or  bad  ;  yet  it  has  fome  appearance  at  leaft,  feme  glim- 
mering, that  makes  us  give  it  a  momentary  approbation.  Wher- 
ever thete  is  eieftion  or  choice,  thtre  mult  be  a  comparifcn  ;  and 
a  comparifon  implies  at  leaff  a  confufed  reiîeftion,  a  kind  of  delib- 
eration^ though  of  a  quick  and  almoft  imperceptible  nature,  on  the 
fubjeft  before  us. 

The  end  of  cur  deliberations  is  to  procure  us  fome  advantage. 
For  the  will  tends  generally  towards  good,  that  is,  towhatfoever  is 
really  or  apparently  proper  for  rendering  us  happy  ;  infomuch,  that 
ail  aftions  depending  on  man,  and  that  are  any  way  relative  to  his 
end,  are  for  this  very  reafon  fubjeft  to  the  will.  And  as  truth,  or 
the  kriowledge  of  thing?,  is  agreeable  toman  ;  and  in  this  fignifica- 
tion  truth  is  alfo  a  good,  it  follows  therefore  that  truth  forms  one 
of  the  principal  objefts  of  the  will. 

Liberty,  like  the  will,  has  goodnefs  and  truth  for  its  objeft  ;  but 
it  has  lefs  extent  with  reaard  to  aftionsi  for  it  does  not  exercifc 

itfelf 


NaturalLaw.  h 

îtfelf  in  all  the  a(£ls  of  the  will,  but  only  in  thofc  which  the  foul  has 
a  power  of  lufpending  or  altering  as  fhe  pleafes. 

IV.  Bat  if  any  one  (hould  inquire  which  are  thofe  afts  wherein  yfg  ©f  Jib- 
liberty  difplays  itfelf?  We  anfwer,  that  they  are  eafily  known,  by  crty  in  our 
attending  to  what  paffes  within  us,  and  to  the  manner  in  which  ju'lgment» 
the  mind  conduis  itfelf  in  the   feveral  cafes  that  daily  occur:  as,  '°  '^^^Pf^ 
in  the  firlt   place,  in  our  judgments   concerning  true  and  falfe  j 
fecondly,  in  our  determinations    in    relation  to  good  and    evil  ; 
and  finally,  in  indifferent  matters.     Thefe  particulars  are  necefTary, 
in  order  to   be  acquainted  with    the   nature,  ufe,   and  extent  of 
liberty. 

With  regard  to  truth,  we  are  formed  in  fuch  a  manner,  that  fo 
Coon  as  evidence  ftrilces  the  mind,  we  are  no  longer  at  liberty  to 
fufpend  our  judgment.  Vain  would  be  the  attempt  to  reflft  this 
fparlcling  light  ;  it  abfolurely  forces  our  aiïent.  Who,  for  exam- 
ple, could  pretend  to  deny  that  the  whole  is  greater  than  its  part, 
or  that  harmony  and  peace  are  preferable,  either  in  a  family  or  Itate, 
to  difcord,  tumults,  and  war  ? 

The  fame  cannot  be  affirmed  in  regard  to  things  that  have  left 
perfpicuity  and  evidence  ;  for  in  thefe  the  ufe  of  liberty  difplays  itfelf 
in  its  full  extent.  It  is  true  our  mind  inclines  naturally  to  that 
fide  which  feems  the  mod  probable  ;  but  this  does  not  debar  it  from 
fufpending  its  affent,  in  order  to  feelc  for  new  proofs,  or  to  refer  the 
whole  inquiry  to  another  opportunity.  The  obfcurer  things  are, 
the  more  we  are  at  liberty  to  hefitate,  to  fufpend,  or  defer  our  de- 
termination. This  is  a  point  fufficiently  evinced  by  experience. 
Every  day,  and  at  every  ftep,  as  it  were,  difputes  arife,  in  which 
the  arguments  on  both  fides  leave  us,  by  reafon  of  our  limited  capac- 
ity,in  a  kind  of  doubt  and  equilibrium,  which  permits  us  to  fufpend  our 
judgment,  to  examine  the  thing  anew,  and  to  incline  the  balance  at 
length  to  one  fide  more  than  the  other.  We  find,  for  example, 
that  the  mind  can  hefitate  a  long  time,  and  forbear  determining 
itfelf,  even  after  a  mature  inquiry,  in  refpsél  to  the  following  . 
queftions  ;  Whether  an  oath  extorted  by  violence  is  obligatory  ? 
Whether  the  murder  of  Cïefar  was  lawful  ?  Whether  the  Roman 
fenate  could  with  juftice  refufe  to  confirm  the  promife  made  by  the 
Confuls  to  the  Samnites,  in  order  to  extricate  themfelves  from  the 
Caudine  Forks  ;  or  whether  they  ought  to  have  ratified  and  givea 
it  the  force  of  a  public  treaty  ?  &c. 

V.  Though  there  is  no  exercife  of  liberty  in  our  judgment,  Lltierfy 
when  things  prefect  themfelves  to  us  in  a  clear  and  diftind  manner  ;  his  its  ci- 

m 


1 2  T^he  Principles  of 

ercife,  fliU  we  mufl  not  imagine  that  the  intire  ufe  of  this  faculty  ceafes 
even  in  re-  jn  rtrrpe6l  to  things  that  are  evident.  \Fcr  in  the  firfl  place,  it  is 
thinçr^  that  î^'ways  in  our  power  to  apply  our  minds  to  the  confideration  of 
are  evident,  thofe  things,  or  elfc  to  divert  them  from  thence,  by  transfering 
fouiewhere  elfe  our  attention.  This  firft  determination  of  the  will, 
by  which  it  is  led  to  confider  or  not  to  confider  the  objedls  that 
occur  to  us,  merits  particular  notice,  becaufe  of  the  natural  influ- 
ence it  mud  have  on  the  very  determination,  by  which  we  conclude 
to  acl  or  not  to  a6t^,  in  confequcnce  of  our  refletSlion  and  judgment. 
Secondly,  we  have  it  likewife  incur  power  to  create,  as  it  were, 
evidence  in  fome  cafes,  by  dint  of  attention,  and  inquiry  ;  whereas 
at  firft  fetting  out,  we  had  only  fome  glimmerings,  infufBcient  to 
give  us  an  adequate  knowledge  of  the  ftate  of  things.  In  fine,  whea 
we  have  attained  this  evidence,  we  are  ftill  at  liberty  to  dwell  more 
or  lefs  on  the  confideration  thereof;  which  is  alfo  of  great  confe- 
qucnce, becaufe  on  this  depends  its  greater  or  leffer  degree  of  im- 
preffion. 

Thefe  remarks  lead  us  to  an  important  reflection  which  may 
Objection,  fej-ve  for  anfwer  to  an  obje6\ion  raifed  againft  liberty.  '^  It  is  not 
*'  in  our  power  (fay  they)  to  perceive  things  otherwife  than  as  they 
"  offer  themfelves  to  our  mind;  now  our  judgments  are  formed 
"  on  this  perception  of  things  ;  and  it  is  by  thefe  judgments  that 
"  the  will  is  dfjtermi ned  ;  the  whole  is  therefore  neceflary  and  inde-» 
"  pendent  of  liberty." 
Anfwer.  ^^'^  t^'s  difficulty  carries  little  more  with  it  than  an  empty 
appearance.  Let  people  fay  what  they  will,  we  are  always  at 
liberty  to  open  or  to  fliut  our  eyes  to  the  light  ;  to  exert,  or  relax 
our  attention.  Experience  (hews,  that  when  we  view  an  objei5l  in 
different  lights,  and  determine  to  fearch  into  the  bottom  of  matters, 
we  defcry  feveral  things  that  efcaped  us  at  firft  fight.  This  is 
fufficient  to  prove  that  there  is  an  exercife  of  liberty  in  the  opera- 
tions of  the  underftanding,  as  well  as  in  the  feveral  acftions  thereon 
depending. 

Ufe  of  lib-      ^^'  "^^^  fécond  queftion  we  have  to  examine,  is  whether  we 
erty    with  ate  equally  free  in  our  determinations  in  regard  to  good  and  evil, 
regard    to        To  decide  this  point,  we  need  notftir  out  of  ourfelvss  ;  for  here 
good    and  ^jf^j  {^y  fjif^c^  2lvA.  even  by  our  internal    experience,  the   queftion 
*'*'  may  be    determined.     Certain  it    is   that  in  refpecl    to  good  and 

evil  confidered  in  general,  and  as  fuch,  we  cannot,  properly  fpeak- 
ino;,  exercife  our  liberty,  by  reafon  that  we  feci  ourfelves  drawn  to- 
wards the  one  by  an  invincible  propenfity,  and  cftranged  from  the 
Other  by  a  natural  and  infuperable  averfion.     Thus  it   has  been 

ordered 


NaturalLaw.  j3 

ordered  by  the  Authoi  or  our  being,  whilft  man  has  no  power  in 
this  refpech  to  change  his  nature.  We  are  formed  in  fuch  a  man- 
ner, that  good  of  neccflity  allures  us  -,  whereas  evil,  by  an  oppofite 
efFcift,  repels  us,  as  it  were,  and  deters  us  from  attempting  to 
purfue  it. 

But  this  ftrong  tendency  to  good,  and  natural  averfion  to  evil 
in  general,  does  not  debar  us  from  being  perfedlly  free  in  refpetl 
to  good  and  evil  particularly  confidered  ;  and  though  v/e  cannon 
help  being  fenfible  of  the  firft  impreflions  which  the  objedls  make 
on  us,  yet  this  does  not  invincibly  determine  us  to  purfue  orfhua 
thofe  obje(5ls.  Let  the  moll  beautiful  and  moft  fragrant  fruit, 
replenifhsd  with  exquifite  and  delicious  juice,  be  unexpeitedly  fet 
before  a  perfon  opprefTed  with  thirfl  and  heat  ;  he  will  find  him- 
felfinftantly  inclined  to  feize  on  the  blcffing  offered  to  him,  and  to 
eale  his  inquietude  by  a  falutiryrefre.lim^nt.  But  he  can  alfo  ftop, 
and  fufpend  his  acftion,  in  order  to  examine  whether  the  good  he 
propoles  to  himfelf,  by  eating  this  fruit,  v.'ill  not  be  attended  with 
evil  ;  in  fhort,  he  is  at  liberty  to  weigh  and  deliberate,  in  order  to 
embrace  the  fafeft  fide  of  the  queflion.  Befides,  we  are  not  only 
capable,  with  the  aflittance  of  reafon,  to  deprive  ourfelves  of  a  thing, 
whofe  flattering  idea  invites  us  ;  but  moreover  we  are  able  to  expole 
ourfelves  to  a  chagrin  or  pain,  which  we  dread  and  would  willingly 
avoid,  were  we  not  induced  by  fuperior  conuderations  tofupport  it. 
Can  any  one  deiire  a  ftronger  proof  of  liberty  ? 

Vir,  True  it  is  notwithftanding,  that  the  exercife  of  this  faculty  -v^rj^ji     ^e- 
nsv^r  difplays  itfelf  more  than  in  indifferent  things.     I  find,  for  in-  gard  to  ia- 
ftance,  ihu  it  depends  intirely  on  myfelf  to  fi retch  out  or  draw  back  diff<-'reRt 
my  hand  ;  to  fit  down  or  to  walk;  to  dire6l  my  fteps  to  the  right  ^^'"S^* 
or  left,  &c.     On  thefe  occafions,  where  the  foul  is  left  intirely  to 
iifelf,  either  for  want  of  external  motives,  or  by  reafon  of  the  oppo- 
ficion,  and,  as  it  were,  the  equilibrium  of  thefe  motives,  if  it  deter- 
mines on  one  fide,  this  may  be  faid  to  be  the  pure  effe£l    of  its 
pleafure  and  good  will,   and  of  the  command  it  has  over  its  own 
allions, 

VIII.  Let  us  ftop  here  a  while  to  inquire,  how  comes  it  that  ^^r,  ^j.^ 
the  exercife  of  this  power  is  limited  to  particular  goods  and  non-  exercife  of 
evident  truths,  without  extending  itfelf  to  good  in  genera!,  or  to  liberty  is 
fuch  truths  as  are  perfe6tly  clear.  Should  we  happen  to  difcover  «"eil^inerl 
the  reafon  thereof,  it  will  furnirti  us  with  a  new  fubje6l  to  admire  ^^  "f°","th'" 
the  wifdom  of  the  Creator  in  the  conflitution  of  man,  and  with  a  and  partic* 

means  u!ar  goods. 


i^  T'h  Principles*?/' 

means  at  the  fame  time  of  being  better  acquainted  with  the  end 
and  true  ufe  of  liberty. 

And  flrft  we  hope  there  is  nobody  but  will  admit,  that  the  end 
of  God  in  creating  man  was  to  render  him  happy.  Upon  this 
fuppofition,  it  will  be  fooii  agreed,  that  man  cannot  attain  to  hap- 
pinefs  any  other  way  than  by  the  knowledge  of  truth,  and  by  the 
pofTeflion  ofreal  good.  This  is  evidently  the  refult  of  the  notions 
above  given  of  good  and  happinefs.  Let  us  therefore  diredl  our 
refledlions  towards  this  profpedt.  When  things,  that  are  the 
obje£l  of  our  refearches,  prefent  themfelves  to  our  minds  with  a 
feeble  light,  and  are  not  accompanied  with  that  fplendor  and 
clearnefs,  which  enables  us  to  know  them  perfe<5tly,  and  to  judge 
of  them  with  full  certainty  ;  it  is  proper  and  even  neceHary  for 
us  to  be  inverted  with  a  power  of  fufpending  our  judgment  ;  to 
the  end  that  being  neceflarily  determined  to  acquiefce  in  the  firft 
impreflion,  we  fliould  be  ftillat  liberty  to  carry  on  our  inquiry, 
till  we  arrive  to  a  higher  degree  of  certainty,  and  if  pofîible,  as 
far  as  evidence  itfelf.  Were  not  this  the  cafe,  we  fhould  be  ex- 
pofed  every  moment  to  error,  withour  any  pofTibility  of  being 
undeceived.  It  was  therefore  extremely  ufeful  and  neccflary  to 
man,  that  under  fuch  circumftances  he  fliould  have  the  ufe  and 
exercife  of  his  liberty. 

But  when  we  happen  to  have  a  clear  and  diflin£l  view  of  things 
und  their  relations,  that  is,  when  evidence  ftrikes  us,  it  would  be 
of  nom.^nner  of  fignification  to  have  the  ufe  of  liberty,  in  order 
to  fufpend  our  judgment.  For  certainty  being  then  in  its  very 
higheit degree,  what  benefit  fhould  we  reap  by  a  new  examen  or 
inquiry,  were  it  in  our  power  ?  We  have  no  longer  occafion  to 
confult  a  guide,  when  we  fee  diflinftly  the  end  we  are  tending  to, 
and  the  road  we  are  to  take.  It  is  therefore  an  advantage  to  man 
to  be  unable  to  refufe  his  alTent  to  evidence. 

IX.  Let  us  reafon  pretty  near  in  the  fame  manner  on  the  ufe 
of  liberty  with  refpe£l  to  good  and  evil.  Man  defigned  for  hap- 
pinefs, (hould  certainly  have  been  formed  in  fuch  a  njanner,  as  to 
find  himfelf  under  an  abfolutc  necelTity  of  defiring  and  purfuing 
good,  and  offliunningon  the  contrary  evil  in  general.  Were  the 
nature  of  thefe  faculties  fuch,  as  to  leave  him  in  a  ftate  of  indiffer- 
ence, fo  as  to  be  at  liberty  in  this  refpeél  to  fufpend  or  alter  his 
defires,  plain  it  is,  that  this  would  be  efleemed  a  very  great  im- 
perfe£lion  in  him  ;  an  imperfeâion  that  would  imply  a  want  of 
wifdom  in  the  Author  of  his  being,  as  a  thing  diredtly  oppofite  to 
the  end  he  propofed  in  giving  him  life. 

No  lefsan  inconveniency  would  it  be  on  the  other  hand,  were 

the 


Natu r al  L hvr,  t5 

the  neceflîty  which  man  is  under  of  purfuing  good  and  avoiding 
evil  to  be  fuch  as  would  infuperably  determine  him  to  a<Sl  or  not 
to  a6l,  in  confequence  of  the  impreflions  made  on  him  by  each 
objedl.  Such  is  the  (tate  of  human  things,  that  we  are  frequent- 
ly deceived  by  appearances  j  it  is  very  rare  that  good  or  evil  pre- 
fents  itfelf  to  us  pure  and  without  mixture  ;  but  there  isalmoft 
always  a  favourable  and  adverfe  fide,  an  inconveniency  mixtwith. 
utility.  In  order  to  aft  therefore  with  fafety,  and  not  to  be  mif- 
taken  in  our  account,  it  is  generally  incumbent  upon  us  to  fufpend 
our  firft  tmotions,  to  examine  more  clofely  into  things,  to  make 
diftindions,  calculations,  and  compenfations  ;  all  which  require 
the  ufe  of  liberty.  Liberty  is  therefore,  as  it  were,  a  fubfidiary 
faculty,  which  fupplies  the  deficiencies  of  the  other  powers,  and 
whofe  office  ceafeth  as  foon  as  it  has  redrelTed  them. 

Hence  let  us  conclude,  that  man  is  provided  with  all  the  necef- 
fary  means  for  attaining  to  the  end  for  which  he  is  defigned  ;  and 
that  in  this,  as  in  every  other  refpeft,  the  Creator  has  aded  with 
wonderful  vvifdora. 

X.  After  what  has  been  faid  concerning  the  nature,  operations,  ^^  liberty 
and  ufe  of  liberty,  itmayfeem  perhaps  unnecefTary  to  attempt  here  drawn 
to  prove  that  man  is  indeed  a  free  agent,  and  that  we  are  as  really  from  our 
inverted  with  this  as  with  any  other  faculty.  J."*^   .  ^._ 

Neverthclefs,  as  it  is  an  efTential  principle,  and  oneof  thefunda-  pg^jor  to* 
mental  fupports  of  our  edifice,  it  is  proper  to  make  the  reader  fen-  any  other. 
Able  of  the  indubitable  proof  with  which  we  are  furnifhed  by  daily 
experience.  Let  us  therefore  confult  only  ourfelves.  Every  one 
finds  that  he  is  mafter,  for  inftance,  to  walk  or  fit,  to  fpeak,  or 
hold  his  tongue.  Do  not  we  alfo  experience  continually,  that  it 
depends  intirely  on  ourfelves  to  fufpend  our  judgment,  in  order  to 
proceed  to  a  new  inquiry  ?  Can  any  one  ferioufly  deny,  that  in  the 
choice  of  good  and  evil  our  refolutions  are  unconfirained  j  that, 
notwithftanding  the  firft  impreffion,  we  have  it  in  our  power  to 
ftop  of  a  fudden,  to  weigh  the  arguments  on  both  fides,  and  to  do, 
in  fhort,  whatever  can  be  expected  from  the  freeft  agent  ?  Were 
I  invincibly  drawn  towards  one  particular  good  rather  than  an- 
other, I  fliould  feel  then  the  fame  impreffion  as  that  which  inclines 
me  to  good  in  general,  that  is,  an  imprefllon  that  would  neceflarily 
drag  mc  along,  an  impreffion  which  there  would  be  no  pofiibility 
of  refiiting.  Now  experience  makes  me  feel  no  fuch  violence 
with  refpedl  to  any  particular  good.  I  find  I  can  abftain  from 
it  ;  I  can  defer  ufing  it  ;  I  can  prefer  fomething  elfe  to  it  ;  I  can 
hefitate  in  my  choice  ;  in  (hort,  I  am  my  own  mafter  to  chufe, 
or,  which  is  the  fame  thing,  1  am/r<r. 

Should 


1 6  T/je  Principles  0/ 

Should  we  be  afked,  how  comes  it,  that  not  being  free  in  refpecîl  to 
good  in  general,  yet  we  are  at  liberty  with  regard  to  particular 
goods  ?  My  anfvver  is,  that  the  natural  defire  of  happinefs  does 
not  infuperably  draw  us  towards  any  particular  good,  becaufe 
no  particular  good  includes  that  happinefs  for  which  we  have  a 
neceflary  inclination. 

Senfible  proofs,  like  thefe,  are  fuperior  to  all  objeftion,  and  pro- 
du6live  of  the  moft  inward  convijSlion,  by  reafon  it  is  impofTible, 
that  when  the  foul  is  modified  after  a  certain  manner,  it  fhould  not 
feel  this  modification,  and  the  ftate  which  confequently  attends  it» 
What  other  certainty  have  we  of  our  exiftence  ?  And  how  is  it 
ve  know  that  we  think,  we  adt,  but  by  cur  inward  fenfe  ? 

This  fcnfe  of  liberty  is  fo  much  the  lefs  equivocal,  as  it  is  not 
momentary  or  tranfient  :  It  is  a  fenfe  that  never  leaves  us,  and  of 
\vhich  we  have  a  daily  and  continual  experience. 

Thus  we  fee  there  is  nothing  better  eftablifhed  in  life,  than  the 
ilrong  perfuafion  which  all  mankind  have  of  liberty.  Let  us  con- 
sider the  fyftem  of  humanity,  either  in  general  or  particular,  we 
fhall  find  that  the  whole  is  built  upon  this  principle.  ReflecSlions, 
deliberations,  refearches,  a6lions,judgm.ents  ;  all  fuppofe  the  ufe  of 
liberty.  Hence  the  ideas  of  gOod  and  evil,  of  vice  and  virtue  : 
hence,  as  a  natural  confeqnence,  arifes  praife  or  blame,  the  cenfure 
or  approbation  of  our  own,  or  other  people's  condué^.  The  fi;me 
may  be  faid  of  the  afFeiStions  and  natural  fentiments  oi  men  towards 
one  another,  as  friendfhip,  benevolence,  gratitude,  hatred,  anger, 
complaints,  and  reproaches  :  none  of  thefe  fentiments  could  take 
place,  unlefs  we  were  to  admit  of  liberty.  In  fine,  as  this  preroga- 
tive is  in  fome  meafure  the  key  of  the  human  fyftem,  he  that  does 
not  allow  it  to  man,  fubverts  all  order,  and  introduces  a  general 
confufion. 

XL  It  is  natural  here  to  inquire,  how  it  was  ever  pofTible  for 
any  body  ferioufly  to  doubt,  whether  man  ismafter  of  his  aâions, 
thaTuberty  whether  he  is  free  ?  I  (hould  be  lefs  furprized  at  this  doubt,  v^ere  it 
has  been  Concerning  a  ftrange  or  remote  faft,  a  fa6l  that  was  not  tranfa£led 
toiucflcd.  vvithin  ouifclves.  But  the  queftion  is  in  regard  to  a  thing,  of  which 
we  have  an  internal  immediate  feeling,  a  confiant  and  daily  experi- 
ence. Strange,  that  any  one  fhould  call  in  queftion  a  faculty  of 
the  foul  !  may  not  we  as  v/ell  doubt  of  the  vmderftanding  and  will, 
as  of  the  liberty  of  man  ?  For  if  we  are  content  to  abide  by  our  in- 
ward fenfe,  there  is  no  more  room  to  difpute  of  one  than  of  the 
other.    But  fome  too  fubtle  philofophers,  by  confidering  this  fubjeél 

in 


comes    it 


Natural    Law.  î/ 

in  a  metaphyfical  light,  have  ftript  it,  as  it  were,  of  its  nature  ;  and 
finding  thsmf^lves  at  a  lofs  to  folve  a  few  difficulties,  they  have 
given  a  greater  attention  to  thefe  difficulties  .than  to  the  pofitive 
proofsof  the  thing;  which  infenfibly  led  them  to  imagine  that  the 
notion  of  liberty  was  all  an  iljullon.  I  own  it  is  neceflaiy,  in  the 
refearch  of  truth,  to  confider  an  objeft  on  every  fide,  and  to  balance 
equally  the  arguments  for  and  ngainft  ;  neverthelefs  we  nnuft  take 
care  we  do  not  give  to  thofe  objedions  more  than  their  real  weight. 
We  are  informed  by  experience,  that  in  feveral  things  v/hich  in 
fefpefltous  are  invefled  with  the  higheft  degree  of  certainty,  there 
are  many  difficulties  notwithfi:anding,  which  we  are  incapable  of 
refolving  toour  fatisfaftion  :  and  this  is  a  natural  confequence  of 
the  limits  of  the  mind.  Let  us  conclude  therefore  from  hence, 
that  when  a  truth  is  fufficiently  evinced  by  folid  reafons,  whatever 
can  be  objeéîed  again'l  it,  ought  not  to  ftagger  or  weaken  our 
conviâion,  as  long  as  they  are  fuch  difficulties  only  as  embarrafs  or 
puzzle  the  mind,  without  invalidating  the  proofs  themfelves.  This 
rule  is  fo  very  ufeful  i n  the  ftudy  of  the  fciences,  that  one  fhould  keep  it 
always  in  fight  *.     Let  us  refume  now  the  thread  of  our  refledions. 

XIL  The  denomination  of  voluntary  or  human  allions  in  gene-  -Adions 
ral  is  given  to  all  thofe  that  depend  on  the  will  ;  and  that  of  free,  to  ^''^'^ol""' 
fuch  as  come  within  the  jurifdiif^ion  of  liberty,  which  the  foul  can  invllunta- 
fufpend  or  turn  as  it  pleafes.     The  oppofite  of  voluntary  is  invclun-  ry  ;  free, 
tary  ;  and  the  contrary  ot  free  is  neceflary,  or  whatever  is  done  by  neceffary, 
force  or  conftraint.      All  human  adions  are  voluntary,   inafmuch  ^"'^.  '^°^' 
as  there  are  none  but  what  proceed   from  ourfelves,  and  of  which       ^ 
we  are  the;  authors.     But  if  violence,  uled   by   an  external  force, 
V/hich  we  are  incapable  to  refift,  hinders  us  from  adin^,  or  makes 
us  a6t  without  the  confent  of  our  will  ;  as   when  a  perfon  Wronger 
than  ourfelves  lays  hold  of  our  arm  to  ftrike   or   wound  another 
perfon,  the  a6lion  refulting  from  thence  being  involuntary,  is  not 
properly  fpeaking,  our  deed  or  aélion,  but  that  of  the  agent  from 
whom  we  fufFer  this  violence. 

C  The 


*  Tôfjre  is  a  luide  difference  beliveen  feeii9  that  a  thing  it  abfurd,  and  net  tnotw 
iitg  all  that  regards  it  ;  betixieeti  an  unanf-werable  qucftion  in  relation  to  a  truth,  and 
an  unanf-werabh  objeBion  agaioji  it;  though  a  great  many  confound  thefe  tiuo  forts  of 
difficulties.  7hofe  only  of  the  latter  order  art  able  to  prove,  that  ivhat  tvas  taL^n  for 
a  htou-n  tru'.h  cannot  be  true,  becaufe  otberivife  fame  abfurdity  mufl  enfue.  But  the 
ethers  prove  nothing  bift  the  ignorance  ive  are  under  in  relation  to  fcv.ral  thirys  that 
regard   a  kno-A-n  truth.     BLb'.ioth,  Raifon.     Tom.  7.  p.  346.  * 


1 8  I'he  Principles  of 


The  fame  cannot  be  faid  of  aérions  thai  are  forced  and  conflraln- 
ed,  only  as  v/e  are  determined  lo  co.nmit  them,  through  fear  of  a 
great  and  immiiient. evil  with  which  we  are  menaced  :  as  for  in- 
itance,  were  an  unjult  and  cruel  prince  to  oblige  a  judge  to  con- 
demn an  innocent  perfon,  by  menacing  to  put  him  to  death  if  he  did 
jiot  obey  his  orders.  Adlions  of  this  fnrt,  though  forced  in  fomc 
kvX'i^  becaufe  we  commit  them  with  reludlancy,  and  would  never 
confent  to  them  were  it  not  fora  very  prcffing  neceffity  ;  fuch  ac- 
tions, I  fay,  are  ranked  neverthelefs  among  the  number  of  voluntary 
aiStions,  becaufe,  after  all,  they  are  produced  by  a  deliberation  of  the 
will,  which  chufes  betweeh  two  inevitable  evil?,  and  determines  to 
prefer  the  leaft  to  the  greatell.  This  will  become  more  intelligi- 
ble by  a  few  examples. 

A  perfon  gives  alms  to  a  poor  man,  who  expofes  his  wants  and 
mifery  to  him  ;  this  allien  is  at  the  fame  time  both  voluntary  and 
free.  But  fuppofe  a  man  that  travels  alone  and  unarmed,  falls  into 
the  hands  of  robber*,  and  that  thefe  mifcreants  menace  him  with 
inftant  death,  unlefs  he  gives  them  all  he  has  ;  the  furrender  which 
this  traveller  makes  of  his  money  in  order  to  fave  his  life,  is  indeed  a 
voluntary  aiStion,  but  conftrained  at  the  fame  time,  and  void  of  lib- 
erty. For  which  reafon there  are  fome  that  diftinguifh  thefe  a£lions 
by  the  name  of  mixt,  *  as  partaking  of  the  voluntary  and  involun- 
tary. They  are  voluntary,  by  reafon  the  principle  that  produces 
them  is  in  the  agent  itfelf,  and  the  will  determines  to  commit  thetn 
as  the  leafl:  of  two  evils  :  but  they  partake  of  the  involuntary,  becaufe 
the  will  execute"?  them  contrary  to  its  inclination,  which  it  would 
nf'vcr  (',0,  could  it  find  any  ether  expedient  to  clear  iifeU"  of  the 
dilemma. 

Another  necefTary  elucidation  is,  that  we  are  to  fuppofe  that  the 
evil  with  which  we  are  menaced  is  confiderable  enough  to  make  a 
reafonabic  impreffion  upon  a  prudent  or  wife  man,  fo  far  as  to  in- 
timidate him  ;  and  beiides  th^t,  the  perfon  who  compels  us  has  no 
risiht  to  reftiain  our  liberty  ;  infomuch  that  we  ào  not  lie  underan 
obligation  of  bearing  with  any  hardfliip  or  inconveniency,  rather 
than  difpleafc  him.  Under  thefe  circumftances,  reafon  would  have 
us  determine  to  fufter  the  lefî'cr  evil,  fuppofing  at  leaft  that  they  are 
bothinevitable.  This  kind  of  conftraint  lay;  us  under  what  is  called 
a  moral  neceffity  ;  whereas,  when  we  are  abfilutely  compelled  toa<Sl 
without  being  able,  in  sny  (hape  whatfoever,  to  avoid  it,  this  is 
termed  a  phyfical  neceffity. 

It  is  therefore  a  neceflary  point  of  philofophical  exa6inefs  todiij- 

tinguifh 


*  %zç.  l'affciidorf  on  tlic  law  of  iniure  and  nation5>  book  i.  chap.  iv.  §  9. 


NaturalLaw.  îç 

tinguifli  between  voluntary  and  free.  In  Tacfl,  it  is  eafy  to  com- 
prehend, by  what  has  been  now  faid,  that  all  free  aiStions  are  indeed 
voluntary,  but  all  voluntary  aiftons  are  not  free.  Neverthelefs, 
the  common  and  vulgar  way  of  rpeakin^i;  frequently  confounds  thoie 
two  terms,  of  which  we  ought  to  take  particular  notice,  in  order  to 
avoid  all  ambiguity. 

We  give  likewife  the  name  of  manners  fometimes  to  free  actions, 
inafmuch  as  the  mind  confidersthem  asfufceptibleof  rule.  Hence, 
we  call  morality  the  art  which  teaches' the  rules  of  conduct,  and 
the  method  of  conforming  our  allions  to  thcfe  rules. 

XIII.  We  fliiU  finiih  what  relates  to  the  faculties  of  the  foul 
by  fome  remarks,  which  will  help  us  to  underltand  betttr  iheir  na- 
ture and  ufe. 

I.  Our  faculties  afîîfl  one  another  in  their  operations,  and  when  Our  faml- 
they  are  all  united  in  the  fame  fubjc£l,  they   adl  always  jointly.  "'^*  /^"^'P 
We  have  already  obferved  that  the  will  luppoRs  the  underllanding,  ^^  recipro- 
and  that  the  light  of  reafon  ferves  for  a  guide  to  liberty.     Thus  the  cally. 
imderflanding,  the  will,  and  liberty  ;   the  fenfcs,  the  imagination, 
and  memory  ;  the  inflinfls,  inclinations,  and  pafRons  ;  arc  like  fo 
many  different  fprings,  -which  concur  all  to  produce  a  particular 
effedl  ;  and  it  is  by  this  united  concurrence  we  attain  at  length  to 
the  knowledge  of  truth,  and  the  pofTefHon  of  folid  good,  on  which 
our  perfc(5lion  and  happinefs  depends. 

XIV.  2.  But  in  order  to  procure  to  ourfelves  thofe  advantage?,  Ofrcafon 
it  is  not  only  necellary  that  our  faculties  be  well  conftituted  in  ^nd  virtus, 
themfelves,  but  moreover  we  ought  to  make  a  good  ufe  of  them, 

and  maintain  the  natural  fubordination  there  is  betv/een  them,  and 
the  différent  motions  which  lead  us  towards,  or  divert  us  from, 
certain  obj eels.  It  is  not  therefore  fufEcientto  know  the  common 
and  natural  ftate  o  f  our  faculties,  we  (hould  likewife  be  acquainted 
with  their  ftate  of  perfeftion,  and  know  in  what  their  real  ufe 
confifts.  Now  truth  being,  as  we  have  leen,  the  proper  objeft  of 
the  underftanding,  the  perfection  of  this  faculty  is  to  have  a  difiinil 
knowledge  of  truth  ;  at  leaft  of  thofe  important  truths,  which  con- 
cern our  duty  and  happinefs.  For  fuch  a  purpofe,  this  faculty 
lîîould  be  formed  to  a  clofe  attention,  ajuft  difcernment,  and 
folid  reafoning.  The  underftanding  thus  perfected,  and  confidered 
as  having  aftually  the  principles  which  enable  us  to  know  and  to 
diftinguilli  the  true  and  the  ufeful,  is  what  is  properly  called  reafon  j 
and  hence  it  is  that  we  are  apt  to  fpeak  of  reafon  as  of  a  light  of  the 

mindj 


20  I'he  Principles^ 

mind,  and  as  of  a  rule  by  which  we  ought  always  to  be  direcfled  in 
our  judgments  and  aclions. 

If  we  confid-T  in  lilce  manner  the  will  in  it?  (late  of  perfedion, 
ve  (ball  find  it  confifts  in  the  force  and  habit  of  determining  always 
right,  that  is,  not  to  dehreany  thing  but  what  reafon  diètates,  and 
not  to  make  ufe  of  our  liberty  but  in  order  to  chufe  the  heft.  This 
fage  direction  of  the  will  is  properly  called  Virtue,  and  fometimes 
goes  by  the  name  of  Rcafon.  And  as  the  perfedtion  of  the  foul 
depends  on  the  mutual  fuccours  which  the  faculties  confidered  in 
their  moft  perfect  ftate,  lend  to  one  another  ;  we  underfland  like- 
wife  fometi  -ne?  by  reafon,  taken  in  a  more  vague,  and  more  exten- 
five  ff  nfe,  the  foul  itfelf  ccnfidc-rcd  with  all  its  faculties,  and  as  mak- 
ing a£lual!y  a  good  ufe  of  them.  Thus  the  term  r/?^«  carries 
with  it  always  an  idea  of  perfection,  which  is  fometimes  applied  to 
the  foul  in  general,  and  at  other  times  to  fome  of  the  faculties  in 
particular. 

Caufes  of  X^".  3.  The  facultieç,  of  which  we  are  treating,  are  common  to 
the  diver-  all  mankmd  ;  but  they  are,not  found  always  in  the  fame  degree,  nei- 
fjiy  we  ob-  (-^gr  are  they  determined  after  the  fame  manner,  Befidcs-,  they  have 
cl'-i'd 'dl ' of  ^^^^^  periods  in  every  man  ;  that  is,  their  increafe,  perftdtion,  in- 
Bjen.  fc'jbling,  and  decay,  in  the  fame  manner  almoft  as  the  organs  of 

the  body.  They  vary  likevvife  exceedingly  in  different  men  ; 
one  has  a  brighter  underftanding  ;  another  a  quicker  fenfation  ; 
this  man  has  a  flrong  imagination  ;  while  another  is  fwayed  by 
violent  pniTions.  And  all  this  is  combined  and  diverfificd  an  in- 
finite number  of  ways,  according  to  the  difference  of  tempera- 
ments, education,  examples,  and  occafions  that  furnifli  an  oppor- 
tunity fur  exercifing  certain  faculties  or  inclinations  rather  than 
others  :  for  it  is  the  exercife  that  ftrengthens  them  more  or  lefs. 
Such  is  the  fource  of  that  prodigious  variety  of  geniufes,  taftes, 
&nd  habits,  which  conflitutes  what  we  call  the  charadters  and 
manners  of  men  ;  a  variety,  which,  confidered  in  general,  very 
far  from  being  unferviceable,  is  of  great  ufe  in  the  views  of  pro- 
vidence. 

Resfonhas  XVI-  But  whatever  ftrength  maybe  attributed  to  the  inclina- 
it always  tions,  paflions,  and  habits,  ftill  it  is  neceflary  to  obferve,  that  they 
'"  Jer"^  to  ^'^''^  never  enough  to  impel  man  invincibly  to  a6t  contrary  to 
rerrnii  reafon.  Reafon  has  it  always  in  her  power  to  preferve  her  fuperi- 
liiiflrcfs.  ority  and  rights.  She  is  able,  with  care  and  application,  to  cor- 
reâ  vicious  difpofitions,  to  prevent  and  even  to  extirpate  bad 
^abits  j  to  bridle  thç  moft  uuruly  palTions  by  h^^z  precautions,  to 

weaken 


Natural  Law.  ^i 

weaken  them  by  degrees,  and  finally  to  deflroy  them  entirely,  or 
to  reduce  them  within  their  proper  bounds.  This  h  fufficiently 
proved  by  the  inward  feeling,  that  every  man  has  of  the  liberty 
with  which  he  determines  to  follow  this  fort  of  impreffions  ;  pro- 
ved by  thefecret  reproaches  we  make  to  ourfelves,  when  we  have 
been  too  much  fwayed  by  them  ;  proved,  in  fine,  by  an  infinite 
variety  of  examples.  True  it  is,  that  there  is  fome  difficulty  in 
furmounting  thefe  obftacles  ;  but  this  is  richly  compenfated  by  the 
glory  attending  fo  noble  a  victory,  and  by  the  folid  advantages 
from  thence  arifing. 


CHAP.     III. 

That  man  thus  coniTttuted,  is  a  creature  capable  of  moral  MreiJiofi, 
and  accountable  for  his  celions. 

'•A 


_^  ^__  FTER  having    feen  the  nature    of  man,  confidered   in  ^a"  '^  cs. 
refpecl  to  right,  the  refult  is,  that  he  is  a  creature  really  fufceptible  ^g^^f^^  ;„ 
of  choice  and  direâion  in  his  condu£b.     For  fince  he  is  capable,  regard    to 
by  means  of  his  faculties,  of  knowing  the  nature  and  ftate  of  things,  his  con- 
and  of  judging  from  this  knowledge  ;  fince  he  is  inveftcd  with  the  '^"*^* 
power  of  determining  between  two  or  feveral  offers  made  to  him  ; 
in  fine,  fince,  with  theaffiftance   of  liberty,  he  is  able,  in  certain 
Cafes,  to  fufpend  or  continue    his  action?,  as  he  judges  proper;  it 
evidently  follows,  that  he  is  mafter  of  his  own  actions,  £.nd  that  he 
excrciles  a  kind  of  authority  and  command  over  them,  by  virtue  of 
which  he  can  direct  and  turn  tliem  which  way  he  pleaies.     Hence 
it  appears  how  neceflary  it  was  for  us  to  fet  out,  as  we  have  done, 
with   inquiring   previoufly  into  the  nature  and  faculties  of  man. 
For  how  could  we  have   difcovered  the  rules   by  which  he   is  to 
fquare  hiscondu£l,  unlefs  we  antecedently  know  in  what  manner 
he  acts,  and  what  are  the  fprings,   as  it  were,  that  put   him  in 
motion  ? 

II.   Another  remark,  which  is  a  confequence  of  the  foregoing,  î^=  '*  '■■-' 
is,  that  fince  man  is  the  immediate  author  of  his  adions  he'isac-  ^"""^.^^'^ 
countable  lor  them  ;  and  injufticeand  reafon  they  can  be  imputed  tions  : 
to  him.     This  is  a  point  of  Vi'hich  vve  think  it  neceffary  togive  they«nbe 
here  a  fhort  explication,  imputed  n 


9 i  The  Principles  of 

The  term  of  imputing  is  borrowed  of  arithmetic,  and  flgnifies 
properly,  to /ct  a  fum  down  to  fomcbody's  account.  To  impute 
an  aélion  therefore  to  a  perfon  is  to  attribute  it  to  him  as  to  its  real 
author,  to  let  it  down,  as  it  were,  to  his  account,  and  to  make  him 
anfwerable  for  it.  Now  it  is  evidently  an  eflential  quality  of 
human  a£tions,  as  produced  and  direâed  by  the  underftanding'and 
will,  to  be  fufceptible  of  imputation  ;  that  is,  it  is  plain  that  man 
can  be  juftly  confidered  as  the  author  and  productive  caufe  of  thofe  ac- 
tions, and  that  for  this  veryreafonit  is'rightto  make  him  accountable 
forthera,andtolay  tohis  charge  the  effedls  that  arife  from  thence  as 
natural  confequences.  In  fa6t,  the  true  reafon  whya  perfon  can- 
not complain  of  being  made  anfwerable  for  an  aâion,  is  that  he 
has  produced  it  himfelf  knowingly  and  willingly.  Every  thing 
almoft  that  isfaidand  done  in  human  focieiy,  ru[ipofes  this  prin- 
ciple  generally  received,  and  every  body  acquiefces  in  it  from  aa 
inward  convidlion. 

Principle         III.  We  muft   therefore  lay  down,  as  an  incontef^able  and 
of  imputa-  fundamental  principle  of  the  imputabilitv  of  human  a£tions,  that 

bihty.    We  ,  r»'        •     r  r  -i  i        r  •  •  r 

irnift     not  6very  voluntary  action  is  lufceptible  or  imputation  ,  or,  to  exprels 

confound  it  the  fame  thing  in  other  terms,  that  every  aiSlion  or  omi'non  fub- 

wjthimpu-  je6l  to  the  direction  of  man,  can  be  charged  to  the  account  of  the 

►  uion.         perfon  in  whofe  power  it  was  to  do  it  or  let.it  alone  ;  and  on  the 

contrary,  every  a£tion,  vvhofe  exigence  ornon-exiftence  does  not 

depend  on  our    will,  cannot   be  imputed   to  us.     Obferve  iiere, 

that  omiflïons  are  ranked  by  civilians  and  moralifts  among  the 

number  of  actions  ;  becaufe  they  apprehend  them  as  the  effeél  of 

a  voluntary  fufpenfion  of  the  exercife  of  our  faculties. 

Such  is  the  foundation  of  impiitability,  and  the  true  reafon  why 
an  action  or  omifTlon  is  of  an  imputable  nature.  But  we  muft 
take  particular  notice,  that  though  an  ailion  is  imputable,  it  does 
not  enfue  from  thence  only,  that  it  merits  actually  to  be  iminited. 
Imputability  and  imputation  are  two  things,  which  we  ihould 
carefully  diffinguifli.  T'he  latter  fuppofes,  befides  the  imputa- 
bility, fomc  moral  neceffity  of  ailing  or  not,  after  a  certain  man- 
ner ;  or,  which  amounts  to  the  fame,  fome  obligation  that  requires 
a  thing  to  be  done  or  omitted  that  can  be  really  done  or  omitted. 
PufTendorf  *  does  not  feeni  to  have  fufficii  ntly  diflinguifhed  be- 
tween thefe  two  ideas-  It  is  enough  for  our  prefent  pr.rpofe  to 
point  out  the  diftiniflion,  defcring   to    treat  of  adlual   imputation, 

and 

*  Seethe  Law  of  nntuie  and  nations,  boq^i.  i.  cli3p.  v,  §  y  and    the  Dutiçs 
ef  man  and  a  citizen,  book  i.  §.  17. 


N  A  T  U  R  A  L    L  A  W.  23 

and  to  eflabiifh  the  principles  thereof,  till  we  have  explained  the 
nature  of  obligation,  and  fhewn  that  man  is  actually  obliged  to 
conform  his  adtions  to  rule. 

What  has  been  hitherto  advanced,  properly  regards  the  nature 
of  the  human  mind  :  or  the  internal  faculties  of  man,  as  they 
render  him  capable  of  moral  direâ^ion.  But  in  order  to  complete 
our  knowledge  of  human  nature,  we  fhould  view  it  likewife  in  its 
extrinfic  condition,  in  its  wants  and  dependancies,  and  in  the 
various  relations  wherein  it  is  placed  ;  in  fine,  in  what  we  may 
call  the  different  dates  of  man.  For  it  is  our  fttuation  in  life  that 
decides  the  ufe  we  ought  to  make  of  our  faculties. 


CHAP.     IV. 

Further  inquire/  into  what  relates  to  human  nature,  by  cinfidering  the 
different  Jlates  of  man, 

l.rry 

X   HE  different  ftates  of  man  are  nothing  more  than  the  fitua-  ^efi"'t'o9' 
tion  wherein  he  finds  himfelf  in  regard  to  the  beings  that  furround 
him,  with  the  relations  from  thence  refulting. 

We  fhall  be  fatisfied  with  talcing  here  a  curfory  view  of  fome 
©f  the  principal  ftates,  and  to  render  them  diftinguifhable  by  their 
eflential  charadleriftics,  without  entering  into  an  exadt  inquiry, 
which  (hould  naturally  take  place,  when  treating  in  particular  of 
each  ftate. 

All  thefc  difFerent  ftates  may  be  ranged  under  two  general  clafles  : 
fome  are  primitive  and  original  ;  others  adventitious, 

II.  Primitive  and  original  ftates   arethofe  in  which  man  finds  and""orié*i- 
himfelf  placed  by  the  very  hand  of  God,  independent  of  any  human  nai  flates. 
a£lion. 

Such  is,  in  thefirft  place,  the  ftate  of  man  with  regard  to  God  ;  t   State  of 
which   is   a  ftate  of  abfolute  dependence.     For  let  us  make  but  nian    with 
never  fo    fmall  a    ufe  of  our  faculties,  and  enter  into  the  lludy  of  q^T'^  '* 
ourfelves,  it  will  evidentally  appear,  that  it  is  from  this  firft  Being 
we  hold  our  life,  reafon,  and  all  other  concomitant  advantages  ;  and 
that  in  this  and  every  other  refpedl  we  experience  daily,  in  the  moft 
fenfible  manner,  the  efFcdts  of  the  power  and  goodnefs  of  the  Creator. 

III.  Another 


34  'Th^    F  R  î  N  C  I  P  L  £  s    of 

a.  State  in.  Another  primitive   and  origin:  1  ftate,  is  that  wherein  men 

ef  lociety.  ^^^  thcmfelves  in  refpe^l  to  one  anuiiier.  They  are  all  inhabitants 
of  the  fame  globe,  placed  in  a  kind  of  vicinity  to  e.:ch  otherj  have 
all  one  common  nature,  the  fame  ficultie?,  fame  mclinations,  wants 
and  defires.  They  cannot  do  without  one  another  j  and  it  is  only 
by  mutual  aïïiflance  they  are  capable  ot  attaining  to  a  ftate  of  eafe 
and  tranquility.  Hence  we  obferve  a  natural  iiichnation  in  man- 
kind that  draws  them  towards  each  other,  and  eftablilhes  a  com- 
merce of  fervices  and  benevolence  between  them,  from  whence 
refults  the  common  good  of  the  whole,  and  the  particular  advantage 
of  individuals.  The  natural  ibte  thereff>re  of  men  amona  them- 
felves,  is  a  uate  of  union  and  lociety  ;  fociety  being  nothing  more 
than  the  union  of  feveral  perfons  for  their  commtjn  advantage. 
Bclides,  it  is  evident  that  this  mufl:  be  a  primitive  (late,  bccaufe  it 
is  not  the  work  of  man,  but  eftablifhed  by  divine  inftitution. 
Natural  fociety  is  a  ftate  of  equality  and  liberty  j  a  ftate  in  which 
all  men  enjoy  the  fame  prerogatives,  and  an  intire  independence 
on  any  other  power  but  God.  For  every  man  is  naturally  mafter 
of  himfelf,  and  equally  to  his  fellow-creatures,  fo  long  as  he  does 
not  fubjedl  himfelf  to  another  pèrfon's  authority  by  a  particular 
convention. 

3,  State  of       IV.  The  oppofite  ftate  to  that  of  fociety,  is  folitude  ;  that  is, 
folitude.      the  condition  in  which  we  imagine  man  would  find  himfelf,  were 

4.  Peace  .  j^^  ^^  jj^^  abfolutely  alone,  abandoned  to  his  own  thoughts,  and 

dcftitute  of  all  commerce  with  thofe  of  his  ownfpecies.  Let  us 
fuppofea  man  arrived  to  the  age  of  maturity,  without  hrtving  had 
the  advantage  of  education  or  any  correfpondence  at  all  with  the 
reft  of  mankind,  and  confequently  without  any  other  knowledge 
but  that  which  he  has  of  himfelf  acquired  ;  fuch  a  man  would  be 
undoubtedly  the  moft  miferable  of  all  animals.  We  ftiould  difcov- 
cr  nothing  in  him  but  weakntfs,  favagenefs,  and  ignorance  ;  fcarce 
would  he  be  able  to  fatisfy  the  wants  (if  his  body,  expr.fed,  poor 
wretch,  to  perifli  with  hunger  or  cold,  or  by  the  ravenous  teeth  of 
wildbeafts.  What  a  vaft  difperence  between  fuch  a  {late  and  that  of 
fociety  which  by  the  mutual  fuccours  that  men  receive  from  one 
another,  procures  them  all  the  knowledge,  convcnicncy,  and  eafe» 
that  form  the  fccurity,  pleafure,  and  happinefs  of  life  ?  True  it  is, 
thatal!  thefe  advantages  fuppofe  that  men,  far  from  prejudicing  one 
another,  live  in  harmony  and  concord,  and  entertain,  thi<:  union  by 
mutual  good  offices.  This  is  what  wc  ca'l  a  ftate  o^ pcace^  whereas 
thofe  who  endeavour  to  do  harm,  and  thofe  alfo  who  find  thcm- 
felves 


N  A  T  U  R  A  L    L  A  V/.  2^ 

felves  obliged  to  guard  agalnft  it,  are   in  a  ftate  of  war  j  a  ilateof 
violence,  diametrically  oppofite  to  that  of  fociety. 

V.  Let  us  obferve,  in  the   next  place,  that  man  finds  himfelf  g^^^^   ^p 
naturallv  attached  lo  the  earth,  from  whole  bofom  he  diaws  what-  n-,an   with 
ever  is  nccelFary   for  the  prefervation  and  conveniences   of  life,  rt-gard  to 
This  fituation  produces  another  primitive  Rate  of  man,  which  is  ^^]^   C°oda 
likewife  deferving  of  our  attention.  ^^^^^  '' 

Such  in  efFedl  is  the  natural  conftitution  of  he  human  body, 
that  it  cannot  fubfift  intirely  of  iifelf,  and  by  thefole  force  of  its 
temperament.  Man,  at  all  ages,  fiands  in  need  of  fevera!  ext  rnal 
fuccours  for  his  nourifhment,  as  well  as  for  repairing  his  ftrengt'pj 
and  keeping  his  faculties  in  proper  order.  For  this  rcafon  our 
Creator  has  fown  plentifully  around  us  fuch  things  as  are  necef- 
fary  for  our  wants,  and  has  implanted  in  us  at  the  fame  time  the 
inflinfts  and  qualifications  proper  for  applying  thefe  things  to  our 
advantage.  The  natural  ftate  therefore  of  man  confidered  in 
this  light,  and  in  refpedl  to  the  goods  of  the  earth,  is  a  Rate  of 
indigence  and  inçcfTant  wants,  againft  which  he  would  be  inca- 
pable to  provide  in  a  fuitable  manner,  were  he  not  to  exercife  his 
induftry  by  confiant  labour.  Such  are  the  principal  of  thofe 
liâtes  that  are  called  primitive  and  original. 

VI.  But  man  being  naturally  a  free  agent,  he  is  capable  of  ^^fivçntjtj. 
making  great  modifications  in  his  primitive  ftate,  and  of  giving  by  ous  ftates. 
a  variety  of  eftablifhments  a  new  face  to  human  life.     Hence  i.  Family; 
thofe  adventitious  ftates  are  formed,  which  are  properly  the  work  *•  M^^"* 
of  man,  wherein  he  finds  himfelf  placed  by  his  own  a6l,  and  in  ^^^* 
confequence  of  eftablifhments,  whereof  he  himfelf  is  the  author. 

Let  us  take  a  curfory  view  of  the  principal  of  thefe  ftates. 

The  firft  that  prefents  itfelf  to  us,  is  the  ftate  of  families.  This 
is  the  moft  natural  and  moft  ancient  ofall  focieties,  and  the  very 
foundation  of  that  which  is  called  national  ;  for  a  people  or  nation 
is  only  an  aflfemblage  or  compofition  of  feveral  families. 

Families  begin  by  marriage  ;  and  it  is  nature  itfelf  that  invites 
men  to  this  union.  Hence  children  arife,  who  by  perpetuating 
the  feveral  farnilies,  prevent  the  extin£fion  of  human  focieties, 
and  repair  the  breaches  made  every  day  by  death. 

The  family  ftate  is  produ6live  of  various  relations  ;  as  thofe  of 
huft)and,  wife,  father,  mother,  children,  brothers,  fiftcrs,  and  all 
the  other  degrees  of  kindred,  which  are  the  firft  tie  of  human 
fociety. 

U  VIL  Man 


2 6  'the  Principles  of 

3.  Weak-      VII.  Man  confidered  in  his  birth  is  weaknefs  and  impotency 
"t^hisb'"th*  '^^^''^'  '"  '■^g^'"^  3S  well  to  the  body,  as  to  the  foul.     It  is  tven 

4.  Natural  re^^i^rl^^blt',  that  the  ftale  of  weaknefs  and  infancy  lafts  longer  in 

dcpen-  man  than  in  any  other  animal.     He  is    befct  and  prefTcd  on  all 

chncc   of    fides  by  a  thonfand  wants,  and  dcltitiite  of  knowledge,  as  well  as 

ihiKlrtn  on  f^rcngih,  finds  hinifclf  in  an  abfolutc  incapacity  of  relieving  them  ; 

rents.  ^  '    ^'-^  '^  therefore  under  a  particular  neceiTity  of  recurring  to  external 

aiTiiiance.     Providence  for  this  reafon  has  infpired  parents  with 

that  inltindtor  natural  tendernelV,  which  prompts  them  fo  eagerly 

to  delight  in  the  molt  Iroublefome  cares,  for  ths  prefervaiion  and 

g;ood  of    thofe  whom  they  have   brought  into  the   world.     It   is 

Jlkewife  in  confcquence  of  this  (tate  of  weaknefs  and  ignorance  in 

which  children  are  born,  that  they  are  naturally  fubj^dl  to  their 

parents  ;  whom  nature   has   inveiled  with  all  the    autliority  and 

power  necefTary  for  governing  thofe,  whofe  advantage  they  are  to 

lludy  and  procure» 

VII  I.  The  property  of  goods  is  another  very  im.portant  eflab- 
of  proper-  ^'^'^^'l^  which  produces  a  new  adventitious  ftate.  It  modifies 
ty.  the  right  which  all  men  had  originally  to  earthly  goods  ;   and  dif- 

tinguifliing  carefully  what  belongs  to  individuals,  enfures  the  quiet 
and  peaceable  enjoyment  of  what  they  poffefs  ;  by  which  means 
it  contributes  to  the  maintenance  of  peace  and  harmony  among 
mankind.  But  fince  all  men  had  ori-inally  a  right  to  a  common 
ufe  of  whatever  the  earth  produces  for  their  feveral  wants  ;  it  is 
evident  therefore,  that  if  this  natural  power  is  adlually  reftrained 
and  liaùted  in  diversrefpe6ls,  this  mud  neceflarily  arife  from  fome 
human  acSt  ;  and  confequently  the  ftate  of  property,  which  is  the 
caufc  of  thofe  limitations,  ought  to  be  ranked  among  the  adven- 
titious  ftatcs. 

Civil  ftate  IX.  But  among  alî  the  ftates  eftablidied  by  the  aiSl  of  man, 
crmnfiiT*  *^^''°  's  none  more  confiderable  than  the  civil  ftate,  or  that  of  civil 
fociety  and  government.  The  efl'ential  charadler  of  this  fociety, 
which  diftinguifhes  it  from  the  foremenàoned  fociety  oï  nature^  is 
the  fubordination  to  a  fupreme  authority,  exclufive  of  equality  and 
independence.  Mankind  were  originally  divided  into  families 
'  only,  and  not  into  nations.     Thofe  families  lived   under  the  pater- 

nal government  of  the  perfon  who  was  their  chief,  as  their  lather 
or  grandfather.  But  when  they  came  afterwards  to  increafe  and 
uni'cefor  their  common  defence,  they  compofed  a  national  body, 
governed  by  the  will  of  him,  or  of  thofe  on  whom  they  had  con- 
ferred the  authority.  This  is  the  origin  of  what  we  call  civil 
government,  and  of  thediftinâion  offçyereign  and  fubjedls. 

X.  The 


N  A  T  U  R  A  L    L  A  W.   .  27 

X.  The  civil    ftate  and   property  of  goods  produced    feveral  The  civil 
other   cftablifnments   which   form  the   beauty  and  ornament  of  ^^^^  l^'    , 

r  1  •  ■  n  T       /•     I    property  01 

focicty,  and  from  whence  \o  many  adventitious  Itatcs  ariie  :  Inch  ^^^j^  gi^g 
as  the  different  ports  or  offices  of  thofe  who  have  any  {hare  in  rife  to  lev- 
the  government  ;  as  magiftrate?,  judges,  ftate  officers,  minifters  of  «'-'''  ^}\^^ 
reiieion,  phvficians,  &c.     To  which  may  be  added  the  polite  arts,  ^'•^'^,f'^'"' 

Y  ■''     \  •        •  ••!•/-  ij        eus  «taits. 

trade'?,  agriculture,  navigation,  commerce,  wan  their  lèverai  dé- 
pendances, whereby  human  life  is  io  agreeably  and  advantageoufly 
diverfifîed. 

XI.  Such  are  the  principal  ftates  produced  by  human  confent. 

And  yet,  as  thefe  different  modifications  of  the  primitive  ftate  ot  True  Mca 
man  are  the  effect   of  his  natural   liberty,  the  nev/  relations  and  °'  i'^n"^„^' 
different  Rates  from  thence arifing,  may  be  very  well  confidered  as  ^f  man.  " 
fo  many  natural  ftates  ;  provided  however  that  the  ule  which  men 
make  of  their  liberty,  in  this  rcfpecl,  has  nothing  in  it  unconforma- 
ble to  their  natural  conflitution,  that  is,  to  realbn  and  the  Hate  of 
fociety. 

It  is  therefore  proper  to  obferve,  in  relation  to  this  fubject,  that 
when  we  fpealc  of  the  natural  ftate  of  man,  we  are  to  underlta  nd  not 
cn!y  that  natural  and  primitive  ftate,in  which  he  is  pl2ced,asit  were, 
by  the  hands  of  nature  herfelf  ;  but  moreover  all  thofe  into  which 
man  enters  by  his  own  adt  and  agreement,  and  that  are  conforma- 
ble in  the  main  to  his  nature,  and  contain  nothing  but  what  is 
agreeable  to  his  conftitution  and  the  end  for  which  he  was  formed. 
For  fince  man  himfelf,  as  a  free  and  intelligent  being,  is  able  to  fee 
and  know  his  fituatio:"!,  as  alfo  to  difcover  his  ultimate  end,  and 
in  confequence  thereof  to  take  the  right  meafures  to  attain  it  ;  it  is 
properly  in  this  light  we  fhould  confider  his  natural  ftate,  to  form 
thereof  a  juft  idea.  That  is,  the  natural  ftate  of  man  is,  generally 
fpeaking,  that  which  is  conformable  to  his  nature,  conftitution,  and 
reafon,  as  well  as  to  the  good  ufe  of  his  faculties,  confidered  in  their 
full  maturity  and  perfection.  We  fhall  be  particulaily  attentive  to 
this  remark,  the  importance  of  which  will  appear  more  (enfibly  by 
the  application  ^ind  ufe  that  may  be  made  thereof  on  feveral  occa- 
fions. 

XII.  Let  us  not  forget  to  obferve  likewife,  that  there  is  this 
difference  between  the  primitive  and  adventitious  ftates,  that  the  ^''''^'■^'■^'*' 
former  being  annexed,  as  it  were,  to  the  nature  and  conftitution  of  ori<rinal 
man,  fuch  as  he  has  received  them  from  God,  are,  for  this  very  and  advcn- 
reafon,  common  to  all  mankind.     The  fame  cannot  be  faid  of  thç  ''t''>us 
adventitious  ftate?  j  which,  fuppofing  an  hpman  ait  or  agreement,    ^'"' 

cannot 


:: 8  "îhe  Principles  of 

cannot  of  themfelves  be  indifferently  fuitable  to  all  men,  but  !• 
thofe  only  that  contrived  and  procured  them. 

Let  us  add,  in  fine,  that  feveral  of  thofe  dates  may  be  found 
combined  and  united  in  the  fame  pcrfon,  provided  they  have  no- 
thing incompatible  in  their  nature.  Thus  the  fame  perfon  may 
be  father  of  a  family,  judge,  minifter  of  ftate,  &c.  all  at  the  fame 
time. 

Scch  are  the  ideas  we  are  to  f  )rm  of  the  nature  and  different 
flates  of  man  ;  and  it  is  of  all  theft-  parts  united  and  compaé^ed 
together,  that  the  intirc  fydetn  of  humanity  is  formed.  Thefe 
are  like  fo  many  wheels  of  the  fame  machine,  which,  combined 
and  managed  by  a  dexterous  hand,  confpire  all  to  the  fame  end  j 
and,  on  the  contrary,  unfkilfully  dire£ted,  embarrafs  and  deftroy 
each  other.  But  how  man,  in  fine,  is  enabled  to  condu6t  himfelf 
in  this  prudent  manner,  and  what  rule  he  is  to  obferve  in  order 
to  attain  this  happy  end,  is  what  we  have  flill  to  inquire,  and 
forms  the  fubjed  of  the  followirig  chapters. 


CHAP.     V. 

^hàt  man  ought  to  fquare  his  conduci  by  rule  ;   the  method  of  finding 
out  this  rule 'f  and  the  foundations  of  right  in  general. 


L- 


pefinit.on  I   y  ET  US  beoin  with  an  explication  of  the  terms.     A  rule, 

of  a  rule.      .      -A-*  ,      »         .  .  r„  ,  /■      ■  •   . 

in    Its  proper  lignification,  is  an  inltrument,   by  means  or  which 

we  draw  the  Ihortefl  line  from  one  point  to  another,  which  for 

this  very  reufon  is  called  a  flraight  line. 

In  a  figurative  and  moral  fenfe,  a  rule  imports  nothing  elfe,  but 

a  principle,  or  raaxini,  which  furnifhes  man  with  a  fure  and  con- 

cife  method  of  attaining  to  the  end  he  propofes. 

It  is  not  ^^-  The  firft  thinp;  we  are  to  inquire  in  regard  to  this  fubjefl.* 

convenient  is,  whether  it  is  really  agreeable  to  the  nature  of  man  to  fubmit 
that  man  his  a£lioiis  to  a  fixt  and  invariable  rule  ;  or  whether,  on  the  con- 
fiiould  hve  jr-iry^  he  is  allpv/ed  to  abandon  himfelf  indifferently  to  all  the 
rule.  m.otions  of  his  will,  and  thus  to  enjoy,  without  either  limit  or 

impediment,  the  extreme  facility  witfi  which  this  faculty  turns 
itfelt  on  all  fides,  in  confequence  of  its  natural  flexibility. 

The 

*  See  PuiI';;ndorf,  Law  cf  nature  ami  nations,  book  ii.  chap.  i. 


NaturalLaw.  29 

The  reflexions  we  have  given  in  the  preceding  chapters,  are 
of  themfclves,  and  independent  of  any  other  argument,  a  fufficienH 
and  convincing  proof,  that  the  nature  and  conftitution  of  man 
requires  the  eftablifhment  of  fome  rule.  Every  thing  in  nature 
has  its  deftination  and  end  ;  and  confequently,  each  creature  is 
condudled  to  its  end  by  a  proper  principle  of  direction.  Man, 
who  holds  a  confiderable  rank  among  the  beings  that  furround 
him,  participates  undoubtedly  of  this  fixt  and  univerfal  order. 
And  whether  we  confider  him  in  himfelf  as  an  intelligent  and 
rational  being  ;  or  view  him  as  a  member  of  fociety  ;  or  whether, 
in  fine,  we  regard  him  as  the  handy  work  of  God,  and  deriving 
from  this  firft  Being  his  faculties,  ftate,  and  exiftence  \  all  thefe 
circumftances  evidently  indicate  an  end,  a  deftination,  and  confe- 
quently imply  the  necefîîty  of  a  rule.  Had  man  been  created  to 
live  at  random  without  any  fixt  and  determinate  view,  without 
knowing  whither  he  is  to  direct  his  courfe,  or  what  road  he  ought 
to  take  ;  it  is  evident  that  his  nobleft  faculties  would  be  of  no 
manner  of  ufe  to  him.  Wherefore  waving  all  difquifitions  con- 
cerning the  necefTity  of  a  rule,  let  us  endeavour  rather  to  difcover 
what  this  ruL  is,  which  alone,  by  enlightning  the  underftanding, 
and  direiling  our  actions  to  an  end  worthy  of  him,  is  capable  of 
forming  the  order  and  beauty  of  human  life. 

III.  When  we  fpeak  of  a  rule  in  relation  to  human  allions,  a  rule  fur- 
two  things  are  manifeflly  fuppofed  :   the  firft,  that  human  condudl  poles  an 
is  fufceptible  of  direflion,  as  we  have  already  proved  ;  the  fécond,  end,  au 
that  man  in  all  his  fieps  and  allions  propofes  to  himfelf  a  fcope  or  ^""* 

end  which  he  is  defirous  to  attain. 

IV.  Now  let  man  reflefl  but  never  fo  little  on  himfelf,  he  will  '^^^  "'*"'' 
foon  perceive  that  every  thing  he  does  is  with  a  view  of  happinefs,  "r*'*^  ^"^ 
and  tnat  this  is  the  ultimate  end  he  propoles  in  all  his  actions,  or  the  hnppiutf». 
lafl  term  to   which  he  reduces  them.      This  is  a  firft  truth,  of 

■which  we  have  a  continual  convidlion  from  our  own  internal  fenfe. 
Such,  in  efFecf,  is  the  nature  of  man,  that  he  neceifarily  loves  him- 
felf, that  he  feeks  in  every  thing  and  every  where  his  own  advan- 
tage, and  can  never  be  diverted  from  this  purfuit.  We  naturally 
defire,  and  neceffarily  wifh  for  good.  This  defire  anticipates  all 
cur  refledionsjand  is  not  in  our  own  eledion  ;  it  predominates  in 
us,  and  becomes  the  primum  mobile  of  all  our  determinations  ; 
our  hearts  being  never  inclined  towards  any  particular  good,  but 
by  the  natural  impreiTion  which  determines  us  to  good  in  general. 
It  is  not  in  our  power  to  change  this  bent  of  the  will,  which  the 
Creator  hinifelf  has  implanted  in  us. 

V.  This 


"30  The  Principles©/' 

It  is  the  V.  This  fyftem  of  providence  extends  to  all  beings  endov/ed 
fyllem  of  ^jj|^  fenfe  and  l^nowledge.  Even  animals  themfelves  have  a  like 
dcncci  inftint^  ;  for  they  all  love  themfelves,  endeavouring  at  felf-prefer- 
vation  by  all  fortsof  means,  eagerly  purfuing  whatever  fee ms  good 
or  ufeful  to  them,  and  turning,  on  the  contrary,  from  whatever 
appears  prejudicial  or  bad.  The  fame  propenfity  {hews  itfclf  in 
man,  not  only  as  an  inftinct,  but  moreover  as  a  rational  inclinatioti 
approved  and  flrengthened  by  reflecStion.  Hence  whatfoever  pre- 
fents  itfelf  to  us  as  an  objecl  proper  to  promote  our  happinefs,  muft 
ofneceflitypleafe  US;  and  every  thing  that  appears  oppofite  to  our  felic- 
îty,become5ofcourfe  theobjeâofouraverfion.  Themore  weftudy 
man,  the  more  we  are  convinced  that  here,  in  reality,  lies  the  fource 
of  all  our  tafles  ;  here  the  grand  fpring  which  lets  us  in  motion. 

of  Lp-i'-^  ^^'  ^'^^  indeed,  if  it  be  natural  to  every  intelligent  and  rational 
nefs  is  ef-  being,  to  a£l  always  with  a  fixt  view  and  determinate  end  ;  it  is 
fential  to  no  lefs  evident,  that  this  view  or  end  muft  be  ultimately  reduced 
■"f"'  ^"bl  ^°  himfelf,  and  confequently  to  his  ov/n  advantage  and  happinefs. 
from  "ea-  The  defire  therefore  of  happinefs  is  as  efl'ential  tea  man,  and  as  in- 
fon.  feparablc  from  his  nature,   as  reafon  itfelf;  for  reafon,  as  the  very 

etymology  of  the  word  implies,  is  nothing  more  than  a  calculation 
and  account.  To  reafon,  is  to  calculate,  and  to  draw  up  an  ac- 
count, after  balancing  every  thing,  in  order  to  fee  on  which  fide 
the  advantage  lies.  It  wouid  therefore  imply  a  contradiction,  tQ 
f'jppole  a  rational  being,  that  could  abfolutcly  forego  its  intérêt},  o» 
be  indifferent  with  regard  to  its  own  felicity. 

Self-love  is      VII.  Wemuft  therefore  take  care  not  to  confider  felf-love,  and 

a  principle  ^^^  f^^fg  qj-  inclination  which  fixes  us  fo  flrongly  to  our  happineff^ 

nothing      ^^  ^  principle  naturally  vicious,  and  the  fruit  of  human  depravation, 

viciousin     This  would  be  accufing  the  Author  of  our  exiftencc,  and  convert- 

itfelf.  inp^  his  nobleft  gifts  into  poifon.      Whatever  comes   from  a  Being 

fupremely  perfect,  is  in  itfelf  good  ;  and  were  v/e  to  condcnm  the 

fenfe  or  inclination  of  felf-love  as  bad  in  itfelf,  under  a  pretence 

that  by  a  mifconftru6tion  and  wrong  ufe  thereof  it  is  the  fource  of 

an  infinite  number  of  diforders,  we  fhould  for  the  very  fame  motives 

be  obliged  to  condemn  reafon  ;   becaufe  it  is  from  the  abufe  of  this 

faculty  that  the  grolTeft  errors  and  moft  extravagant  irregularities 

of  men  proceed. 

It  may  appear  furprifipg  to  fome  that  we  fhould  have  flopt  here, 
tc  inveftigate  and  explain  the  truth  of  a  principle,  which  one 
would  imagine  is  obvicus  to  every  b'ody,  to  the  learned  as  well  as 

the 


NaturalLaw,  32 

the  vulgar.  And  yet  it  was  abfolutely  neccflTary  ;  becaufe  this 
is  a  truth  of  the  very  laft  importance,  which  gives  us  the  key,  as 
it  were,  of  the  human  fyftcm.  It  is  true,  that  all  ethic  writers 
agree  that  man  is  made  for  happinefs,  and  naturally  defires  it  (for 
how  is  it  poffibie  not  to  hear  the  voice  of  nature,  which  rifes  from 
the  very  bottom  of  the  heart  ?)  But  a  great  many,  after  acknow- 
ledging this  principle,  feem  to  lofe  fight  of  it,  and  not  attending  to 
the  confcquences  that  flow  from  thence,  they  eredl  their  fyftems 
on  different,  and  fometimes  quite  oppofite  foundations. 

VlII.  But  if  it  be  true  that  man  does  nothing  but  with  a  view  ^^'^  «an- 
of  happinefs,  it  is  no  lefs  certain  that  reafon  is  the  only  way  he  has  "o°hap**irfer3 
to  attain  it.  but  by  the 

In  ord'^r  to  eftablifh  this  fécond  propofition  or  truth,  we  have  help  of  rea- 
only  to  attend  to  the  very  idea  of  happinefs,  and  to  the  notion  we  ^°°* 
have  of  good  and  evil.      Happinefs  is  that  internal  fatisfa£tion  of  the 
foul  which  arifes  from   the  poireflion  of  good  ;  good  is  whatever  is 
agreeable  to  man   for  his  prefervation,  perfection,    entertainment, 
and  pleafure.     Evil  is  the  oppofite  of  good. 

Man  incefTantly  experiences,  that  there  are  fome  things  conve- 
nient, and  others  inconvenient  to  him  ;  that  the  former  are  not 
all  equally  convenient,  but  fome  more  than  others  ;  in  fine,  that 
this  conveniency  depends,  for  the  moft  part,  on  the  ufe  he  knows 
how  to  make  of  thing?,  and  that  the  fame  thing  which  may  fuit 
him,  ufing  it  after  a  certain  manner  and  meafiire,  becomes  unfuit- 
able  when  this  ufe  exceeds  its  limits.  It  is  only  therefore  by  in- 
veftigating  the  nature  of  things,  as  alfo  the  relations  they  have 
between  themfelves  and  with  us,  that  we  are  capable  of  difcovering 
their  fitnefs  or  difagreement  with  our  felicity,  of  difcerning  good 
'from  evil,  of  ranging  eveiy  thing  in  its  proper  order,  of  fetting  a 
right  value  upon  each,  and  of  regulating  confequently  our  refearches 
and  defires. 

But  is  there  any  other  method  of  acquiring  this  difcei  nment, 
but  by  forming  jull  ideas  of  things  and  iheir  relations,  and  by  dedu- 
cing from  thefe  firft  ideas  the  confcquences  that  flow  from  thence 
by  exa6l  and  clofe  argumentations  ?  Now  it  is  reafon  alone  that 
dire£ts  all  thefe  operations.  Yet  this  is  not  all  :  foras  in  order  to 
arrive  at  happinef?,  it  is  not  fufficient  to  form  juft  ideas  of  the 
nature  and  ibte  of  thing?,  but  it  is  alfo  neceflary  that  the  will  fhould 
be  direéted  by  thofe  ideas  and  judgments  in  the  feries  of  our  con- 
duiEl  ;  fo  it  is  certain,  that  toothing  but  reafon  cari  communicate  and 
fupport  in  man  the  necefiTary  ftrength  for  making  a  right  ufe  of 
liberty,  and  for  detçrmining  in  all  cafes  according  to  the  light  of 

his 


3 Z  The  Principles  of 

his  underftanding,  in  fpite  of  all  the  impreflxons  and  motions  that 
may  lead  him  to  a  contrary  purfuit. 

Rcafon  i*  ^^'  R^afon  is  therefore  the  only  means,  in  every  refpe£t,  that 
therefore  man  has  left  to  attain  to  happinefs,  and  the  principal  end  f.  r  which 
the  primi-  he  has  received  it.  All  the  faculties  of  the  foul,  its  inftinds,  incli- 
■aan  nations,  and  even  the  paffions  are  relative  to  this  end  ;   and  confe- 

quently  it  is  this  fame  reafon  that  is  capable  of  pointing  out  the  true 
rule  of  human  aélions,  or,  if  you  will,  fhe  herfelf  is  this  primitive 
rule.  In  facl,  yvere  it  not  for  this  faithful  guide,  man  would  lead 
a  random  life,  ignorant  even  of  what  regards  himfelf,  unacquaint- 
ed with  his  own  origin  and  dertination,  and  with  the  ufe  he  ought 
to  make  of  whatever  furrounds  him  ;  ftumbling,  like  a  blind  man, 
at  every  ftep  i  loft,  in  fine,  and  bewildered  in  an  inextricable  laby- 
rinth. 

Xvhat  ÎJ         X.  Thus  we  are  condu£led  naturally  to  the  firft  idea  of  the  word 

Right  in      Rights  which  in  its  moft  general  fenfe,  and  that  to  which  all   the 

'      particular  fignifications  bear  feme    relation,  is  nothing   elfe  but 

whatever  reafon  certainly  acknowledges  as   a   fure  and  concife 

means  of  attaining  happinefs,  and  approves  as  fuch. 

Thisdefinition  is  the  refuU  of  the  principles  hitherto  eftablifhed. 
In  order  to  be  convinced  of  its  exaântfs,  we  have  only  to  dravr 
thefe  principles  together,  and  unite  them  under  one  profpeâ.  In 
faé^,  fince  right  (droit)  in  its  primary  notion  fignifies  v/hatever 
direcls,  or  is  well  dire£led;  (ince  dire(5ïion  fuppofts  a  fcope  and  an 
end,  to  which  we  are  defirous  of  attaining  ;  fmce  the  ultimate  end 
of  man  is  happinefs  ;  and,  in  fine,  fince  he  cannot  attain  to  hap- 
pinefs but  by  the  help  o{  reafon  ;  does  it  not  evidently  follow,  that 
Right  in  general  is  whatever  reafon  approves  as  a  fure  and  concife 
means  of  acquiring  happinefs  ?  It  is  likewife  in  confequence  of 
thefe  principles,  that  reafon  giving  its  approbation  to  itfelf,  when 
it  happens  to  be  properly  cultivated,  and  arrived  to  that  itate  of 
perfcdlion  in  which  it  knows  how  to  ufe  all  its  difcernment,  bears, 
by  way  of  preference  or  excellence,  the  appellation  of  right  rea- 
fon, as  being  the  firft  and  fureft  means  of  diredlion,  whereby  man 
is  enabled  to  acquire  felicity. 

That  we  may  not  forget  any  thing  in  the  analyfis  of  thefe  firft 
ideas,  it  is  proper  to  obferve  here  that  the  Latins  exprefs  what  we 
call  Right  by  the  word  jus,  which  pr'ôperly  fignifies  an  order  or 
precept.  *     Thefe  different  denominations  undoubtedly  proceed 

from 

*  Jus  ajuisrtili  ;  Jura  enim  vutcres  Ji-fx  vel  Ji^Jfa  vocabant.  Fcftu»  -.j^/jy 
Jura, 


NaturalLaw.  33 

from  this,  that  reafon  feems  to  command  with  authority  whatever 
it  avows  to  be  a  right  and  Aire  means  of  promoting  our  felicity. 
And  as  we  have  only  to  feek  for  what  is  right,  in  order  to  know 
what  reafon  commands  us,  hence  the  natural  connexion  of  thefe 
two  ideas arofc  in  refpe(5l  to  the  rules  of  right  reafon.  In  a  word, 
of  two  ideas  naturally  conneded,  the  Latins  have  followed  one, 
and  we  the  other. 


CHAP.     VI. 

General  rules  of  conduéf  prcfçribed  by  reafon.     Of  the  nature  eind 

firft  foundations  of  oblization. 
I.  T  -^  ^ 

J_T   is   already  a  great  point  gained,  to  have  difcovered  the  Reafoa 
primitive  rule  of  human  adions,  and  to  know  this  faithful  guide,  f'J^^i* 
which  is  todire6l  the  ftepsof  man,  and  whofe  directions  and  coun-  rules  of     " 
fels  he  may  follow  with  an  intire  confidence.     But  let  us  not  (lop  conduft. 
here;  and  fince  experience  informs  us  that  we  are  frequently  mif- 
taken  in  our  judgments  concerning  good  and  evil,  and  that  thefe 
erroneous  judgments  throw  us  into  moft  dangerous  irregularities, 
let  us  confult  therefore  our  guide,  and  learn  which  are  the  charac- 
ters of  real  good  and  evil,  in  order  to  know  in  what  true  felicity 
confifts,  and  what  road  we  are  to  take  in  order  to  attain  it. 

II.  Though  the  general  notion  of  good  and  evil  be  fixed  in  itfelf,  F'f  ^  *■"'«• 
and  invariable,  ftill  there  are  various  forts  of  particular  goods  and  rj^hT^dif-* 
evils,  or  of  things  thatpafs  for  fuch  in  the  minds  of  men.  tindion  of 

I.  The  firft  counfel  therefore  that  reafon  gives  U3,  is  to  exam-  good  aad 
ine  well  into  the  nature  of  good  and  evil,  and  to  obfsrve  carefully  *^'1« 
their  feveral  differences,  in  order  to  fet  upon  each  thing  its  proper 
value. 

This  diflinfllon  is  eafily  made.  A  very  flight  attention  to  what 
we  continually  experience,  informs  us,  that  rnan  being  compofed 
of  body  and  foul,  there  are  confequently  two  forts  of  goods  and 
evils,  fpiritual  and  corporeal.  The  firlt  are  thofc  that  proceed  only 
from  our  thoughts  j  the  fécond  arife  from  the  impreflions  of  exter-  \ 
nal  obje<£ls  on  our  fenfes.  Tfaus,  the  fenfible  pleafure  refuking 
from  the  difcovery  of  an  important  truth  ;  or  the  felf-approbatioii 
arifing  from  a  confcioufnefs  of  having  d.fcharged  our  duty,  &c.  are 
goods  purely  fpiritual  :  as  the  chagrin  of  a  geometrician  for  b^ing 
unable  to  find  out  a  dsmonftration  %  or  the  remorfe  a  perfon  feels 

E  for 


34-  ^^  Principles  of 

for  having  committed  a  bad  adion,  &c.  are  mere  fpiritualpains. 
With  regard  to  corporeal  goods  and  evils,  they  are  fufficicntly 
knov/n  ;  on  one  iKle,  they  are  health,  ftrength,  beauty  ;  on  the 
other,  ficknefs,  vveakncfs,  pain,  &c.  Thele  two  forts  of  goods 
and  evils  are  interefting  to  man,  and  cannot  be  reckoned  indiffer- 
ent, by  reafon  that  man  being  compofed  of  body  and  foul,  it  is  plain 
his  perfcdion  and  happincfs  depend  on  the  good  Hate  of  thefe  two 
parts. 

2.  We  likewifeobferve,  that  appearances  frequently  deceive  us, 
and  what  at  firft  fight  carries  with  it  the  face  cf  good,  proves  to  be 
a  real  evil,  whilft  an  apparent  evil  oftentimes  conceals  an  extraor- 
dinary good.  We  fhould  therefore  make  a  diftin£lion  between 
real  goods  and  evils,  and  thofe  that  are  falfc  and  apparent.  Or, 
which  amounts  to  pretty  near  the  fame  thing,  there  isfometimesa 
pure  good  and  a  pure  evil,  and  fometimes  there  is  a  mixture  of  both, 
which  does  notobftru(5l  our  difcerning  what  part  it  is  that  prevail?, 
and  whether  the  good  or  evil  be  predominant. 

3.  A  third  difference  regards  their  duration.  In  this  refpeft 
goods  and  evils  have  not  all  the  fame  nature  ;  fome  are  iolid  and 
durable,  others  tranfitory  and  inconftant.  Whereto  we  may  add, 
that  there  are  goods  and  evils  of  which  we  are  mafters,  as  it  were, 
and  which  depend  in  fuch  a  manner  on  ourfelves,  that  we  are  able 
to  fix  the  one,  in  order  to  have  a  confiant  enjoyment  of  them,  and 
to  ftiun  or  get  rid  of  the  others.  But  they  are  not  all  of  this  kind  ; 
fome  goods  there  are  that  efcape  our  moft  eager  purfuits,  whilft 
fome  evils  overtake  us,  notwithftanding  our  moft  folicitous  efforts 
to  avoid  them. 

4.  There  are  at  prefent  goods  and  evils,  which  we  a(5lually  feel  ; 
and  future  goods  and  evils,  which  are  the  objedts  of  our  hopes  or 
fears. 

5.  There  are  particular  goods  and  evils,  which  affeflonly  fome 
individuals  ;  and  others  that  are  common  and  univerfal,  of  which 
all  the  members  of  the  fociety  partake.  The  good  of  the  whole 
is  the  real  good  ;  that  of  one  of  the  parts,  oppofite  to  the  good  of 
the  whole,  is  only  an  apparent  good,  and  confequently  a  real  evil. 

6.  From  all  thefe  remarks  we  may  in  fine  conclude,  that  goods 
and  evils  not  being  all  of  the  fame  fpecies,  there  are  confequently 
fome  differences  amongft  them,  and  that  compared  together,  we 
find  there  are  fome  goods  more  excellent  than  others,  and  evils 
moreorlefs  incommodious.  It  happens  likewife,  that  a  good 
compared  with  an  evil,  may  be  either  equal  or  greater,  or  leffer; 
from  whence  feveral  differences  or  gradations  arife,  that  are  worthy 
cf  fpecial  notice. 

Thefe  particulars  are  fufficient  tofhew  the  utility  of  the  principal 
rule  we  have  given,  and  how  effenti.il  it  is  to  our   happinefs   to 

make 


Natural  La  w.  3  5 

make  ajuft  dlftinaion  of  goods  and  evil?.  But  this  Is  not  the 
only  counfel  that  realbn  gives  us,  we  are  going  to  point  out  fomc 
others  that  are  not  of  lefs  importance. 

III.  2.  True  happinefs  cannot  ccnfift  in  things  that  arc  incon-  Second 
fiftent  with  the  nature  and  ftate  of  man.    This  is  another  principle,  [^"'^  .  Jj^"= 
which  naturally  flows  from  the  very  notion  of  good  and  evil,     r  cr  ^^^^^^  ^^^^ 
whatfoever  is  bconfiilent  with  the  nature  of  a  being,  tends  fortius  f,aintliiugs 
very  reafon  to  degrade  or  deftroy  it,  to  corrupt  or  alter  its  confti-  that  are  m- 
tution  ;  which  being  direRly  oppofite  to  the  prefervation,  perfec-  ^°^^^^'^^l 
tion,  and  good  of  this  being,  fubverts  the  foundation  of  its  felicity.  ^^^^^^Jç  ^pj 
Wherefore  reafon  being  the  nobleft  part  of  man,  and  conftltuting  ftate    of 
his  principal  eflence,  whatever  is   inconfiftent  with  reafon,  cannot  num. 
form  his  happinefs.     To  which  I  add,  that  whatever  is  incompat- 
ible with  the  ftate  of  man,  cannot  contribute  to  his  felicity  ;   and 

this  is  a  point  as  clear  as  evidence  can  make  it.  Every  being, 
that  by  its  conftitution  has  eflential  relations  to  other  beings,  which 
it  cannot  fliake  off,  ought  not  to  be  confidered  merely  as  to  itl-lf, 
but  as  conftitutinga  part  of  the  whole  to  which  it  is  related.  And 
it  is  fufnciently  manifcft,  that  it  is  on  its  fituation  in  regard  to  the 
beings  thatfurround  it,  and  on  the  relations  of  agreement  or  op- 
pofition  it  has  with  them,  that  its  good  or  bad  ftate,  its  happinefs  or 
mifery,  muft  in  great  meafure  depend. 

IV.  3.  In  order  to  procure  forourfclves  a  folid  happinefs,  it  is  ^J'^g^*^"''"* 
not  fufficient  to  be  attentive  to  the  prefent  good  and  evil,  we  m.uft  p^,.^,  ^jj^ 
likewife    examine    their  natural  confequences  ;   to  the  end,  that  prefent  and 
comparing  the  prefent  with  the  future,  and  balancing  one  with  the  the  future 
other,  we  muft  know  before-hand  what  may  be  the  natural  refuU.  ^°2" 

4..  It  is  therefore  contrary  to  reafon,  topurfuea  good  that  muft  Fourtli 
certainly  be  attended  with  a  more  confiderable  evil.  * 

5.  But  on  the  contrary,  nothing  is  more  reafonable  than  to  re-  jifiK  rule, 
folve  to  bear  with  an  evil,  from  whence  a  greater  gocd  muft  certain- 
ly arife. 

The  truth  and  importance  of  thcfe  maxims  are  felf-obvious. 
Good  and  evil  being  two  oppofites,  the  effeil  of  one  deftroys  that 
of  the  other  ;  that  is  to  fay,  the  polVeffion  of  a  good,  attended  with 
a  greater  evil,  renders  us  really  unhappy  ;  and  on  the  contrary,  a 
flight  evil,  v^hich  procures  us  a  more  confiderable  good,  does  not 
hinder  us  from  being  happy,  Wherefwre,  every  thing  well  con- 
fidered, the  firft  ought  to  be  avoided  as  a  real  evil,  and  the  fécond 
fhould  be  courted  as  a  real  good. 

The 
■I.     '  I  I     I  ■  I  1 1  I  ■  i 

*  See  the  third  note  of  Monf.  Barbeyrac  on  the  duties  of  man  and  a  citizen, 
book  i.  chap.  x.  §  H . 


36  l*he  Principles^?/" 

The  nature  ofhuman  things  requires  us  to  be  attentive  to  thefe 
principles.  Were  each  of  our  adions  reftraincd  in  iuch  a  manner, 
an'J  limited  within  itfelf,  as  nut  to  be  attended  with  any 
confcquence,  we  (hoiild  not  be  fo  often  miftaken  in  our 
choice,  but  ihould  be  almoft  furc  of  grafping  the  good.  But  in- 
formed as  we  are  by  experience,  that  things  have  frequently  vety 
different  eftcils  from  what  they  fccmed  to  promife,  inibmuch  that 
the  mod  pleafing  objects  are  attended  with  bitter  confcquence?, 
and  on  the  contrary  a  real  and  iolid  good  is  purchafed  with  labour 
and  pains,  prudence  does  not  allow  us  to  fix  our  whole  attention 
on  the  prefent.  We  fliould  extend  our  views  to  futurity,  and 
equally  weigh  and  confider  the  one  and  the  other,  in  order  to  pafj 
a  folid  judgment  on  them,  a  judgment  fufficient  to  fix  properly 
our  relulutions. 

?ixth  rule.  V.  6.  For  the  fame  reafon,  wc  ousht  to  préféra  greater  to  a 
To  give  the  IgHej-  good  ;  wc  ought  always  to  afpire  to  the  nobleft  goods  that 
c°ccl'  !oil'^  ^"^'^  "^'  ^"^  proportion  our  defires  and  purfuits  to  the  nature  and 
the  prefer-  merit  of  each  good.  This  rule  is  fo  evident,  that  it  would  be 
ence,  .        lofing  time  to  pretend  to  prove  it. 

Seventh  VI.  7.  It  is  not  neceflary  to  have  an  intire  certainty  in  regard 

J*^'"'  Ji'l  ■  *"  confiderable  goods  and  evils  :  mere  poflibility,  and  much  more 
voffibihty  foi  probability,  are  fufficient  to  induce  a  rcafonable  perfon  to  de- 
only,  and  prive  himfe'.f  of  foiTie  trifling  good,  snd  even  to  fufFer  fome  flight 
Vy  «mudi  t;\^il,vvitha  defign  of  acquiring  a  far  greater  good,  and  avoiding  a 
^t"'''of  '       "^"'^  troubk'fome  evil. 

«i-ob:.bility,  ^  his  ruîe  is  a  confequence  of  the  foregoing  ones  ;  and  we  may 
pughc  to  aSirrn,  that  the  ordinary  condudl  of  men  fhews  they  are  fenfibly 
tktcrmine  convinced  of  theprudence  and  necefilty  thereof.  In  effect,  v;hat 
us.  is  the  aim   of  all   this  tumult  ofbullnefs    into  which   they  hurry 

themfelves  ?  To  what  end  and  purpofe  are  all  the  labours  they 
undertake,  all  the  pains  and  fitigues  they  endure,  all  the  perils  to 
vvhich  they  conftantly  expcfe  themfelves  \  Their  intent  is  to  ac- 
quire fome  advantages  which  they  imagine  they  do  not  purchafe 
too  dear  ;  though  thefe  advantages  are  neitner  prefent,  nor  fo  cer- 
tain, as  the  facrifices  they  muft  make  in  order  to  obtain  them. 

This  i;  a  very  rational  manner  of  adling.  Reafon  requires, 
that  in  defaultof  certainty  we  fhould  take  up  with  probability  as  the 
rule  of  our  judgment  and  determination;  fur  probability  in  that 
ciK^Q  is  the  onlv  light  and  guide  we  have.  .And'  unlcfs  it  is  more 
eligible  to  wander  in  unceruinty,  than  to  follov/  a  guide  ;  unlefs 
vve'are  o?  opinion  that  our  lainp  ought  to  be  extinguished  when  we 
.    are  deprived  of  the  light  of  the  fan  j  it  is  rcafonable  to  be  dire6-ed 

by 


Natural    Law.  37 

bv  probability,  when  we  are  incapable  to  come  at  evidcnc.  It  is 
eaficr  to  attain  our  aim  by  help  of  a  faint  or  glimmering  light  than 
by  continuing  in  darknefs.  ♦ 

VII.  8.  We  fliould    be  folic i tons    to  acquire  a  tafte  for  true  Eighth 
goods,  infomu.h  that  goods  of  an  excellent  nature,  and  aclcnow-  rule.    To 
ledged  as  fuch,  ILuuld  excite  our  deflres,  and  induce  us  to  make  all  hj'"'^  ^  '■^^" 
the  efforts  necelTary  for  getting  them  into  our  poflefHon.  good». 

This  laH  rule  is  a  natural  confequence  of  the  others,  afcertain- 
ing  their  execution  and  efFeds.  It  is  not  fufficient  to  have  en- 
lightened the  mind  in  refpeiSt  to  the  nature  of  thefe  goods  and 
evils  that  are  capable  of  rendering  vis  really  happy  or  unhappy  ; 
we  fliould  likewife  give  activity  and  efficacy  to  thcfe  principles, 
by  forming  the  will  fo  as  to  determine  itlclf  by  tafte  and  habit, 
pm-fuant  to  the  counfels  of  enlightened  reafon.  And  let  no  one 
think  it  impofllljle  to  change  our  inclinations,  or  to  reform  our 
taftos.  It  is  with  the  tafte  of  the  mind,  as  with  that  of  the  palate. 
Experience  fhews,  that  we  may  alter  both,  fo  as  to  find  pleafure 
at  length  in  things  that  before  were.difagreeable  to  us.  We  begin 
to  do  a  thing  with  pain,  and  by  an  effort  of  reafon  ;  afterwards  we 
familiarize  ourfelves  to  it  by  degrees  ;  then  a  frequency  of  a£ls 
renders  it  eafier  to  us,  the  repugnance  ceafes,  we  view  the  thing 
in  a  different  light  from  what  we  did  before  ;  and  ufe  at  length 
makes  us  love  a  thing  that  before  was  the  objetl  of  our  averfion. 
Such  is  the  power  of  iiabit  :  it  makes  us  infenfibly  feel  fo  much 
eafe  and  fatisfadtion  in  what  we  areaccuftomed  to,  that  we  find  it 
difficult  afterwards  to  abftain  from  it. 

VIII.  Thefe  are  the  principal  counfels  we  receive  from  reafon.  Our  mhid 
They   are  in  fume  meafure  a   fyftem  of  maxims,   which  drawn  acqulefces 
from  the   nature  of  things,  and  particularly  from  the  nature  and  "^Y"^^^*" 
ftateof  man,  acquaint  us  with  what  is  effentially  fuitable  to  him,  jj^^ .  a„^j 

and  they  ought 

«-__—„ -__^— —.—-______ i  to  influence 

•  In  the  ordinary  courfe  of  life,  we  are  generally  obliged  to  be  determined  "^^  '•°°' 
hy  probability,  for  it  is  not  always  in  our  power  to  attain  to  a  complete  evi-  "uct» 
dencc.  Seneca  the  philofoi-her  has  beautifully  cftablifhed  and  explained  this 
maxim  :  "  Huic  refpondcbimus,  nunquani  e3ip!;elaye  nos  certifTmiam  rerum 
•'  cenipreheufionom  :  quoniam  in  arduo  eft  veri  expioratio  :  fed  ca  ire,  qua 
•' duclt  vcri  fimilitudo.  Omne  hac  via  frocedit  officjum.  Sic  ferimus, 
*'  Cc  navigamus,  fie  militanius,  fic  uxores  ducimus,  fic  liberos  tollimuà  ;  quum 
'•  omnium  horum  incertus  fit  eventus.  Ad  ea  accedimus,  de  quilms  bene  fper- 
"  andum  effe  credimiis.  Qals  enim  poHiceatur  fcrenti  provcntum,  iiaviganti 
'<  portum,  militant!  vidoriam,  marito  pudicam  uxorem,  patri  pios  liberos  ? 
*«  ijcquimur  qua  ratio,  non  qua  Veritas  trahit.  Exfpe>îla,  ut  nifi  bene  ceflura 
'•'  non  facias,  &.  nifi  comperca  veritate  nihil  moveris  :  relido  omni  aiflu  vita 
«'  coijfiftit.  Duni  verifimi'ia  me  in  hoc  aut  illud  impellant,  non  verebor  bene. 
"  ficium  dare  cij  quern  vciifunils  crit  gratura  efle,"  De  Benefic.  lib.  4.  c  33. 


j8  The  Principles   of 

and  include  the  moft  neceflary  rules  for  his  perfe£lion  and  hap- 
pinefs. 

Thcfe  general  principles  are  of  fuch  a  nature,  as  to  force,  as  it 
were,  our  alfent  ;  infomuch  that  a  clear  and  cool  uuderflianding, 
difengaged  from  the  prejudice  and  tumult  of  paiTions,  cannot  help 
acknowledging  their  truth  and  prudence.  Every  one  fees  how 
ufeful  it  would  be  to  man  to  have  thefe  principles  prefent  always 
in  his  mind,  that  by  the  apphcation  and  ufe  of  them  in  particular 
cafes,  they  may  infenfibly  become  the  uniform  and  confiant  rule 
of  his  inclinations  and  condu6t. 

Maxims,  in  fadt,  like  ihefe,  are  not  mere  fperulations  :  they 
fliould  naturally  influence  our  morals,  and  be  of  ftrvice  to  us  in 
pradical  life.  For  to  wdiat  purpofe  would  it  be  to  lilitn  to  the 
advice  of  reafon,  unlefs  we  intended  to  follow  it  :'  Of  v;hat  fignifi- 
cationare  thofe  rules  of  conduit,  which  manifeftly  appear  to  us 
good  and  ufeful,  if  we  refufe  to  conform  to  then  ?  We  ourfelvts 
arc  fenfible  that  this  light  was  given  us  to  regulate  our  fteps  and 
inoticns.  If  we  deviate  from  thcfe  maxims,  we  inwardly  difap- 
prove  and  condemn  ourfelvcs,  as  we  are  apt  to  coiidemn  any  other 
perfon  in  a  fimilar  cafe.  But  if  we  happen  to  conform  to  thcfe 
maxims,  it  is  a  fubjeitof  internal  fatisfadion,  and  we  commend 
ourfelves,  as  we  commend  others  who  have  aâcd  after  this  manner. 
Thefc  fentiments  are  fo  very  natural,  that  it  is  not  in  our  power  to 
think  otherwife.  We  are  forced  to  refpe(ft  thefe  principles,  as  a 
rule  agreeable  to  our  nature,  and  on  which  our  felicity  depends. 

Ofotliga-  ]X.  This  agreeablenef?  fufficiently  known  implies  a  neceffity 
^?"  f  did-  <^f  f'luar'ng  oi^"»t  condu(5l  by  it.  When  we  mention  necefHty,  it  is 
ered.  plain  we  do  not  mean  a  phydcal  but  mor:;l  ncccfîity,  confi fling  in 

the  impreffion  made  on  us  by  fome  particular  motives,  which  de- 
termine us  to  act  after  a  certain  manner,  and  do  not  permit  us  to 
a£l  rationally  the  oppofite  way. 

FindinfT  ourfelves  in  thefe  circumftances,  we  fay  we  are  under 
an  obligation  of  doing  or' omitting  a  certain  thing  ;  that  is,  we  are 
determined  to  it  by  folid  reafons,  and  engaged  by  cogent  motives, 
which,  like  fo  many  ties,  draw  our  will  to  that  fide.  It  is  in  this 
fenfe  a  perfon  fays  he  is  obliged.  For  whether  we  are  determined 
by  popular  opinion,  or  whether  we  are  direcled  by  civilians  and 
ethic  writers,  vvc  find  that  the  one  and  the  other  make  obligation 
properly  confift  in  a  reafon,  which  being  well  underflood  and 
approved,  determines  us  abfcjlutely  to  act  after  a  certain  manner 
preferable  to  another.  From  whence  it  follows,  th.at  the  whole 
force  of  this  obligation  depends  on  the  judgmcntj  by  which  we 

approve 


•Natural    Law.  39 

approve  or  condemn  a  particular  manner  of  ailing.  For  to  ap- 
prove, is  ackraowledging  we  ought  to  do  a  thing  ;  and  to  condtmn, 
is  owning  we  'ought  not  to  do  it.  Now  ought  and  to  be  obliged 
are  fynonymous  terms. 

We  have  already  hinted  at  the  natural  analogy  between  the 
proper  and  literal  fenfe  of  the  word  obliged,  and  the  figurative  fig- 
nification  of  this  fame  term.  Obligation  properly  denotes  a  tie  ;  * 
a  man  obliged^  is  therefore  a  perfon  who  is  tied.  And  as  a  man 
bound  with  cords  or  chains,  cannot  move  or  a6l  with  liberty,  fo 
it  is  very  near  the  fame  cafe  with  a  perfon  who  is  obliged;  with 
this  difference,  that  in  the  firftcafe,  it  is  an  external  and  phyfical 
impeditnent  which  prevents  the  effeél  of  one's  natural  flrength  ; 
but  in  the  fécond  it  is  only  a  moral  tie,  that  is,  the  fubjc61-ion  of 
liberty  is  produced  by  reafon,  which  being  the  primitive  rule  of 
man  and  his  faculties,  dircftsand  neceiVarily  inodifies  his  opera- 
tions in  a  manner  fuifable  to  the  end  it  propofed. 

We  may  therefore  define  obligation,  confidered  in  general  and 
inits  firft  origin,  a  rellridion  of  natural  liberty,  produced  by 
reafon  j  inafriuch  as  the  counfels  which  reafon  gives  us,  are  fo 
many  motives,  that  determine  man  to  adt  after  a  certain  manner 
preferable  to  another. 

X.  Such  is  the  nature  of  primitive  and    original    obligation.  Obligation 
From  thence  it  follows,  that  this  obligation  may  be  more  or  Icfs  "■'^^X  ^'^ 
ftrons,  more  or  lefs  rigorous  ;  accordintr  as  the  reafons  that  eftab-  J^°r^ oriels 
lifh  il  have  more  or  lefs  weight,  and  confequently  as  the  motives         ** 
from  thence  refulting  have  more  or  lefs  imprellion  on  the  will.  For 
manifefl  it  is,  that  the  more  thefe  piotives  arc  cogent  and  effica- 
cious, the  more  the  necefHty  of  conforming  our  actions  to  them 
becomes  flrong  and  indifpenlible. 

XI.  I  am  not  ignorant,  that  this  explication  of  the  nature  and  Dr.  Clark's 

origin  of  obligation  is  far  from  being  adopted  by  all  civilians  and  op'nion  on 

ethic  writers.      Some  pretend,  *  that  the  natural  fitnefs  or  unfitnefs  'Ij"^'"^^ 

;  •  7  t  J    1      •  •         ^  •  ■       1  1--1  *"'»  origin 

which  we  acknowledge  in  certain  actions^   is  the  true  and  original  ofoblicra- 

foundation  of  all  obligation  ;  that  virtue  has  an  intrinfic  beauty  which  tion. 

renders  it  amiable  of  itfclf,  aiul  that  vice  on  the  contrary  is  attended 

with  an  intrinfic  deformity^  luhich  ought  to  make  us  dctejl  it.,  and  this 

antecedent  to  andi7idependent  of  the  good  and  evil.,  of  the  rewards  and 

punijhments  which  may  arife  from  the  practice  of  either. 

But  this  opinion,  methinks,  can  be  fupported  no  farther  than  it  is 

reduced  to  that  which  we  have  jufl  now  explained.     For  to  fay 

that 

*  Obligaiio  a  Uganda. 

*  See  Dr.  Clark  on  the  cvid.-nce  of  natural  and  revealed  religion. 


40  72^    P  R  I  N  C  I  P  L  E  s    ^ 

that  virtue  has  of  itfelf  a  natural  beauty,  which  renders  it  worthy 
of  our  love,  and  that  vice,  on  the  contrary,  merits  our  averfion  ; 
is  not  this  acknowledging,  in  fail,  that  we  have  nafon  to  prefer  one 
to  the  other  ?  Now  whatever  this  reafon  be,  it  certainly  can  never 
become  a  motive  capable  of  determining  the  will,  but  inalmuch  as 
it  prefents  to  us  Tome  good  to  acquire,  or  tends  to  make  us  avoid 
fome  evil  ;  in  (hort,  only  as  it  is  able  to  contribute  to  our  fatisfac- 
tion,  and  to  place  us  in  aftate  of  tranquility  and  happinefs.  Thus 
it  is  ordained  by  the  very  conftitution  of  man,  ,and  the  nature  of 
human  will.  For  as  good,  in  general,  is  the  objeét  of  the  will  ; 
the  only  motive  capable  of  fetting  it  in  motion,  or  of  determining 
it  to  one  fide  preferable  to  another,  is  the  hopes  of  obtaining  this 
good.  To  abftraél  therefore  from  all  intereft  in  refpedt  to  man, 
is  depriving  him  of  all  motive  of  ailing,  that  is,  reducing  him  to  a 
ftate  of  inailion  and  indifference.  Befuies,  what  idea  fhould  we 
be  able  to  form  of  the  agrecablenefs  or  difagreeablenefs  of  human 
aiElions,  of  their  beauty  or  turpitude,  of  their  proportion  or  irregu- 
larity, were  not  all  this  referred  to  man  himftlf,  and  to  what  his 
deftination,  his  perfedlion,  his  v;elfare,  and,  in  (hort,  his  true 
felicity  requires  ? 

Monfieur         XII.  Moft  civilians  are  of  a  different  opinion  from  that  of  Dr. 

Barbeyrac's  Clark.     "  *  They  fcftablifh  as  a  principle  of  obligation,  properly  (o 

opinion        n  j.j,j[gj^  fj^g  will  of  a  fuperior  being,  on  whom  dependence  i^  ac- 

thisfubjed.  "  knowledged.     They  pretend  there  is  nothing  but  this   will,  or 

*'  the  orders  of  a  being  of  this  kind,  that  can  bridle  our  liberty,  or 

*'  prefcribe  particular  rules  to  our  ailions.     They  add,  that  neither 

**  the  relations  of  proportion  nor  difagreement  which  we  acknow- 

*'  ledge  in  the  things  themfelve?,  nor  the  approbation  they  receive 

*'  from  reafon,  lay   us  under  an  indifpenfible  ncccffity  of  following 

*'  thofe  ideas,  as  the  rules  of  our  conduit.     That  our  reafon  being 

"  in  reality  nothing  elfc  but  ourfelves,  nobody,  properly  fpeaking, 

**  can  lay  himfelf  under  an  obligation.     From  whence  theycon- 

*'  elude,  that  the  maxims  of  reafon,  confidered  in  themfelves,  and 

"  independent  of  the  will  of  a  fupeiior,  have  nothing  obligatory 

"  in  their  nature." 

This  manner  of  explaining  the  nature,  and  laying  the  founda- 
tion of  obligation,  appears  to  me  infufficient,  becaufe  it  does   not 

afcend 


*  Sec  t-lie  judgment  of  an  anonymus  writer,  Is'c.  §  15  This  Is  a  fmall 
work  of  Mr.  Leibnitz,  on  whidi  Mr  Barbeyrac  has  made  fomc  remarks,  and 
which  is  inferted  in  the  fifth  edition  of  his  tranflatiou  of  the  duties  of  mun  and 
eitizen. 


Natural    Law.  41 

afcend  to  the  original  fource,  and  real  principles.  True  it  is, 
that  the  will  of  a  fuperior  obliges  thofe  who  are  his  dependants  ; 
yet  this  will  cannot  have  fuch  an  effec!^,  but  inafmuch  as  it  meets 
with  the  approbation  of  our  reafon.  For  this  purpofe,  it  is  not 
only  neceftiry  that  the  fuperior's  will  fliould  contain  nothing  in 
itfelfoppofite  to  th-j  nature  of  man  ;  b«t  moreover  it  ought  to  be 
proportioned  in  fuch  a  manner  to  his  conftiiution  and  ultimate  end, 
that  we  cannot  help  acknowledging  it  as  the  rule  of  our  allions  ; 
infomuch  that  there  is  no  neglecting  it  without  falling  into  a  dan- 
gerous error  J  and,  on  the  contrary,  the  only  means  of  attaining 
our  end  is  to  bsdirefted  by  it.  Ocherwife,  it  is  inconceivable 
bowman  can  volunt;uily  fubmit  to  the  orders  of  a  fuperior,  or 
determine  willingly  to  obey  him.  Own  indeed  I  muft,  that,  ac- 
cording to  the  language  of  civilians,  the  idea  of  a  fuperior  who 
commands,  muft  intervene  to  eftablilh  an  obligation,  fuch  as  is 
commonly  confidered.  But  unlefs  we  trace  things  higher,  by 
grounding  even  the  authority  of  this  fuperior  on  the  approbation 
he  receives  from  reafon,  it  will  produce  only  an  external  conftrainr, 
very  different  from  obligation,  which  hath  of  itfelf  a  power  of. pen- 
etrating the  will,  and  moving  it  by  an  inv/ard  fenfe  ;  infomuch  that 
man  is  of  his  own  accord,  and  without  any  reftraint  or  violence, 
inclined  to  obey. 

XIII.  From  all  thefe  remarks  we  may  conclude,  that  the  differ-  ^      - 
ences  between  the  principal   lyltems  concerning  the   nature  and  of  obipa- 
originof  obligation,  are  not  fo  great  as  they  appear  at  firlt  fight,  tions  ;"jn- 
Were  we  to  make  a  defer  inquiry  into  thefe  opinions,  by  afcending  te^nal  and 
to  their  primitive  fources,  we  ihould  find  that  thefe  different  ideas,  ^-''^"^'*^» 
reduced  to  their  exadl  value,  far  from  beingoppofitCjaa^ree  vury  well 
together,  and  ought  even  to  concur,  in  order  to  form  a  fyftem  con- 
neifled  properly  with  all  its  effential  parts,  in  relation  to   the  nature 
and  ftate   of  man.     This  is  what  we  intend  more  particularly  to 
perform  hereafter.  *     It  is  proper  at  prefent  to  obferve,  that  there 
are  two  forts  of  obligations,  one  internal,   and  the  other  external. 
By  internal  obligation,  I  underftand  that  which   is  produced  only 
by  our  own  reafon,  confidered   as  the  primitive  rule  of  conduct, 
and  in  confequence  of  the  good  or  evil  the  a6lion  in  itfelf  contains. 
By  external  obligation,  we  mean   that  which  arifes  fron;  the  will 
of  a  being,  on  v/hom  we  allow  ourfelves  dependent,  and  who  com- 
mands or  prohibits  fome  particular  thinf»*-,   under  a  cornminati  >a 
of  punifhment.     Whereto  we  muft  add,  that  thefe  two  obligations, 
far  from  being  oppofite  to    eacti  other,  have,  on   the  coiiLiai\,  a 

F  p-rfe£l 

*   See  the  fécond  part,  chap,  vi. 


4-2  The  Principles  of 

perfe»^  agreement.  Foras  the  external  obligation  is  capable  ol 
giving  a  new  force  to  the  intcrnul,  fo  the  whole  force  of  the  exter- 
nal obligation  ultiinatcly  depends  on  the  internal  ;  and  it  is  from  the 
agreement  and  concurrence  of  thcfe  two  obligations  that  the  high- 
efl  tlegree  of  moral  necellity  atifes,  as  alfo  the  llrongeft  tie,  or  the 
pr#«ereft  motive  to  make  impreiîion  on  man,  in  order  to  deter- 
mine him  to  purfiie  fteadily  and  never  to  deviate  from  fome  fixt 
rules  of  condu6l  ;  in  a  word,  by  this  it  is  that  the  moft  perf«dl 
obligation  is  formed. 


CHAP.     VII. 

Of  right  confidercd  as  a  faculty^  and  of  the  obligation  thereto  corref- 
ponding. 

The  word     ^'    "O 

right  istak-  JLJ^SIDilS  the  general  idea  of  right,  fuch  as  has  been  now 
en  in  fever-  cxplamed,  eonfidering  it  as  the  primitive  rule  of  human  ad^ions  i 
alparticu-    this  term  is  taken   in  feveral  particular  fi^nifications,  which  wc 

lar   fenfss,  n.  .  •  '^  ^ 

>vliich  are   "^"''^  ^ere  point  out. 

all  derived  But,  previous  to  every  thing  elfe,  we^'fliould  not  forget  the 
from  the  prim'tiveand  general  notion  we  have  given  of  right.  For  fmce 
general  jj-j^  f^.^^^  ^j^jg  notion,  as  from  its  princif)le,  that  the  fubje£l  of  this 
and  the  following  chapters  is  deduced  ;  if  our  reafonings  are  exadt 
in  themfiilve?,  and  have  a  necellary  connexion  with  the  principle, 
this  will  furniih  us  with  a  new  argument  in  its  favour.  But  i/, 
unexpedledly,  it  Hiould  turn  out  otherwife,  we  (hall  have  at  ieaft 
the  advantage  ofdete6ling  the  error  in  its  very  fource,  and  of  being 
better  able  to  correiSl  it.  Such  is  the  effeft  of  a  juft  method  :  we 
are  convinced  that  a  general  idea  is  exa£l,  when  the  particular 
idîas  are  reducible  toit  as  different  branches  to  their  trunk. 

of  right,  II-  Tnthe  firft  place.  Right  is  frequently  taken  for  a  perfonal 

confidered    quality,  for  a  power  of  acting  or  faculty.     It  is  thus  we  fay,  that 

asafuciiity.  gvery  man  has  a  right  to  attend  to    his  own  prefervation  ;  that  a 

parent  has  a  right  to  bring  up  his  children  ;  that  a  fovereign  has  a 

right  to  levy  troops  for  the  defence  of  the  (late,  Sec. 

In  this  fenfe  we  muft  define  Right,  a  power  that  man  hath  to 
nr^kc  ufe  of  his  liberty  and  natural  ftrength  in  a  particular  manner, 
cither  in  regard  to  himfelf,  or  in  refpcct  toother  men,  fo  far  as  this 
exercife  of  his  ftrength  and  liberty  is  approved  by  reafon. 

Thu?,  when  we  fay  that  a  father  has  a  right  to  bring  up  his 

children, 


Natural    La  w.  43 

children,  all  that  is  meant  hereby  is,  that  reafon  allo'A's  a  f.ithsr  to 
njake  I'.fe  of  hi;*  liberty  and  natural  force  in  a  manner  fuitable  to 
the  prefervation  of  his  children,  and  proper  to  cultivate  their  un- 
derftandings,  and  to  train  them  up  in  the  principles  of  virtue.  In 
like  manner,  as  reafon  gives  its  approbation  to  the  fovercign  in 
whatever  is  ncceflary  for  the  prefervation  and  welfare  of  the  ftate, 
it  particularly  authorifes  him  to  raife  troops  and  bring  armies  into 
the  field,  in  order  to  oppofe  an  enemy  ;  and  in  confequence  hereof 
we  fay  he  has  a  right  to  do  it/  But,  on  the  contrary,  we  afarm, 
that  a  prince  has  no  right,  without  a  particular  necefïîty,  to  drag 
the  peafant  from  the  plough,  or  to  force  poor  tradefmen  from  their 
families  ;  that  a  father  has  no  right  to  expofe  his  children,  or  to 
put  Uiem  to  death,  ccc.  becaufe  thefe  things,  far  from  being  ap- 
proved, are  expref?ly  condemned  by  reafon. 

III.  We  m u ft    not   therefore  confound  a    finr) pie  power  vvith  taUe  care  to 
right.      A  funple  power  is  a  phyfical  quality  ;  it  is  a  power  of  aftng  dirtirguiih 
in  the  full  extent  of  our  natural  ftrength  and  liberty  :    but  the  idea  '^"««een 
of  right  is  more  confined.     This  inc'udes  a  relation  of  agreeable-  c"ând^°^^' 
nefs  to  a  rule  which  modifies    ttie  phyficel  power,   and  directs  its  right. 
operations  in  a  manner  proper  to  condu(5l  niaii  to  a  certain  end. 
It  is  for  this  reafon  we  fiy,  th.it  right  is  a  moral  quality.     It  is  true 
there  are  fome  that  rank  power  as  v^'cll  as  right  among   the  num- 
ber of  moral  qualities  :  *    but  there   is  nothing  in  this  effc-nti^lly 
cppofite   to  our  diftinclion.       Thofe  who  rank  thefe  two  ideas 
among  moral  entities,  undcrftand  by  power,  pretty  near  the  fame 
thing  as  we  undcrftand  by  right  ;  and  cuftom  feems  to  authorife 
this  confufion  ;    f^r  we  equally  ufe,  for  m^zncQ^  paternal  power, 
s.nd  paternal  right.,  Sic.     Be  this  as  it  will,   we  are  not  to  difpup 
about  words.     The  main  point  is  to  diftinguilh  here  between  p/:y- 
Jfcal  2.ni  ncral;  and  it  feems  that  the  v/ord  rigbty   as   PuFrendorf 
himfelf  infinuates,  t    isntter  of  itfelfthan  poiver^    to   exprels  the 
moral  idea.     In  fhort,  the  ufe  of  our  faculties  becomes  a  right, 
only  fofar  as  it  is  approved  by  reafon,  and  is  found  agreeable  to  this 
primitive  rule  of  humanisions.     And  whatever  aman  can  rris- 
fonably  perform,  becomes  in  regard  to  him  a  right,  becaufe  reafon  is 

the 

*  See  Piiffendorf  on  the  Law  of  Nature   and  Nations,  book    i.  chap  i.  §  iQ. 

+  There    feems  to  be   this  d:2ire.".ce  between  the  terms  o{ pozver  and  rhLf  ; 

that  the  firft  does  more  exprefsly  import    the  prefencc  of  the   faid  quality,  .ind 

does, but  obicurely  denote  the  manner  how  any  one  acquired  it.      Whereas  the 

;4  rigJjt  does  properly  and  clearly  (hew,  that  the  quality  was  fairly  got,  i",d 

bw  fiirly  pojl^ned.      FuJ:r.d:irf  ^n    :':;  L^-v    if  I\'.;li.i(    and  Niliohs,   L-jjJ:  i, 

,4.  i.  §  10. 


44  ^^^  Principles  of 

the  only  means  that  can  conduct  him  in  a  fliort  and  fure  manner 
to  tlie  end  he  propoles.  There  is  nothing  therefore  arbitrary  in 
thefe  ideas  j  they  are  borrowed  from  the  veiy  nature  of  things,  and 
if  we  compare  them  to  the  foregoing  principles,  we  fhall  find  they 
flow  from  thence  as  neceflary  confequences. 

General  jy^  If  any  one  (hoiild  afterwards  inquire,  on  what  foundation 

oun  ail  j^ -^^  ^^^  reafon  api)roves  a  particular  exercife  of  our  ftrength  and 
rights  of  liberty,  in  preference  to  another  ;  the  anfwcr  is  obvious.  The 
»iao,  difference  of  thofe  judgments  arifes  from  the  very  nature  of  things 

and  their  effeft^.  Every  exercife  of  our  faculties,  that  tends  of 
ititJfto  the  perfeilion  and  happinefs  of  man,  meets  with  the  appro- 
bation of  reafon,  which  condemns  whatever  leads  to  a  contrary  end. 

j^.  ,  V.  Obligation  anfwers  to  right,    taken,   in  the  manner  above 

duces  obli-  explained,  and  confidered  in  its  effedls  with  regard  to  another 
gation.        perfon. 

What  we  have  already  faid,  in  the  preceding  chapter,  concern- 
ing obligation,  is  fufficient  to  convey  a  general  notion  of  the  nature 
of  this  moral  quality.  But  in  order  to  form  a  juft  idea  of  that 
which  comes  under  our  prefent  examination,  we  are  to  obferve, 
that  when  reafom  allows  a  man  to  make  a  particular  ufe  of  his 
iirength  and  liberty,  or,  which  is  the  fame  thing,  when  it  acknow- 
ledges he  has  a  particular  right  ;  it  is  requilite,  by  a  very  natural 
confequence,  that  in  order  to  enfure  this  right  to  man,  he  (hould 
acknowledge  at  the  fame  tim.e,  that  other  people  ought  not  to  em- 
ploy their  ftrength  and  liberty  in  refifting  him  in  this  point;  but 
on  the  contrary,  that  theyfliould  refpeft  his  right,  and  afTifl  him  in 
the  exercife  of  it,  rather  than  do  him  any  prejudice.  From  thence 
the  idea  of  obligation  naturally  arifes  ;  which  is  nothing  more  than 
a  reflriftion  of  natural  liberty  produced  by  reafon  ;  inafmuch  as 
reafon  does  not  permit  an  oppofition  to  be  made  to  thofe  who  ufe 
their  right,  bur  on  the  contrary  it  obliges  everybody  to  favour  and 
abetfuch  as  do  nothing  but  v.'hat  it  authorifes,  rather  than  oppofo 
or  traverfe  them  in  the  execution  of  their  lawful  defigns. 

Itjght  and        VI.  Right  therefore  and  obligation  are,  as  the  logicians  exprefs 

ohiiv.uiun    it,  two  corrt'//rt/iW  terms  :    one  of  thcfe  ideaB    necefTarily  fuppofes 

arc  two  re-  ^^^  othf  r  ;  and  we  cannot  conceive  a  right  without  a  correfpond- 

terms.  î^g  obligation.     How,  for  example,  could  we  attribute  to  a  father 

the  right  of  forming  his  children  to  wifdom  and  virtue  by"  a  perfedl 

education,  without  acknowledging  at  the  fame  time  that  children 

cught  to  fubmit  to  paternal  diredion,  and  that  they  are  not  only 

obliged 


NaturalLaw.  ^^ 

obliged  not  to  make  any  rcfiftance  in  this  refpeiSl,  but  moreover 
they  ought  to  concur,  by  their  docility  and  obedience,  to  the  exe- 
cution of  their  parents  views  ?  Were  it  otherv.?ife,  reafon  would 
be  no  longer  the  rule  of  human  a6lions  :  it  would  contradict  itfelf, 
and  all  the  rights  it  grants  to  man  v/ould  become  ufelefs  and  of  no 
efFeiSt  ;  which  is  taking  from  him  with  one  hand  what  it  gives  him 
with  the  other. 

VII.  Such  is  the  nature  ofright  taken  for  a  faculty,  and  of  the  At  what 
obligation  thereto  correfponding.     It  may  be  generally  affirmed,  ^^"^^  '^.^"  ^* 
that  man  is  fufceptible  of  thefe  two  qualities,  as  foon  as  he  begins  to  of  right  and 
enjoy  life  and  fenfe.     Yet   we  muft  make  ibme  difference  here,  obligation, 
between  right  and  obligation,  in  refpedl  to  the  time  in  which  thefe 
qualities  begin  to  unfold  themfelves  in  man.     The  obligations  a 

perfon  contra6ls  as  man,  do  not  aélually  difplay  their  virtue  till  he 
is  arrived  to  the  age  of  reafun  and  difcretion.  For,  in  order  to 
difcharge  an  obligation,  we  nmfl  be  firft  acquainted  with  it,  we 
muft  know  what  we  do,  and  be  able  to  fquarc  our  adtions  by  a 
certain  rule.  But  as  for  thofe  rights  that  are  capable  of  procuring 
the  advantage  of  a  perfon  without  his  knowing  any  thing  of  the 
matter,  they  date  their  origin,  and  are  in  full  force  from  the  very 
firft  moment  of  his  exiftence,  and  lay  the  reft  of  mankind  under 
an  obligation  of  refpc6ling  them.  Forrxample,  the  right  which 
requires  that  nobody  (hould  injure  or  offend  us,  belongs  as  well 
to  children,  and  even  to  infants,  that  are  ftill  in  their  mothers 
wombs,  as  to  adult  perfons.  This  is  the  foundation  of  that 
equitable  rule  of  the  Roman  law,  which  declares,  *  That  infants 
who  are  as  yet  in  their  mothers  wcmbs^are  covfidered  as  already  brought 
into  the  worlds  vjhenever  the  que/iion  relates  in  any  thing  that  may 
turn  to  their  advantage.  But  we  cannot  with  any  exadtnefs  affirm, 
that  an  infant,  whether  already  come  or  coming  into  the  world, 
is  adiually  fubjefl  to  any  obligation  with  refpedt  to  other  men. 
This  ftate  does  not  properly  commence,  with  refpecl  to  man,  till 
he  has  attained  the  age  of  knowledge  and  difcretion. 

VIII.  Various  are  the  diftincSlions  of  rights  and  obligations;  Several 
but  itwill  befufficient  for  us  to  point  out  thofe  only,  that  are  ^^'r^^.^  °^ 
moft  worthy  of  notice,  t '^ In  ^^'^^^^L 

*  ^ii)i  utero  ejî,per!>ide  acft  in  rebus  humants  ejfct,  cujloditur,  quathns  de  commodo 
ip/ius  partus,  quar'itur.  L.  7.  de  flatu  homin.  lib.  i.  tit.  3.  Another  civilian 
eftabliflies  this  rule  :  Jtaqu:  pati  quis  injuriamy  etiamjl  nonfent'iat,  potcfl:  facers 
nemo,  nift  qui  fcit  fe  in juriam  facers ^  etiamfi  ncfdcit  eui  facial,  L.  3.  §  a.  D.  de 
injuriis   lib.  47-  tit.  10. 

+  See  Puffendorf  on  the  Law  of  Nature  and  Nations,  book  i.  chap.  i.  §  19. 
and  Grotius  of  the  Rightiof  War  and  Peace,  book  I   chap,  i.  §  4,  $^(>,  7.  with 
Baibeyrac's  notes. 


^.6  'ïhe  Principles  of 


in  the  firfl;  placi",  rights  are  natural,  or  acquired.  The  former 
are  fuch  as  appertain  originally  and  eiRntially  toman,  fuch  as  arc 
inherent  in  his  nature,  and  which  he  enjoys  as  man,  independent 
of  any  particular  a£l  on  his  fide.  Acquired  ri^h'^s  C'l  the  con- 
trary, are  thofe  which  he  does  not  naturally  cnj^y,  but  are  owing 
to  his  own  procurem-mt.  Thus  the  right  of  providing  for  our 
preftrvation,  is  a  right  natural  to  man  ;  but  fnver.'ign'V;  -r  the 
right  of  commanding  a  fociety  of  men,  is  a  right  acquired. 

Secondly,  rights  are  pertecl,  or  iraperfeft  Perft  éî  rights  are 
thofe  which  may  be  alTerted  in  rigour,  even  by  employing  force  to 
to  obtain  the  execution,  or  to  fecure  the  cxercife  tnereof  in  oppo- 
iition  to  all  thofe  who  ihould  attempt  to  refifl  or  difturb  us.  Thus 
reafon  would  impower  us  to  ufe  force  againft  any  one  that  wctiM 
make  an  unjuft  attack  upon  our  lives,  our  goods,  or  our  liberty. 
But  when  reafon  does  not  allow  us  to  ufe  forcible  metncds,  in 
order  to  (ccure  the  enjoyment  of  the  rights  it  grants  us,  then  thcfe 
rightsare  called  imperfecl.  ThuF,  notwithilinding  reafon  author- 
jfes  thofe,  who  ofthemfelvesare  deftitute  of  means  of  living,  to  ap- 
ply for  fuccoiir  to  other  men  ;  yet  they  cannot,  in  cafe  of  refufii, 
infill  upon  it  by  force,  or  procure  it  by  open  violence.  It  is  obvi- 
ous, without  our  having  any  occafion  to  mention  it  her?,  that  obli- 
gation anfwers  exactly  to  right,  and  is  more  or  lefs  ftrnng,  perfect, 
or  imperfcâ-,  according  as  right  itfclf  is  perfcâ  or  imperfect. 

Thirdly,  another  diltinclion  worthy  of  our  attention,  is,  that 
there  are  rights  which  may  be  lawfully  renounced,  and  others 
that  cannot.  A  creditor,  for  example,  may  forgive  a  fum  due  to 
him,  if  he  pleafes,  either  in  the  whole  or  part  ;  but  a  father  can- 
not renounce  the  right  he  has  over  his  children,  nor  leave  thcrri 
in  ail  intire  independence.  The  reafon  of  this  difFdrence  is,  that 
there  are  rights  which  of  them feU'es  have  a  natural  connection 
with  our  duties,  and  are  given  to  man  only  as  means  to  perform 
them.  To  renounce  this  fort  of  rights,  would  be  therefore  re- 
nouncing our  duty,  which  is  never  allowed.  But  with  refpedl  to 
rights  that  no  way  concern  our  duties,  the  renunciation  of  them  is 
licit,  and  only  a  matter  of  prudence.  Let  us  illull^rate  this  with 
another  example.  Man  cannot  abrolutcly,and  witliout  any  man- 
ner of  referve,  renounce  his  liberty  ;  for  this  would  be  manifeflly 
throwing  himfelf  into  a  necefllty  of  doing  wrong,  were  he  fo 
commanded  by  the  perfon  to  whom  he  has  made  this  fubje6tion. 
But  it  is  lawful  for  us  to  renounce  a  part  of  our  liberty,  if  we  find 
ourfelves  better  enabled  thereby  to  difcharge  our  duties,  and  to 
acquire  fome  certain  and  reafonable  advantage.  It  is  with  there 
modifications  we  mufl  underftand  the  commion  maxim,  That  h  h 


N  A  T  U  R  A  L     L  A  w.  47 

alkwàhh  for  tver-^  one  to  renounce  his  right. 

Fourthly  ;  Right,  in  fine,  confidered  in  refpcft  to  its  different 
objects,  may  be  reduced  to  four  principal  fpecies.  i.  The  right 
we  have  over  our  own  perfons  and  acftion?,  which  is  called  Liberty. 
2.  The  right  we  have  over  things  or  goods  that  belong  to  us,  which 
\>i^à\\cà  Property,  3.  Theright  we  have  over  the  perfons  and  actions 
of  other  men,  which  is  diltinguiflied  by  the  name  oï Empire  or  Au- 
thority. 4.  And,  ill  fine,  the  right  one  may  have  over  other  men's 
thing*:,  of  which  there  are  fevera!  forts.  It  fuffices,  at  prefent,  to 
have  given  a  rjeneral  notion  ofthcfe  different  fpecies  of  right.  Their 
n.iture  and  effc;6ls  will  be  explained,  when  we  come  to  a  particular 
inquiry  mto  thefe  matters. 

Such  are  the  ideas  we  ought  to  have  of  right,  confidered  as  a 
fliculty.  But  there  is  likewife  another  particular  hgnification  of 
this  word,  by  which  it  is  taken  for  laiv  ;  as  when  we  iay,  that 
natural  right  is  the  foundation  of  morality  and  politics  ;  that  it 
forbids  us  to  break  our  word  ;  that  it  commands  the  reparation  of 
damage,  &c.  In  all  thefe  cafes,  right  is  taken  for  laiv.  And  as 
this  kind  of  right  agrees  in  a  particular  manner  with  man,  it  is 
therefore  a  matter  of  importance  to  clear  and  explain  it  well,  which 
we  (hall  endeavour  to  perform  in  the  following  chapters. 


CHAP.      VIII.* 
Of  Law  in  general. 


IT 

J_N  the  refearches  hitherto  made  concerning  the  rule  of  human 
a6lion?,we  have  confulted  only  the  nature  of  man,his  eflence,and  what 
belongs  to  his  internal  part.  This  inquiry  has  fhewn  us,  that 
man  finds  within  himfelf,  and  in  his  own  Reafon^  the  rule  he 
ought  to  follow  ;  and  fincc  the  counfels  which  reafon  gives  him, 
p  )int  out  the  ftiortefl:  and  fafeft  road  to  his  perfe(flion  and  happinefs, 
froTj  thence  arifes  a  principle  of  obligation,  or  a  cogent  motive  to 
fquare  his  a6lions  by  this  primitive  rule.  But  in  order  to  have  an 
tx^ck  knowledge  of  the  human  fyfl^em,  we  muft  not  flop  at  thefe 
firlt  confiderations  ;  we  fhould  likewife,  purfuant  to  the  method 
already  pointed  out  in  this   work,  f    transfer  our  attention  to  the 

different 

•  See  Puffendorf  on  the  Law  of  Nature«aad  Natitns,  book  i.  chap,  ri»  " 
t  See  chap,  iii-  of  this  part,  §  ^. 


48 


The  Principles  of 


different  ftates  of  man,  and  to  the  relations  from  thence  arlfing, 
which  muft  abfolutely  produce  fome  particular  modifications  in 
the  rules  he  is  to  follow.  For,  as  we  have  already  obferved,  thefc 
rules  ought  not  only  to  be  conformable  to  the  nature  of  man,  but 
they  fhouldbe  proportionable  moreover  to  hisflate  and  fltuation. 


As  man  bjr      \\^  Now  among  the  primitive  ftates  of  man,  dependence  is  one 
depcndeVit^  of  thofe  which  merits  the  mofl:  attention,  and  ought  to  have  the 
being,  the    greateft  influence  on  the  rule  he  is  to  obferve.     In   fa(5l,  a  being 
law  ought    independent  of  every  body  elfe,  has  no  other  rule  to  purfue  but  the 
*°i^^  f^^h-     counfels  of  his  own  reafon  ;  and  in  confequence  of  this  indepen- 
anions    '*    dence  he  is  freed  from  all  fubje£lion  to  another's  will  ;  in  {horr,  he 
is  abfolute  maft  3r  of  himfelf  and  his  a6lions.     But  the  cafe  is  not 
the  fame  with  a  being  who  V  fuppofed  to  be  dependent  on  another, 
as  on  his  fuperior  and   mafter.       The  fenfe  of  this   dependence 
ought  naturally  to  engage  the  inferior  to  take  the  will  of  him  on 
whom  he  depends  for  the  rule  of  his  condu'^l;  fincethe  fubjedtion 
in  which  he  finds  himfelf,  does   not  permit  him  to  entertain  the 
leaft  reafonable  hopes  of  acquiring  any  folid  happinefs,  independent 
of  the  will  of  his  fuperior,  and  of  the  views  he  may  propofe  in  rela- 
tion to  him.  *  Befides,  this  has  more  or  lefs  extent  and  efFedt,  in 
proportion  as  the  fuperiority  of  the  one,  and  the  dependence  of  the 
other,  is    greater  or   lefs,    abfolute  or   limited.      It  is    obvious 
that  all  thefe  remarks  are  in   a   particular  manner  applicable  to 
man  \  fo  that  as  foon  as   he  acknovi'ledges  a  fuperior,  to  whofc 
power  and  authority  he  is  naturally  fubjedt  ;    in  confequence  of 
this  ftate,  he  muft  acknowledge  likewife  the  will  of  this  fuperior 
to  be  the  rule  of  his  adions.     This  is  the  Right  we  call  Laiv. 

It  is  to  be  underftood  however,  that  this  will  of  the  fuperior  has 
nothing  in  it  contrary  to  reafon,  the  primitive  rule  of  man.  For 
were  this  the  cafe,  it  would  be  impoffible  for  us  to  obey  him.  In 
order  to  render  a  law  the  rule  of  human  aflions,  it  fhould  be  abfo- 
lutely agreeable  to  the  nature  and  conltitution  of  tnan,  and  be 
ultimately  defigned  for  his  happinefs,  which  reafon  makes  him 
neceflTarily  purfue.  Thefe  remarks,  though  clear  enough  of 
themfelves,  will  receive  a  greater  light,  when  we  have  more  partic- 
ularly explained  the  nature  of  law. 

Definition  \\i  ^3^^  J  define,  a  rule  prefcribed  by  the  fovereign  of  a 
fociety  to  his  fubjeds,  either  in  order  to  lay  an  obligation  upon 
them  of  doing  or  omitting  certain  things,  under  the  commination 

of 


WW»— '>*'■"■— 


Ses  chap.  vi.  §  3, 


NaturalLaw.  49 

of  punifhinsnt  ;  or  to  leave  them  at  liberty  to  ad  or  not  in  other 
things  jull  as  they  think  proper,  and  to  fccure  to  them,  in  this  ref- 
pedl,  the  full  enjoyment  of  their  rights. 

By  thus  defining  law,  we  deviate  a  little  from  the  definitions 
given    by  Grotius  and   Puffeudorf.  But    the    delinititions    of 

thefc  authors  are,  m^thinks,  fomewhat  too  vague,  and  befides  do 
not  feem  to  agree  with  law  confidered  in  its  full  extent.  This 
opinion  of  mine  will  be  juftified  by  the  particular  explication  I 
am  going  to  enter  upon,  provided  it  be  compared  with  the  paiFagcs 
here  referred  to. * 

IV.  I  fay  that  law  is  a  rule,  to  fignify,  in  the  firft  place,  what  Why  lawî» 
law  has  in  common  with  counfel  j  which   is,  that  they  are  both  ^«fi^eda 
rules  of  conduâ  ;  and  fecondly,  to  diflinguilh  law  from  the  tran-  'f"rib,dl' 
fient  orders  which  may  be  given  by   a  fuperior,  and  not  being 
permanent  rules  of  the  fubjefl's  conducSl',  are  not  properly  laws. 

The  idea  of  rule  includes  principally  thefe  two  things,  univerfality 
and  perpetuity  ;  and  both  thefe  charailers  being  eifential  to  rule, 
generally  considered,  help  to  difcriminate  law  from  any  other  par- 
ticular will  of  the  fovereign. 

I  add,  that  law  is  a  rule  pfefcribed  \  becaufe  a  fimple  refolution 
confined  within  the  fovereign's  mind,  without  manifefting  itfelfby 
lome  external  fign,  can  never  be  a  law.  It  is  requifite  that  this 
will  be  notified  in  a  proper  manner  to  the  fubjedls  ;  fo  that  they  be 
acquainted  with  what  the  fovereign  requires  of  them,  and  with  the 
neceffity  of  fquaring  thereby  their  condu<ft.  But  in  what  manner 
this  notification  is  to  be  made,  whether  viva  voce^  by  writing,  or 
othcrwife,  is  a  matter  of  mere  indifFerence.  Sufficient  it  is,  that 
the  fubje(3:s  be  properly  inftrudled  concerning  the  will  of  the 
legislator. 

V.  Let  usfinifli  the  explication  of  the  principal  ideas  that  enter  Whatîsun. 
into  the  definition  of  law.  Law  is  prefcribed  by  the  fovereign:  ;  derftood  by 
this  is  whatdiftinguiQies  it  hom  counfel,  which  comes  from  a  friend  'lJ^'"J"Jf"* 
or  equal  j  who,  as  fuch,  has  no  power  over  us,  and  whofe  advices,  Indtheright 
conftrquently,  neither  have  the  fame  force,  nor  produce  the  fame  of  command' 
obligation  as  law,  which  coming  from  a  fovereign,  has  for  its  fup-  *"S* 

port  the  command  and  authority  of  a  fuperior.  +  Counfels  are 
followed  for  reafons  drawn  from  the  nature  of  the  thing  ;  laws  are 

G  obeyed, 

•  See  Grotius  on  the  Rights  of  War  and  Peace,  book  i.  chap.  i.  §  9.  And 
PufTendorf  on  the  Law  of  Nature  and  Nations,  book  i.  chap.  vi.  §  4.  Te 
which  we  mîy  add  Monf.  Barbeyrac's  notes. 

f  Sec  the  Law  of  Nature  and  Naîioni,  book.  i.  chap,  vi.  §  it 


50  The  Principles  of 


obeyed,  not  only  on  account  of  the  reafons  on  which  they  are 
eftablifhed,  but  hkewife  becaiifc  of  the  authority  of  the  fovereigii 
that  prcfcribes  them.  The  obligation  arifing  from  counfel  is  mere- 
ly internal  \  that  of  law  is  both  internal  and  external.  * 

Society,  as  we  have  already  obferved,  is  the  union  of  feveral  per- 
fons  fora  particular  end,  from  whence  fome  common  advantage 
arifes.  The  end,  is  the  cffe£l  or  advantage  which  intelligent  be- 
ings propofc  to  themfclves,  and  are  willing  to  procure.  The 
union  of  feveral  pcrfons,  is  the  concurrence  ot  their  will  to  procure 
the  end  they  aim  at  in  common.  But  though  we  make  the  idea 
of  fociety  enter  into  the  definition  of  law,  it  muft  not  bs  inferred 
from  thence,  that  fociety  is  a  condition  abfolutely  efTential  and  ne- 
ceflary  to  the  enafting  of  laws.  Confidering  the  thing  exa£lly, 
we  may  very  well  form  a  conception  of  law,  when  the  fovereign 
has  only  afingle  perfon  fubje6i:  to  his  authority  ;  and  it  is  only  in 
order  to  enter  into  the  actual  ftate  of  things,  that  we  fuppofe  a 
fovereign  commanding  a  fociety  of  tnen.  VVe  muft  neverthelefs 
obferve,  that  the  relation  there  is  between  the  fovereign  and  the 
fubjefls,  forms  a  fociety  between  them,  but  of  a  particular  kind, 
which  we  may  call  Jociety  of  wequality^  where  the  fovereign  com- 
mands, and  the  fubje^Sts  obey. 

The  fovereign  is  therefore  he  who  has  a  right  to  command  in 
the  laft  refort.  To  command,  is  direding  the  allions  of  thofe 
who  are  fubjedt  to  us,  according  to  our  own  will,  and  with  author- 
ity or  the  power  of  conft^raint.  I  (ay  that  the  fovereign  comntaneh 
in  the  laji  refort^  to  (hew  that  as  he  has  the  firft  rank  in  fociety,  his 
will  is  fuperior  to  any  other,  and  holds  all  the  members  of  the  foci- 
ety in  fubjecSïion.  In  fine,  the  right  of  commanding  is  nothing 
more  than  the  power  of  directing  the  a6ïions  of  others  with  au- 
thority. And  as  the  power  of  exercifing  one's  force  and  liberty, 
is  no  farther  a  right,  than  as  it  is  approved  and  authorized  by  rea- 
ton,  it  is  on  this  approbation  of  reafon,  as  the  laft  refort,  that  the 
right  of  commanding  is  ertabliflied. 

VI.  This  leads  us  to  inquire  more  particularly  into  the  natural 
foundation  of  empire  or  fovereignty  ;  or,  which  amounts  to  the 
fame  thing,  what  is  it  that  confers  or  confFitutes  a  right  of  laying 
an  obligation  on  another  perfon,  and  of  requiring  his  fubmifllon 
and  obedience.  This  is  a  very  important  qucftion  in  itfelf  ;  im- 
portant alfo  in  its  effefls.  For  the  more  we  are  convinced  of  the 
reafons,  which  eftablifh  on  the  one  hand  authority,  and  dépendance 

on 

•  See  above,  chap,  yi.  §  13. 


Natural  La  w.  5^ 

on  the  other,  the  more  we  are  inclined  to  make  a  real  and  vohm- 
tary  fiib  niffion  to  thofe  on  whom  v\'e  depend.  B-fidcs,  the  divcr- 
fity  of  I'ntiments,  in  relation  to  the  manner  of  laying  the  founda- 
tion offovereignty,  is  a  fufficient  proof  that  this  fubjedt  requires  to 
be  treated  with  care  and  attention. 


CHAP.     XIX. 

Of  ihe  foundation  of  fovcrcignty^  or  the  right  of  commanding. 
I. 


XNQUIRING    here     into  the  foundation  of  the   right  of  Flrft  re- 
comnianJ,  we  confider  the  thing  only  in  a  general  and  metaphyllcal  '"^'^.'  ^^^ 

-r-,  n-  ^  '     I         r  1       •  C  CT  quellion  lb, 

manner.      1  he  queltion  is  to  know  the  toundation  or  a  necellary  j„  regard 
fovereignty  and   dépendance  ;  that  i',  fuch  as  is  founded  on  the  to  a  neccf- 
vcry  nature  of  things,  and  is  a  natural  confequence  of  the  conlli-  f^ry  fover- 
tution  of  thofe  beings  to  whom  it   is  attributed.     Let  us  therefore  ^'g"*!'- 
wave  whatever  relates  to  a  particular  fpecies  of  fovereignty,  in  or- 
der to  afccnd  to  the  general  ideas  from  whence  the  firit  principles 
are  derived.     But  as  general  principle?,  when  juft  and  well  found- 
ed, are  cafdy  applied  to  particular  cafes  ;  it  follows  therefore,  that 
the  fîrft  foundation  of  fovereignty,  or  the  reafons  on  which  it  is 
ellablifhed,  ought  to  be  laid  in  fuch  a  manner,  as  to  be  eafily  appli- 
cable to  the  feveral  fpecies  that  fall    within  our  knowledge.      By 
this  mean?,  as  we  obferved   before,  wc  can  be  fully  fati^fied  with 
regard  to  thejuftnefs  of  the  prixiciples,  or  diilinguilli  whether  they 
are  defeflive. 

TI.  Another  general  and  preliminary  remark  is,  that  there  can  Second  rc- 
be  neither  fovereignty  nor  natural    and  neceflary  dépendance   be-  n)arlc. 
tween  beings,  which  by  their  nature,  faculties,  and  ffate,  have  fo  ^^^^''^''J, 
perfect  an  equality,  that  nothing  can  be  attribut>.'d  to  one  which  is  ercie-nty 
not  alike  applicable  to  the  other.     In  fa6t,   in  fuch  a   fuppofition,  nornecclTa. 
there  could  be  no  reafon,  why  one  (hould  arrogate   an  authority  ry  depend- 
over  the  reft,  and  fubjecl  them  to  a  flateof  dépendance,  cf  which  """  ^^' 
the  latter  could  not  equally  avail  themfelves  again  (I    the  former.  j,,^3     j./ 
Butas  this  reduces  the  thing  to  an  abfurdit)',  it  follow?,   tiiat  fuch  feaiy 
an  equality  between   feveral  beings  excludes  all  fubordinatlon,  all  equal, 
empire  and  necefTary  dépendance  of  one  on  the  other  ;  juft  as  the 
equality   of  two  weights  keeps  thefe  in  a  pcrfc<5l   equilibrium. 
There  muftbe  therefore  in  the  very  nature  of  thofe  being?,   who 
ftre  fuppofsd  to  be  fubordinate  one  to  the  other,  an  elTentiai  differ- 

encQ 


5 2  The  Principles   oJ 

cnce  of  qualities,  on  which  the  relation  offuperior  and  inferior  may 
be  founded.  But  the  fentiments  of  writers  are  divided  in  the  de- 
termination of  thofe  quahties. 

Different  \\\,   j.  Some  pretend  that  the  fole  fuperiority  of  fircngth,  or,  as 

thc"oiX-i  °"  ^^^  e^'prefs  it  an  irrefjftible  power,  is  the  true  and  firU  foundatioa 
andfcunda-  of  the  right  of  impofing  an  obligation,  and  prefcribing  laws.  "This 
tionpf  fov-  "  fuperiorityofpowergives,  according  to  them,  a  rirrht  of  reigning, 
ereigniy.  «  by  the  impombility''in  which  it  places  others,  of  refifting  him 
"  who  has  fo  great  an  advantage  over  them.  "  * 

1.  Others  there  are,  who  derive  the  origin  and  foundation  of 
fovercignty,  from  the  eminency  or  fuperior  excellence  of  nature  \ 
^'  which  nor  only  renders  a  being  independent  of  all  thofe  who  are 
"  of  an  inferior  nature  ;  but  moreover  caufes  the  latter  to  be  regard- 
*'  ed  as  made  for  the  former.  And  of  this,  ûy  thev,  we  have  a 
"  proof  in  the  very  conftitution  of  man,  where  the  foul  governs,  as 
-  "  being  the  nobleft  part  ;  and  it  is  likevvife  on  this  foundation,  that 
**  the  empire  of  man  over  brutes  is  grounded.  "  f 

3.  A  third  opinion,  which  defcrves  alfo  our  notice,  is  that  of 
Barbeyrac.  %  According  to  tins  judicious  author,  "  there  is, 
"  properly  fpeaking,  only  one  general  foundation  of  obligation,  to 
*'  which  all  others  may  be  reduced,  and  that  is,  our  natural  rle- 
"  pendance  on  God,  inafmuch  as  he  has  given  us  being,  and  has 
"  confequently  a  right  to  require  v;e  fnould  apply  our  faculties  to 
•'  the  nfe  for  which  he  has  manifeflly  dcfigned  thern.  An  artift, 
"  he  continues,  as  fuch,  ismafter  of  his  own  work,  and  can  dif- 
"  pofe  of  it  as  he  pleafes.  Were  a  fculptor  capable  of  making 
'*  aiiimatcd  Hatues,  this  alone  wouldentitle  him  to  inllfl,  that  the 
"  marble  fhapcd  by  his  own  hands,  and  endowed  by  him  with 
"  underftanding,  fliall  be  fubjedl  to  his  will, — But  God  is  the  au- 
**  thor  of  the  matter  and  form  of  the  parts  of  which  our  being  is 
*'  c()m{)ofcd,  ai^.dhe  has  given  thcin  all  tlie  faculties,  with  which 
''  they  are  inveittd.  To  thcfe  f^Kulties,  therefore,  he  has  a  right 
"  to  prefcribe  what  limits  he  pleafes,  and  to  require  that  men 
"  fliould  ufe  them  in  fuch  or  fuch  a  iTianner,"  &c. 

r.xamcn  of  YM  Such  are  the  principal  fyfiems  on  the  origin  and  fonndaticn 
ions.  T'""  of  fovereignty  and  dépendance.  Let  us  examine  them  thoroughly, 
Ihefclc'  2nd 


*  See  HclibcR  de  Cive.  cap.  I5    §  5. 

•j-  Sea  PiifFi-ndorf  on  the  Law  of  Naliirc  and  Nation»,  book  i.  chap.  vi.  §  II. 

+  It  is  found  in  the  fécond  note  on  fedion  \^.  of  PuflTendoif  on  the  Law  of 
fJature  and  Nations,  book  i.  chap.  6  and  ill  the  thifd  note  on  §  J.  of  the 
Diititsof  Ma.n  and  a  Citizen,  book  i.  ch.  2. 


Natural     Law.  53 

aiid  in  order  to  pafs  a  right  judgment,  let  us  take  care  not  to  forget  fuperlcri'v 
the  di({in6tion  of  phyfical  and  moral  neccfîîty,  nor  the  primitive  f'^^P'l'*^'.'^'  '"■ 
notions  of  right  and  obligation,ruch  as  have  been  above  explained.*  '"  foùn^'!j 

I.  This  being  premifed,  I  affirm,  that  thofe  who  found  tlie  right  of 
right  of  prefcribing  laws  on  the  foic  fuperiority  of  Urength,  or  on  c)mmand- 
an  irrefiftible  power,  eftablilh  an  infufficient  principle,  and  which,  '"S* 
rigoroufjy  confidercd,  is  ahfoiutely  falfe.  In  fad,  it  does  not 
follow,  that  becaufe  I  am  incapable  to  refifl  a  perfon,  he  has 
therefore  a  right  to  command  me,  that  is,  that  I  am  bound  to  fub- 
mit  to  him  by  virtue  of  a  principle  of  obligation,  and  to  acknowl- 
edge his  will  as  the  univerfal  rule  of  my  conduft.  Right  being 
rrothing  elfe  but  that  which  reafon  approves,  it  is  this  approbation 
only  which  reafon  gives  to  him  wlio  commands,  that  is  capable  of 
founding  his  right,  and,  by  a  neceffary  confequence,  produces  that 
inward  fenfe,  which  wediftinguifh  by  the  name  of  Obligation,  and 
inclines  us  toa  fpontaneons  fubmiffion.  Every  obligation  there- 
fore fuppofes  foxiie  particular  reafons  that  influence  the  confcience 
and  bend  the  will,  infomuch  that,  purfuant  to  the  light  of  our 
own  reafon,  we  fliould  think  it  criminal  to  refill:,  were  it  even  in 
our  power,  and  fhould  conclude  that  we  have  therefore  no  right 
to  do  if.  Now  a  perfon  that  alledges  no  other  reafon,  but  a  fu- 
periority of  force,  does  not  propofe  a  motive  fnflicient  to  oblige 
the  will.  For  inftance,  the  power  which  may  chance  to  refide  in 
a  malignant  being,  neither  invefts  him  with  any  right  to  com- 
mand, nor  irapofes  any  obligation  on  us  to  obey  ;  becaufe  this  is 
evidently  repugnant  even  to  the  very  idea  of  right  and  obligation. 
On  the  contrary,  the  firft  counfel  which  reafon  gives  us  in  regard  to 
a  malignant  power,  is  to  refift,  and,  if  pofTible,  to  dellroy  hirn. 
Now,  if  we  have  a  right  to  refifl:,  this  right  is  inconfiftent  with 
the  obligation  of  obeying,  which  is  evidently  thereby  excludcjj. 
True  it  is,  that  if  we  cLearly.  fee  that  all  cur  ciîbrts  will  be  ufelefs, 
?.nd  that  our  refiftence  muft  only  fubjecl  us  to  a  greater  evil  ;  we 
fliould  chufe  to  fubmit,  though  v/ith  relu6tancc  fora  while,  rather 
than  expofeourfelves  to  the  attacks  and  violence  of  a  malignant 
power.  But  in  this  cafe  v.'e  fhculd  be  conflrained,  though  not 
under  an  obligation.  We  endure,  in  fpiteofu?,  the  cfFecls  of  a 
fnperior  force,  and  whilfl  v^e  make  an  external  fubmiffion,  we  in- 
wardly feci  our  nature  rife  and  protelt  againfi:  it.  This  leaves  us 
always  a  full  right  to  attempt  all  forts  of  ways  to  Ihake  ofF  the 
unjuft  and  opprelfive  yoke.  There  is  therefore,  properly  fpeaking, 
no  obligation  in  that  cafe  i  now  the  default  of  obligation  implies  - 


the 


Chap,  vi,  and  vii. 


54  'ïb^  Principles^ 

the  tlefault  of  right.  ♦  We  have  omitted  making  meniion  here 
of  the  dangerous  confequences  of  tlus  fyftein,  it  is  fufficient  at 
prefcnt  to  have  refuted  it  by  principles  ;  and  pcihaps  we  fhall  have 
occafion  to  take  notice  of  thefe  confequences  another  time. 

2.  Nor  the  V.  The  Other  two  opinions  have  fomething  in  them  that  is 
fole  excel-  pjaufible  and  even  true,  yet  they  do  not  feem  to  me  intirely  fuffi- 
pTrlorky  of  ^ient.  The  principles  ihey  eftabhfh  are  too  vague,  and  have  need 
nature.         to  be  reduced  to  a  more  determinate  point. 

2.  And,  indeed,  I  do  not  fee,  that  the  fole  excellency  of  nature  is 
fufficient  to  found  a  right  of  fovereignty.  I  will  aknowlt;dge,  if 
you  pleafe,  this  excellency,  and  agree  to  it  as  a  truth  that  I  am  v/tU 
convinced  of:  This  is  the  whole  effecEl  that  muft  naturally  arife 
from  this  hypothecs.  But  here  I  make  a  halt  ;  and  the  knowledge 
I  have  of  the  excellency  of  a  fuperior  being  does  not  alone  afford 
me  a  motive  fufficient  to  fubjeil  myfelf  to  him,  and  to  induce  me 
to  abandon  my  own  will,  in  order  to  take  his  for  my  rule.  So 
long  as  I  am  confined  to  thefe  general  heads,  and  am  informed  of 
nothing  more,  I  do  not  feel  myfelf  inclined  by  an  internal  motion 
to  fubmit  ;  and  without  any  reproach  of  confcience,  1  may  fmcerely 
judge,  that  the  intelligent  principle  within  me,  is  fufficient  to  direct 
my  conduct.  So  far  wc  confine  ourfelves  to  mere  fpeculation. 
But  if  you  fhould  attempt  to  require  any  thing  more  of  me,  the 
queftion  would  then  be  reduced  to  this  point  :  how  and  in  what 
manner  does  this  being,  whom  you  fuppofe  tofurpafs  me  in  exceU 
lence,  intend  to  conduct  himfelf  with  regard  to  me  ;  and  by  what 
effects  will  thisfuperiority  or  excellence  be  difplayed  ?  Is  he  wil- 
ling to  do  me  good  or  harm,  or  is  he,  in  refpc6t  to  me,  in  a  ftate  of 
indifference?  To  thefe  interrogations  there  muft  be  abfolutely 
{oTCiQ  anfvver  given  ;  and  according  to  the  fide  that  is  chofcn,  I  fhall 
agree  perhaps,  that  this  being  l">as  a  right  to  command  me,  and  that 
I  am  under  an  obligation  of  obeying.  But  thefe  reflections  are,  if 
I  am  not  miftaken,  a  demonftrative  proof,  that  it  is  not  fufficient  to  ' 
alledge  merely  and  fimply  the  excellence  of  a  fuperior  being,  in 
order  to  eftablifh  the  foundation  of  fovereignty. 

fole  quality      ^^'  Pe^^^ps  there  is  fomething  more  exact  in  the  third  hypothecs. 

pf  Creator.  "  God,  fay  they,  is  the  Creator  of  man  ;  it  is  from  him  he  has  received 
"  and  holds  his  life,  his  reafon,  and  all  his  faculties  \  he  is  therefore 
"  mafter  of  his  work,  and  can  ofcourfe  prefcribe  what  rules  he 
*'  pleafes.     Hence  our  dépendante,  hence  the  abfolute  empire  of^j, 

"  God 

'  3fe  chap,  viij,  §  6, 


NaturalLaw.  ^^ 

•♦  God  over  us  naturally  arifes  ;  and  this  is  the  very  origin  or  firft 
*'  foundation  of  all  authority." 

The  fiim  of  what  is  here  alledged  to  found  the  empire  of  God 
over  man,  is  reduced  to  his  fupreme  power.  But  does  it  follow 
from  thence  only,  and  by  an  immediate  and  necelFary  confequence, 
that  he  has  a  right  to  prtfcribe  laws  to  us  ?  That  is  the  queftion. 
The  fovereign  power  of  God  enables  him  to  difpofeof  manas  he 
has  a  mind,  to  require  of  him  whatever  he  pleafes,  and  to  lay  him 
under  an  abfolute  necelTity  of  complying  :  for  the  creature  cannot 
relift  the  Creator  ;  and  by  its  nature  and  ftate  it  finds  itfelf  in  fo 
abfolute  a  dépendance,  that  the  Creator  may,  iffo  is  his  pleafure, 
even  annihilate  and  dellroy  it.  This  we  own,  is  certain  ;  and  yet 
it  does  not  fcem  fufficicnt  to  eftablifh  the  right  of  the  Creator. 
There  is  fomething  more  than  this  requifite  to  form  a  moral  qual- 
ity of  afimple  power,  and  to  convert  it  into  right.  *  In  a  word, 
it  is  necelfary,  as  we  have  more  than  once  obferved,  that  the  power 
be  fuch  as  ought  to  be  approved  by  reafon  ;  to  the  end  that  maa 
may  fubmit  to  it  willingly,  and  by  that  inward  fenfe  which  pro- 
duces obligation. 

Here  1  beg  leave  to  make  a  fuppofition  that  will  fet  the  thing 
in  a  much  clearer  light.  Had  the  Creavor  given  exiftence  to  the 
creature  only  to  render  it  unhappy,  the  relation  of  Creator  and 
creature  would  ftill  fubfid,  and  yet  v/e  could  not  poflibly  conceive, 
in  this  fuppofition,  either  right  or  obligation.  The  irrefiftible 
power  of  the  Creator  might  indeed  conftrain  the  creature  ;  but 
this  conftraint  would  never  form  a  reafonable  obligation,  a  moral 
tie  ;  becaufe  an  obligation  of  this  nature  always  fuppofes  the  con- 
currence of  the  will,  and  an  approbation  or  an  acquiefcence  qn  the 
part  of  man,  from  whence  a  voluntary  fubniiOion  arifes.  Now 
this  acquiefcence  could  never  be  given  to  a  being,  that  would  ex- 
ert his  fupreme  power  only  to  opprefs  his  creature,  and  render  it 
unhappy. 

The  quality  therefore  of  Creator  is  not  alone  and  of  itfelf  fuf- 
ficicnt to  eftablifh  the  right  of  command,  and  the  obligation  of 
obeying. 

Vn.  But  if  to  the  idea  of  the  Creator  we  join  (which  Barbey-  True  foun- 
rac  probably  fuppofed,  though  he  has  not  diilinétly  exprefied  it)  dation  of 
the  idea  of  a  being  perfedlly   wife  and  fovercignly  good,  who  has  fovereign- 
no  defire  of  exercifino-  his  power  but  for  the  good  and  advantage  of  '^.>.  ''''^•''* 
nis  creatures  ;  then  we  have  every  thing  necellary  to  round  a  legiti-  gaodnc/i 
mate  authority.  joined  u. 

•  Ssc  chap,  vii,  §  3. 


5^  T^^  Principles  of 

Let  us  only  confult  ouifelves,  and  fuppofe,  that  wc  not  only  de- 
rive ourexiftence,  life,  and  all  our  faculties,  from  a  Being  infinitely 
fiiperior  to  us  in  power  ;  but  moreover,  that  we  are  perfedly 
convinced  that  this  Being,  no  lefs  wife  than  povyerful,  had  no  other 
aim  in  creating  us,  but  to  render  us  happy,  and  that  with  this  view 
he  is  willing  to  fubjc6t  us  to  laws  :  certain  it  is,  that  under  thefc 
circumllances,  we  could  not  avoid  approving  of  fuch  a  power,  and 
the  exercife  thereof  in  refpeft  to  us.  Now  this  approbation  is 
acknowledging  the  right  of  the  fuperior;  and  confequently  the  firft 
counfel  that  reafon  gives  uf,  is  to  refign  ourfelves  to  the  direction 
of  fuch  a  mafter,  to  fubjefl  ourfelves  to  hhn,  and  to  conform  all  our 
allions  to  what  we  know  in  relation  to  his  will.  And  why  fo  ?  Be- 
caufe  it  is  evident  to  u«,  from  the  very  nature  of  things,  that  this  is 
the  fureft  and  fîiortefl:  w  ay  to  arrive  at  happir^efs,  theend  to  which  all 
mankind  afpire.  And  from  the  manner  we  are  formed,  this  know- 
ledge will  be  neceflarily  attended  with  the  concurrence  of  cur  will, 
with  ouracquiefcence,  and  fubmifTion  ;  infomuch  that  if  wefhouM 
a6l  contrary  to  thole  principles,  and  any  misfortune  fhould  after- 
wards bcfal  UÎ,  we  could  not  avoid  condemning  ourfelves,  and 
acknowledging,  that  we  have  juftly  drawn  upon  ourfelves  the  evil 
we  fuffer.  Now  this  is  what  conftitutes  the  true  charader  of  obli- 
gation, properly  fo  called. 

ExpHcauoh  VIII.  If  we  have  therefore  a  mind  to  embrace  and  take  in  the 
of  our  whole,  in  order  to  form  a  compleat  defrnition,  we  muft  fay,  that 
opinion,  {j^g  right  of  fovereignty  ailfes  from  afuperiority  of  power,  accom- 
panied with  wifdom  and  goodnefs. 

I4ay,  in  the  firft  place,  afuperloriiyofpower^htczu^c  an  equality 
of  power,  as  wc  have  obferved  in  the  very  beginning,  excludes  all 
empire,  all  natural  and  nccefllary  fubordination -,  and  befides,  fov- 
ereignty and  command  would  become  ufelcfs  and  of  no  manner  of 
effcdt,  were  they  not  fiipported  by  a  fufficient  power.  What 
would  it  avail  a  perfon  to  be  a  fovercign,  unlefs  he  were  pofTefTed  of 
efTcvTlual  methods  to  enforce  his  orders  and  make  himfelf  obeyed  ? 

But  this  is  not  yet  fufficient;  wherefore  I  fay,  in  the  fécond 
place,  that  this  power  ought  to  be  ^vif^  and  benevoh-iit  :  wife^  to 
know  and  to  chufe  the  propereft  means  to  make  us  happy  ;  and 
benevolent^  to  be  generally  inclinable  to  ufe  thofe  means  that  tend 
to  promote  our  felicity. 

In  order  to  be  convinced  of  thi?,  it  will  be  fufficient  to  remark 
three  cafes,  which  are  the  only  ones  that  can  be  here  fuppofed. 
Either  he  i?,  with  refpedl  to  us,  an  indifferent  power,  that  is,  a 

power 


NaturalLaw.  57 

power  willing  to  do  us  neither  good  nor  harm,  as  no  ways  intereft- 
ing  himfelf  in  what  concerns  us  ;  or  he  is  a  malignant  power  i  or, 
in  fine,  he  is  a  propitious  and  benevolent  power. 

In  the  firft  cafe,  our  queftion  cannot  take  place.  How  fuperior 
foever  a  being  is  in  regard  to  me,  fo  long  as  he  does  not  concern 
lîimfclf  aboutme,  but  leaves  me  intirely  tomyfelf  ;  I  remain  in  as 
complete  a  liberty,  inre{pe6t  to  him,  as  if  he  were  not  known  to 
me,  or  as  if  he  did  not  at  all  exift.  •  Wherefore  there  is  no 
authority  on  his  fide,  nor  obligation  on  mine. 

But  if  we  fuppofe  a  malignant  power  ;  reafon,  far  from  approv- 
ing, revolts  againft  him,  as  againft  an  enemy,  fo  much  the  more 
dangerous,  as  he  is  invefted  with  great  power.  Man  cannot  ac- 
knowledge fuch  a  power  has  a  right  ;  on  the  contrary,  he  finds  him- 
felf  authoriz::d  to  leave  no  meafure  untried  to  get  rid  of  fo  formid- 
able a  mafter,  in  order  to  be  fheltered  from  the  evils  with  which  he 
might  otherwifebeunjuftly  afflidted. 

But  let  us  fuppofe  a  being  equally  wife  and  beneficent.  Man, 
infliead  of  being  able  to  refufe  him  his  approbation,  will  feel  himfelf 
inwardly  and  naturally  inclined  to  fubmit  and  acquiefre  intirely  in 
the  will  of  fuch  a  being,  who  is  pofTefled  of  all  the  qualities  necef- 
fary  to  condufl  him  to  his  ultimate  end.  By  his  poiver,  he  is 
perfe£lly  able  to  procure  the  good  ofthofe  who  are  fubjeâ  to  him, 
and  to  remove  whatever  may  poflibly  injure  them.  By  his  wifdom.y 
he  is  thoroughly  acquainted  with  the  nature  and  conftitution  of 
thofc  on  whom  he  impofes  laws,  and  knows  their  faculties  and 
ftrength,and  in  what  their  real  interefts  confia.  He  cannot  there- 
fore be  miftaken,  either  in  the  defigns  he  propofes  for  their  benefit, 
or  in  the  means  he  employs  in  order  to  attain  them.  In  fine, 
goodnefs  inclines  fuch  a  fovereign  to  be  really  willing  to  render 
his  fubjecls  happy,  and  conftantly  to  direft  to  this  end  the  opera- 
tions of  his  wifdom  and  power.  Thus  the  alTemblage  of  thefa 
qualities,  by  uniting  in  the  very  highell  degree  all  that  is  capable 
of  deferving  the  approbation  of  reafon,  comprifes  whatfoever  can 
determine  man,  and  lay  him  under  an  internal  as  well  as  external 
obligation  of  fubmiflion  and  obedience  ^  Here  therefote  lies  the 
true  foundation  of  the  right  of  fovereignty. 

H  IX.  In 

*  And  therefore  though  that  notion  of  the  Epicureans  was  mofl  fenfelefs  and 
impious,  in  which  they  defbribed  the  gods,  as  enjoying  their  own  bappinefs 
with  the  higheft  peace  and  tranquility,  '  far  removed  from  the  troublsfome 
care  of  human  bufinefs,  and  neither  fmiling  at  the  good,  nor  frowning  at  the 
wicked  deeds  of  men  ;  yet  they  rightly  enough  inferred,  that  upon  this  fuppo- 
fition,  all  reh'gioB,  and  all  fear  of  divine  powers,  was  vaia  and  ufelefs.  Puf' 
fcndorf,  Latv  of  Nature  ar.d  NatliiSy  book  t.  cba^.  vi  5  H-  ^'^  Ciaro  di  A'j', 
J)cor,  lib,  i.  ca^.  %, 


58  T*he  Principles  of 

We  muft  IX.  In  order  to  bind  and  fubjed  free  and  rational  creatures, 
jioc  fepar-  ^q^q  [5  no  nec^fTuy,  properly  ("peaking,  for  more  than  an  en  pire  or 
""iV^  authori;v,  whofc  wifdom  and  lenity  would  forcibly  cnsaue  the 
\\hich  approbition  of  realon,  independent  or  the  motives  txtited  by  the 
form  the  apprehenri')n  of  power.  But  as  it  eafily  happens,  from  the  man- 
riglu  of  JJ2J.  (1^3^  n^^,ji  3re  Jormed,  that  either  throut,h  lev  ity  and  neglt<5l, 
overeigii-  ^^  paffxoii  and  malice,  they  are  not  fo  much  ftrnck.  as  they  ought, 
with  the  wifdom  of  the  Le^iflator,  and  with  the  excellency  of  his 
laws  ;  it  was  therefore  proper  there  fhould  be  an  efficacious  mo- 
tive, fuch  as  the  apprehenfion  cf  punifhment,  in  order  to  have  a 
flronger  influence  over  the  vvil).  Fur  which  reafon  it  is  neccfla- 
ry  that  the  fovereign  (hould  be  armed  with  power  and  force,  to  be 
better  able  to  maintain  his  authority  Let  us  notfeparate  therefore 
thefe  different  qualities,  which  form,  by  their  concurrence,  the 
right  of  the  fovereign.  As  pov/er  alone,  unaccompanied  with 
benevolence,  cannot  conftitute  any  riL,ht  -,  fo  benevolence,  defti- 
tut?  of  power  and  wifdom,  is  likewifc  infufficient  for  this  efFe6l. 
For  from  this  only,  that  a  perfon  wifhes  another  well,  it  does  not 
follow,  that  he  is  his  mafter  :  neither  are  a  few  particular  a«Sls  of 
benevolence  fulHcient  for  that  purpofe.  A  benefit  requires  no 
more  than  gratitude  and  acknowledgment  ;  for  in  order  to  teftify 
our  gratitude,  it  is  not  nccf  fTary  we  (hould  fubjcdl  ourfeives  to  the 
power  of  our  benefacftor.  But  let  us  join  thefe  ideas,  and  fuppofe, 
at  one  and  the  fame  time,  a  fovereign  power,  on  which  every  one 
adtually  and  really  depends  ;  a  fovereign  wifdom,  that  direcfls  this 
power  ;  and  a  fupreme  goodnefs,  by  which  it  is  animated.  What 
can  we  defirc  more,  to  ellablifh,  on  the  one  fide,  the  moft  ctrùnent 
authority,  and,  on  the  other,  the  greatefl;  fubordination  ?  We  are 
compelled  then,  as  it  were,  by  our  own  reafon,  which  will  not  fo 
much  as  fuffer  us  to  deny,  that  fuch  a  fuperior  is  invefted  with  a 
true  right  to  command,  and  that  we  are  under  a  real  obligation  to 
obey. * 

X.  The 

*  It  may  hideed  be  faid,  that  the  foundatiou  of  extemal  obligation,  is  the 
•will  of  a  fuperior  (fee  above,  chap,  vi  §  xii  )  provided  this  general  propofitioa 
be  afterwards  explained  by  the  pjrticulars  into  wh'ch  we  have  entered.  But 
when  fome  add  that  force  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  foundation  of  this  obli- 
gation and  that  it  only  ferves  to  enable  the  fuperior  to  exert  his  right  (."^cc 
Baibeyrac's  ift  note  on  the  9th  fe<3ion  of  Puffcndorf's  large  work,  book  i. 
chap.  6  )  this  notion  does  not  appear  to  me  to  be  exacS  ;  and  ti'ethinks  that 
this  abftraft  manner  of  confidering  the  thing  fubvcrts  the  very  foundation  o£ 
tlic  obligation  here  in  queftion.  Thrre  can  be  no  external  obligation  without 
a  fuperior  nor  a  fuperior  without  force,  or,  which  is  the  fame  thing  without 
power  :  force  therefore  or  power  is  a  ueccITary  part  of  the  foundation  of  obli» 
galion. 


N  A  T  U  R  A  L      L  A  W.  59 

X.  The  notions  of  fovercign  and  fovereignty  being  once  fettled,  Definition 
it  is  eafy  to  i\x  thcfe  ot  fubjcétion  and  dépendance.  °._^'^  '^'^'^' 

Subj;£ts  therefore  are  perfons,    that  are  under  an  obligation  po^n^a. 
of  i)bcying.     And  as  it  is  power,  vvifdom,   and  benevolence,  that  tion  of  ds- 
conftitute  fovereignty  ;  we  mult  fuppofe,  on  the  contrary,  in  fub-  pcndance. 
j;cts  the  weaknefs  and  want'i,  from  whence  dépendance  arifes. 

It  is  therefore  right  in  Puftendorf  to  remark,  t  that  what  renders 
man  fjfcepiible  ot  an  obligation  produced  by  an  external  principle, 
is  that  he  naturally  depends  on  a  fuperior,  and  that  morf.ever  as  a 
free  and  intelligent  being,  he  is  capable  of  knowing  the  rules  giverk 
him,  and  of  chuilng  to  con'orm  his  actions  to  them.  But  thefe 
are  ratiier  conditions  neceiTarily  fuppofed,  and  of  themfelves  under- 
ftood,  than  the  exa£l  and  immediate  caufes  of  fubjection.  Pvlorc 
important  it  is  to  obft-rve,  that  as  the  power  of  obliging  a  rational 
creature  is  founded  on  the  ability  and  will  of  making  him  happy, 
if  he  obeys  ;  unhappy,  if  he  difobeys  ;  this  fnpixd'es  that  this  crea- 
ture is  capable  of  good  and  evil,  fenfible  cfpieafure  and  pain,  and 
befides  that  his  ftate  of  happinefs  or  mifery  may  be  either  increafed 
or  diminiftied.  Otherwife,  he  might  be  forced  indeed,  by  a  fu-r 
perior  power,  to  a6t  after  a  certain  manner,  but  he  could  not  be 
properly  obliged. 

Xr.  Such  is  the  true  foundation  of  fovereignty  and  dépendance  ;  tIic  obiî- 
a  foundation  that    might  be    ftill  better  eftabliQied,  by   applying  gatiin 
thefe  general  principles  to   the   particular  fpecies  of  known  fove-  producec? 
reignty  or  empire,  fuch  as  that  ot  God  over  man,  that  of  a  prince  f'j^'j,  nioft  " 
over  his  fubjecls,   and  the  power  of  fathers  over   their  children,  perfccl 
We  fhould  be  convinced  thereby,  that  all  thefe  fpecies  of  author-  that  caabe 
ity  are  originally   founded  on   the  principles  ab(jve  effabliihed  ;   in^agmed. 
which  would  ferve  for  a  new  proof  of  the  truth  of  thofe  principles.* 
But  it  is  fufficient  to  have  hinted  here  in  general  at  this  remark  j 
the  particulars  we  referve  for  another  place. 

An  authority  eftabliflied  on  fuch  a  foundation,  and  which  com- 
prizes whatever  can  be  imagined  moft  efficacious  and  capable  to 
bind  man,  and  to  incline  him  to  be  ftcadily  ^ire^ted  by  certain 
rules  of  condudl,  undoubtedly  forms  the  completed:  and  ftrongeft 
obligation.  For  there  is  no  obligation  more  perfedt  than  that  v.'hich 
is  produced  by  the  ftrongell  motives  to  determine  the  will,  and  the 
moft  capable,  by   their  preponderancy,  to  prevail  over  all    other 

contrary 

I  See  the  Du  tie*  of  Man  and  a  Citizen»  book  i.  chap.    a.  §  4.  and  the  Lav 
of  Nature  and  Nations,  book  i.  chap.  6.  §  6,  8. 
*  See  feftioa  1. 


6o  T^he  Principles  of 

contrary  reafons.  ♦  Now  every  thing  concurs  here  to  thiscfFcd: 
the  nature  of  the  rules  prefcribed  by  the  fov'ereign,  which  of  them- 
felves  are  the  fitteft  to  promote  ourperfeclior^  and  felicity  ;  the 
power  and  authority  with  which  he  is  invefted,  whereby  he  is  en- 
abled to  decide  our  happinefs  or  mifery  ;  and,  in  fine,  the  intire 
confidence  ue  have  in  him,  btcaufe  of  his  power,  wifdom,  and 
goodnefs.  What  can  we  imagine  more  to  captivate  the  will,  to 
gain  the  heart,  to  oblige  man,  and  to  produce  within  him  the  high- 
e(l  degree  of  moral  neceflity,  which  conftitutes  the  moft  perfeél 
obligation  ?  I  fay,  moral  necelfity  j  for  we  arc  not  to  deflroy  the  nature 
of  man;  he  remains  always  what  he  is,  a  free  and  intelligent 
being  ;  and  as  fuch,  the  fovereign  undertakes  to  diredl  him  hy  his 
Ja'A'S.  Hence  it  is  that  even  the  flricSlefl  obligations  never  force 
the  v.'ill  •,  but,  rigoroufly  fpeakiiig,  man  is  always  at  liberty  to 
comply  or  n(,t,  though,  as  we  commonly  fay,  at  his  rifk  and  peril. 
But  it  he  conftilts  reafon,  and  is  willing  to  follow  its  diftates,  he 
will  take  parrrcular  care  to  avoid  exercifing  this  metajhyfical 
power,  in  oppofition  to  the  views  of  his  fovereign  j  an  oppofition 
that  mult  terminate  in  his  own  mifery  and  ruin. 

Obligation  XII.  We  have  already  obferveJ,  that  there  are  two  forts  of  ob- 
jsiaternal  ligation;  f  the  one  internal,  which  is  the  work  of  reafon  only, 
and  exter-  ^j^j  founded  on  the  good  or  evil  we  perceive  in  the  very  nature  of 
fa  leMm^e  ^l^'"©^  •  ''^^  Other  external,  which  is  produced  by  the  will  of  him 
ivhom  we  acknowledge  our  fuperior  and  mafler.  Now  the  obli- 
gation produced  by  law,  unites  thefe  two  forts  of  ties,  which  by 
their  concurrence  Itrengthen  each  other,  and  thus  form  the  com- 
pleted obligation  that  can  poffibly  be  imagined.  It  is  probably  for 
this  reafon,  that  rnofl  civilians  acknowledge  no  other  obligation 
properly  Co  called,  but  that  which  is  the  effc£l  of  law,  and  impofed 
bvafupeiior.  This  is  true,  if  we  mean  only  an  external  obliga- 
tion, which  indeed  is  the  ftrongefl:  tieof  man.  But  itmufl  not  be 
inferred  from  thence,  thatwe  ought  to  admit  no  other  fort  of  obli- 
gation. The  principles  we  eflablifhed,  vshen  inquiring  into  the 
fi'-fl:  origin  and  the  nature  of  obligation  generally  confidered,  and 
the  particular  remarks"  we  have  juft  now  m.ade  on  the  obligation 
firifint;  from  law,  are  fufncient,  if  I  am  not  miflaken,  to  evince, 
that  there  is  a  primitive,  original,  and  internal  obligation,  which  is 
infeparable  from  reafon,  and  ought  necciîiirily  to  concur  with  the 
external  obligation,  in  order  to  communicate  to  the  latter  all  the 
necefTary  force  for  determining  and  bending  the  will,  and  forinflu- 
encing  effc:ctu3lly  the  human  heart.  By 


•  See  chsp.  vi.  §    to. 
f  See  chap.  vi.  §  J  3, 


Natural  Law.  6i 

By  diftinguiflîing  rightly  thefe  idea?,  we  fhall  find,  perhaps,  that 
this  is  one  way  of  reconciling  opiiiions,  which  feem  to  be  wide 
from  each  other,  only  becaufe  they  are  mifunderftood.  ♦  Sure  it 
is  at  lead,  that  the  manner  in  which  wc  have  explained  the  foun- 
dation of  fovereignty  and  dépendance,  coincides,  in  the  main,  with 
PufFendorf's  fyltem,  as  will  eafily  appear  by  comparing  it  with 
what  this  author  fays,  whether  in  his  large  work,  or  in  his  abridg- 
ment, t 


CHAP.     XX. 

Of  the  end  ofîatvs  ;   of  their  charaBers^  differences-,  ^c. 


I. 


l^OME  perhaps  v/ill  complain,  that  we  have  dwelt  too  long  Oftlie<în<i 

on  the  nature  and  foundation  of  fovcreio-ntv.     But  the  importance  of  J^wa 

/•ir.-r.  -1  ..p-'  ,  '^i  either  in 

of  the  luoject  required  us  to  treat  it  witn  care,  and  to  unravel  prop-  regard  to 

erly  its   principles.     Befides,  we*  apprehend,  that   nothing  could  thefub- 

contribute  better  to  a  right  knowledge  of  the  n:iture  of  law  ;  and  j«<Ss,  or  m 

wefhall  prefently  fee,  that  whatever  in  face  remains  f)r   us  fllll  to  ^^^'^f^.'i,'* 

fay  concerning  this  fubjedV,  is   deduced  from  the    principles   juft  rejgn, 

now  eftablifhed. 

In  the  firft  place,  it  may  be  afkcd,  what  is  the  end  anddefign  of 
laws  ? 

This  queftion  prefents  itfelf  in  two  different  lights  ;  namely,  with 
refpeiSl  to  the  rubje61,  and  with  regard  to  the  fovereign  :  adifHnc- 
tion  that  mull  be  carefully  obferved. 

The  relation  of  the  fovereign  to  his  fubjciSls  forms  a  kind  of 
fociety  between  them,  which  the  fovereign  diredls  by  the  laws  he 
eftabliihes.  +  But  as  fociety  naturally  requires  there  fhould  be 
fome  provifion  made  for  the  good  of  all  thofe  who  are  the  conftit- 
uent  parts  thereof,  it  is  by  this  principle  we  muil  judge  of  the  end 
of  laws  :  and  this  end,  coiifidered  with  refpect  to  the  fovereign, 
ought  to  include  nothing  in  it  oppofite  to  the  end  of  thefe  very 
laws  confidered  with  regard  to  the  fubjeft. 

II.  The 

*  See  part  the  fécond,  chap,  vi . 

\  See  the  Law  of  Nature    and    Nations,  book  t.  chap.  vi.  §    5>  6  ,  2,  and  9. 
And  the  Duties  of  Man  and  a  citizen,  book  i.  chap.  ii.  §  3,  4,  J. 
}  See  chap,  viii.  §  5, 


6a  "The  Principles  of 

II.  The  end  of  the  hw  in  regard  to  the  fubjcft  is,  that  he 
(houid  conform  his  atitions  to  it,  and  by  this  means  acquire  hap- 
piriïifs.  As  for  what  concerns  the  fovereign,  ihe  end  he  aims  at  for 
himfelf,  by  giving  laws  lohis  fubj:6ls,  is  the  fatisfadtion  and  glory 
arifing  Ircm  the  execution  of  the  wife  defigns  he  propofes,  tor  the 
prefcrvation  of  thofe  who  are  fubjt-(£l  to  his  authority.  Thefe 
two  ends  ot  the  law  fhould  never  be  teparated,  one  being  naturally 
connrretcd  with  the  other  ;  for  it  is  the  happinefs  of  thcfubject  that 
forms  the  fatisfadion  and  glory  ol  the  fovereign. 

TTie  end  of      ^^^-  ^^  fliould  therefore  take  care  not  to  imagine  that  laws  are 

law*  is  not  prop«rr!y  :nade  in  order  to  bring  men  under  a  yoke.     So  idle  an  end 

to  lay  a  re    would  be  quite  unworthy  of  a  fovereign,  whofe  goodnefs  ought  to 

fsint  up-  beeq^J3]  j^,  i^;,;  povver  and  vvifdûin,  and  who  fivjuhi  always   acl  up 

bur  to  .!i.    ^^  ^'^<^'^^  perfe6tions.     Let  us  fay   rather,  that  laws  are  made  to 

r<d  it  in  3  ob'iie  the  fuhj  cl  to  purfue  his  real  intereft,  and  to  chufe  thefurett 

proper         a: id  beft  Way  to  attain  the  end  he  is  drfigned  for,  which  is  happincfs. 

wanner.      With  this  view  the  fovereign  is  willing  todire6l  his  people  better 

than  they  could  themfvrlves,  and  gives  a  check  to  tlieir  liberty,  left 

they  ihouid  make  a  bad  ufe   of  it  contrary  to  their  own  and  the 

public  good.      In  (hort,  the  fovereign  commands  rational  beings  ; 

it  is  on  this  f  ?oti!ig  he  treats  with  them  ;  all  his  ordinances  have 

the  (tamp  of  reafon  ;  he  is  willing  to  reign  over  our  hearts;  and  it 

■3.1  any  time  he  enploys  force,  it  is  in  order  to  bring  back  to  reafon 

thofe  who  have  unhappily  flrayed  from   it,  contrary  to  their  own 

good  and  that  of  fociety. 

Exametîof      jy    Wherefore  Puftendorf.  methinkf,  fpeaks  fomewhat  loofely 
what  Fuf-  .       ,  •/■        u      •  i\  1  J  <- 1         u         u 

fendorf       '"  *he  coTiparifon  he  araws  between   law  and  counlel,  where  he 

fays  con-    fays,  "  That  counfel  tends  to  the  ends  pro[iofed  by  thof?  to  whom 

cernitsg       ti  jj.  jg  given,  aiid  that  they  thsmfelves  can  j  jdge  of  thofe  end?,  in 

thn  fub-      cc  order  to  approve  or  difapprove  them. Whereas  lawaims  only 

"at  the  end  of  the  perfon  that  eftabliihes  it,  and  if  fometimes  it  has 

*'  views  in  regard  to  thofe  for  whom  it  is  made,  it  is  not  their  bufi- 

"  nefs  to  exa  nine  tht-m — this  depends  intirely  on  the  determination 

"  of  the  l-rgillator."  *     It  would  be  a  much  jufter  way,  rrxthinks, 

of  exprefling  the  thing,  to  fiy,  that  laws  have  a  double  tvià^  relative 

to  the  fovereign  and  the  fubject  ;  that  the  initent  of  the  fovereign  in 

cftablifliing  them,  is  to  confult  his  own   fatisfa<£tion  and  glory,  by 

rendering  his  fuhjeits  happy  ;  th  it  thefe  two  things  are  infeparable  j 

and  that  it  would  be  doing  injultice  to  the  fovereign  to  imagine  he 

thinks 


See  the  Law  of  Nature  and   Nations,  l>oo4  i-  chap,  -i'u  §  i. 


'  N  A  T  U  R  A  L     L  A  W .  62; 

thinks  only  of  himfelf,  without  any  regard  to  the  good  of  thofe  who 
are  his  dependants.  Puffcndorf  feems  here,  as  well  as  in  fome 
other  pkces,  to  give  a  little  too  much  into  Hobbes's  principles. 

V".  We  defined  lav.',  a  rule  which  lays  an  obligation  on  fubjc<5ls  Of  the 
of  doing    or  omitdng   certain  things,    and  leaves  them  at  liberty  ''|,"^j"'" 
to  a6l  or  not  to  a£l  in  other  matters,  according  as  they  judge  prop-  obiio-itory, 
er,  &c.     This  is  what  we  muit  explain  here  in  a  more  particular  andtha  of 
manner.  fimpJepcr- 

Afovereign  has  undoubtedly  a  right  to  dire£l:the  allions  of  thofe  "^'  '''"'■ 
who  are  fubjecfl  to  him,  according  to  the  ends  he  has  in  view.  In 
confequence  of  this  right,  he  impcjfes  aneceffityon  them  of  atSting 
or  not  adling  after  a  particular  manner  in  certain  cafes  ;  and  this 
obligation  is  the  firft  efFed  of  the  law.  From  thence  it  follows, 
that  all  adlions,  not  pofitively  commanded  or  forbidden,  are  left 
within  the  fjjhere  of  our  natural  liberty  ^  and  that  the  fovereign  is 
hereby  fuppofed  to  grant  every  body  a  permifîîon  to  a<fl  in  this  ref- 
pe<!il  as  they  think  proper;  and  this  permiflion  is  a  fécond  effect  of 
the  law.  We  may  therefore  diftinguiûi  the  law,  taken  in  its  full 
extent,  into  an  oblioatory  law,  and  a  law  of  fimple  permifTion. 

It  is  true,  Grotius,  *  and  after  him  PufFendorf,  are  of  opinion,  The  opm- 
that  permiflion  is  not  properly,  andof  itfelf,  an  tfTedtor  conftquence  »onof  Gro. 
of  the  law-  but  a  mere  inaction   of  the  le;iifljtor.        t  IVhatever  'i!"!-"*" .    r 
things^  fays  Pufrendorr,  the  law  permits^  thofe    tt  neither  commûnas  upon  this 
nor  forbids^  and  therefore  it  really  doth  nothing  at  all  concerning  them,  fuojciil. 

But  though  this  different  manner  of  confidcring  the  thing  be  not 
perhaps  of  any  great  confequence,  yet  Baibeyrac's  opinion,  fuch  as 
he  has  explained  it  in  his  notes  on  the  foreciced  paflages,  appears 
to  be  much  more  exadl.  A  permiflion  ariûng  from  the  legifl  .tor's 
filence  cannot  be  confidered  as  a  fimple  inaélion.  The  legifl.-tor 
does  nothing  but  with<ieliberationand  wifdom.  If  he  is  facisfisd 
vith  impofmg,  only  in  fome  cafes,  an  indifpenfible  neceflity  of 
a6t;ing  after  a  certain  manner,  and  d^ts  not  extend  this  necelHty 
further,  it  is  becaufe  bethinks  it  agreeable  to  the  end  he  propofes, 
to  leave  his  fubjeéls  at  liberty  in  (bme  cafes  to  do  as  they  pleafe. 
Wherefore,  the  filence  of  the  let^iflaor  imports  a  pofitive  though 
tacit  permilfion  of  whatfoever  he  has  not  frirbidden  or  commanded, 
though  he  might  have  done  it,  and  would  certainly  have  don?  it, 
had  he  thought  proper.  Infomuch  thit  as  the  forbidden  or  com- 
manded 
»■■■  — — ■'  •  ■  '  '  »  ■  ' 

♦  See  the  Rights  of  War  and  Peace,  book  i.  chap .  t.  §  9. 

f  Sec  the  Law  of  Nature  and  Nations,  book  i.  chap.  ti.  §  i/i 


64  7/5^  Principles  of 

manded  allions  are  pofitively  regulated  by  thelaw,  aiflions  permit- 
ted are  likewife  pofitively  determined  by  the  fame  law,  though  after 
their  martner  and  according  to  the  nature  of  the  thing.  In  fine, 
whoever  detennines  certain  limits,  which  he  declares  we  ought 
not  to  exceed,  does  hereby  point  out  how  far  he  permits  and  con- 
fents  we  fhnuUl  go.  Permiffion  therefore  is  as  pofitive  an  efFedl  of 
the  law  as  obligation. 

Irhe  rights       VII.  This  will  appear  dill  more  evident,  if  v/e  confider,  that 

whichmen  having  once  fuppofed  that  we  all   depend   on  a   fupeiior,  whofe 

enjoy  m      ^jjj  (^^^^  jg  j^g  jj^g  univerfal  rule  of  our  conduit,  the  rights 

founded  on  attributed  to  man    in  this  ftate,   by  virtue  of  which  he  may  a£t 

this  per-      fafely  and  with  impunity,  are  founded   on   the   exprefs  or  tacit 

miffion.       permiffion  received  from  the  fovcreign  or  the  law.     Befidcs,  every 

body  agrees  that  the  permifiion  granted  by  the  law,  and  the  right 

from  thence  refulting,  lay  oilier  men  under  an  obligation  not  to 

refift  the  perfon  that  ufes  his  right,  but  rather  to  afîifl:  him  in  this 

rcfpedî,   than  do  him  any  prejudice.     Obligation,  therefore,  and 

permiflion  are  naturally  connc6}ed  with  each  other  ;  and  this  is  the 

fcffeél  of  the  law,  which  likewife  authorizes  thofe,   who  are  dif- 

turbed  in  the  exercife  of  their  rights,  to  employ  force,  or  to  have 

recourfe  to  the  fovereign,  in  order  to  rem.ove  thefe   irnpediments. 

Hence  it  is,  that  after  having  mentioned  in  the  definition  of  law, 

that  it  leaves  us  in  certain  cafes  at  liberty  to  a(Sl  or  not  to  acl,  we 

added,  that  it  fecures  the  fubjeils  in  the  full  enjoyment  of  their 

rights.  * 

The  mat-  VIII.  The  nature  and  end  of  laws  fhew  us  their  matter  or 
object.  The  matter  of  laws  in  general  are  all  human  actions;  in- 
ternal and  external  ;  thoughts,  and  words,  as  well  as  deeds  ;  thofe 
which  relate  to  another,  and  thofe  which  terminate  in  the  perfon 
itfelf  \  fo  far,  atleafl,  as  the  dire6tion  of  thofe  adlions  may  eHen- 
tially  contribute  to  the  particular  good  of  each  perfon,  to  that  of 
fociety  in  general,  and  to  the  glory  of  the  fovcreign. 

Internal  IX.  This  fuppofes  naturally  the  three  following  conditions, 

conditions  \.  That  the  things  ordained  by  the  law  be  poffible  to  fulfil  ;  for 
tha^  i*  be'  ''  "'°"'^  ^^  f'^llv?  ^"d  even  cruelty,  to  require  of  any  perfon,  un- 
poflihle,  ^'^'^  *^^  ^e^^t  commination  of  punifhment,  whatever  is  and  always 
«feful,  and  has  been  above  his  ftrength.  2.  The  law  muft  be  offome  iitil- 
j'jft.  iiy  J  for  reafon  will  never  allow  any  reflraint  to  be  laid  on  the  lib- 

erty 

*  Sec  chap.  viii.  §  3. 


ter  of 
laws. 


Natural  Law.  65 

erty  of  the  fubjeiSV,  merely  for  the  fake  of  the  rcfiraint,  and  without 
any  benefit  or  advantage  arifing  to  him.  3,  In  fine,  the  law  muft 
be  in  iifelf  ju(i;  that  is,  conformable  to  the  order  and  nature  of 
things,  as  well  as  to  the  conditution  of  man  :  this  is  what  the 
very  idea  of  rule  requires,  which,  as  we  have  already  obferved,  is 
the  fame  as  that  of  law. 

X.  To  thefe  three  conditions,  which  we  may  call  the  internal  External 
charadteriftics  of  law,  namely,  that  it  be  poffible,  juflr,  and  ufcful,  conditions 
we  may  add  two  othor  conditions,  which  in  fome  meafure  are  exter-  f,   .  ;^,^j,,„ 
nalj  one,  that  the  lav/  be  made  fuiîîciently  known  ;  the  other,  that  be  made 
it  be  attended  with  a  proper  fanclion.  known  ; 

I.  It  is  neceflarythat  the  laws  be  fufRciently    notified  to  the  ^"'^.^\'^°"*' 
fubject  ;  *    for  how  could  he  regulate  his  a£lions  and  motions  by  \^^,^\ 
thofe  laws,  if  he  had  never  any  knowledge  of  them  \  The  fovereign  fandlion. 
ought  therefore  to  publifh  his  laws  in  afolemn,  clear,  and  didinét 
manner.     But,  after  that,  it  is  the  fubjedl's  bufinefs  to  be  acquainted 
with  the  will  of  the  fovereign  ;  and  thci  ignorance  or  error  he  may 
He  under  in  this  refpecl,  cannot,  generally  fpeaking,  be  a  legitimate 
excufe  in  his  favour.     This  is  what  the  civilians  mean,  when  they 
lay  down  as  a  maxim,  f   That   ignorance  or  error  hi  regard  to  the 
law  is  blamcable  and  hurtful.     Were  it  not  (o.^  the  laws  would  be 
of  no  efFeil,  but  might  alv/ays   under  a  pretext  of  ignorance  be 
eluded  with  impunity. 

XI.  2.  The  next  thing  requifite  is  that  the  law  be  attended 
with  a  proper  fanction. 

Sanilion  is  that  part  of  the  law,  which  includes  the  penalty 
enacted  againft  thofe  who  tranfgrefs  it.  With  regard  to  the  penal- 
ty, it  is  an  evil  with  v/hich  the  fovereign  menaces  thofe  fubjeds 
who  fhould  prefume  to  violate  his  laws,  and  which  he  aflually  in- 
fli<Sls,  whenever  they  violate  them  :  and  this  with  a  defign  of  pro- 
curing fome  good  ;  fuch  as  to  correal  the  culpable,  and  to  ad- 
monifh  the  reft  ;  but  ultimately,  that  his  laws  being  refpe»fl:^d 
and  obferved,  fociety  fhould  enjoy  a  ftate  of  fecurity,  quiet,  and 
happinefs. 

All  laws  have  therefore  two  efiential  parts  :  the  firft  is  the 
difpofition  of  the  law,  which  expreifeth  the  command  or  prohibi- 
tion ;  the  fécond  is  the  fanâion,  which  pronounces  the  penalty  ; 
and  it  is  the  fandlion  that  gives  it  the  proper  and  particular  force 
of  law.  For  were  the  fovereign  contented  with  merely  ordain- 
I  ing 

*  See  chap.  viii.  §  4. 

filegala  eft,  juris  cjuldem  iguorantiam  cuique  noccrc.     Digeft,  lib,  î3.  tit. 
6.  leg.  9.  pr. 


06  'The  Principles   of 

in'»  or  forbiddinT  certain  lliings,  without  additig  any  kind  olmc- 
nice  ;  this  would  be  no  longer  a  law  prtfcribed  by  authority,  but 
merely  a  prudent  counfel. 

It  is  not  however  ablolutely  neceflary  that  that  the  nature  or 
quality  of  the  punifh^-nent  be  form.illy  Ipecified  in  the  law;  it  is 
lutHcient  that  the  fovirrcign  declares  he  will  puniil),  ref?rving  to 
hiinfelf  the  fpecics  and  degree  of  chaftifement  according  to  his  pru- 
dence. *  We  muft  alfo  obferve,  that  tlie  evil,  which  conftitute^  the 
punifhmcnt  properly  fo  called,  ought  not  to  be  a  natural  produ(5lioa 
or  a  necellary  confequence  of  the  adion  intended  to  be  punifhi  d.  It 
(hould  be,  as  It  were,  an  occafional  evil,  and  infli£lcd  by  the  will 
of  the  fovereign.  For  whatever  the  action  may  have  bad  of  itfdf 
and  dangerous  in  its  efFeiflsand  inevitable  conîequences,  cannotbe 
reckoned  as  proceeding  from  the  law,  fmce  it  would  equally  happen 
without  it.  The  m-^naces  therefore  of  the  fovereign  muft,  in  or- 
der to  have  fome  weight,  be  inflidive  offuch  punilhments  a?difFer 
from  the  evil  that  necefùrily  urifcs  from  the  nature  of  the  thing,  f 

AVhether  XII.  It  may  be  afked,  in  fuic,  whether  the  fandion  of  laws 
theprcm-  niay  not  as  well  conlift  in  the  promife  of  a  recompence,  as  in  the 
I  e  o  rec-  commination  of  punifhmcnt  ?  I  anfvver,  that  this  depend?,  in  een- 
equally  ca-  ^t"^'»  o'l  ^^'^2  wiU  of  the  fovereign,  who  may  ufe  either  of  thefe 
pa'ole,  as  ways  \  or  even  employ  them  both,  according  as  his  prudence  directs, 
the  com.  g^t  fince  the  queitionisto  know,  which  is  the  moft  effectuai  me- 
i-^.  „'"n!     thod  the    fovereign  can  ufc,  in   order  to  enforce  the  obfervance  of 

ot  puniln-     ...  ,_"..  .,  .  ..,, 

mciu.  to  his  laws  ;  and  hnce  it  is  certain  that  man  is  naturally  more  (enisbly 
conftitute  afl'c(5tcd  by  evil  than  good,  it  f^cms  more  proper  to  efhiblifh  the 
the  fane-  fan'ftion  of  law  in  the  commination  of  punifiiment,  than  in  the 
Idw.  promife  of  recompence.     People  arc  feldom  induced  to  violate  the 

law,  unlefs  it  be  with  the  hope  of  procuring  at  leaft  fome  apparent 
good.  The  beft  way  therefore  to  prevent  this  deception,  is  to 
remove  the  bait  that  allures  them,  and  to  annex,  on  the  contrary, 
a  real  and  inevitable  evil  to  diiobcdience.  Suppofe,  for  inftance, 
two  Icgiflators,  willing  to  ellablifh  the  fame  law,  propoi'ed,  one  of 
th.eni  great  reward?,  and  the  other  fevere  punifliments,  the  latter 
would  undoubtedly  difpoie  men  more  effectually  to  compliance 
than  the  former,  I'he  mod  fpecious  promifes  do  not  always  de- 
termine the  will  ;  but  the  view  of  a  rigorous  punifhmcnt  ftaggers 

and 

*  Ex  quo  ctimn  intelligitur  onini  legi  civili  annexam  efTe  poena  in.  vel  expli- 
cité, vcl  impliciic  ;  nam  ubi  porna  ntqiic  fcripto,  neqiie  exemplo  alicujusquL 
pa-nas  legis  j:'ni  tranfgrefTx  de^iit.  definitiir.  ibi  fubintclligitur  ])oenam  arbitra- 
riam  effe,  niniiruni  ex  arbitrio  pendcre  Icgiflatoris.      Holies  de  Cive,  cn/>.  14.  §  8. 

I  Sec  Locke's  Eflay  on  Human  Uudciftanclin<j,  book  a,  chap,  aS.  §  6, 


Natural  L  a  w.  67 

anJ  Intu-nidcitcs  it.  *  Bat  if  the  fo/er-^ign,  by  a  particular  effccl 
of  his  bouiity  anJ  wifJom,  is  willing  to  join  tlu'fe  two  means,  anJ 
to  enforce  the  law  by  a  double  motive  of  obfervaucc  ;  there  is  the:i 
nothiiKT  wantin?  to  complete  its  force,  fmce  in  everv  refpedt  it  is 
a  perfect  faiiction. 

XIII.  The  obligation  which  the  laws  impofe,  have  as  great  an  ^''''""'  ''^'^ 
extent  as  the  right  ot  the  fovereign  ;  and  contcquently  K  may  be  ^,^^  j^^ 
laid  in  general,  that  .ill  thofe  who  are  dependent  on  the  legiflUor,  „i,ii^es. 
arefubj -61  to  this  obligUion.     But  each  law  in  particular  obliges  Of  (iifpen. 
thofe  iubjecls  only,  to  whom   the  fubjedt  matter  may  be  applied  ;  fa'aon. 
and  this  is  eafily  known  from  the  very  nature  of  each  law,  by  whicii 

the  intention  of  the  legillator  is  fuiîiciently  expreflcd. 

Neverihclcfs  it  fomctimes  happens,  that  particuhu-  perfons  are 
exempted  from  the  obligation  of  obferviiig  the  la.v  ;  2nd  this  h 
v/hat  we  cail  difpenfaiion,  on  which  v.c  have  a  few  remarks  to 
make. 

1.  If  the  legiflator  can  entirely  abrogate  a  h;w,  by  a  much 
ftronger  rcafon  he  can  fufpend  the  efTcdl  thereof,  \\  itl;  regard  to  any 
particular  perfon. 

2.  But  we  muft  likewife  acknowledge,  that  none  but  the  legif- 
lator himfelf  is  inveftcd  with  this  power. 

3.  He  never  ouglit  to  ufe  it  without  very  good  reafons,  and 
then  he  fliould  a6l  uith  moderation,  and  according  to  the  rules  of 
equity  and  prudence.  For  were  he,  without  difcretion  or  choice, 
to  favour  too  great  a  number  of  people  with  difpenfations,  he  would 
enervate  the  authority  of  the  law;  or  were  he  to  refufe  it  in  cafes 
perfectly  alike,  fo  uiireafonable  a  partiality  would  certainly  be  at- 
tended with  jealoufy  and  difcontent. 

XIV.  As  for  what  concerns  the  duration  of  laws,  2nd  the  man-  Qf.p^^  ^|,,. 
ner  in  which  they  are  abolilhed,  we  are  to  ablerve  tlie  follov/ing  raticnof 
principles.  I^i^s,  a'»! 

1.  In  general  the  duration  of  law,  as  well  as  its  firft  eftablifli-  -^^J" ''"""y 
ment,  depends  on  the  free  will  and  pleafure  of  the  fovereign,  who  ,{}.,.,}' 
cannot  reafonably  tie  up  his  own  hands  in  this  refpedl. 

2.  Aiid  yet  every  law,  ofitfelf  and  by  its  nature,  is  fuppofed 
perpetual,  when  it  contains  nothing  in  its  difpciltion,  or  in  the 
circumllances  attending  it,  that  evidently  denotes  a  contrary  inten- 
tion of  the  legiflator,  or  that  may  induce  us  reafon:ibly  to  prefume 
that  it  was  only  a  temporary  ordinance.     The  law  is  a  rule  ;  now 

every 

*  Sec  Puffendorf,  Law  cf  Nature  and  Nations^  book  i.  chap  vi.   §  i.-^.  v/i:li 
Jarbeyrac'à  notes. 


68  "ïbe  Principles  of 

every  rule  is  cfitfelf  perpetual  ;  and,  generally  fpeaking,  when  the 
loverelgn  eiiablifhcs  a  law,  it  is  not  with  a  defign  to  repeal  it. 

3.  But  as  the  ftate  of  things  may  happen  to  alter  in  fuch  a  man- 
ner, that  the  law,  grown  ufelefs  or  hurtful,  can  no  longer  be  put 
into  execution  ;  the  fovereign  can,  and  ought,  in  that  cafe,  to  re- 
peal and  abolifh  it.  It  would  be  abfurd  and  pernicious  to  fociety, 
to  pretc-r.d  that  laws  once  enacted  ought  to  fubfift  forever,  let  what' 
inconvcnisncy  foever  arife. 

4.  This  repeal  may  be  made  in  two  difFcrcnt  manner?,  either 
cxprefsly  or  tacitly.  For  when  the  fovereign,  well  acquainted 
^vith  the  ftate  of  things,  negleils  for  a  long  time  to  enforce  the 
cbfervance  of  the  laws,  or  formally  permits,  that  affairs  relating 
thereto  be  regulated  in  a  manner  contrary  to  his  dilpofition  ;  from 
thence  a  ftrong  prefumption  arifes  of  the  abrogation  of  this  law, 
uhich  falls  thus  of  itfelf,  though  the  legiflator  has  not  exprcfsly 
ab  ):  fhed  it. 

Tt  is  plain  we  have  only  glanced  here  upon  the  general  princi- 
ples. As  for  the  application  that  ought  to  be  made  cf  tl^em  to 
each  fpecics  of  laws,  it  requires  fome  modification,  purfuant  to 
their  different  nature..  But  it  is  not  our  bufmefs  to  enter  here  into 
thofe  particulars. 

jHv/  XV.  Law  may  be  divided,   i.  into  divine  or  human,  according 

iMiry  fort»  as  it  has  God  or  man  for  its  author. 

^^f  liws.  2.  Divine  law  may  be  fubdivided  into  two  forts,  namely,  natural 

and  pofitivc  or  revealed. 

l^Taturallaw  is  that  which  fo  neceffarily  agrees  with  the  nature 
and  fiate  of  man,  that  without obferving  its  maxims,  the  peace  and 
happinefs  of  fociety  can  never  be  preferved.  As  this  law  has  an 
effential  agreeablenefs  with  the  conftirution  of  hum.an  nature,  the 
knowledge  thereof  may  be  attained  merely  by  the  light  of  reafon  ; 
and  hence  it  is  called  natural. 

Pofitive  or  revealed  law  is  that  which-  is  not  founded  on  the 
general  conilitution  of  human  nature,  but  only  on  the  willof  God  j 
though  in  other  refpeds  this  law  is  eftablilhed  on  very  good  rea- 
fons,  and  procures  the  advantage  of  thofe  who  receive  it. 

We  meet  with  examples  of  thefe  two  forts  of  laws  in  the  or- 
dinances which  God  gave  formerly  to  the  Jews.  It  is  cafy  to 
diftinguifh  fuch  as  were  natural,  from  thole  that,  being  merely 
ceremonial  or  political,  had  no  other  foundation  than  the  particu- 
Lirwiil  of  God,  accommodated  to  the  adual  ftate  of  that  people. 
With  regard  to  human  laws,  conlidercd  flri6lly  as  fuch,  viz.  as 
originally  proceeding  from  a  fovereign  who  prefides  over  fociety, 

they 


N  A  T  U  R  A  L    L  A  W.  69 


ity  of  sc- 
tions  con- 


they  are  all  pofitive.  For  though  fome  natural  laws  are  made 
the  fubjedl  of  human  laws,  they  do  not  derive  their  obligatory 
iorce  from  the  human  icgiflator  ;  (incc  they  would  oblige  all  the 
fame  without  any  intervention  on  his  part,  becaufe  they  come 
frrom  God. 

Before  we  leave  thefe  definitions,  we  mufl:  not  forget  to  obferve, 
that  the  fcience  or  art  of  making  and  explaining  laws,  and  of 
applying  them  to  human  a£tion?,  goes  by  the  general  name  of 
yurifprudence. 


CHAP.     XI. 
Of  the  morality  of  human  aâïlons.  * 

I.  T 

I  y  AW  being  the  rule  of  human  actions,  in  a  comparative  Tn  what 
view,  we  obferve  that  the  latter  sre  either  conformable  orcppo-  |fj^"^"7^' 
fite  to  the  former;  and  this  fort  of  qualification  of  our  adlions  in 
lifpcd  to  the  law,  is  called  tfiorality.  fifts. 

The  term  of  ?norrMty  comes  from  mores  or  man  ners.  Manners, 
as  we  have  already  obferved,  are  the  free  allions  of  man,  conlidered 
as  fufceptiblc  of  direction  and  rule.  Thus  we  call  morality  the 
relation  of  human  actions  to  the  law,  by  which  they  are  directed  ; 
and  we  give  the  name  of  mora!  philofophy  to  the  collection  of  thofe 
rules  by  which  wcare  to  fquare  our  a£lions. 

II.  The  morality  of  actions  maybe  confidered  in  two  different  ''^<?'''"s 
lights:    I.  in  regard  to  the  manner  in  which  the  law  difpofes  ot  ^p,^   '' 
them  ;  and  2.  in  relation  to  the  conformity  or  oppofition  of  thofe  co^.n-.a- .!- 
fame  actions  to  the  law.  ti.  or  ,'.;r- 

In  the  firft  confideration,  human  actions  are  either  commanded,  '^"'■"'    •  f 
or  forbidden,  or  permitted.  ptraucttu. 

As  we  are  indifpenfibly  obliged  to  do  what  is  commanded,  and 
to  abftain  from  what  is  forbidden  by  a  lawful  fuperior,  civili:ins 
confider  commanded  a£tions  as  neceflary,  and  forbidden  actions  as 
impoffible.  Not  that  man  is  deprived  of  a  phyfical  power  of  a6ting 
contrary  to  law,  and  incapable,  if  he  has  a  mind,  of  exercifing  this 
power.  But  hnce  his  acting  afcer  this  manner  would  be  oppofite  to 
right  rcafon,  and  inconfiftent  with  his  actual  Hate  of  dépendance  ; 

it 

*  See  the  Lr.w  of  Nature  and  Nations,  book  i.  chap.  vii.  and  ths  Duties  of 
Man  and  a  Citiz>;n,  book  i.  chap.  ii.  §  li.  &c. 


yo  7^^  Principles  of 

it  is  to  be  prefiimed  that  a  reafonable  and  virtuous  man,  continu- 
ing and  adting  as  fucli,  could  not  make  fo  bad  a  ufc  of  his  liberty  ; 
and  this  prelumption  is  in  itfclf  too  reafonablt-  and  honoiirable 
for  humanity,  not  io  meet  with  approbation.  IVbatever  (Iny  the 
Roman  lawyers  *)  is  injurious  to  picty^  reputation^  or  modefty-^  and 
in  general  to  good  manners^  ought  to  be  prejiimcd  impojpblc. 

Remarks         HI.  With  regard   to   permitted   aflion?,  they  are  fuch  as  the 
on  permit-  j^y_r  leave^  US  at  liberty  to  do,  if  we  think,  proper,  f     Upon  which 
we  mult  make  two  or  three  remarks. 

1.  We  may  didinguilh  two  forts  of  permlflîon  ;  one  full  and 
abfolute,  which  not  only  gives  us  a  right  to  do  certain  things 
with  impunity,  but  moreover  is  attended  with  a  pofitive  appro- 
bation of  the  legiiliuor  :  the  other  is  an  imperfc(5l  permifTion,  or 
a  kind  of  toleration,  which  implies  no  approbation  but  a  fimple 
impunity. 

2.  The  permiflion  of  natural  laws  always  denotes  a  pofitive 
approbation  of  the  Itgiflator;  and  whatever  happens  in  confe- 
quence  thereof,  is  innocently  done,  and  without  any  violation  of 
uur  duty.  For  it  is  evident,  that  God  could  not  polhively  permit 
the  lealt  thing  that  is  bad  in  its  nature. 

3.  It  is  othervvife  in  refpe61:  to  the  permiflion  of  human  laws. 
We  may,  indeed,  judly  and  with  certainty  infer,  that  a  fovereign 
has  not  thought  proper  to  forbid  or  punilh  fume  particular  things  ; 
but  it  does  not  alvvay>fr  m  thence  follow,  that  he  really  approves 
thofe  things,  and  much  ^  fs  that  they  may  be  innocently  done,  and 
without  any  breach  of  duty. 

.  g..  IV.  The  other  manner  in   which  we  may  view  the  moraliiy 

a.  A<S:ons     r,  n-  -u  II-  /•  r  • 

are  good  or  o*  human  adtiun^,  IS  with  regard  to  meir  conformity  or  oppoiitioii 

juft,  bad  or  to  the  law.     In  this  refpcfi,  adions  are  divided  into  good  or  jufl, 

unjuft,  and  bad  or  unjuft,  and  indifferent, 

uidifferenc.  ^j^  adlion  morally  good  or  juft,  is  that  which  in  itfelf  is  exactly 
conformable  to  fome  obligatory  law,  and  moreover  is  attended 
with  the  circumftances  and  conditions  required  by  the  lepiflator. 

1  faid,  I.  h  good  or jujî  aâîion  ;  for  there  is  properly  i;o  ilifFerence 
between  the  goodnefsand  jultice  of  actions  ;  and  th.ere  is  no  nc- 
ceflity  to  deviate  here  from  the  common  language,  vk  hich  con- 
founds thefe  two  ideas.  The  diftinclion  which  PufFendorf  makes 
between  thefe  two  qualities  is  quite  arbitrary,  and  even  he  himfelf 

afterwards 

*  Nam  qiiîE  faita  la^.iunt  pietJtcm,  exiftimutionem.  virccundiam  noftrani, 
&  (ut  gCKcruliter  dixeriui)  contra  bonos  mores  fiur.tj  U(.c  fiiCtrc  nos  jiofle  cie- 
denduin  eft.     L.  15.  D.  d:  aiml.  Infiiui. 

■j-  See  chap  X  §  5 . 


N  A  T  U  R  A  L    L  A  W.  'JX 

afterwanls  confounds  them.    * 

2.  I  faid,  an  action  morally  good  \  becaufe  we  do  not  confider 
here  the  intrinfic  and  natural  g'^odnefs  of  aiSlions,  by  virtue  of 
which  they  rcdoinid  to  rhe  phyiical  good  of  man  ;  but  only  the 
relation  of  agrecablenefs  they  have  to  the  law,  which  conftitutes 
their  moral  goodnefs.  And  though  thefe  two  forts  of  goodnefs 
are  always fuund  inleparably  united  in  things  ordained  by  natural 
lav/,  yet  we  mult  not  confound  thefe  two  different  relations. 

V.  Inline,  to  didinguifli  the  general  conditions,  whofe  concurrence  Conditions 
is  necefTary  in  order  to  rend'^r  an  a(flion  morally  good,  with  refpeét  rtquifite  to 
to  tlie  agent  ;  I  have  aded,  ihat  this  aSi'ion  ought  to  be  in  itfelf  exa£l-  reii'^er  an 
ly  conformable  to  the  laiv^  and  accompanied  moreover  with  the  circian'  ^^]|'  „qojj] 
Ifance s  and  conditions  required  by  the  legiflator.  And  firfl-,  it  is 
neccfTary  that  this  a(5tion  fhould  comply  exactly,  and  through  all 
its  parts,  with  the  tenor  of  what  the  law  ordains.  For  as  a  right 
Iin<:  is  that  whofe  points  corrcfpond  to  the  rule  without  the  leaft 
deviation  ;  in  like  manner  an  a<5tion,  rigoroufly  fpeaking,  cannot 
be  jjO,  good,  or  right,  unlefs  it  agrees  exactly,  and  in  every  rcrpecft 
with  the  law.  But  even  this  is  not  fuiîîcient  ;  the  a£lion  mult  be 
performed  alfo  purfuant  to  the  manner  required  and  intended  by 
the  legiflator.  And  in  the  firfl:  place,  it  is  necefiary  it  be  done 
with  a  competent  knowledge,  that  is,  we  mufl  know  that  what  we 
do  is  conformable  to  the  law  :  otherwife  the  legiflator  would  have 
no  regard  for  the  action,  and  our  labour  would  be  intirely  lofl.  In 
the  next  place,  we  mufl:  act  with  an  upright  intention  and  for  a 
good  end,  namely,  to  fulfil  the  views  of  the  legiflator,  and  to  pay  a 
due  obedience  to  the  law  ;  for  if  the  agent's  intention  be  bad,  the 
aition,  inftead  of  being  deemed  good,  may  be  imputed  to  him  as 
vicious.  In  t1ne,  we  iliould  aift  through  a  good  motive,  I  mean  a 
principle  of  refpeft  for  the  fovereign,  of  fubmiflion  to  the  law,  and 
from  a  love  of  our  duty  ;  for  plain  it  is,  that  all  thefe  conditions 
are  required  by  the  legiflator. 

VI.   What  has  been  above  affirmed  concerning  good  a£tion?.  Of  the  na- 

fiifficiently  fnews  us  the  nature  of  thofe  which  are  bad  or  unjufl:.  tureofbad 

Thefe  arc,  in  general,  fuch  as  of  themfelves,  or  by  their  concomi-  oru"]"^ 
*..•  n.''  ^  ^      \.     i-r     <-  ■  c  Li-  actions, 

tant  circumltances,  are  contrary  to  the  cifpoutiou  of  an  obligatory 

law,  or  to  the  intention  of  the  legiflator. 

Thtre  are,  therefore,  two  general  fprings  of  injuftice  in  humaa 

a(5tions  ; 

*   Compare  what  he  fays  in  the  Law  of    Nature  and  Nation?,  bock  i.  chap» 
vit.  5  /•  Ja  the  beginning, with  §  4.  of  the  fame  chaptfr. 


7 2  72^  Principles  oj 

allions  ;  one  proceeds  from  the  action  confiJcrcd  in  itfelf,  an  J 
from  its  manifeft  oppofition .  to  what  is  commanded  or  prohibited 
by  the  law.  Such  as,  for  example,  the  murder  cf  an  innocent 
perfon.  And  all  thefs  kinds  of  adtions  intrinfically  bad  can  never 
become  good,  whatever  may  be  in  other  refpedts  the  intention  or 
motive  of  the  agent.  We  cannot  employ  a  criminal  adtion  as  a 
lawful  means  to  attain  an  end  in  itfelf  good  ;  and  thus  we  are  to 
undcrf^and  the  common  maxim,  evilmujl  not  he  done  ^  that  good  may 
come  of  it.  But  an  a6lion  intrinfically  and  as  to  its  fubftance  good, 
may  become  bad,  if  it  be  accompanied  with  circumftances  dircifHy 
contrary  to  the  legiflator's  intention  ;  as  for  inftance,  if  it  be  done 
with  a  bad  view,  and  through  a  vicious  motive.  To  be  liberal 
and  generous  towards  our  fellow-citl-zens,  is  a  good  and  com- 
mend.ible  thing  in  it  itfelf;  but  if  this  generofity  is  praflifed  mere- 
ly with  ambitious  views,  in  order  to  become  infenfibly  mafler  of 
the  commonwealth,  and  to  opprtfs  the  public  liberty  ;  the  perver- 
fity  of  the  motive,  and  the  injuftice  of  the  defign,  render  this  adion 
criminal. 

Alljull  ac-  Yjj^  All  juft  aftions  are,  properly  fpeakinj,  equally  juft  J  by 
«qually  reafon  that  they  have  all  an  exa6t  conformity  to  the  law.  It  is 
ju«>  ;  but  not  the  fame  with  unjuft  or  bad  actions  ;  which,  according  as  they 
.id  ac    are  more  or  lefs  oppolite  to  the  law,  are  more  or  lefs  vicious  ;  fimilar 


» 
t 

C  ore  or 


t  o  .,  are      -^^  ^j^jg  pgfpg^^  jq  curve  lineF,  which  are  more  or  lefs  fo,  in  propor 


kLunjufl.  t'o"  as  they  deviate  from  the  rule.  We  may  therefore  be  feveral 
ways  wanting  in  our  duty.  Sometimes  people  violate  the  law  de- 
liberately, and  ivitb  inalice  prepe-nfe  \  which  is  undoubtedly  the  very 
higheft  degree  of  iniquity,  becaufe  this  kind  of  condu6t  manifeftly 
indicates  a  formal  and  refledtive  contempt  of  the  Icgiflator  and  his 
orders  ;  but  fometimes  we  are  apt  to  fin  through  negledt  and  inad- 
vertency, which  is  rather  a  fault  than  a  crime.  Befide3,  it  is  plain 
that  this  negledt  has  its  degrees,  and  may  be  greater  or  lefler,  and 
defcrving  of  more  or  lefs  cer.fure.  And  as  in  every  thing  unfufcep- 
tible  of  an  exact  and  mathematical  menfure,  we  may  always  diftin- 
guifti  at  leaft  three  degrees,  namely,  two  extremes  and  a  middle  : 
hence  the  civilians  d'iftinguifh  three  degrees  of  fault  or  negligence  ; 
a  grofs  fault,  a  flight  one,  and  a  very  flight  one.  It  is  fufficientto 
have  mentioned  thefe  principles,  the  explication  and  diftin£t  ac- 
count whereof  will  naturally  take  place,  when  we  come  to  the  par- 
ticular queftions  relating  to  them. 

fhlwdkl  '^^^^^'  ^^^  ^'"'^  ^■'^^  carefully  obfervc,  that  what  efTentially  con- 
rfmijuft  ftitutes  the  nature  of  an  unjuft  adtion,  is  its  diredt  oppofition  or 
actions.  contrariety 


N  A  T  U  R  A  L      L  A  W.  7^ 

Contrariety  tothcdifpofition  of  the  law,  or  to  the  intention  of  the 
legiflator  ;  which  produces  an  intriniic  defe(5l  in  the  matter  or  tonn 
of  that  a£tion.  For  though  in  order  to  render  an  a6tion  morally 
good,  it  is  necefi'ary,  as  we  hjve  already  ohferved,  that  it  be  intire- 
ly  conformable  to  the  law,  with  refpedlas  well  to  the  fubftance,  as 
to  the  manner  and  circunift.mces  ;  yet  we  mull  not  from  thence 
conclude,  that  the  dcfedl  of  fome  of  thofe  conditions  always  renders 
an  action  pofuively  bad  or  criminal.  To  proJure  this  effect,  there 
mufl:  be  a  diretl  oppofition,  or  formal  contrariety  between  the  ac- 
tion and  the  law  ;  a  fimple  defeat  of  conformity  being  infufficient 
for  that  purp')fe.  This  defe£l  is,  indeed,  fufficient  to  render  an 
aélion  not  poRtively  good  or  juft  ;  however,  it  does  not  become 
therefore  bad,  but  only  indifferent.  For  example,  if  wc  perform 
an  adtion  good  in  itfelf,  without  knowing  for  whatreafon,  or  even 
that  it  is  commanded  by  the  law  ;  or  if  we  a6l  through  a  different 
motive  from  that  prefcribed  by  the  law,  but  in  itfelf  innocent  and 
not  vicious  ^  the  a£lion  is  reputed  neither  good  nor  bad,  but  mere* 
\y  indifFcrent. 

IX.  There  is  therefore  fuch  a  thing  as  indifferent  aiflion^,  Ofindlf- 
which  hold  a  middle  rank,  as  it  were,  between  juft  and  unjuft.  ^f ""ent  ac- 
Thefe  are  fuch  as  are  neither  commanded  nor  prohibited,  but 

which  the  law  leaves  usai  liberty  to  do  or  to  omit,  according  as 
we  think  proper.  .  That  is,  thofe  allions  are  referred  to  a  law  of 
fimple  permifîîon,  and  not  to  an  obligatory  law. 

Now  that  fuch  actions  there  are,  is  what  no  one  can  reafonably 
queftion.  For  what  a  number  of  things  are  there,  which  b.ing 
neither  commanded  nor  forbidden  by  any  law,  whether  divine  or 
human,  haveconfequently  nothing  obligatory  in  their  nature,  but 
are  left  to  our  liberty,  to  do  or  to  omit,  juft  as  we  think  proper  ? 
It  is  therefore  an  idle  fubtlety  in  fchoolmen  to  pretend  that  aa 
a6lion  cannot  be  indifferent,  iinlefs  it  be  in  an  abfl:ra6l  confidera- 
tion,  as  ftript  of  all  the  particular  circu  nft.mces  of  perfon,  time, 
place,  intention,  and  m.mner.  An  a6lion  divefled  of  ail  thefe 
circumitances,  is  a  mere  Ens  ratlonis  ;  and  if  there  be  reilly  any 
indifferent  actions,  as  undoubtedly  there  arc,  they  miift  be  relative 
to  particular  circumftances  of  perfon,  time,  and  place,  &c. 

X.  Good  or  bad  anions  may  be  ranged  under  different  claffes,  ^j^j,^^"'"^"^ 
according  to  the  objeiStto  which  they  relate.     Good  allions  refer-  ^adac 
red  to  God,    are    comprifed*  under  the  name   of   Piety.      Thofe  tions. 
which  relate  to  ourfclvcs,  are  dilVmguifhed  by  the  words,  IFifdom^^  ■ 
Temperance^  Modnratm,     Thofe  which  concern   other  men,  are 

K  included 


74  T/je  Principles   of 

included  under  the  terms  of  Jud'ice  and  Benevolence.  We  only 
anticipate  here  the  mentioning  ofthis  diflinciion,  becaufe  we  mult 
return  to  it  again  when  we  come  to  treat  of  natural  law.  The 
fame  diflinéiion  is  applicable  to  bad  actions,  which  belong  either 
to  Impiety^  Intemperance.^  or  Injuji'ice. 

of  j»iaice,      XI.  It  iscommon  to  propofc  fsvcral  divifions  of  juftice.     That 
nndits  dit-  ^^  ^       ^^^^  ^^  filent  on  this  article,  we  fhall  obferve, 
kinds.  !•    I'hat  jufticemay,  in  general,  be  divided  into  perfe(5l  or  rigor- 

ous. The  former  is  that  by  which  we  perform  towards  cur  neigh- 
bour whatever  is  due  to  him  in  virtue  of  a  perfect  or  rigorous 
right,  that  is,  the  execution  of  which  he  may  demand  by  forcible 
means,  unlefs  wc  fatlsfy  him  freely  and  with  a  good  will  ;  and  it  is 
in  this  ftrict  fenfe  that  the  word  Juflice  is  generally  underftood. 
Ths  fccond  is  that  by  which  we  perform  towards  another  the 
duties  owing  to  him  only  in  virtue  of  an  imperfedl:  and  non-rigor- 
ous obligation,  which  cannot  be  infifted  upon  by  violent  methods; 
but  the  fulfilling  of  them  is  left  to  each  perfon's  honoiu'  and  con- 
fciencc.  *  Thefe  kinds  of  duties  are  generally  comprehended 
under  the  appellations  of  humanity,  charity,  or  benevolence,  in 
oppofition  to  rigorous  juftice,  or  juftice  properly  fo  called.  This 
divifion  of  juftice  coincides  with  that  of  Grotius,  into  expletive  and 
attributive. 
,  2.  We  might  fubdivide  rigorous  juftice  into  that  which  is  exer- 

clfed  between  equals,  and  that  which  takes  place  between  fuperior 
and  inferior,  f  The  former  contains  as  many  different  fpecies  as 
there  are  duties,  which  one  man  may  in  rigour  require  of  every 
other  man,  confidered  as  fuch,  and  one  citizen  of  every  fellow- 
citizen.  The  latter  includes  as  many  fpecies  as  there  are  different 
focieties,  where  fome  command,  and  others  obey.  + 

3.  There  are  other  divifions  of  juflice,  but  fuch  as  feem  ufelefs, 
and  far  from  being  exadt.  For  example,  that  of  univeifal  and 
particular  juftice,  taken  in  the  manner  as  Puftendorf  explains  it, 
appears  incorreâ:,  inafinuch  as  one  of  the  members  of  the  divifion 
is  included  in  the  other.  ||  The  fubdivifion  of  particular  juftice  into 
diftributive  and  commutative,  is  incomplete  ;  becaufe  it  includes 

only 

*   See  chap.  vii.  §  8. 

f  This  amounts  to  the  fame  thing  very  near,  as  the  Jui  rectorhm  and  irq^a» 
torium  of  Grotius.      Buok  i.  diap.    I.  §  3.  num.  3. 

^  See  Baddms.  EJementa  philof.  pracl.  part  ii.  cap.  ii.  §  46. 

II  Law  of  Nature  mid  Nations,  book  i.chap.  viii.  §  8.  And  the  Duties  of 
Man  and  a  Citizen,  booki.  chap.  ii.  §  14.  with  Barbeyrac's  notes. 


N  A  T  U  R  A  L    L  A  W.  y^ 

wly  what  is  due  to  another,  by  virtue  of  feme  pa£l  or  engagement^ 
notwithftaiidiiig  there  are  many  things  which  our  neighbour  may 
retjuire  of  us  in  rigour,  v^ithoutany  rep;ard  to  pacl  or  convention. 
And  we  may  obferve  in  general,  by  reading  what  Grotius  and  Puf- 
fendorf  have  wrote  concerning  this  fubjeit,  that  they  are  at  a  lofs 
themfelves,  to  give  a  clear  and  exacSt  idea  of  thefe  different  kinds  of 
juflice.  Hence  it  is  manifefl:,  that  we  had  better  wave  all  thcfc 
fcholaflric  divifions,  contrived  in  imitation  of  <hofe  of  Arillotle,  and 
abide  by  our  firfl:  divifion.  And  indeed,  it  is  only  out  of  rel'pecSt 
to  the  common  opinion,  that  we  have  taicen  any  notice  thereof.  X 

XII.  Befides   what  we  may  call  the  quality  of  moral  adion<^,  Of  the  re- 
they  have  likewife  a  kind  of  quantity,  which,    by  comparing  the  btivc  cfti- 
good  adions  to  one  another,  as  alfo  the  bad  in  the  fame  manner,  li'.atlons  of 
leads  us  to  a  fort  of  relative  cftimation,  in  order  to  mark  the  great-  ^}°'^^'-  ^^' 
er  or  lefler  degree  of  evil  to  be  found  in  each.    We  fhall  give  here 
the  principles  neceflary  for  this  eftimation. 

r.  Thefe  adtions  may  be  confidered  with  regard  to  their  object. 
The  nobler  the  obje6l,  the  higher  the  excellence  of  the  good  adrioti 
done  towards  this  obje£l  ;  and  a  bad  adlion,  on  the  contrary,  be- 
comes more  criminal. 

2.  In  refpect  to  the  quality  and  flate  of  the  agent.  Thus  a 
favour  or  benefit  received  of  an  enemy,  excels  that  which  is  con- 
ferred upon  us  by  a  friend.  And,  on  the  contrary,  an  injury  done 
us  by  a  friend,  is  more  fenfiblc,  and  more  atrocious,  than  that  which 
is  committed  by  an  enemy. 

3.  In  reference  to  the  very  nature  of  the  aflion,  according  as 
there  is  more  or  lefi  trouble  to  perform.  The  more  a  good  a6tion 
is  difficult,  fjppofmg  every  thing  elfe  equal,  the  more  worthy  it 
is  of  praife  and  admiration.  But  the  eafier  it  is  to  abflain  from  a 
bad  aiStion,  the  more  it  is  blameable  and  enormous  in  comparlfon 
to  another  of  the  fame  Ipecies. 

4.  In  relation  to  the  efFedls  and  confequences  of  the  a£lion.  An 
a<5lion  is  fo  much  the  better  or  worfe,  in  proportion  as  we  forefee 
that  its  confcquences  mull  be  more  orlefs  advantageous  or  hurtful. 

5.  We  m  ly  add  the   circumftances  of  time,  place,  &c.  which 
are  alfo  capable   of  making  the  good    or  bad  aitions  furpafs  one 
another  in  excellence  or  badnefs.      We  have  borrowed  tiiefe  re- 
marks 


I  See  Grotiuî,  Rij^hts  of  War  and  Peace,  book  i.  chap.  i.  §  8.  and  Puff<jndoif, 
Law  of  Nature  and  Nations,  book  i.  chjp,  vii.  -j  9.  10,  ix,  12.  with  Birbeyrac'* 
|iote$. 


7Û  l'he  P  R  I  x\  C  I  P  L  E  s,'  ÊPc. 

marks  from  one  of  Barbeyrac  s  notes  on  PufFendorf.  * 

h^a"*'îica-  ^^I^-  Let  us  obftrve,  in  fine,  that  morality  is  attributed  to 
"le  uTpcr-  persons  as  well  as  aétions  ;  and  as  adions  are  good  or  bad,  jiift  or 
fondas  well  unjull,  vve  (ay  likcv/lfc  of  men,  that  they  are  good  or  bad,  virtuous 
asadliocs.    oi-   vicious. 

A  virtuous  man  is  he  that  has  a  habit  of  aâing  conformably  ta 
the  laws  and  his  duty,  A  vicious  man  is  one  that  has  the  oppofite 
habit. 

Virtue  therefore  confifts  in  a  habit  of  adting  according  to  the 
laws  ;  and  vice  in  the  contrary  habit. 

I  faid  that  virtue  and  vice  arc  habits.  Hence  to  judge  properly 
of  thefe  two  charaiSters,  we  fhould  not  flop  at  fome  particular 
aflion  we  ought  to  confider  the  whole  fcries  of  the  life  and  ordi- 
nary conducl  of  man.  "VVe  ftiou'd  not  therefore  rank  among  the 
number  of  vicious  men,  thofe  who  through  weaknefs,  or  otherwife, 
have  been  fomctimes  induced  to  commit  a  bad  atftion  ;  as  on  the 
other  hand,  thofe  who  have  done  a  few  ails  of  virtue,  do  not  merit 
the  title  of  honefl  men.  There  is  no  fuch  thing  to  be  found  in 
this  world  as  virtue  in  every  refpt£t  complete  ;  and  the  weaknefs 
infeparable  from  man,  requires  we  (hould  not  judge  him  with  full 
rigour.  Since  it  is  allowed  that  a  virtuous  man  may,  through 
weaknefs  and  furprife,  commit  fome  unjufl  a6lion  ;  ïo  it  is  but 
right  we  ihould  likewife  allow,  that  a  man  who  has  contrafled 
feveral  vicious  habits,  may  notwithftanding,  in  particular  cafes,  do 
foiîie  good  action,  acknowledged  and  performed  as  fuch.  Let  us 
not  fuppofe  men  worfe  than  they  really  arc,  but  take  care  to  diftin- 
guifh  the  lèverai  degrees  of  iniquity  and  vice,  as  well  as  thofe  of 
proberty  and  virtue. 

^  See  the  Law  of  Nature  and  Nations,  book  i.  chap.  viii.  §  5.  note  i. 

'Jhe  End  of  the  First  Part, 


T  H  B 


THE 

PRINCIPLES 

O   F 

NATURAL     LAW. 

PART     II. 

Of  the  Law  of  Nature* 

CHAP.     I. 


Jn  what  the  Law  of  Nature  conjijlsy  and  that  there  hfucha  thing. 
Firji  confiderations  drawn  from  the  exxjlence  of  God  and  his 
auhority  over  us. 

I.         A       FTER  havincr  fettled  the  general  principles  of  law,    S"bjeâ  of 
"*  J     r      /■    •  .  1     .L        ^         .11  •      this  fécond 

our  bulinefs  is  now  to  apply  them  to  natural  law  in    ^^^ 

particular.      The  queftions  we  have  to  examine   in 

this  fécond  part  are  of  no  lefs  importance  than  to 

know,    whether  man,  by  his  nature  and  conftitution, 

is   really  fubjedl  to   lav/s  properly  fo  called  ?      What   are  thefe 

laws  ?      Who   is    the  fuperior  that  impofes  them  ?    By   what 

method  or  means  is  it  poffible  to  know  them  ?  From- whence  refults 

the  obligation  of  obferving  them  ?    What  confequencc  may  follow 

from  our  negligence  in  this  refpefl  ?  And,  in  fine,  what  advantage 

on  the  contrary  may  arifc  from  the  obfervance  of  thefe  laws  ? 

II.  Let  us  begin  with  a  proper  definition  of  the  terms.  By 
natural  law  we  underftand,  a  law  that  God  impofes  on  all  men, 
and  which  they  are  able  to  difcover  and  know  by  the  fole  light 

of 


■7  8  The  Principles   of 

of  rcafon,  and  by  jiMcntively  confiderinc^  their  ftate  anj  nature. 

Natural  law  is  likewifc  taken  for  the  I'yftem,  aflemblage,  or 
body  ot  the  laws  of  nature. 

Natural  jurifpriidcince  is  the  art  of  allaiaing  to  the  knowledge 
of  the  laws  of  nature,  of  explaining  and  applying  them  to  human 
a<flions. 

Whether       J  J  J.  But  whether  thsre be  really  any  natural  laws.is  the  firfiqueflion 

there  are     jj^^^  prefents  itlelf  here  to  our  inùuiry.     lnx)rder  to  make  a  proper 
any  natui^i        ^    '  n      •  i      .'  •  r      r 

j^^,,5^  anlwer/we  rnuftalcend  to  the  principles  of  natural   theology,  as 

being  the  firft  and  true  foundation  ot  the  law  of  natuie.     For  when 

we  are  afked,  whether  there  are  any  natural  laws,  this  cueftion 

cannot  be  refolved,  but  by  examining  the  three  following  articles. 

T.  Whether  there  is  à  God  r    2.  If  there  is  a  God,  v.'hether  he 

has  a  right  to  impofe  laws  on  man  ?    3.  Whether  God  afiually 

exercifcrs  his  right  in  this   refpect,  by  really  giving  us  laws,  and 

requiring    we  fhould  fqiiars  thereby  our  adlions  ?    Thefe  three 

points  will  furnifh  theûibje«£l  of  this  and  the  following  chapters. 

Of  the  ex-       IV,  The  exiftence  of  God,  that  is,  of  a  firf>,   intelligent,  and 

irtence  of    f-lf-exiflent  being,  on  whom  all  things  depend  as  on  their  firft  caufe, 

"'  ■  and  who  depends  himfelf  on  no  one  ;  the  exidence,  I  fay,  of  fuch 

a  being,    is  one  of  thof;;  truths  that  fhew  ihemfclves  to  us  at  the 

iirft  glance.     We  have  only  to  attend  to  the  evident  and  ienfibfe 

proofs,  that  prefent  themfelves  to  us,  as  it  were,  from  all  parts. 

The  chain  and  fubordination  of  caufes  ainong  themlelves, 
which  necelTarily  requires  we  Ihould  fix  on  a  firft  caufe  ;  the  ne- 
cefTity  of  acknowledging  a  firfl  mover  ;  the  admirable  ftruélure 
and  order  of  the  univerfe  ;  are  all  fo  many  demondrations  of  the 
exigence  of  God,  within  the  reach  of  every  capacity.  Let  us 
unfold  them  in  a  fev/  words. 

rirfl proof.  V.  I  We  behold  an  infinite  number  of  objeé^s,  v;hlch  form 
The  nccef-  j^^j  together  1  h :- aflemblage  v/e  call  the  univerfe.  Something 
felf-exia-  therefore  mult  have  always  cxilfed.  For  were  we  to  fuppofe  a  time 
tilt  and  in-  in  v-'hich  there  was  abfbjutcly  nothing,  it  is  evident  that  nothing 
ttlllgcnt  could  have  ever  exifled  ;  becaufc  whatfoever  has  a  beginning, 
muft  have  a  caufe  ofits  exiftence  :  fince  nothing  can  produce 
nothing.  It  m.iift  be  therefore  acknowledged  that  there  is  fome 
eternal  being,  who  cxifls  necefTarily  and  of  himfelf  \  for  he  can 
be  indebted  to  no  one  tlfe  for  his  origin  \  and  it  implies  a  çontra- 
diâion  that  fuch  a  being  does  not  exill. 

r\iorcovcr,  this  eteinal  beina;,  v.ho  nccefTarilv  and    of  himftljf 

fubliftj, 


jti 


N  A  T  U  R  A  L    L  A  w.  79 

fubfifts,  ts  endued  with  reafon  and  underftanding.  For  to  purfue 
the  fame  manner  of  arguing,  were  we  to  fuppofe  a  time  in  which 
there  was  nothing  but  inanimate  beings,  it  would  have  been  impof- 
Jible  for  intelligent  being':,  fuch  as  -we  now  behold,  ever  to  rxift. 
Intelle(5lion  can  no  more  proceed  from  a  blind  and  unintelligent 
caufe,  than  a  being,  of  any  kind  whatfoever,  can  come  from  noth- 
ing. There  mu(t  therefore  have  always  exilled  a  father  of  Ipirit- 
ual  beings,  an  eternal  mind,  the  fource  from  whence  all  others  derive 
their  exiftence.  Let  what  fyftem  foever  be  adopted  concerning 
the  nature  and  origin  of  the  loul,  our  proof  fubfills  ft^ill  in  its  full 
force.  Were  it  even  to  be  fuppofed  that  the  cogitative  part  of 
man  is  no  more  than  the  efFe<fl  of  a  certain  motion  or  modification 
of  matter  ;  yet  we  fhould  flill  want  to  know  how  matter  acquired 
this  activity,  which  is  not  eflential  to  it,  and  this  particular  and  fo 
much  admired  organization,  which  it  cannot  impart  to  itfelf.  Wc 
ihould  inquire,  who  is  it  that  has  modihed  the  body  in  fuch  a  manner 
proper  to  produce  fuch  wonderful  operations  asthofe  of  intellection, 
which  refleds,  which  a6ls  on  the  very  body  itfelf  with  command, 
which  furveys  the  earth,  and  meafurcs  the  heaven?,  reccllefls  paft 
tranfadtions,  and  extends  its  views  to  futurity.  Such  a  mafi-er- 
piece  muft  come  from  the  hands  of  an  intelligent  caufe  ;  where- 
fore it  is  abfolutely  necefTary  to  acknowledge  a  firfl,  eternal,  and 
intelligent  Being. 

VI.  An  eternal  Spirit,  who  has  within  himfelf  the  principle  of  we  muft 
his  own  exif^ence,  and  of  all  his  faculties,  can  be  neither  changed    not  fttk 
nor  deftroyed  ;  neither  dependent  nor  limited  ;   he  fhould  even  be  1^°''  ^hi=  be- 
invefled  with  infinite  perfection,  fufficient  to  render  him  the  fole  y^^!"i.|-e'* 
and  firft  caufe  of  all,  fo  that  we  may  have  no  occafion  to  feek  for 
any  other. 

But  does  not  (fome  will  afk)  this  quality  of  an  eternal  and  intel- 
ligent being,  belong  to  matter  itfelf,  to  the  vifible  world,  or  to 
fome  of  the  parts  thereof? 

I  anfwer,  that  this  fappofition  is  abfolutely  contrary  to  all  our 
ideas.  Matter  is  not  efTentially  and  of  itfelf  intelligent  :  nor  can 
it  be  fuppofed  to  acquire  intellecSlion  but  by  a  particular  modifica- 
tion received  from  a  caufe  fupremely  intelligent.  Now  this  firfl 
caufe  cannot  have  fuch  a  modification  from  any  other  being  ;  for 
he  thinks  efTentially  and  of  himfelf;  wherefore  he  cannot  be  a 
material  being.  Befides,  as  all  the  parts  of  the  univerfe  are  vari- 
able and  dependent,  how  is  it  poffible  to  reconcile  this  with  the 
idea  of  an  infinite  and  all  perfed  being  ? 

As  for  what  relates  to  man,  his  dépendance  and  vveaknefs  are 

much 


8o  7^^  Principles  of 

much  more  fenfible  than  thofe  of  other  creatures.  Since  he  has  no 
life  of  himfelf,  he  cannot  be  the  efficient  caufe  of  the  exiftence  of 
others.  He  is  unacquainted  with  the  ftrudure  of  his  own  body, 
and  with  the  principle  of  life;  incapable  of  difcovering  in  what 
manner  motions  are  conne<5led  with  ideas,  and  which  is  the  proper 
fpring  of  the  empire  of  the  will.  We  muft  therefore  look  out  for 
an  efficient,  primitive,  and  original  caufe  of  mankind,  beyond  the 
human  chain,  be  itfuppofed  ever  fo  long  ;  we  muft  trace  the  caufe 
of  each  part  of  the  world  beyond  this  material  and  vifible  world. 

Second  ^^^*  ^'  After  this  firft  proof  drawn  from  the  necefllty  of  a  firft, 

proof.  The  eternal,  ami  intelligent  being,  diftin<51:  from  matter  ;  we  proceed  to 
rcceflity  of  a  fecond,  which  fh?ws  us  the  Deity  in  a  more  {.mfible  manner, 
afirft  and  more  within  the  reach  of  common  capacities.  The  proof  1 
mover.  mean,  is  the  contemplation  of  this  vifible  world,  wherein  v/e  per- 
ceive a  motion  and  order,  which  matter  has  not  of  itfel^  and  mufl 
therefore  receive  from  fome  other  being. 

Motion  or  active  force  is  not  an  eflential  quality  of  body  :  exten- 
fion  is  of  itfelf  rather  a  pafîîve  being;  it  is ealily  conceived  at  reft, 
and  if  it  has  any  motion,  we  may  v.'ell  conceive  it  may  lofe  it  with- 
out being  ftript  of  its  exiftence  ;  it  is  a  quality  or  ftate  that  pafTes, 
and  is  accidentally  communicated  from  one  body  to  another.  The 
firft  imprelTion  muft  therefore  proceed  from  an  intrinfic  caufe  ; 
and  as  Ariftotle  has  well  expreiied  it,  *  The  firft  mover  of  bodies 
Tnuji  not  be  moveable  hmjelf-y  mujl  not  be  a  body.  This  has  been 
alfo  agreed  to  by  Hobbss.  f  But  the  acknowledging^  fays  he,  of 
one  God  eternal^  infinite^  and  omnipotent^  may  more  eajily  be  derived.^ 
from  the  de  fire  men  have  to  knoiv  the  caufes  of  natural  bodies^  and 
their  fever  al  virtues  and  operations,  than  from  the  fear  of  what  ivas 
to  befal  them  in  time  to  come.  For  he  that  from  any  effeû  he  fecth 
come  to pafs^/hould  reafon  to  the  next  and  immediate  caiije  thereof^  and 
from  thence  to  the  caufe  of  that  caufe.,  and  plunge  himjelf  profoundly 
in  the  purfuit  of  caufs  \  jhall  at  lafl  come  to  this.,  that  there  mufl  be 
(as  even  the  heathen  philofophers  confejfed)  one  firfl  mover  ;  thai  is^ 
afirfl  and  eternal  caufe  of  all  things  j  vjhich  is  that  zuhichmen  mean 
by  the  name  of  God. 

VIII.  3.  But  if  matter  has  not  been  able  to  move  of  itfelf, 
'^Mf'^The  "^"^'^  ^^^^  ^'^^  ^'  capable  to  move  to  the  exact  degree,  and  with  all . 
ftrudurer  ^^^  determinations,  neceffary  to  form  fuch  a  world  as  we  behold, 
order,  aad  rather  than  a  confufed  chaos. 

beauty  of  In 

the  uni«  . 

verfc,  -    ^  ./I  ..       ,  , 

•  Arijîot.     AUtaphsf. 

\  Leviathan,  cbap.xii.  p-  H'  edit.  165Ï, 


Natural  Law.  è-'i 

In  faiEt,  let  us  only  caft  our  eyes  on  this  univerfe,  and  we  (hall 
«very  where  difcover,  even  at  thefirft  glance,  an  admirable  beauty, 
regularity,  and  order  ;  and  this  admiration  will  increafe  in  propor- 
tion,as  in  fearching  moreclofely  into  nature,  we  enter  into  the  par- 
ticulars of  the  ftriii5lure,  proportion,  and  ufe  of  each  part.  For 
then  we  ftiall  clearly  fee,  that  every  thing  is  relative  to  a  certain 
end,  and  that  thcfe  particular  ends,  though  infinitely  varied  among 
themfelves,  are  (o  dextroufly  managed  and  combined,  as  toconfpire 
all  to  a  general  defign.  Notvvithllanding  this  amazing  divcrfity 
of  creatures,  there  is  no  confufion  ;  we  behold  feycral  thoufand 
different  fpecies,  which  preferve  their  diftindt  form  and  qualities. 
The  parts  of  the  univerfe  are  proportioned  and  balanced,  in  order 
to  preferve  a  general  harmony  ;  and  each  of  thofe  parts  has  exa£lly 
its  proper  figure,  proportions,  Gtuation,  and  motion,  either  to  pro- 
duce its  particular  eiFe£l,  or  to  form  a  beautiful  whole. 

It  is  evident  therefore,  that  there  is  a  defign,  a  choice,  a  vifible 
leafon  in  all  the  works  of  nature  ;  and  confequently  there  are  marks 
of  wifdom  and  underftanding,  obviou?,  as  it  were,  even  to  our 
very  fenfes. 

IX.  Though  there  have  been  fomephilofophers  who  have  attributed  The  world 
all  thefe  phaenomena  to  chance,  yet  this  is  fo  ridiculous  a  thought,  is  net  the 
that  I  qucftion  whether  a  more  extravagant  chimera  ever  entered  e||^s<^°f 
into  the  mind  of  man.     Is  it  pofTible  for  any  one  to  perfuade  him-  '^  *°"' 
felf  fcrioufly,  that  the  different  parts  of  matter  having  been  fet  in 
fome  unaccountable  manner  in  motion,   produced  of  themfelves 
the  heavens,  the  ftars,  the  earth,  the  plants,  and  even  animals  and 
men,  and  whatever  is  moft  regular  in  the  organization  ?  A  man  that 
wou'd  pafs  the  like  judgment  on  the  leafl:  edifice,   on  a  book  or 
pidlure,  would  be  looked  upon  as  a  mad  extravagant  perfon.    How 
much  more  (hocking  is  it  to  common  knie.,  to  attribute  to  chance 
fo  valt  a  work,  and  fo  wonderful  a  compofition  as  this  univerfe  ? 

X.  It  would  be  equally  frivolous  to  alledge  the  eternity  of  the  It  is  not 
world,  in  order  to  exclude  a  firft  intelligent  caufe.  For  befides  eternal- 
the  marks  of  novelty  we  meet  with  in  the  hiftory  of  mankind,  as 
the  origin  of  nations  and  empires,  and  the  invention  of  arts  and 
fciences,  &c.  befides  the  afTurance  we  have  from  the  moft  general 
and  moft  ancient  tradition  that  the  world  has  had  a  beo;inninr^ 
(a  tradition  which  is  of  great  weight  in  regard  to  a  matter'^of  fact, 
like  this  ;  )  befides,  I  fay,  all  thi?,  the  very  nature  of  the  thing  does 
not  allow  us  to  admit  of  this  hypothefis  no  more  than  that  of 
chance.  For  the  queftion  is  ftill  to  explain  whence  comes  this 
L  beautiful 


8 2  "The  Principles  of 

beautiful  order,  this  regular  ftrudlure  and  defign,  in  a  v/ord,  whence 
proceed  thofe  marks  of  reafon  and  v/ifdom  that  are  fo  vifibly  dif- 
played  in  all  parts  of  the  univerfe.  To  fay  that  it  has  been  always 
fo,  without  the  intervention  of  an  intelligent  caufe,  does  not  explain 
the  thing,  but  leaves  us  in  the  fame  embarrafTment,  and  advances 
t'le  fame  abfurdity  as  thofe  who  a  while  ago  were  fpeaking  to  us  of 
chance.  For  this  is  in  reality  telling  us  that  whatever  we  behold 
throughout  the  univerfe,  is  blindly  ranged  without  defign,  choice, 
caufe,  reafon,  or  underfl:anding.  Hence  the  principal  abfurdity  of 
the  hypothecs  of  chance,  occurs  likewife  in  this  fyllem  ;  with  this 
difference  only,  that  by  eftablifliirg  the  eternity  ol  the  world,  they 
fuppole  a  chance  that  from  all  eternity  hit  upon  order;  whereas 
thofe  who  attribute  the  formation  of  the  world  to  the  fortuitous 
jundlion  of  its  parts,  fuppofe  that  chance  did  not  fucceed  till  a 
certain  time,  when  it  fell  in  at  length  with  order  after  an  infinite 
nua-.ber  of  trials  and  fruitlefs  combinations.  Both  acknowledge 
therefore  no  other  caufe  but  chance,  or  properly  fpeaking  the) 
acknowledge  none  at  all  ;  for  chance  is  no  real  caufe,  it  is  a  word 
that  cannot  account  fora  real  efFed,  fuch  as  the  arrangement  of 
the  univerfe. 

It  would  not  be  a  diiîîcult  matter  to  carry  thefe  proofs  to  a  much 
greater  length,  and  even  to  increafe  them  with  an  additional  num- 
ber. But  this  may  fuffice  for  a  work  of  this  kind  ;  and  the  little 
we  have  faid,  intitles  us,  methinks,  to  eftablilh  the  exiftence  of 
a  Firli  Caufe^  or  of  a  Creator^  as  an  inconteftable  truth,  that  may 
ferve  henceforward  for  thebafis  of  all  our  reafonings. 

God  has  a  XL  As  foon  as  we  have  acknowledged  a  Creator,  it  is  evident 
"^'^f'  IT  ^^'^^  ^^  ^^^  ^  fupreme  right  to  lay  his  commands  on  man,  to  pre- 
fawst'o  fcribe  rules  of  condudl  to  him,  and  to  fubjeft  him  to  la'.vs  ;  and 
nifln.  it  is  no  leis  evident,  that  man  on  his  fide  finds  himfelf,  by  his  nat- 

ural conflitution,  under  an  obligation  of  fubje£ling  his  actions  to 
the  will  of  this  fupreme  Being. 

We  have  already  (hewn,  -  that  thetrue  foundation  of  fovereign- 
ty  in  the  perfon  of  the  fovereign,  is  power  united  with  wifdom  and 
goodnefs  ;  and  that,  on  the  other  hand,  weaknefs  and  wants  in  the 
iubjeds,  are  the  natural  caufe  of  dépendance.  We  have  only 
therefore  to  fee,  whether  all  thcfe  qualities  of  fovereign  are  to  be 
found  in  God  j  and  whether  men,  on  their  fide,  are  in  a  ftate  of 
infirmity  and  want?,  fo  as  to  depend  neceflarily  on  him  for  their 
happinefs. 

XII.  It 

*  See  pirt  i.  chap.   u. 


nefs. 


NaturalLaw.  82 

XII.  It  is  beyond  doubt,  that  he  who  exifts   nccefTarily  and  on  Jiii» 
himfelf,  and  has  created  the  univerle,  muft  be  invefted  with  an  infi-  '*  ^   confe- 

»      •        I  •  n  11    1  •  1       1  •  qucnce  ot 

nite  power.     As  he  has  given  exiitence  to  all  things  by  his  own  ^is  power, 
will,  he  may  likewife  pref^rve,  annihilate,  or  change  thtm  as  he  wifdom 
plcafes.  3"^  good- 

But  his  wifdom  is  equal  to  his  power.  Having  made  every 
thing,  he  muft  know  every  thing,  as  well  the  caufcs  as  the  efFcdts 
from  thence  refulting.  We  fje  befiJcs  in  all  his  works  the  moft 
excellent  ends,  and  a  choice  of  the  mod  proper  means  to  attain 
them  J  infhort,  they  all  bear,  as  it  were,  the  ftamp  of  wifdom. 

Xlir.  Reafon  informs  us,  that  God  is  a  being  eflentiilly  good  ; 
a  perfection  which  feenis  to  flow  naturally  from  his  wifdom  and 
power.  For  how  is  it  pofiiole  for  a  being,  who  of  his  nature 
is  infinitely  wife  and  powerful,  to  have  any  inclination  to  hurt? 
Surely  no  fort  of  reafon  can  ever  determine  him  to  it.  Malice, 
cruelty,  and  injuftice,  are  always  a  confequcnce  of  ignorance  or 
weaknefs.  Let  mm  therefore  confider  but  never  fo  little  the  things 
which  furround  him,  and  reflafl  on  his  own  conftitution,  he  will 
difcover  both  within  and  without  himfelf  the  benevolent  hand  of 
his  Creator,  who  treats  him  like  a  father.  It  is  from  God  we 
hold  our  life  and  reafon  ;  it  is  he  thatfupplies  moft  abundantly  our 
v/ants,  adding  the  ufeful  to  the  neceflTary,  and  the  agreeable  to  the 
ufeful.  Philofophers  obferve,  that  whatever  contributes  to  our 
prefervation,  has  been  arrayed  with  fome  agreeable  quality. 
*  Nourifhment,  repofe,  action,  heat,  cold,  in  fliort,  whatever  is 
ufeful  to  us,  pleafes  us  in  its  turn,  and  fo  long  as  it  is  ufeful. 
Should  it  ceafe  to  be  lo,  becaufe  things  are  carried  to  a  dangerous 
excefs,  we  have  notice  therefore  by  an  oppofite  fenuition.  The 
allurement  of  pleafure  invites  ns  to  ufe  them  when  they  are  necef- 
fary  for  our  wants  ;  difrelifli  and  latitude  induce  us  to  abftain 
from  them,  when  they  are  likely  to  hurt  us.  Such  is  the  happy 
and  fweet  ceconomy  of  nature,  which  annexes  a  pleafure  to  the 
moderate  exercife  of  our  fenfes  and  faculties,  infomuch  that  what- 
ever furrounds  us  becomes  a  fource  of  fatisfaftion,  when  we  know 
how  to  ufe  it  with  difcretion.  What  can  be  more  magnificent, 
for  example,  than  this  great  theatre  of  the  world  in  which  we  live, 

and 

*  See  an  excellent  trcatife  lately  publiflied  (at  Geneva,  for  Barillot  and  Son. 
in  Ilmo,  r747.)  intitled,  T/je  Theory  of  agreealU  Senfaiiur,!  \  where,  after 
pointing  out  the  rules  that  nature  follows  in  the  diftribution  of  pleafure,  tl;3 
principles  of  natural  thcolojy  and  ethics  are  eftablifhcd. 


84  The  Principles  of 

and  this  glittering  decoration  of  heaven  and  earth,  exhibiting  a 
ihoufand  agreeable  obje<5ts  to  our  view  ?  What  fatisfaction  does 
not  the  mind  receive  from  the  fciences,  by  which  it  is  cxercifcd, 
inlarged,  and  improved  ?  What  conveniencies  do  not  we  draw 
from  human  induftry  J  What  advantages  do  not  we  derive  from 
an  intercourle  with  our  equals  !  what  charms  in  their  convcrfation  ! 
what  fweetncfs  in  friendfhip,  and  the  other  connexions  of  the  heart  ! 
When  we  avoid  the  excefs  and  abufe  of  thing?,  the  grcriteft  part  of 
human  life  abounds  with  agreeable  fenfatioiîs.  And  iftothiswe 
add,  that  the  laws  which  God  gives  u<:,  tend,  as  hereafter  we  fnall 
fee,  to  pcrfecl  our  nature,  to  prevent  all  kind  of  abufe,  and  to  con- 
fine us  to  a  moderate  ufe  of  the  good  things  of  life,  on  which  the 
prefervation,  excelleiice,  and  happinef*^,  as  well  pubhc  as  private, 
of  man  depends  ;  what  more  is  there  wanting  to  convince  us,  that 
the  goodnefs  of  God  is  not  inferior  either  to  his  wifdom  or  power  ? 
We  have  therefore  a  fuperior  undoubtedly  inverted  with  all  the 
qualities  nccefl'ary  to  found  the  moft  legititnarc  and  mcft  extenfive 
authority  :  And  fince  on  our  fide  experience  ftitws  us,  that  we  are 
weak  and  fubje£l  to  divers  wants  ;  and  fince  every  thing  we  have, 
we  have  from  him,  and  he  is  able  either  to  augment  or  diminifh 
our  enjoym.ents  ;  it  is  evident,  that  nothing  is  wanting  here  to 
eftablifh  on  the  one  fide  the  abfo'ute  fovpreignty  of  God,  and  oil 
^  the  other  our  unlimited  dépendance. 


CHAP.    II. 

That  God^  in  consequence  of  his  authority  over  usy  has  aSîually  thought 
proper  to  prefer  ike  to  us  laws  or  rules  ofconcluiî. 


God  CTcr 
ci-fes  his 


_|_   O  proye  fhe  exiftcnçc  of  God,  and  our  dépendance  in 

nthority     refpect  to  him,  is  eftablifhing  the  fight  he  has  of  prescribing  laws 

over  u-.,  by  to  maFi,     But  this  is  not  fufficient  ;  the  queftion  is,  whether  hz 

prcfcnbing  h^g  adually  thought  proper  to  exercife  this  right.     He  can   un- 

°  "^*  doubredly  impofelaws  on  us  ;  but  has  he  really  done  it  ?  And  though 

we  depend  on  him  for  our  life,  and  for  our  phyfical  faculties,  I^as 

he  not  left  us  ia   a  ftate  of  independence  in  rcfpe6l  to  the  moral 

ufe  to  v/hich  we  are  to  apply  them  ?  This  is  the  third  and  capital 

point  we  have  ft  ill  left  to  examine. 

Firft  proof,      H-   ^-  We  have  made  fome  progrefs  already  in  this  refearch,  by 
orawn        difcovcring  all  the  circumftances  nectflary  to  eftablifli  an  aftual 

legiflature. 


NaturalLaw.  85 

legiflature.     On  the  one  fide  we  find  a  fiiperior,  who  by  his  nature  from  the 
is  poflelîed  in  the  very  highcft  degree  of  all  the  conditions  rcquifite  ^."^  ^^••^* 
to  eftablifli  a   legitimate  authority  ;  and  on   the  other  we  behold  ^.^j^-jj  ^e 
man,  who  is  God's  creature,  endowed  with  underlianding  and  lib-  have  been 
crty,  capable  of  afting  with   knowledge    and  choice,  fenfible  of  fpeaking. 
pleafure  and  pain,  fufceptible  of  good  and  evil,  of  rewards  and  pun- 
ifhments.     Sach  an  aptitude  of  giving  and  receiving  laws  cannot 
be  ufelefs.     This  concurrence  of  relations  and  circumftances  un- 
doubtedly denotes  an  end,  and  rr.uft  have  Tome   effeil  ;  juft  as  ths 
particular  organization  of  the  eye  {hews  we  are  defined  to  fee  the 
light.     Why  Ihould  God  have  nnade  us  exadtly  fit  to  receive  laws, 
if  he  intended  none  tor  us  ?  This    would  be  creating  fo  many  idle 
and  ufelefs  faculties.     It  is   therefore  not  only  poflible,  but  very 
probable,  that  our  deftinarion  in  general  is  fuch,  unlefs  the  contrary 
ihould  appear  from  much  fcronger  reafons.     Nowinftead  of  there 
being  any  reafon  to  deftroy  this  firfl  prefumption,  we  fhallfee  that 
every  thing  tends  to  confirm  it. 

III.  2.  When  we  confider  the  beautiful  order  which  the  fupretne 
wifdom  has  efiablifhed  in  the  phyfical  world,  it  is  impofîible  to  ^^<^°"^ 
perfuade  ourfelves,  that  he  has  abandoned   the  fpiritual  or  moral  ^^3^^ 
world  to  chance  and  diforder.     Reafon,  on  the  contrary,  tells  us,  from  the 
that  a  wife  being  propofes  to  himfelf  a  realonable  end  in  every  thing  end  which 
he  does,  and  that  he  ufes  all  the  necefl'ary  means  to  attain  it.     The  ^^T^^' 
end  which  God  had  in  view  with  regard  to  his  creatures,  and  par-  hj^felf 
ticularly  with  refpefl  to  man,  cannot  be  any  other,  on  the  one  fide,  withre- 
than  his  glory  ;  and  on  the  other,  the  perfedion   and  happinefs  of  l"pe<ît  to 
his  creatures,  fo  far   as  their  nature   or  conflitution  will  admit,  j!*^^"'    t"^ 
Thefe  two  views,  fo  worthy  of  the  Creator,  are  perfedlly  combined,  necefiity  of 
For  the  glory  of  God  confifts  in  manifefling  his  perfediions,  his  moral 
power,   his  goodnefs,  wifdom,  and  juftice  ;   and  thefe  virtues  are  ^^'^'s-**' 3°' 
nothing  elfe  but  the  love  of  order  and   of  the  good  of  the  whole.  ^^^"^^5^ 
Thus  a  being  abfolutely  perfeél  and  fupremely  happy,  willing   to 
condu£l  man  to  that  flate  of  order  and  happinefs  which  fuits  his 
nature,  cannot  but  be  willing  at  the  fame  lime  to  employ  whatever 
is  necefiary  for  fuch  an  end  ;  and  confequently  he  mufl  approve  of 
thofe  means  that  are  proper,  and  difapprove  of  fuch  as  are  improper 
for  attaining  it.     Had  the  conftitution  of  man  been  merely  phyfical 
or  mechanical,  God  himfelf  would  have  done  Whatever  is  expedi- 
ent for  his  work  :  but  man  being  a  free  and   intelligent  creature, 
capable  of  difcernment  and  choice  ;    the  means  whTch   the  Deity 
ufes  tocondnfl  him  to  his   end,  ought  to  be  proportioned  to  his 
nature,  that  is,  fuch  as  man  may  engage  in,  and  concur  with,. by  his 
pwniidions, 

]S[ow 


86  The  Principles  of 

Now  as  all  means  are  notequally  fit  to  condudt  us  to  a  certain 
end,  all  human  a£lions  cannot  therefore  be  indifferent.  Plain  it 
is,  that  every  action,  contrary  to  the  ends  which  God  has  propo- 
fed,  is  not  agreeable  to  the  divine  Majefty  ;  and  that  he  approves, 
on  the  contrary,  thofe  v\  hich  of  thcmfelves  are  proper  to  promote 
his  ends.  Since  there  is  a  choice  to  be  made,  who  can  queftion 
but  ourC/eator  is  willing  we  fhould  take  the  right  road  ;  and 
that,  inflead  of  ading  fortuitoufly  and  raftiiy,  we  fhould  behave 
like  rational  creatures,  by  exerciling  our  liberty,  and  the  other 
faculties  he  has  given  us,  in  the  manner  moft  agreeable  to  our  (late 
and  deftination,  in  order  to  promote  his  views,  and  to  advance 
our  own  happinefs,  together  with  that  of  our  fellow-creatures  r 

Confirma-  jy^  Thefe  confiderations  aiTume  a  new  force,  when  we  attend 
precedine  *°  ^'^  natural  confequences  of  the  oppofite  fyftem.  What 
yroof.  would  become  of  man  and  fociety,  were  every  one  to  be  fo  far 
mafler  of  his  actions,  as  to  do  every  thing  he  lifted,  without  hav- 
ing any  other  principle  of  conducfb  than  caprice  or  paflion  ?  Let  us 
fuppofe,  that  God  abandoning  us  to  ourfelves,  had  not  aftually 
prefcribed  any  rules  of  life,  or  fubjedled  us  to  laws;  moft  of  our 
talents  and  faculties  would  be  of  no  manner  of  ufe  to  us.  To 
what  purpofe  would  it  be  for  man  to  have  the  light  of  reafon,  were 
he  to  follow  only  -the  impulfe  of  inftlndt,  without  watching 
over  his  conduct  P  What  would  it  avail  him  to  have  the  power  of 
fufpsnding  his  judgment,  were  he  to  yield  ftupidly  to  the  firft  im- 
preffions  ?  And  ol  vvliatfervice  would  refletSiion  be,  were  he  nei- 
ther to  chnfe  nor  deliberate  ;  and  were  he,  inftead  of  liflening  to 
the  counfels  of  prudence,  to  be  hurried  away  by  blind  inclinations  ? 
Thefc  faculties,  which  form  the  excellence  and  dignity  of  our  na- 
ture, would  not  only  be  remâered  hereby  entirely  frivolous,  but, 
moreover,  w^ould  become  prejudicial  even  by  their  excellence  ; 
for  the  higher  and  nobler  the  faculty  is,  the  more  the  abufe  of  it 
proves  dangerous. 

This  would  benotonlyagreat  misfortune  for  man  confidered  alone, 
and  inrefpeâ:  to  himfelf  ;  but  would  ftiU  prove  a  greater  evil  to 
him  when  viewed  in  the  flate  of  fociety.  For  this  more  than  any 
other  flate  requires  laws,  to  the  end  that  each  perfon  may  fe^  lim- 
its to  his  pretenfions,  without  invading  another  man's  right. 
Were  it  otherwife,  licentioufncfs  mufl  be  the  confequence  of  in- 
dépendance. To  leave  men  abandoned  to  themfelves,  is  leaving 
an  open  field  to  the  pallions,  and  paving  the  way  for  injustice, 
violence,  perfidy  and  cruelty.  Take  away  natural  laws,  and  that 
moral  tie  which  fupports  juftice  and  honedy  in  a  whole  nation, 


Natural    Law.  S^ 

and  eftablifliesalfo  particular  duties  either  in  families,  or  in  theothcr 
relations  of  life  ^  man  would  be  then  the  mofl  favage  and  ferocious 
of  all  animals.  The  more  dexterous  and  artful  he  is,  the  more 
dangerous  he  would  prove  to  his  equals  ;  his  dexterity  would 
degenerate  into  craft,  and  his  art  into  malice.  Then  we  Oiould 
be  diveded  of  all  the  advantages  and  fweets  of  fociety  i  and  thrown 
into  a  ftate  of  war  and  libertinifm. 

V.  3.  Were  any  one  to  fay,  that  man  himfelf  would  not  fiil  to  Third 
remedy  thefe  diforders,  by  eftablifhing  laws  in  fociety  ;  (befide  that  pr^of 
human  laws  would  have  very  little  force  were  they  not  founded  ^  *"'", 
on  the  principles  of  conlcience;)  this  remark  thews  there  i  s  a  goodnefaof 
necefRty  for  laws  in  general,  whereby  we  gain  our  caufe.  For  if  God. 
it  be  agreeable  to  the  order  of  reafon  that  men  ftiould  eflablifh  a 
rule  of  life  among  themfelves,  in  order  to  be  fcreened  from  the  evils 
they  might  apprehend  from  one  another,  and  to  procure  thofe 
advantages  that  are  capable  of  forming  their  private  and  public 
happinefs;  this  alone  ought  to  convince  us,  that  the  Creator,  infi- 
nitely vvifer  and  better  than  ourfelves  muft  have  undoubtedly  purfued 
the  fame  method.  A  good  parent  that  takes  care  to  direct  his  chil- 
dren by  his  authority  and  counfelr,  is  able  to  preferve  peace  and  or- 
der in  his  family  j  is  it  then  to  be  imagined,  that  the  common  father  of 
mankind  (hould  negle6l  to  give  us  the  like  afliflance  ?  And  if  a  wife 
fovereign  has  nothing  fo  much  at  heart  as  to  prevent  licentioufnefs 
by  falutary  regulations;  how  can  any  one  believe^  that  God,  who 
is  a  much  greater  friend  to  man  than  man  is  to  his  equals,  has 
left  all  mankind  without  direction  and  guide,  even  on  the  moft 
important  matters,  on  which  our  whole  happinefs  depends  ?  Such 
a  fyftem  would  be  no  lefs  contrary  to  the  goodnefs  than  to  the 
wiidom  of  God.  We  muft  therefore  have  recourfe  to  other  ideas, 
and  conclude  that  the  Creator  having,  through  a  pure  efFe6l  of  his 
bounty,  created  man  for  happinefs,  and  having  implanted  in  him 
an  infuperable  inclination  to  felicity,  fubjeding  him  at  the  fame 
time  to  live  in  fociety,  he  mud  have  given  him  alfo  fuch  principles 
as  are  capable  of  infpiring  him  with  a  love  of  order,  and  rules  to 
point  out  the  means  of  procuring  and  attaining  it. 

Vr.  4.  But  let  us  enter  into  ourfelves,  and  we  flialla  (finally  find.  Fourth 
that  what  we  ought  to  expert  in  thisrefpe6t  from 'the  divine  wif-  proof, 
dom  and  goodnefs,  is  didated  by  right  reafon,  and  by  the  princi-  drawn 
pies  engraved  in  our  hearts.  from  the 

If  there  be  any  fpeculative  truths  that  are  evident,  or  if  there  be  of'cbnduft 
any  certain  axioms  that  ferve  as  a  bafis  to  fciences  \  there  is  no  lefs  which  we 

certainty 


83  The  Principles  of 


aCually  certainty  in  fomc  principles  that  are  lakl  dov/n  in  order  to  dire^ 
find  withia  ^^j.  conduit,  and  to  ferve  as  the  foundation  of  morality.  For 
exannple  ;  That  the  all-iuife  and  all  bountiful  Creator  merits  the 
refpC'^s  of  the  creature  :  that  man  ought  to  feek  his  own  happinefs  : 
that  lue  Jhould  prefer  the  greater  to  the  leffer  evil  :  that  a  benefit 
deferves  a  grateful  acknowledgment  :  that  the  (late  of  order  excels 
that  of  diforder^  i^c.  Thofe  maxims,  and  others  of  the  fame  fort, 
differ  very  little  in  evidence  from  thefe,  The  zvhole  is  greater  than 
its  part  ;  or  the  caufe  precedes  the  effèâi,  i^c.  Both  are  didtated 
by  purereafon  ;  and  hence  we  feel  ourfelves  forced,  as  it  were,  to 
give  our  affent  to  them.  Thefe  general  principles  are  feldom 
contefted  J  if  there  beany  difpute,  it  relates  only  to  their  applica- 
tion and  confequences.  But  fo  foon  as  the  truth  of  thofe  princi- 
ples is  difcovered,  their  confequences,  whether  immediate  or  re- 
mote, are  entirely  as  certain,  provided  they  be  well  connedled  ; 
the  whole  bufinefs  being  to  deduce  them  by  a  train  of  clofe  and 
conclufive  argumentations. 

VII.  In  order  tobefenfible  of  the  influence  which  fuch  prin- 
principles    ciples,  with  their  legitimate  confequences,  ought  to  have  over  our 
areobliga-  condu6l,  we  have  only  to  recolle£l  what  has  been  already  faid  in 
tory  of       the  firft  part  of  this  work,  *  concerning  the  obligation  we  are  un- 
ïhcmfelvcs.  jjgj.  of  following  the  dictates  of  reafon.     As  it  would  be  abfurd  in 
fpeculative  matters,  to  fpeak  and  judge  otherwife  than  according 
to  that  light  which  makes  us  difcern  truth  from  falfhood  }  fo  it 
would  be  no  lefs  prepofterous  to  deviate  in  our  conduiSl  from  thofe 
certain  maxims  which  enable  us  to  difcern  good  from  evil.    When 
once  it  is  manifeft,  that  a  particular  manner  of  a6ting  is  fuitable 
to  our  nature,  and  to  the  great  end  we   have  in  view  ;    and  that 
another,  on  the  contrary,  does  not  fuit  our  conflitution  or  happi- 
nefs ;  it  follows,  that  man,  as  a  free  and  rational  creature,  ought 
to  be  very  attentive  to  this  difference,  and   to  take  his  refolutions 
accordingly.     He  is  obliged  to  it  by  the  very  nature  of  the  thing  j 
becaufe  it  is  abfolutely  necelTary  when  a  perfon  is  defirous  of  the 
end,  to  be  defirous  alfo  ofthe  means  ;  and  he  is  obliged  to  it  more- 
over, becaufe  he  cannot  miftake  the  intention  and  will  of  his  fu- 
perior  in  this  refpedl. 

Th:y  are  VIII.  In  effedl  God  being  the  author  of  the  nature  of  things, 
by  ufc°di.  ^"^^  of  our  conflitution,  if,  in  confequence  of  this  nature  and  con- 
vine  will,  ftitution 

become  «  Chap,  vi,  " 

fcal  lawst 


NaturalLaw.  89 

ftitutlon,  we  are  reafonably  determined  to  judge  after  a  certain 
manner,  and  to  a£l  according  to  our  jidgtnent,  the  Creator  (uf- 
ficiently  manifcfts  his  intention,  io  that  we  can  no  longer  be  ig- 
norant of  his  will.  The  language  therefore  of  reafon  is  that  of 
God  himfv'if.  When  our  reafon  tells  us  fo  clearly,  that  we  mujl 
not  return  evil  far  gooi^  it  is  God  himfelf,  who  by  this  internal 
oracle  gives  us  to  underftand  what  is  good  and  juft,  what  is  agree- 
able to  him  and  fuitable  to  our(elves.  We  faid  that  it  is  not  ac 
all  probable,  that  the  good  and  wife  Creator  ftiould  have  abandon- 
ed man  to  himfeif,  without  a  guide  and  diredtion  for  his  condué^. 
We  have  here  a  diredion  that  comes  from  him  ;  and  fince  he  is 
inverted  in  the  very  highell  degree,  as  we  have  alrtady  obferved, 
with  the  perfeflions  on  which  a  legitimate  fuperiorlty  is  founded, 
who  can  pretend  to  queftion  that  the  will  of  fuch  a  fupeiior  is  a 
law  to  us  ?  The  reader,  I  fuppofe,  has  not  forgot  the  conditions 
requifite  to  conftitute  a  law  ;  conditions  that  are  all  to  be  met 
with  in  the  prefent  cafe.  i.  There  is  a  rule.  2.  This  rule  ig 
juft  and  ufcful.  3.  It  comes  from  a  fuperior  on  whom  weintire- 
ly  depend.  4.  In  fine,  it  is  fufficiently  made  known  to  us,  by 
principles  engraved  in  our  hearts,  and  even  by  our  own  reafon. 
It  is  therefore  a  law  properly  fo  called,  which  we  are  really  obliged, 
to  obferve.  But  let  us  inquire  a  little  further,  by  what  means  this 
natural  law  is  difcovered,  or,  which  amounts  to  the  fame  thing, 
from  what  fource  we  muft  derive  it.  What  we  have  hitherto 
proved  only  in  a  general  manner,  will  be  further  illuftrated  and 
confirmed  by  the  particulars  on  which  we  are  now  going  to  en- 
large. For  nothing  can  be  a  ftronger  proof  of  our  having  hit 
upon  the  true  principles,  than  v.hen  unfolding  and  confidering 
them  in  their  different  branches,  we  find  they  are  always  conform- 
able to  the  nature  of  things. 


CHAP.     III. 

Of  the  jneans  by  which  we  difcern  what  is  juji  and  uvju/}^  or  what  is 
dictated  by  natural/aw,  nani^ly^  1.  moral injiinaij  and  2,  reafon. 


Wh 


Firft 


I. 

AT   has  been  fiid  in   the  preceding  chapter  already  . 

n.  Ir^jL-         ,11  •!  r  •    ■  means  or 

mew-,  tnat  (jod  has  mvelted  us  v/itn  two  me:.ns  of  perceivmg  or  difcerning 
difcerning  moral  good  and  evil  ;  the  firft  is  only  a  kind  of  inflindt  ;  moral  gncd 
the  fécond  is  reafon  or  judgment.  ^^^  «^'''» 

Moral  inftinvft  I   call  that  natural  bent    or  inclination    which  °^,v^li'' 

r  ■  inUinct  oc 

prompts  us  to  approve  of  certain  ihmgs  as  good  and  commendable,  inward 
M  and  ferJe, 


90 


Ezamplts. 


Vv'hencc 
thefe  fen- 
fations 
proceed. 


li'he  Principles  oJ 

snJ  toceudemn  otliers  as  bad  and  blameable,  independent  cf  re-« 
fledlion.  Or  if  any  one  has  a  inind  lo  diilingtiilh  this  inftinét  by 
the  name  of  moral  fenfe,  as  Mr.  Hutchinfon  has  done,  I  (hall 
then  fay,  that  it  is  a  faculty  ot  the  mind,  which  inftantly  difcerns, 
in  certain  cafes,  moral  good  and  evil,  by  a  kind  of  fenfation  and 
tafte,  independent  of  reafon  and  refledlion. 

ÎI.  Thus  at  the  (ight  of  a  man  in  mifery  or  pain,  we   feci  im- 
mediately a  {'cw'iç.  of  compaffion,  which  prompts  us  to  relieve  him. 
The  fii  It  emotion  that  (lrik.es   us,   after  receiving  a  benefit,  is  to 
acknowledge  the  favour,  and  to  thank  our  benefa(f^or.     The  firfl 
difpofition  of  one  man  towards  another,  ab(tra£ling  from  any  par- 
ticular reafon  he  may  have  of  hatred  or  fear,  is  a  fenfe  of  bcricvo- 
lence,  as  towards  his  fellow-creature,  with   whom  he  finds  him- 
ffir  conneiSled  by  a  conformity  of  nature  and  wants.     We  iikewife 
obferve,  that  without  any   great  thought  or  reafoning,  a  child,  or 
untutored  peafant,  is  fenfible  that  ingratitude  is  a  vice,  and  exclaims 
againfl:  perfidy,  as  a  black  and  unjuft  a(Si:ion,  which  highly  fhocks 
him,  and  isabfolutely  repugnant  to  his  nature.     On  the  contrary, 
to  keep  one's  word,  to  be  grateful   for  a  benefit,  to  pay  every  body 
their  due,   to  honour  our  parents,   to  comfort  thofe    who  are  ia 
diftrefs  or  mifery,-  are  all  fo   many  actions  which  we  cannot  but 
approve  and  cfleem  as  juft,  good,  honeft,  beneficent,  and  ufeful 
to  mankind.      Hence  the  iBind  is  pleafed  to   fee  or  hear  fuch  a£ts 
of  equity,  fincerity,  humanity,  and  beneficence  ;  the  heart  is  touch- 
ed and  moved  ;  and  reading  them  in  hiftory  we  ate  feized  with 
admiration,  and  extol  the  happinefs  of  the  age,  nation,  or  family, 
diltinguifli^d  by  fuch  noble  examples.     As  for  criminal  infiances, 
we  cannot   fee  or  hear   them    raentioaed,  without  contempt  or 
indignation. 

IÎI.  If  any  one  fliould  a(k,  from  whence  comes  this  emotion 
of  the  heart,  which  prompts  us,  almoft:  without  any  realoning  or 
inquiry,  to  love  fome  acStions  and  to  deteft  others  ;  the  only  anfwer 
I  am  able  to  give^  is,  that  it  proceeds  from  theauihor  of  our  being, 
who  has  formed  us  after  this  manner,  and  whom  it  has  pleafed 
that  our  nature  or  conftitution  fhould  be  fuch,  that  the  difference 
of  moral  good  and  evil  fhould,  in  fome  cafes,  affe(5t  us  exactly  in 
the  fame  manner  as  phyfical  good  and  evil.  It  is  therefore  a  kind 
of  inrtinél,  like  lèverai  others  which  nature  has  given  us,  in  order 
to  determine  us  with  more  .expedition  and  vigour,  where  reflec- 
tion would  be  too  flow.  It  is  thus  we  are  informed  of  our  cor- 
poreal wants  by  our  inward  fenfe  ;  while  our  outward  fenfes  ac- 
quaint 


Natural     Law.  9-t. 

quaint  us  with  the  quality  of  the  objedls  that  may  be  ufeful  or  pre- 
judicial to  us,  in  order  to  lead  us,  as  it  were,  mechanically  to 
whatever  is  requifite  for  our  prclervation.  Such  is  alfo  the  inPciniSt 
that  attaches  us  to  life,  and  the  defire  of  happinef'-,  tjie  primum 
mobile  of  all  our  aflions.  Such  is  likewifethe  almolt  blind,  but 
neceflary  tendernefs  of  parents  towards  their  children.  The  pref- 
fingand  indifpenfible  wants  of  man  required  he  fhould  bedireftcd 
by  the  way  of  fenfe,  which  is  always  quicker  and  readier  than  that 
of  reafon, 

IV.  God  has  therefore  thought  proper  to  ufe  this  method  in  of  what 

refpedl  to  the  moral  conduct  of  man,  bv  imprinting   within  us  a  ^'"^^  ^^^y 
,     V.  ,1        --      .  1     •    n-  .^-1  •    •  •     r   '       are  to  us. 

lenfe  or  talte  of  vutue   and   jultice,   wnich  anticipates,  in  loine 

meafure,  our  reafon,  decides  our  hrft  motions,  and  happily  fupplies, 
in  moft  men,  the  want  of  attention  or  rcfle£tion.  For  whatnum- 
bers  of  people  would  never  trouble  their  heads  with  rcfle£ling? 
What  multicudes  there  are  of  ftupid  wretches,  that  lead  a  mere 
animal  life,  and  are  fcarce  able  to  diftinguifli  three  or  four  ideas, 
in  order  to  form  what  is  called  ratiocination  ?  It  was  there- 
fore our  particular  advantage,  that  the  Creator  flioukl  give  us 
a  difcernment  of  good  and  evil,  with  a  love  for  the  one,  and  an 
averfion  for  the  other,  by  means  of  a  quick  and  lively  kind  of  fac- 
ulty, which  has  no  neceflity  to  wait  for  the  fpeculations  of  the 
mind. 

V.  Ifany  one  fliould  difpute  the  reality  ofthefe  fenfations,  by  Objeaion  : 
faying  they  are  not  to  be  found  in  all  men,  becaufe  there  are  fav-  J'.      *^"" 

^      °      ■,  ■^      ,       r  u  Mj  -i     fat  ions   are 

age  people  who  ieem  to  have  none  at  all  ;   and  even  among  civil-  ^^^  found 
ized  nations  we  meet  with  fuch  perverfe  and  ftubborn  mind'?,  as  do  in  all  men. 
not  appear  to  have  any   notion  or  fenfe   of  virtue  :   I  anfwer,   i.  Anfwcr  : 
that  the  mo(t  favage  people  have  neverthelefs  the  firft  ideas  above  j-  V'^find 
mentioned  ;  and  if  there  are  fome  who  feem  to  give  no  outward  ^i  the'm 
figns  or  demonftrations  thereof,    this  is  owing  to  our  not  being  among  the 
fufficiently  acquainted   with  their  manners  ;   or  becaufe  they  are  nioft  ^^'^- 
intirely  flupified,  and  have  ftifled  almoft  all  fentiments  of  human-  as^r^oP'"' 
ity  ;  or,  in  fine,  by  reafon  that  in    fome  refpeds  they  fall  into  an 
abufe  contrary  to  thefe  principles,  not  by  rejecting  them  pofitively, 
but  through  fome   prejudice  that  has    prevailed  over  their  good 
fenfe  and  natural  rectitude,  and  inclines  them  to  make  a  bad  appli- 
cation of  thefe  principles.     For  example,   we  fee  favages  who  de- 
vour theireneinies  whom  they  have  made  prifoners,  imacining  it 
to  be  the  right  of  war,  and  that  fmce  they  have  liberty  to  kill  them, 
nothing  ought  to  hinder  them  from  benefiting  b^  their  flefh,  as 
their  proper  fpoils.     But  thof;  very  favages  would  not  treat  in  that 

manner 


9 3  T^he  Principles   of 

manner  (heir  friends  or  countrymen  :  they  have  laws  and  rules 
amonf^  themfelves  ;  llncerity  and  plain  dcahng  are  cfteemed  there 
as  in  other  places,  and  a  grateful  heart  meets  with  as  much  com- 
mendation among  them  as  with  us. 

niiift^^dT-         ^^'  ^'  ^^'^'"^  regard  to  thofe  who  in  the  moft  enlightened  and 

tirgir.ih       civilized  couiitrie"^,  feem  to  be  void  of  all  fname,  humanity,  orjuf- 

Vetwccn      tice,  we  muft  take  care  to  dillinguifti  between  the  natural  ftate  of 

tli2  raturai  p-jan,  and  thj  depravation  into   which   he    may  fall   by  abufe,  and 

Tnan°and    i'""  co;)fequence  of  irregularity  and  debauch.     For  example,   what 

t'lat'cf  his  *^"'"'  t>e  more  natural  than  paternal  tendernefs  r    And  yet  we  have 

déprava-      (c^zt)  men  who  feemed  to  have  (tifled  it,  through  violence  of  pafTicn, 

tion.  Qp  ^,y  firceof  a  prefent  temptation,  which  fufpsndcd  for  a  wliile 

this   natural    afleclion.     What  can  be  ftronger  than  the  love  of 

curfïlves  and  of  our  own  prefervation  ?   It  happen?,  neverthelefr, 

that  whether  through  anger,  or  ft-mc  other  motion  which  throws 

the  foul  out  of  it;:  natural  pofition,   a  man  tears  his  own  limbr, 

fquanders  his  fubftance,  or  does  himfclf  fome  great  préjudice,  as  ii 

he  were  bent  on  his  own  mifery  and  dcftruclion. 

VII.  3.   In  fine,  if  there  are  people,  who  ccoly,  and  without 

^.  If  there  ^^y  agitation  of   mind,    feem  to    have  divefted  themfeVves  of  all 

mongers  in  affection  and  efteem  for  virtue  ;   (befide?,  that  monfrers  like   thefe 

tic  n>or.il    are  as  rare,  I  hope,  in  th?  moral  as  in  the  phyfical  world  ;)  we  only 

r.rder  they  fee  thereby  the  efFeéls  of  an  cxquiHte  and  inveterate  depravation. 

^l^  ''"^,     For  man  is  not  born  thus  corrupted  ;    but  the  interefl   he  has  in 

no  conle-     excuflng  and  palliating  his  vice^,  the  habit  he  has  contrafted,   and 

quencecar*  the  fc^phiftical  arguments   to  which  he  has  recourfe,  may  flifle,  in 

be  drawn     f^pe,  or  corrupt  the  moral  ftnfe  of  which  we  have  been  fpeaking  ; 

fronuhem.  ^^  ^^.^  ç^^  ^^„^  every  other  faculty  of  the  foul  or  body  may  by  long 

abufe  be  altered   or  corrupted.     Happily   neverthelefs  we  obferve, 

that  our  fpiritual  fenfes  areltfs  fubjeâ  than  our  corporeal   ones  to 

depravity  and  corruption.     The  principle  is  almoft  always  pre- 

ferved  ;  it  is  a  fire,  that   when  it  ftems  even  to  be  extinfl,  may 

kindle  again  and  throw  out  fome  glimmerings  of  light,  as  we  have 

feen  examples  in  very  profligate  men,  under  particular  conjunC' 

tures. 

Second  VIII.  But  notv/ithflanding  God  has   implanted  in  us  this  in- 

tneans  of  {{'\n6}  or  fer.fe,  as  the  firft  means  of  difcerning  moral  good  and  evil, 

difccrnin{r  y„f  y^ç  ^^^  pqj  f^^pj.  ^gre  ;  he  has  alfo  thought  proper  that  the  fame 

sn'devf!"-'  light  which  ferves  to  direél  us  in  every  thing  elfe,  that  is,  reafor, 

which  is'  fhould   come  to  our  afliftance,  in  order  to  enable  us  the  better  to 

îçafpn.  difcern  and  con:iprehcnd  the  true  rules  ofcondu6t. 

Reafon 


N  A  T  U  R  A  L    L  A  W.  Çj 

Rcafon  I  call  the  Lcnhy  of  comparing  ideas,  of  inveftigating 
the  mutual  relations  of  things,  and  trom  thence  inferring  jutt  con- 
fequenccs.  This  noble  faculty,  which  is  the  dire£lrefs  ot  the  mind, 
ferves  to  illuftrate,  to  prove,  to  extend,  and  apply  what  our  nat- 
ural fenfe  already  gave  us  to  underftand,  in  relation  to  juUice  and 
injudice.  As  rcfleiSlion, inltead  of  diminifhing  paternal  tender- 
nefs,  tends  to  f'/cngthen  it,  by  making  us  oblcrve  how  agreeable  it 
is  to  the  relation  of  father  and  Ton,  to  the  advantage  not  only  of  a 
family,  but  of  the  whole  fpecies  ;  in  like  manner  the  natural  fenle 
we  have  of  the  beauty  and  excellence  of  virtue,  is  confiderably 
improved  by  the  reflections  we  are  taught  by  reafon,  in  regard  to 
the  foundations,  motives,  relations,  imd  the  general  as  well  as 
particular  ufes  of  this  fame  virtue,  which  feemed  fo  beautiful  to  us 
pt  firft  fight. 

IX.  We  may  even  affirm,  that   the  light  of  reafon  has  three  Firft  ad- 
advantages  here  in  refpe£l  to  this  initin£l  or  fenfe.  vantage,  of 

I.  It  contributes  to  prove  its  truth  and  cxaânefs  :  in  the  fam.e  '"'^^  "" '" 

1  r  •  •  .  •  I         n     ]  I        1        r  rcfpc(5t  to 

îT.anner  as  we  oblerve  m  other  things  that  ttudy  and  rules  lerveto  i„{iind  ;  it 
verify  the  cxaclnefs  cftafte,  by  (lievving  us  it  is  neither  blind  nor  ferves  to 
arbitiarv,  but  founded  on  reafon,  and  direéled  by  principles  ;  or  as  verify  it, 
thofe  who  are  quick-fighted,  judge  with   greater  certainty  of  the 
diftance  or  figure  of  an  objedt,  after  having  compared,  examined, 
and  meafured  it  quite  at  their  leifure,  than  if  they  had  deperided 
intirely  on  the  firit  fight.     We  find  likewife  that  there  are  opinions 
and  cufloms,  which  m.ake  fo  ftrong  and  fo  general  an  impreffion 
on  our  minds,    that  to  judge  of  them  only  by  the  fentiment  they 
excite,  we  fhtmld  be   in  danger  of  mi  flaking  prejudice  for  truth. 
It  is  reafon's  province  to  recStify  this  erroneous  judgment,  and  to 
counterbalance  this  efîlcl  of  education,  by  fetting  before  us  the 
true  principles  on  which  vjq  cught  to  judge  of  things. 

X.  2.  A  fécond  advantage  which  reafon  has  in  refpe£l  tofim-  Second  ad- 
pie  infrinct,  is,  tliat  it  unfolds  the  ideas  better,  by  conHdering  them  vantage  : 
in  all  their  relations  and  confequences.  For  we  frequently  fee  ''  unfolds^ 
that  thofe,  who  have  had  only  the  firft  notion,  find  themfelves  em-  ^'^^^^^l^lJ^jj^'* 
barrafled  and  miilaken,  when  they  are  to  apply  it  to  a  cafe  of  the  fVorn"* 
lead  delicate  or  complicated  nature.  They  arc  fenfible  indeed  of  thence  in- 
the  general  principles,  but  they  do  net  know  how  to  follow  chem  ^^'^-  rnfer 
through  their  different  branches,  to  make  the  ncceflary  diftinélions  '^°^^'^^^"^"' 
or  exceptions,  or  to  modify  them  according  to  time  and  place. 
This  is  the  bufinefs  of  reafon,  which  it  difcharges  fo  much  the  bet- 
ter, in  proportion  as  there  is  care  taken  to  excrcife  and  imnrove  it. 

XI;  3.'  Reafoa 


CCS. 


94-  'ïke  Principles  of 

Third  ad-       XI.  3.  Reafon  not  only  carries  its  views  farther  than  inlliné}, 
vantage  :    ^\^  refpe6l  to    the  unfolding  and   aiJiiUcation  of  principles  ;  but 
«niverfal     has  alio  a  more  extcnlive  (phirre,  \\\  regard  to  the  very  principles 
means  and  it  difcovers,   and   the  objedts  it  embraces.     Fur  inftincl  has  been 
applicable    given  US  only  for  a  fmall  number  of  fimple  cafes,  relative  to  our 
"*"*■  natural  ftatc,  and  virhich  requircie  quick  determination.     But  be- 
fides  ihofe  fimple  cafes,  where  it  is  proper  that  man  fliould  be  drawn 
and  determined  by  a  firft;  motion  ;  there  are  cafes  of  a  more  ccm- 
pofite  nature,  which  arifefrom  the  difFercnt   ftatcs  of  man,   from 
the  combination  of  certain  circumftances,  and  from  the  particular 
fituation  of  each  perfon  ;  on  all  which  it  is  impofTiblc  to  form  any 
rules  but  by  refleition,  and  by  an  attentive  obfervation  of  the  re- 
lations and  agreements  of  each  thing. 

Such  are  the  two  faculties  with  which  God  has  inverted  us,  in 
order  to  enable  us  to  difcern  between  good  and  evil.  Thefe  fic- 
ulties  happily  joined,  and  fubordinate  one  to  the  other,  concur  to 
the  fame  efFe^.  One  gives  the  firft  notice,  the  other  verifies  and 
proves  it;  one  acquaints  us  with  the  principles,  the  other  applies 
and  unfolds  them;  one  ferves  for  a  guide  in  the  moft  prefTing  and 
necefl'ary  cafes,  the  other  diliinguifhes  all  forts  of  afRnity  or  rela- 
tion, and  lays  down  rules  for  the  moft  particular  cafes. 

It  is  thus  we  are  enabled  to  difcern  what  is  good  and  juft,  or, 
which  amounts  to  the  fame  thing,  to  know  wh.^.t  is  the  divine  will, 
in  refpeèl:  to  the  nroral  condu61:  we  are  to  obferve.  Let  us  unite 
at  prefent  thefe  two  means,  in  order  to  find  the  principles  of  the  law 
of  nature. 


CHAP.    IV. 
Of  the  principles  from  whence  reafon  may  deduce  the  law  of  nature,  * 


I. 

From 
whence  are 
we  to 
duce  the 


J^F  we  fhould  be  afterwards  afked,  what  principles  ought 
"'^^  reafon  to  make  ufe  of,  in  order  to  judge  of  what  relates  to  the 
auce  the  law  of  nature,  and  to  deduce  or  unfold  it?  Oiiranfwer  is  in  general, 
principles  that  vve  have  Only  to  attend  to  the  nature  of  man,  and  to  hi*^  ibtes 
of  the  law  ^^  relations  ;  and  as  thefe  relations  arediffc-rent,  there  may  be  like- 
0  nature  ,  y^ife^Jiff^jr^^-it  principles,  that  lead  us  to  the  knovv  ledge  of  our  dntits. 


•  See  on  this,  and    the  following  chapter,  PulTendorf's  Law  of  Nature  ac<i 
î^ations,  book  ii.  chap.  iii. 


Natural  Law.  95 

But  before  we  enter  upon  this  point,  it  will  be  proper  to  make 
f(^m^  preliminary  remarks  on  what  we  c?\\  principles  of  natural 
law  ;  in  order  lo  prevent  the  ambiguity  or  equivocation,  that  has 
often  entangled  this  fubjedl. 

II.  I.     When  we  inquire  he^e,  which  are  the  firft  principles 

of  natural  law,  thequeftion  is,  which  are  thole  truths  or  primitive  Prehmma. 

rules,  whereby  we  may  effectually    know  the  divine  will  in  re-  marks. 

gard  to  mm  j  and  thus  arrive,  by  juft  confequences,  to  the  know-  What  we 

ledge  of  the  particular  laws  and  duties  which  Gad  impofes  on  us  underftand 

by  right  reufon  ?  ^f  P"""; 

•'»,,  ,  ,^  rii  ••II  •      plcsotnat- 

2.   VVe  mult  not  therefore  contound   the  prmciples  here    m  u^ai  i^^, 

queftion,  with  the  efficient  and  produdive  caufe  of  natural  laws, 

or  with  their  obligatory  principle.     It  is  unqueftionable,  that  the 

will  of  the  fupreme  Being  is  the  efficient  caufe  of  the  law  of  nature, 

and  the  fource  of  the  obligation   from  thence   arihng.     But  this 

being  taken  for  granted,   we  have   frill  to  inquire  how  man  may 

attain  to  the  knowledge  of  this  will,  and  to  the  difcovery  ofthofe 

principles,  which  acquainting  us  with  the  divine  intention  enable 

us  to  reduce  from  thence  all  our  particular  duties,  fo  far  as  they  are 

difcoverable  by  reafon  oaly.     A  perfon  cfks,  for  example,  whether 

the  law  of  nature  requires  us  to  repair  injuries,  or  to  be  faithful  to 

our  engagements  ?  If  we  are  fatisfied  with  anfweringhim,  that  the 

thing  is  iiiconteftable,  becaufe  fo  it  is  ordered  by  the  divine  will  ; 

it  is  plain  that  this  is  not  a  fufficient  anfwer  to    his  queftion  ;  and 

that  he  may  reafonably  infift  to  have  a  principle  pointed  out,  which 

fhonld  really  convince  him  that  fuch  in  effedt  is  the  will  of  the 

Deity  ;  for  this  is  the  point  he  is  in  fearch  of. 

III.  Let  us  afterwards  obfervc,  that  the  firfl  principles  of  natural 

laws,  ought  to  be  not  only  true,  but  likewife  ûmple,  clear, fufficient,  ^^  •h'ofe^' 
and  proper  for  thofe  laws.  principle». 

They  ought  to  be  true  ;  that  is,  they  fhould  be  taken  from  the 
very  nature  aiîd  ftate  of  the  thing.  Falfe  or  hypocritic  principles 
muft  produce  confequences  of  the  fame  nature  ;  for  a  folid  edifice 
can  never  beraifed  on  a  rotten  foundation.  They  ought  to  be 
fimple  and  clear  of  their  own  nature,  or  at  leaft  eafy  to  apprehend 
and  unfold.  For  the  laws  of  nature  being  obligatory  for  all  man- 
kind, their  firft  principles  fhould  be  within  every  body's  reach,  fo 
that  whofoever  has  common  {en{e  may  be  eafily  acquainted  with 
them.  It  would  be  very  reafonable  therefore  to  miftruft  principles 
that  are  far-fetched,  or  of  too  fubtle  and  metaphyfical  a  nature. 

I  add,  that  thefe  principles  o'JgIn  tg  be  fufficient  and  univerfal. 

They 


go  T/je  Principles  of 

They  fliould  be  fuch  as  one  may  deduce  from  thence,  by  immedi- 
ate and  natural  cnnfequences,  ail  the  laws  of  nature,  and  the  feveral 
duties  from  thence  relulting;  infomuch  that  the  expofition  of  par- 
ticulars be  properly  only  an  explication  of  the  principles  ;  in  the 
fame  manner,  pretty  neir,  as  the  produdtion  or  increafc  of  a  plant 
is  only  an  unfolding  of  the  feed. 

And  as  moft  natural  laws  are  fubjefl  to  divers  exceptions,  it  is 
lilcewife  necefTary  that  the  principles  be  fuch  as  include  the  reafons 
of  the  very  exceptions  ;  and  that  we  may  not  only  draw  from  thence 
all  the  coTimon  rules  of  morality,  but  that  they  alfo  ferve  to  re- 
Itrain  thefe  rules,  according  as  place,  time,  and  occafion  require. 

In  fine,  thofe  firft  principles  ought  to  be  eftablifned  in  fuch  a 
manner,  as  to  be  really  the  proper  and  dire£l  foundation  of  all  the 
duties  of  natural  law  ;  infomuch  that  whether  we  defcend  from  the 
principle  to  deduce  the  confequences,  or  whether  we  afcend  from 
the  confequences  to  the  principle,  our  reafonings  ought  always  to 
be  immediately  conneded,  and  their  thread,  as  it  wcie  never  in- 
terrupted. 

w?ou.'ht        ^^'  ■^"*'  gsne^^^^y  fpealcing,  it  is  a  matter  of  mere  indifFerence, 
toredirce     whether  we  reduce  the  whole  to  one  fingle  principle,  or  eftablifh  a 
the  whole    variety  of  them.       We  muft  confult  and   follow  in  this  relpedl  a 
to  one         judicious  and  exa6l  method.     All  that  can  be  faid  on  this  head,  is, 
cM^e^"'^'  that  it  is  not  at  all   neceffary  to  the   folidity  or  perfcûion  of  the 
fyftein,  that  all  natural  laws  be  deduced  from  one  fmgle  and  fun- 
damental maxim  :  nay,  perhaps   the  thing  is  impoiîîble.     Be  that 
as  it  may,  it  is  idle  to  endeavour  to  reduce  the  whole  to  this  unity. 

Such  are  the  general  remarks  we  had  to  propofe.  If  they  prove 
juil-,  we  fhould  reap  this  double  advantage  from  them,  that  they 
will  inftruct  us  in  the  method  we  are  to  follow,  in  order  to  cftab- 
lifh  the  true  principles  of  natural  law  :  and  at  the  fame  time  they 
will  enable  us  to  pafs  a  folid  judgment  on  the  different  fyftems 
concerning  this  fubjedl.     But  it  is  lime  now  to  come  to  the  point. 


Man  can-  V.  T'he  only  way  to  attain  to  the  knowledge  of  natural  law, 
tiot  attain  ig  to  confider  attentively  the  nature  and  conftitution  of  man,  the 
knowled  e  '"'^''^^'^"5  ^e  has  to  the  beings  that  furround  him,  and  the  ftates  from 
of  natural  thence  rtfulting.  In  fa£l,  the  very  term  of  7iaturallaiv^  and  the 
laws,  but  notion  v;e  have  given  of  it,  fhew  that  the  principles  ot  this  fcience 
by  examm-  niuft  be  taken  from  the  very  nature  and  conftitution  of  man.  We 
tufe  con-  ^^''  therefore  lay  down  two  general  propofitions,  as  the  founda- 
ftitutiou      tion  of  the  whole  fyftem  of  the  law  of  nature, 

and  ftate. 

FirJ 


N  A  T  U  R  A  L     L  A  w.  97 

Flrji  Propofitlon. 

Whatever  is  in  the  nature  and  original  conftituiion  of  man, 
and  appears  a  iiecefiary  confequcnce  of  this  natufe  and  conliitu- 
tioo,  certainly  indicates  the  intention  or  will  of  God  with  refpcct 
to  man,  and  confcquently  acquaints  us  with  the  law  of  nature. 

Second  Propojiùùn. 

But  in  order  to  have  a  complete  fyftem  of  the  law  of  nature,  we 
muft  not  only  confider  the  nature  of  inan,  fuch  as  it  is  in  iifiif  ;  it 
is  alfonecelfary  to  attend  to  the  relations  he  has  to  other  b^ingr^, 
and  to  the  different  ftates  from  thence  arillng  :  otherwife  it  is  evi- 
dent we  (hould  have  only  an  imperfe(5l  and  dcfedlive  fyflem. 

We  may  therefore  afHrm,  that  the  general  foundation  of  th-: 
fyftem  of  natural  law,  is  the  nature  of  man  confidered  under  the 
fevera!  circumftances  that  attend  it,  and  in  which  God  hitnfclf 
has  placed  him  for  particular  ends  ;  inafmueh  as  by  this  means  vvw; 
may  be  acquainted  with  the  will  of  God.  In  (hort,  fmcc  m?.n 
holds  from  the  hand  of  God  himlelf  whatever  he  pofTeffes,  as  well 
with  regard  to  his  cxiftence,  as  to  his  manner  of  exifting  ;  it  is  ths 
ffudy  of  human  nature  only,  that  can  fully  inftru£t  us  concerning 
the  views  which  God  propofed  to  himfelf  in  giving  us  our  beinr, 
and  confequently  with  the  rules  we  ou^jht  to  follow,  in  order  to  ac- 
complifh  the  défions  of  the  Creator. 


VI.  For  this  pnrpofe  we  mufl  recolle£l  v/hat  has  been  already  Three 
faid,  of  the  manner  in  which  man  may  be  confidered  under  three  ^-at-f»  of 
different  refpefls  or  ftates,  which  embrace  all  his  particular  rcl?.-  ™^^' 
lions.  In  the  firft  place  we  may  confider  him  as  God's  creature, 
from  whom  he  has  received  his  life,  his  reafon,  and  ail  the  advan- 
tages he  enjoys.  Secondly,  man  may  be  confidered  in  himfelf  as  a 
being,  compoled  of  body  and  fjul,  and  endowed  with  many  differ- 
ent faculties  ;  as  a  being  that  naturally  lov^s  himfelf,  and  ne'ccffirily 
defires  his  own  felicity.  In  fine,  we  may  confider  liim  as  form- 
ing apart  of  the  fpecie-,  as  placed  on  the  earth  near  feveral  other 
beingsof  a  fimilar  nature,  and  with  whom  he  is  inclined,  nay,  by 
his  natural  condition,  obliged  to  live  in  fociety.  Such,  in  fad,  is 
the  fyftem  of  humanity,  from  whence  refults  the  mo'ft  comm  .n  and 
natural  diftinâion  of  our  duties,  taken  from  the  three  different 
dates  here  mentio.aed  j  duties  towards  God,  towards  ourfelves 
N  WÀ 


98  TZj  Principles  of 

and  towaids  therefl  of  mankind.  * 

Rclio-icn  :  ^■'ï'  ï'1  the  fiill:  place,  Hnce  reafon  brings  u''.  acquainted  wiih 
principe  God  as  a  fcU-exilK-nt  being,  and  fovereign  I^ord  of  all  thingfj  and 
tf  the  11:  t-  ill  particular  as  our  creator,  preferver,  and  bencfa^lcr  ;  ii  follows 
thathvA;'  tl'^itfore  that  we  oughc  ncccfTaril).'  to  acknowledge  the  fovereign 
Goil  for  perfedVion  of  this  fuj)reme  Being,  and  our  abfoUite  dépendance  ou 
their  ob-  him  :  which  by  a  natural  confequence  infpires  us  with  fcntiments 
Y^'  of  refpecf,  love,   and   fear,  and  with  an   entire  fjbm'.ffion  to  his 

win.  For  why  fliould  God  have  thus  manifcfted  himfclf  to  man- 
kind, were  it  roc  that  their  reafon  fhoiild  teach  them  to  entertain 
fentiments  proportioned  to  the  excellence  of  his  nature,  t!,at  is,  they 
fhould  honour,  love,  adore,  and  obey  him  ? 


Confi 
quences  0 


VIII.  Infinite  rcfpedl  is  the  natural  conftquence  of  the  impref- 
f  fion  we  receive  from  a  profpcdl  of  all  the  divine  perfe<flion?.     We 
ihisprinci-  cannot  refufe  love  and  gratitude  to  a  being  fupremcly  beneficent. 
p'-<i>  The  fear  of  difpleafmg  oroBcniing  him,  is  a  natural   eftedt  of  the 

idea  we  entertain  of  his  judice  and  power,  and  obedience  cannot 
but  follow  from  the  knowledge  of  his  legitimate  authority  over  us, 
of  his  boimty,  and  fupreme  wifdom,  which  are  furs  to  conduct  us 
by  the  road  moft  agreeable  to  our  nature  and  happinefs.  The 
afien^.blage  of  thtfe  fentinicnts,  deeply  engraved  in  the  heart,  is 
called  Pïdy. 

Piety,  if  it  be  real,  will  fhew  itfelf  externally  two  different 
■ways,  by  our  moral?,  and  by  outward  worfiiip.  I  fay,  r.  by  our 
morals^  becaufe  a  pious  man,  fincerely  penttrated  with  the  above- 
mentioned  fentiments,  will  find  himfclf  naturally  inclined  to  fpeak 
and  aéï  after  the  manner  he  knows  to  be  mod:  conformable  to  the 
divine  will  and  perfet'lions  :  this  is  his  rule  ar.d  model;  from 
whence  the  pr;ictice  of  the  moft  excellent  virtues  arifcs. 

2.  But  bcfides  this  manner  of  honouring  God,  which  is  un- 
doubtedly the  moft  necefTary  and  moft  real,  a  religious  man  will 
confider  it  as  a  pleafure  and  duty  to  ftrcngthen  himfclf  in  thefe 
Tcntiments  ofpiety,and  to  excite  them  in  others.  Hence  external 
worllnp,  as  well  public  as  private,  is  derived.  For  whether  we 
confider  this  worfhip  as  the  firft  and  almoft  orHy  means  of  exciting, 

entertaining, 

*  We  meet  with  this  divifion  in  Cicero  :  Philofof  liy,  fays  he,  teaches  us  in 
the  firft  place  the  worfiiip  of  the  deity  ;  fecondly.  the  mutual  duties  of  men, 
ft.uiidcd  on  human  focicty  ;  and,  in  fine,  modemtion  and  greatnefs  of  foul. 
'•  Hrec  (  philofophii)  nos  primnm  ad  illorum  (dcoriim)  culium,  deindc  ad  jus 
*•  hon-.inum,  PjUod  faum  eft  in  generis  humani  foùietate,  turn  ad  mod-jiiiam 
jnagniiudincnupe  animicrndivit,     Cie,  7ujc,  quejl.  lil>.  l.cap.  7,6. 


Natural    Law.  99 

entertaining,  and  improving  religious  and  pious  fentimcn;s  in  fhs 
mind  ;  or  whether  v/e  look  upon  it  as  a  homage,  which  men, 
united  by  particular  or  private  focieties,  pay  in  como^on  to  the 
D-itv;  or  whether,  in  fine,  both  thcf-^  views  are  joined,  reafon 
rcprefents  it  to  us  as  a  duty  ofindirpenfible  neceflity. 

Tnis  wordiip  may  vary  indeed  in  regard  to  its  form  ;  yet  there 
is  a  natural  principle  which  determines  its  clK-'nce,  i:\\d  prcferves 
it  from  a'l  frivo'ous  and  fuperftitiou-;  prr.£iices  j  viz.  thatit  confifls 
in  in(tru£tin^  mankind,  in  rendering  them  pious  and  virtuous,  ar.d 
ingivin2;  them  juil  ideas  of  the  nature  of  God,  as  alio  of  v/hat  he 
requires  from  his  creatures. 

The  different  duties  here  pointed  cut,  confiitute  what  we  dif- 
tingniili  by  the  name  of  Rellgiju.  We  may  àthuz  it,  a  connexion 
which  attaches  man  to  God,  and  to  the  obfervance  of  his  b\v?,  by 
thofe  fentiments  of  refpedt,  love,  fubmiffioîi,  and  fear,  uhich  the 
pcrfeâions  of  a  fupreme  Beinj,  and  our  inti-.e  dépendance  on  hi'ii, 
as  an  all-wife,  and  ull-bouniiful  Creator,  are  apt  to  excite  in  the 
human  mind. 

Thus  by  iludyingour  nature  and  frate,  we  find,  in  the  relation 
we  have  to  the  Deity,  the  proper  principle  from  whence  thofe  du- 
ties of  natural  law,  that  have  God  for  their  objed,  are  immediately 
derived. 

IX.  If  we  fearch  afterwards  for  the   principle  of  thofe  duties  Selfl'^Tc  : 
that  regard  ourfelvcs,  it  will  be  eafy  todlfcover  them,  by  examining  the  rrinci' 
the  internal  coniiitution  of  man,  and  incjuiring  into  the  Creator's  p't^oi  thofe 
views  in  regard  to  him,  in  order  to  know  fjr  end  he  has   endowed  j^^swlikJi 
him  with  thofe  faculties   of  mind   and    body   that    conftitutc  his  conctrn 
fiatu:e-  our£clves. 

Nov/  it  is  evident,  that  God,  by  creating  u^,  propofed  our  pre- 
fervation,  perfection,  and  happinefs.  This   is   wh:it  manifeftly 

appears,  as  well  by  the  faculties  witli  which  iiian  is  inverted,  v/hich 
all  tend  to  the  fame  end  ;  as  by  the  firong  inclination  that  prompts 
us  to  purfue  good,  and  fhun  evil.  God  is  therefore  willing,  that 
every  one  flionld  labour  for  his  own  prefervation  and  perfection,  in 
ord;r  to  acquire  all  the  happincfs  of  v/hich  he  is  capable  according 
to  his  nature  and  Itate. 

This  being  prcmifed,  we  may  afErm  thst  felf-love  (I  mean  an 
en!ig!uened  and  rational  love  of  ourfe'ves)  may  ferve  lor  the  llrft 
principle  with  regard  to  the  duties  which  concern  man  himfjlf; 
inifmuch  as  this  fenfation  being  infeparable  from  human  nature, 
and  having  God  for  its  author,  gives  us  clearly  to  underftand  ii} 
this  xdozSt  the  will  of  the  fupremt;  Being. 

Yet 


I oo  ll^e  Princïplls  of 

Yet  wc  fhould  take  particular  notice,  thnt  ihc  love  of  ourfclvcs 
cannot  ferve  us  as  a  principle  and  rule,  but  inafir.uch  as  it  is  direc- 
ted by  right  reafon,  according  to  the  exigencies  or  nccefiitics  of  our 
nature  andjtatc. 

For  thus  only  it  becomes  an  interpreter  cf  the  Creator's  will 
i:î  refpeil  to  us  ;  that  is,  it  ought  to  be  mspiiged  in  fuch  a  manner, 
as  not  to  oftrnd  the  laws  cf  religion  or  fociety.  Otherwife  this 
fflf-love  would  become  the  fourceof  a  thouf;ind  iniquities  ;  and  fo 
fsr  from  being  of  any  fervice,  would  prove  a  fiiare  to  uf,  by  the 
prejudice  we  Ihould  certainly  receive  from  thofc  very  iniouities. 

^  X.  From  this   principle,  thus  eftablifiicc',  it  is  cafy  to  deduce 

ifvvs^dTn-  t^e  "iitnral  laws  and  duties  that  dirt £lly  concern  u?.  The  dt fire 
veil  from  of  lîjppinefs  is  attended,  in  the  firft  place,  with  the  care  cf  our 
this  princi-  prcfcrvaticn.  It  require?  next,  that  (every  thing  elfe  being  equal) 
?'^-  the  care  cf  the  foul  (hould  be  preferred  to 'that  cf  the  body.      We 

OU:  ht  net  to  neglect  to  improve  cur  reafcn,  by  learning  to  cifccrn 
trii'h  from  falfhoqd,  the  ufeful  from  the  hurtful,  in  order  to  acquire 
a  juft  kno'A'lcdge  of  things  tb.at  concern  us,  and  to  form  a  right 
'(Udgment  cf  them.  It  is  in  this  that  the  pcrfc(5lion  of  the  ur.der- 
li:anding,  or  vvifJom,  confifts.  We  fliould  afterwards  be  dctcr- 
tni  ned,  and  rcl  conf-antly  according  to  this  liglit,  in  fpite  of :dl  con- 
trary fuggtiticn  and  pnfTion.  Fcr  it  is  properly  this  vigour  or  per- 
j'everance  of  the  foul,  in  follov-ing  the  ccunfels  cf  uifdom,  that 
coiulitutes  virtucj  and  forms  the  perfeclicn  of  the  will,  vvithout 
which  tho  light  cfthe  underftanding  would  be  of  no  manner  of  ufe. 
From  this  principle  all  the  particular  rules  arife.  You  afk,  lor 
cxarïiple,  v/hether  the  moderation  of  the  pafHcns  be  a  duty  impofcd 
ï^pon  U5  by  the  law  of  nature  r  In  order  to  gi\  c  you  an  anfv.-er,  1 
iTiquire,  in  rriy  turn,  whether  it  is  neccfi'ary  to  our  prefcrvation, 
perfeflior,  and  happir.eis  ?  If  it  be  a?,  undoubtedly  it  i?,  the  quefticn 
IS  decided.  You  have  a  mind  to  know  whether  the  love  c?  oc- 
crp.itioiT,  the  difcerning  between  permitted  and  forbidden  pJeafurfS, 
and  modération  in  the  ufe  of  fuch  as  are  permitted,  whether,  in 
tine,  patience,  conflancy,  rcfolution,  &c.  arc  natural  duties  ;  1  foall 
always  anfwer,  by  making  ufe  of  the  fame  principle  :  and,  provided 
\  apply  it.vvell,  my  anfwer  cannot  but  be  rightand  exaft  ;  becaufe 
•.He  principle  conducts  me  certainly  to  the  end,  by  acquainting  mç 
w.th  the  will  of  God. 

IVT-n  is  VT,   There  reinnins  fti!'.  another  point  to  invsftigate,  name! 3', 

nia.'.rf.ir     j^^  jrinciule  fjcin  whence  we  arc  :o  deduce  thofc  natural  laws 

that 


Natural  Lav/.  ïoî 

that  regard  our  mutual  dutL\s  a"^  have  fociety  for  their  obje6V. 
Let  us  fee  whether  we  cannot  difcovcr  this  principle,  by  purluing 
the  fame  method.  We  ought  always  to  confult  the  adlual  liate  of 
things,  in  order  to  take  their  refait. 

I  am  not  the  only  perfoii  upon  earth  ;  I  find  myfelf  in  the  middle 
of  an  infinite  number  of  other  men,  who  refcmble  me  in  every 
refpeèl  ;  and  I  am  fubjecl  to  this  ftate,  even  from  my  nativity,  by 
the  very  a6l  of  providence.  This  induces  mc  naturally  to  thmlc, 
IX  was  aot  the  intention  of  Cod  that  each  man  fliould  live  iingle 
and  feparate  from  the  refl  j  but  that,  on  the  contrary,  it  was  his 
will  they  (hould  live  together,  and  be  joined  in  fociety.  The 
Crea'-or  might  certainly  have  formed  all  men  at  the  fame  time, 
though  feparated  from  one  another,  by  invefting  each  of  them  with 
the  proper  and  fufficient  qualities  ior  this  kind  of  folitary  life.  If 
lie  has  not  followed  this  plan,  it  is  probable  becaufe  it  was  his  will 
that  the  ti:s  of  confanjuinity  and  birth  fliould  begin  to  form  a  more 
exttnfive  union,  which  he  was  plcafed  to  eitablifh  amcngd  men. 

The  more  i  examine,  the  more  I  am  confirmed  in  this  thought. 
Mofl  of  the  faculties  of  man,  his  natural  inclinations,  his  v^eaknefs, 
and  wants,  are  all  fo  many  indubitable  proofs  of  this  intention  of 
the  Creaior, 

XII.  Such  in  efFecl:  is  the  nature  and  conftitutionof  man,  that  i-  Society 
out  of  foclcty  he  could  neither  prefcrve  his  life,  nor  difplay  ar.d  !*^^^°'"'^' 
perfedi:  his  faculties  and  talent?,  nor  attain  any  real  and  folid  happi-  ^^  ^^^ 
nefs.  What  would  become  ol  an  infant,  were  there  not  fome  n.aji, 
benevolent  and  affixing  hand  to  provide  for  his  wants  ?  He  inufl: 
perifh,  if  no  or.e  takes  care  of  him  ;  and  this  flate  of  weakncfs  and 
ignorance  requires  even  a  long  and  continued  affiflancc.  View 
him  when  grown  up  to  manhood,  you  find  nothing  but  rudercfs, 
ignorance,  ani  confufed  iJeas,  Vr'hich  lie  is  fcarce  able  to  convey  ; 
abandon  him  to  himfelf,  and  you  behold  a  favage,  and  perhaps  a 
ferocious  animal  j  ignorant  of  all  the  conveniences  of  life,  funk  in 
idlenef?,  a  prey  to  fpleen  and  melancholy,  and  almofi:  incapable  of 
providing  againft  the  firfl  wants  of  nature.  If  he  attains  to  old 
age,  behold  him  relapfed  into  infirmities  that  render  him  almoft  as 
dependent  on  external  aid  as  he  was  in  his  infancy.  This  dcrcn- 
dance  fhsws  itfelf  in  a  more  fenfible  manner  in  accidents  and  mal- 
Tidies.  What  would  then  become  of  man,  were  he  to  be  in  a  '/ate 
cffoiitude?  There  is  nothing  but  the  affillance  of  our  fellow- 
creaMires  that  is  able  to  preferve  us  from  divers  evil":,  or  to 
redrif  them,  and  render  life  czfy  and  happy,  in  vvhatfoev&r  (lage  or 
lit'ja.ion  of  lif.-. 

We 


I c 2  The  Principles  of 

We  have  an  excellent  pifiurc  of  the  ufe  of  focicty,  drawn  liv 
Seneca.  *  Onwhat^  fays  he,  does  our  fccurlty  dcpcnà^  hut  on  the 
fervices  we  render  one  another  f  //  ;j  this  commerce  ofbiiirfits  that 
7mkes  Ufe  ecfy^  and  enables  us  to  defend  ourfclves  agalnji  any  piddcn 
infults  or  attacks,  l^ hat  would  be  the  fate  of  mankind.^  ivcre  every 
one  to  liv:  apart  ?  So  many  mcn^fo  many  vicious  to  other  animals^  an 
eafy  prey^  in  fyori^  fcehlenfs  itjetf.  In  fatly  ether  animals  have 
Jlrength  juj/iàent  to  defend  themfclvcs  :  thofe  that  are  luild  and 
wanderings  and  whfc  ferocity  does  not  permit  them,  to  herd  together ^ 
are  byrn^  as  it  w^re.,  with  arms  \  wher^is  man  is  on  all  fjes  er.csm- 
paffed  with  weaknep,  having  n;':th':r  arms^  nor  teeth.,  nor  daws  to 
render  him  formidable.  But  th;  fircngth  he  wa^ts  by  himfclf  he 
finds  when  united  with  his  equals.  Nature  to  make  abends.,  has 
endnvedhirnvjith  two  things^  vjhich  give  him  a  corfider able  force 
and  fnperiority^  where  cthcrwife  he  would  be  'much  inferior;  I  meai% 
rerfon  and fociability.,  whereby  he  who  alone  could  make  no  refi/îance^ 
becomes  ma'fler  cf  the  lubole.  Society  gives  him  an  empire  over  ether 
animals;  fcicty  is  the  cauf:.,  that.,  not  (atisjl.'d  xvith  the  clement  on 
which  he  zvas  born^  he  extends  his  ccrnmird  over  the  fca.  It  is  this 
fame  union  that  fupplies  him  with  remedies  in  his  difeafs.,  offiliance  /« 
his  old  age,  and  c'emjort  in  his  pains  and  an:Aetics\  it  is  this  thai 
enables  him.,  as  it  luere,  to  biddefance  to  frtunc.  Take  away  foci'-ty., 
cndyou  defîroy  the  union  of  mankind.^  on  vohich  the  prrfervutïûn  and 
the  whole  happinefs  cflifc  upends, 

,,     ,  XIII.   As  fociety  is  To  ncccfTarv  to    man,    Gcd    lias    therefore 

«.Man  by      .  ,  .  n-       •  r       i  ■  i      i  l  j        «  • 

hisconfti-    given  him  a  coiUtitution,   iaculties,  and  taicnt?,  that  render   hnn 

tut'on  is      very  proper  for  this  flate.      Such  is,  for  example,  the  faculty   of 

very  fit  for  |"p=ech,  which  enables  us  to  convey  cur  thoughts  with  facility  ?.nJ 

io.ie.y.       readinefsj  and  would  be  of  no  manner  of  ufe  out  of  fociety.      The 

fame 


*  Quo  a'io  tuti  fundus  q;:àr!i  q'''bi  nni'iiis  jiivan~.iir  cfTiciis  ?  Hccuno  iiiflruc< 
tior  vita  contraque  iiiciirfirnes  Jubitas  n.unitior  eft,  bcneficiorum  conunercio. 
Fac  nos  finguins  quid  funius  ?  Prxdi  aniinalium  ct  vidinix,  ac  lieHifTinHis  et 
.facillimuô  ùr5;ii!3.  Quoniam  cxtcii?  r.nimalibiis  in  tiuelr.m  fui  f?tis  viriuni 
cft  t  qnxcuiique  vaga  r.afcuntur,  &  acîvira  vitam  fegit.-<;er.i,  .irmati  Aint. 
Honiinem  imbecillitascingif;  non  uiiguiuRi  visi  non  dcntiiim,  terrihilcm  ceteris 
fccir.  Niidam  &  infirmum  focictas  mutiic  Duas  rr ?  dcJit  qus  il  imi,  o'*nox- 
iiim  caeteris,  validiîTnuini  facerent,  racionem  &  focictatem.  Itrq\ie.  qui  jiar 
eue  nnlli  poterat.fifc'Jucerenir,  rerum  potitur.  Societas  i'ii  dominant  onirium 
animalium  dédit  :  Socictas  terris  geRit'.ini,  in  a'.icnx  natur.x  trinfnùfit  iniperi- 
i!ai,  &  don-.inari  ctiam  in  mari  jiillit.  Haec  r.ioiborum  ip.-.rftuî  arcuit,  fcnec- 
tiîti  a'.minicula  profpexit,  ft;bti.:  contra  dolores  dédit.  H32C  fortes  nos  fâcit, 
quod  iicct  contra  fr.rturiim  advocare.  Hanc  focletatem  toile,  &  unitatem  gen- 
eris humant,  cjuâ  vitî  luRinetur,  fcir.des.     Hcna  du  Bc.<tf.llh.  ^.  «/.  i8. 


N  A  T  U  R  A  L    L  A  W.  1 03 

fame  may  be  faid  withreg?rd  to  our  propcnfity  to  imitation,  and 
of  that  lurprifing  mechanifm  which  renders  all  the  pafTions  and 
inripreflions  of  the  foul  fo  eafy  to  be  communicated.  It  is  fuf- 
ficient  a  man  appears  to  be  moved,  in  order  to  move  and  folten 
others.  *  Il  a  perfon  accofts  us  with  joy  painted  on  his  counte- 
nance, he  excites  in  us  the  like  featitnent  of  joy.  l^hc  tears  of  a 
ftranger  affe(5l  us,  even  before  wc  know  the  caufe  thereof;  :|:  and 
the  cries  ()f  a  man  related  to  us  only  by  the  common  tic  of  hu- 
manity, make  us  fly  to  bis  fuccour  by  a  mechanical  movtment 
previous  to  all  deliberation. 

This  is  not  all.  We  fee  that  nature  has  thought  proper  to 
dillribute  difii-rcnily  her  talents  among  mon,  by  giving  to  fome 
an  apiitiide  to  perform  certain  things,  which  to  others  are  impof- 
fible  ;  while  the  latter  have  received,  in  their  turn,  an  induliry 
denied  to  the  former.  Wherefore,  if  the  natural  wants  of  men 
render  them  dependent  on  one  another,  the  diverfity  of  talents, 
which  qualifies  them  for  mutual  aid,conne6ls  and  unites  them. 
Thefe  arc  {o  many  evident  iigns  of  man's  being  defigned  for 
focicty. 

XIV.  But  if  we  confultourown  inclinations,  we  fhalHikewife  /•  ^urna- 

fi,      ,  ,  11     I  ■  n     r        \  tural  incU» 

nJ,  that  our  hearts  are  naturally  bent  to  wilh  tor  the  company  lacions 

of  our  equals,  and  to  dread  an  intire  folitude  as   an  irkfome  and  prompt  us 

forlorn  ilare.     And  though  there  have  been  inflances  of   people  to  look  ouc 

who  have  thrown  themfelves  into  a  folitary  life,  yet    we    cannot  for  foci-'y» 

conlider  this  in  any  other  light  but  as  the  tWcâ  of  fuperflition,  or 

meIancholy,or  of  a  angularity  extremely  remtote  from  the  Hate  of 

nature.     Were  we  to  inveftigate  the  caufe  of  this  facial  inclina^. 

tion,  we  fhould  find  it  was  very  wifely  beftov^ed  on  us  by  the  author 

of  our  being;  by  reafon  that  it  is  in  fociety  man  finds  a   remedy 

for  the  greateft  part  of  his  wants,  and  an  occafion    for  exercifing 

mofl  of  his  faculties  ;  it  is  in  fociety  he  is  capable  of  feeling  and 

difplayingthofe  fenfations  on  which  nature  has    intailed  fu  much 

facisfaélion  and  plcafure  ;   I  mean,  the  fen.faticîns  of  benevolence, 

friendOiip,  compalFion,  and  generofity»     For  fvich  are  charms  of 

locial  afll-é^ions,  that  from    thence  our  pureft  enjoyments  arife. 

Nothing  in  ta6t  is  fo  faiisfaclory  and  flattering  to  man,  as  to  think 

he  merits  tiie  efteem  and  fricndlhip  of  others.     Science  acquires 

an  additional  value,  when  it  can  difplay  itfelf  abroad  ;  and  our  joy 

becomes  raore  fenlible,  when  we  have  an  opportunity  of  teftifying  it 

in 
■■  ■  •  ...  _  ^  , 

*   Homo  fum  ;  humani  nihil  a  me  alienum  puto.     Ter,  Hctn-hn, 
^_   Ut  ridentibusadrident,  i:a  flentib-us  adfunt 
tigmiuli  VultU3.<.   .i  ■    /for,  dsartt ^eet,  Y.  ici' 


ï 04  l^hc  Principles  of 

in  public,  or  ofpouring  it  into  the  bcfom  of  a  friend  :  it  is  redoubled 
by  being  commnnicated  ;  for  our  own  fatisfadtion  is  increafcd  by 
th:  agreeable  idea  we  have  of  giving  pleafure  to  our  Iriends,  and 
of  fixing  thenn  more  fteadily  in  ourintereft.  Anxiety  on  the  con- 
trary, is  alleviated  and  foftened  by  fharing  it  with  our  neighbour  ; 
jull  as  a  burdvii  is  cafed  when  a  good-natured  pcrfon  helps  us  to 
bear  it. 

Thus  every  thing  invites  us  to  the  (late  of  fociety  ;  want  ren- 
ders it  necelFary  to  us,  inclination  makes  it  a  pleafure,  and  the 
difpofi  ions  v/e  naturally  have  for  it,  are  a  fufficient  indication  of 
its  being  really  intended  by  our  Creator.   ' 

ty.  PiincI-      ^V.  But  as  human   fociety  can    neither    fubfift,   nor  produce 
pies  of        th.^  happy  efFc£ls  for  which  God    has  eftabliihed  it,  unlefs  man- 
natural       kind  have  fentimenis  of  afFe6tion  and  benevolence  ibr   one  anc- 
lawirela-    ^j^gj.  j  jt  follows  therefore,  that  our  Creator  and  common  Father 
^jthg^jjjg.^    is  willing  that  everybody  Ihould   be  animated    wii!»  ihcfe  fenti- 
msnts,  and  do  whatever  lies  in  their  power  to  maintain  this  focie- 
ty in  an  agreeable  and  advantageous  (late,  and  to  tie  the  knot  ftiil 
clofer  by  reciprocal  fervices  and  benefits. 

This  is  the  true  principle  of  the  duties  which  the  law  of  nature 
prefcribes  to  us  in  refpedl:  to  other  men.  Ethic  writers  have  given 
it  the  name  of  Sociûbii!t}\  by  which  they  underfland  thatdifpofition 
which  inclines  us  to  benevolence  towards  our  fellow-creatures,  to 
do  them  all  the  good  that  lies  in  our  power,  to  reconcile  our  own 
happinefs  to  that  of  others,  and  to  render  our  particular  advantage 
fubordinate  to  the  common  and  general  good. 

Th-:  more  we  ftuJy  our  own  nature,  the  more  we  are  convinced 
that  this  fociability  is  really  agreeable  to  the  will  of  God.  For, 
beilde  the  necefllty  of  this  principle,  we  find  it  engraved  in  our 
heart  ;  where,  if  the  Creator  has  implanted  on  one  fide  the  love  of 
ourfelve«,  the  fame  hand  has  imprinted  on  the  other  a  fentiment 
of  benevolence  for  our  fellow-creatures.  Thefe  two  inclinations, 
though  di(Hn£l  from  one  another,  have  nothing  oppofite  in  their 
nature  ;  and  God  who  has  bedowed  them  upon  us,  defigned  they 
fhould  act  in  concert,  in  order  to  htrlp,  and  not  to  deftroy  each 
other.  Hence  good  natiired  and  generous  hearts  feel  a  mo(l  fen- 
fible  fatisfaclion  in  doing  good  to  mankind,  becaufe  in  this  they 
follow  the  inclination  they  received  from  nature. 

Natural 

Liws which  XVI.  From  the  principle  of  fociability,  as  from  their  real 
flow  from  fource,  all  the  laws  of  fociety,  and  all  our  general  and  particular 
fociability.  ^ijtigs  towa;"ds  Other  men,  are  derived, 

I.  This 


Natural  Law.  105 

Î.  This  union  which  God  has  eftabliOied  among  men  requires,  '•  '^'^'^ 
that  in  ev.ery  thing  relating  to  fo  icty,  the  pubUc  good  llîoulJ  be  g^odoucrht 
the  fupreme  rule  of  their  conJuil,  and  that  [^uidtd  by  the  counfcls  always  to 
of    prudence,    they    {hould     never    puifue   their  private  advan-  f>e  the  fu- 
tjge   to  the  prejudice  of  the  public  :   for   this  is  what  their  ftatc  prcir.eruls. 
demands,  and  is  confequentiy  the  will  of  their  common  father.         2.  The 

2.  The  fpirit  of  fociability  ought  to  be  univerfal.     Human  fo-  ipirit  of 
ciety  embraces  all  thofe    with   whom    we   can  have  poffibly  any  ^'''^'^'''''ty 
communication  :    becaufe  it  is  founded  on    the  relations  they  all  ot^umver. 
be;ir  to  one;  another,  in  confequence  of  their  nature  and  ftate.  *         fai. 

3.  Rrafon   afterwards  informs  us,    that   creatures  of  the  fame 

rank  and  fpecies,  born  with  the  fame  faculties  to  live   in  focietv,  r'     °  °  ' 
and  to  partake  of  the  fame  advantages,  have  in  general  an  equal  natural  e- 
and  common  right.      We  are  therefore  obliged   to  confider   our-  quality, 
fclves  as  naturally  equal,  and  to  behave  as  fuch  ;  and  it  would  be 
bidding  defiance  to  nature,    not  to  a  knowledge    this  principle  of 
cquitv  (which  by  the  civilians  is  called  aquabUitas  juris)  as  one  of 
the  firft  foundations  of  fociety.     It  is  on   this  the   lex  talionis   is 
founded,  as  alfo  that  fimple  but  univerfal  and  ufeful   rule,  that  v/e 
ought  to  have  the  fame  difpofitions  in  regard  to  other  men,  as  we 
deiire  they  Ihould  have    towards    us,  and  to  behave  in  the  fame 
manner  towards  them,  as  we  are  willing    they  ftiould  behave  to 
us  in  the  like  circumftances. 

4.  Sociability  being  a  reciprocal  obligation  among  men,  fuch       ^ 

as  through  malice    orinjuflice  break  the  band  of  fociety,  cannot  pj-eferve  a 
reafnnably  complain,  if  tivife  they  have  injured  do  not  treat  them  henevo 
as  friends,   or    even    if  th>^y  proceed  agaiiUt   them  by  forcible '""=*^  ^'^n 
methods.  _  T,^l[t 

But  though  we  have  a  right  to  fufpend  the  afls  of  benevolence  niies. 
in  regard  to  an  cws-my^  yet  we  are  never  allowed  to  ftifle  its    prin-  Self-de- 
ciple.     As  nothing  but  neccfliry  can  authorife  us  to  haverecourfe  ience  is 
to  force  againd  an  unjuft  aggreflbr,  fo  this  fame  neceflity   (hould  P^''"''^'^^^» 
be  the  rule  and  meafure  of  the  harm  we  do  him  j  and  we  ought  to  not. 
be  always  dilpoltd  to  reconcilement  fo  loon  as  he  has  done  us  juf- 
tice,  and  we  have  nothing  farther  to  apprehend. 

Wc  muft  therefore  diftinguifh  carefully  between  a  jufl  defence 
of  one's  own  perfon,  and  revenge.  The  firft  does  but  fufpend, 
through  neceditv,  and  for  a  while,  the  exercife  of  benevolence, 
and  has  nothing  in  it  oppjiite  to  fociability.  But  the  other, 
ftifling  the  very  principle  of  benevolence,  introduces,  in  its  ftead,  a 
O  fentiment 


Sec  Pufiendorf,  L:x\v  of  Nature  and  Nations,  book  ii,  chap.  iii.  §  i j. 


n 


i  06  'Ike  Principles  of 

fenlimcnt  of  liatred  and  animofity,  a  fcntirncnt  vicious  in  Mfclf, 
contrary  to  tiie  public  good,  and  cxprcfsly  condemned  by  the  law 
of  nature. 

c.'pf:.    '  XVÏI.  Thcfe  general    rules  are  very  fertile  of  confeciuences. 

qu-in-es.  Wc  (hould  do  no  wrong  to  any  one,  either  in  word  or  action  ; 

and  we  ought  to  repair  all  damages  by  us  committed  j  for  lociety 
could  not  lubfift,  were  a6ls  of  injufticc  tolerated. 

We  ought  to  be  lîncere  in  our  difcourfc,  and  fteady  to  our  en- 
gagements ;  f(jr  whut  truft  could  men  rcpofe  in  one  another,  and 
what  fcrarity  could  ibey  have  in  commercial  life,  were  it  lawful  to 
violate  their  plighted  faith  ? 

VVc  not  only  ought  to  do  every  man  the  good  he  properly 
deferves,  but  moreover  we  (hould  pay  him  the  degree  of  efteem  and 
honour  due  to  him,  according  to  his  eftate  and  rank  ;  becaufe  fnb- 
ordination  is  the  link  of  fociety,  without  which  there  can  be  no 
order   either  in   families,  or  in  civil  governments. 

But  if  the  public  good  requires  that  inferiors  fhould  obey,  it 
demands  nlfo  that  fuperiors  fhould  prtferve  the  rights  of  thofe  who 
are  fubjaft  to  them,  and  ftiould  govern  their  people  only  in  order 
to  render  them  happy. 

Again  :  men  are  captivated  by  the  heart,  and  by  favours  ;  now 
nothing  is  more  agreeable  to  humanity,  or  more  ufeful  to  fociety, 
than  compadiiMi,  lenity,  beneficence,  and  generofity.  This  is 
what  inciuced  Cicero  to  fay,  *  There  is  nothing  truer  than  that  ex- 
cellent maxim  of  PIcity.,  viz.  that  we  are  not  born  for  ourfches  alone^ 
hut  like-wife  for  our  country  and  friends  :  and  if  according  to  the 
Stoics^the  productions  of  thi  earth  are  for  men^  and  7nen  theinfelves 
for  the  good  and  affijlance  of  one  another  \  %ve  ought  certainly^  in  this 
rcfl>c5t,  to  comply  ivith  the  defign  of  nature^  andpromote  her  intention^ 
by  contributing  our  jhare  to  ■  the  general  inter efi^  by  mutually  giving 
and  receiving  goad  turns,  and  employing  all  our  care  and  indiijiry^ 
and  even  our  fub fiance^  to  fircngthcn  that  love  and  friendflAp  which 
ffjould  akvays  prevail  in  human  fociety. 

Since  therefore  the  different  fcntiments  and  acls  cfjuftice  and 
goodnefs,  are  the  only  and  true  bonds  that  knit  men  together,  and 
are  capable  of  contributing  to  the  ftabihty,  peace,  and  profperity 
of   fociety  ;   we  mufl  look  upon  thofe  virtues  as  fo  many  duties 

that 

*  ScJqiinniam  (lit  prjeclarè  fcriptum  eft  a  Platone)  non  nobis  folCim  nati 
fumus  ortuTquc  noftri  partem  patria  vindicate  partem  amici  :  afque  (ut  placet 
Stoicis)  quae  in  terris  <^'<riiuntur,  ad  ufum  hoiiiinum  omnia  creari,  homines 
aute'"  honjinimi  c:\ufa  tiTe  generates  iit  ipfi  inter  fe  alii  pro('efle  poffent  :  m 
hoc  naturam  flebcmus  duceni  fequi,  &  communes  luilitatcs  in  medium  afFerrc, 
mutationc  ofiicionim.  dando.  accipitndo  ;  turn  artibus,  tum  opera  turn  facul- 
tiitibus  devincirc  homiuum  inter  homines  fucictateni.  CU,  dc  OJ!e.  lib.  i,caù.  ;• 


NaturalLaw.  107 

tîiatCjod  impofes  on  us,  for  this  reafon,   bccaufi  whatever  is  nc- 
celfary  to  his  delign,  is  of  courfc  cunfoimable  to  his  will. 

XVIII.  We  have  therefore  three  general  principles  of  the  laws  -YhcCa 

of  nature  relative  to  the  abovemcntioned  three  ftates  of  idsm  :  And  tlnce  prin- 
thefeare,  I.  Religion.  2.  S:lf-love.  3.  Sociability  or  benevo-  ciples  have 
lence  towards  our  fellow-creatures.  r-'uhc  '^^' 

Thefe  principles  have  all  th;i  characters  above  required.  They  [;iiàraaers. 
^xctrue,  becautethey  are  taken  from  the  nature  of  man,  in  the 
conftitution  and  ftate  in  which  G"d  has  placed  hiin.  They  are 
fimple,  and  within  every  body's  reach,  which  is  an  important 
point  ;  becaufe,  in  regard  to  duties,  there  is  nothing  wanting  but 
principles  that  are  obvious  to  every  one  ;  for  a  fubtkty  of  mind 
that  fets  us  upon  lingular  and  new  ways,  is  always  dant,crous.  In 
fine,  thefe  principles  zxe  fufficic7tt ,  and  sexy  fertile  ;  by  reafon  they 
embrace  all  the  objc£ts  ot  our  duties,  and  acquaint  us  with  the 
will  of  God  in  thefeveral  liâtes  and  relations  of  man. 

XIX.  True  it  is,  that  Puffendorf  reduces  the  thing  within  a  , 
lefier  compafs,  by    eftablifhmg  lociability  alone  as  the  foundation  .^^^  v^xSca- 
of  all  natural  laws.       But  it    has   been  juftly  obftrved,  that  this  aorfs 
method   is  defei^ive.        For  the  principle  of  fociability  does  not  lyftcm. 
furnifli  us  with  the  proper  and  di reel:  foundation  of  all  our  duties. 

Thofe  which  have  God  for  their  obje<rt,  and  thofe  which  are  rela- 
tive to  man  himfelf,  do  not  flow  directly  and  immediately  frojn 
thisfource,  but  have  their  proper  and  particular  principle.  Let 
us  fuppofe  man  in  foiitude  :  he  would  ftili  have  fever;d  duties  to 
difcharge,  fuchasto  love  and  honour  God,  to  preferve  himfelf,  to 
cultivate  his  faculties  as  much  as  poffiblc,  he.  I  acknowledge 
that  the  principle  oi  fociability  is  the  molt  extenfive,  and  that  the 
other  two  have  a  natural  conneilion  with  it  ;  yet  we  ought  not  to 
confound  them,  as  if  they  had  not  their  own  particular  force,  inde- 
pendent of  fociability.  Tht-fe  are  three  difierent  (prings,  which 
give  motion  and  adtion  to  the  fyftem  of  humanity  ;  fprings  diftindt 
from  o^e  another,  but  which  a6tall  at  the  fame  tinne  purfuant  to 
the  views  of  the  Creator. 

XX.  Be  it  faid  neverthelefs,  in  iuftifîcation  of  PufFendorf,  and  The  critics 

-  -  -•'-  have  carnej 


according  to  a  judicious  obfervaiion  made  by  Barbeyrac,  that  moft   1"^.' 
of  the  criticifms  on  the  former's  fyftem,  as  defective  in  its  princi-  furc 
pie,  have  been  puflied  too  far.       This  illuilrious  relVorcr  cf  the  far  agai 
ftudy  of  natural  law  declares,   his  dcf'gn  was  properly  no  more '"!?^'"' 

than      ^ 


ï o 8  The  Principles   of 

than  to  explain  the  natural  duties  of  man  :  *  nov/  for  this  purpofehe 
had  occafioa  only  for  the  principle  of  fociability.  According  to  hinn, 
our  duties  towards  God  form  apart  of  natural  tiitology  ;  and  relig- 
ion isinterwoven  in  a  treatife  of  natural  law,only  as  it  is  a  firm  fup- 
portof  fociety.  V/iih  regard  to  the  duties  that  concern  m^^n  himfelf, 
he  malces  them  depend  parily  on  religion,  and  partly  on  fociability.  f 
Such  is  Puftendort's  fyftem  :  he  v/ould  certainly  have  made  his 
work  more  perfed,  it  embracing  all  the  dates  of  man,  he  had 
eftablifhcd  diltindt'y  the  proper  principles  agreeable  to  each  of  thofe 
flares,  in  o.derto  deduce  afterwards  from  thence  all  our  particular 
dutiLS  :  for  fuch  is  the  juft  extent  we  ought  to  give  to  natural  law. 

Ofthecnn-  XXI.  This  was  fo  much  the  more  necefTary,  as  notwithfland- 
iiexion  lie-  jj^g  q^.  duties  are  relative  to  different  objefts,  and  deduced  from 
natural  diilinft  principles,  yet  they  have,  as  we  already  hinted,  a  natural 
duties.  connexion;,  'infornuch  that  they  are  interwoven,  as  it  were,  wiili 
one  another,  and  by  mutual  aiTiftancc,  the  obfervance  of  fome 
renders  the  pradlice  of  others  more  eafy  and  certain.  It  is  certain, 
tor  example,  that  the  fear  of  God,  joined  to  a  perfe61:  fubmiflion  to 
his  v/i!l,  is  a  very  euîcacicus  motive  to  engage  men  to  difcharge 
what  diredly  concerns  themfelves,  and  to  do  for  their  neighbour 
and  for  fociety  whatever  the  law  of  nature  requires.  It  is  alfo 
certain,  that  the  duties  which  relate  to  ourfelves,  contribute  not  a 
litt'e  to  direiTt  us  with  refpeâ  to  other  men.  For  what  good 
could  the  fociety  expcifl  from  a  man,  who  would  take  no  care  to 
improve  his  reafon,  or  to  form  his  mind  and  heart  to  wifdom  and 
virtue  ?  On  the  contrary,  what  may  we  not  promifeourfelves  from 
thofe  v;ho  fpare  no  pains  to  perfedt  their  faculties  and  talent?,  and 
are  puflied  on  towards  this  noble  end,  cither  by  the  defire  of  ren- 
dering themfelves  happy,  or  by  that  of  procuring  the  happinefs  ot 
others  ?  Thus  whofoever  negle(3:s  his  duty  towards  God,  and 
deviates  from  the  rules  of  virtue  in  what  concerns  himfelf,  com- 
mits thereby  an  injuflice  in  refpecSl  to  other  men,  becaule  he  fub- 
tradls  fo  much  i^civa  the  common  happinefs.  On  the^contrary,  a 
perfon  who  is  penetrated  with  fuch  fentiments  of  piety,  juftice,  and 
benevolence,  as  religion  and  fociability  require,  endeavours  to  make 
himfelf  happy  ;  becaufe,  accordin2;  to  the  plan  of  providence,  the 
perfonal  felicity  of  every  man  is  infeparably  connected,  on  the  one 
fide  v.'ith  religion,  and  on  the  pther,  with  the  general  happinefs  of 

the 

*  See  the  J-aw    of   Nature  nnd  Nations,  book  ii.    chap.  iii.  §  19.     Speciin. 
cnntrovcri".  cnr>.  5.  §  aT-      Spicilcgiiim  coiitrovcrfiarutLi,  cnp.  i.  §  14. 
f  Sec  the  Duties  of  Mr.n  and  u  Citizen,  bvch  i.  chap.  iii.  §  Ï3. 


Natural    Law.  109 

the  fociety  of  which  he  is  a  member  ;  infomuch  that  to  take  a  par- 
ticular road  to  happinefs  is  nniftaking  the  thing,  and  rambling  quits 
out  of  the  way.  Such  is  the  admirable  harmony,  which  the  divine 
wifdom  lias  eitabliihcd  between  the-  different  parts  of  the  human 
fyftem.  What  could  be  wanting  to  complete  the  happintfs  of 
man,  were  h.  always  attentive  to  Ijch  falutary  direûions  ? 

XXI  I.  But  as  the  three  grand  principles  of  our  duties  are  thus 
co!inccl:ed,  fo  there  is  lilcewife  a  natural  fubordinaiion  between  them,     fl^^^l^^' 
that  helps  to  dtciJj  wh.ch  of  thofe  duti-js  ou^^ht  to  have  the  pref-  that  fomç- 
erence  in  particular  circumftances  or  caf;t^  when  they  have  a  kind  times  hap- 
ofconHi(5l  or  oppontion  that  docs  not  perniit  us  to  (lifchar,<'e  them  P*^"'  ^^* 

all  ah k-  ''^^^" 

,  .      .  .  ...      thefe  very 

The  general  principle  to  judge   rightly  of  this  fubordinatioii  is,  dutki. 

that  the  ftronger   obligation    ought   always    to  prevail  over  the 

weaker.     But  to  know  afterwards  which  is  the  ftronger  obiigatioîi, 

we  have  only  to  attend  to  the  very  nature  of  our  duties,  and  their 

different  degrees  of  neccfllty  and  utility  ;  for  this  is  the  right  way 

to  know  in  tliat  cafe  the  will  of  God.     Pinfuant  to  thefe  ideas, 

we  fhall  give  here  Tome  general  rules  concerning  the  cafes  above 

mentioned. 

1.  The  duties  of  man  towards  God  fhould  always  prevail  over 
any  other.  For  of  all  obligations,  that  which  binds  us  to  our  all- 
wife  and  ali-bountiful  Creator,  is  without  doubt  the  nearell  and 
fcrongeft, 

2.  If  what  we  owe  to  ourfelves  comes  in  competition  with  our 
c!uty  to  fociety  in  general,  fociety  oup.ht  to  have  the  preference. 
Otherv/ife,  we  fhould  invert  the  order  of  things,  dcftroy  the  foun- 
dations of  fociety,  and  a6l  diredly  contrary  to  the  will  of  God,  whu 
by  fjbordinating  the  part  to  the  whole,  has  laid  us  imder  an  indif- 
penhble  obligation  of  never  deviating  from  the  fupremelaw  of  the 
common  good. 

3.  But  if,  every  thing  elfe  equal,  there  happens  to  be  an  oppofition 
between  the  duties  of  felt-love  and  fociabilily,  felf-love  ought  to 
prevail.  For  man  being  dircdly  and  primarily  charged  with  the 
care  of  his  own  prefervation  and  happinefs,  it  follows  therefore  that 
in  a  cafe  of  intire  inequality,  the  care  of  ourfelves  ought  to  prevail 
over  that  or  others. 

4.  But  if,  in  fine,  the  oppofition  is  between  duties  relating;  to 
onrfeK-es,  or  betv/een  two  duties  of  fociability,  we  ought  to  prefer 
that  v.'hicii  is  accoinpanicd  with  the  greatefl  utility,  as  being  the 
mo^  important.  * 

XXIII.  What 


*  Sec  Barhcyrac's  fifth  note  on  feaion  rj.  of   the  thirU  chapter,   book  ii.  of 
the  Law  of  Nature  auJ  Natlcns. 


no  'The  Principles  of 

Natural  XXIII.  What  wc  hnve   hitherto  cxplainevi,  properly  rcgarJs 

law  ij>^ig<'-  the  natural  law  called  «M^e^^cry,  viz.  that  which  haviiigfoj  its  obji.(5l 
jj3f,,r3ll3\y  thyfeacïions  wherein  vvedifcovcr a  nccellary  agreeablenefs  or  difa- 
oifimp.'e  greeabltncfs  to  the  nature  and  date  of  man,!aysus  therefore  under  ;in 
feym^Jjlon.  indifpcnfible  obligation  of  adtmg  or  not  ailing  i.fter a  pnrticularman- 
.'^'^' J  ner.  But  in  confcquence  of  what  has  been  faid  above, f  we  muft  ac- 
«fthe  law  knowledge  that  there  is  likewife  a  law  o\  fimple  pcrmifjlon,  which 
orpermif-  leaves  us  at  liberty  in  particular  cafes  to  a6t  or  not  ;  and  by  laying 
Son.  other  men  under  a   neceOity  of  giving   us  no  let  or   molcftution, 

fe curer,  to  us  in  this  ref[^6l  the  exercife  and  efFccl  of  our  liberty. 

The  general  principle  of  this  law  of  permiilion  i9,  that  we  may 
reafonably,  and  according  as  we  judge  proper,  do  or  omit  whatever 
has  not  an  abfolute  and  eilVntial  agreeablenefs  or  difagrecblenefs 
to  the  nature  and  flate  of  man  ;  unlcfs  it  hz  a  thing  exprcfsly  or- 
dained or  forbidden  by  fomepofitive  law,  to  which  we  are  other- 
wife  fubje(Sl. 

The  truth  of  tliis  principle  is  obvious.  The  Cre.itor  having 
inverted  man  with  feveral  faculiies,  and,  among  the  reft  with 
that  of  modifying  his  actions  as  he  thinks  proper  ;  it  is  plain  tliat 
in  every  thing  in  which  he  has  not  reftrained  the  ufc  of  thofe  fac- 
ulties, either  by  an  exprcfs  command  or  a  p')ritive  prohibition,  he 
leaves  man  at  liberty  to  exercife  them  according  to  his  own  difcre- 
tion.  It  is  on  this  Uw  of  permiflion  all  thofe  rights  are  founded, 
which  are  of  fuch  a  nature  as  to  leave  us  at  liberty  to  ufe  them  or 
not,  to  retain  or  renounce  them  in  the  whole  or  in  part  ;  and,  \n 
confcquence  of  this  renunciation,  aillions  in  thenifc'vcs  permitted, 
happen  fonietinies  to  be  commanded  or  forbidden  by  the  authority 
of  the  fovereign,  and  become  obligatory  by  that  means. 


Two  fpe-  XXIV.  This  is  what  right  reafon  difcovcrs  in  the  nature  and 
cies  of  nat- conditution  of  man,  in  his  original  and  pri;nltive  (l?,te.  Butas 
urallaw  ;  ^^^^  himfelf  may  make  divers  modifications  in  his  primitive  (late, 
one  pnnu.  •         /•  i      i  •  •  i  r  \        •  ,-    i     /• 

tive    the     ^'""^  enter  into  lèverai  adventitioiis  ones  ;  the  conlidcration  o\  thole 

other  ffc-    new  fiâtes  falls  likewife  upon  the  object  of  the  law  of  nature,  taken 
ondary,      j^  its  full  extent  \  and  the  principles  wc  have  laid  clown  ought  to 
(I'rve  likewife  for  a  rule   in  the  ftates  in  which   man  engages  by 
his  own  adt  and  deed. 

Hence  occafion  has  been  taken  to  diflinguifli   two  fpccies   of 
natural  law  j  the  one  primary,  the  C)iher  fecondary. 

Theprimary  or  primitive  natural  law  isthat  which  immediately 

arifcs 

f  See  pjrt  i.  chap,  x.  §  5.  and  6, 


N   A  T  U  R  A  L    L  A  W.  J  1 1 

arifes  from  die  primitive  conflitution  of  man,  as  God  himfclf  has 
ellablilhed  it,  independent  of  any  human  a6t. 

Secondary  natural  law  is  that  which  (uppofes  fome  human  ail 
or  eftablifhment  ;   as  a  civil  ibte,  property  uf  goods,  &c. 

It  is  cafy  to  comprehend,  that  this  fecondary  natural  law  is  only 
a  conftquence  of  ihe  former  ;  or  rather  it  is  a  jufl  application  of 
the  general  maxims  of  natural  law  to  ihe  particular  fiâtes  of  man- 
kind, and  to  the  different  circumftances  in  which  they  find  them- 
felves  by  their  own  a£l  ;  as  it  appears  in  fad,  when  we  come  to 
examine  into  particuUr  duties. 

*  Some  perhaps  will  be  furprifed,  that  in  eflabliftiing  the  prin- 
ciples of  natural  law,  we  have  ttken  no  notice  of  the  different 
opinions  of  writers  concerning  this  fubjeft.  But  we  judged  it 
more  advifeable  to  point  out  the  true  fourccs  from  whence  the 
principles  were  to  be  drawn,  and  to  eftabliih  afterwards  the  princi- 
ples themfelveP,  than  to  enter  into  a  difcuiîion  which  would  have 
carried  us  too  far  for  a  work  of  this  nature.  If  we  have  hit  upon 
the  true  one,  this  will  be  fufficient  to  enable  us  to  judge  of  all  the 
reft  ;  and  if  any  one  defires  a  more  ample  and  more  particular 
inftrudion,  he  may  ealîly  find  it,  by  confulting  Puffendorf,  who 
relates  the  different  opinions  of  civilians,  and  accompanies  them 
with  very  judicious  refiedions.  t 


CHAP.     V. 

That  natural  lazus  have  heenfuffciently  notified  \  of  their  proper  cha* 
raéieri/îics,  the  obligation  they  produce^  &(. 

Jf\.FTER  what  has   been  hitherto  faid  in    relation  to  the  fug^ic^iy 
principles  of  natural  laws,  and  the  way  we   come  to  know   them,  notified 
there  is  no  need  to  a(k  whether  God  has  fufficiently  notified  thofe  the  laws  of 
laws  to  man.     It  is  evident  we   can  difcover  all  their  principles,  "a^ure  ta 
and  deduce  from  thence  our  feveral  duties,   by  that  natural  light  ™^"' 
which  to  no  man  has  been  ever  refufed.     It  is  in  this  fenfe  we  are 
to  underftand   what   is  commonly  faid,  that  this  law  is  naturally 
known  to  all  mankind.     For  to  think  with  fome  people,  that  the 
law  of  nature  is  innate,  as  it  were,   in  our  minds,  and  adually 

imprinted 

•  See  Grotlus,  Rights  of   War  and  Peace,  book  i.  chap.  i.  §  lo.    and    Puf- 
fendorf, Law  of  Nature  and  Nations,  book  ii.  chap.  iii.  §  22, 

t  Sec  Puffendorf,  Law  of  Nature  aad  Nations,  book  ii.  chap,  iii-  §  z>     14' 


112  *ïhe  Principles  of 

imprinted  rn  our  fouls  from  the  firft  moment  of  our  cxiilence  ;  is 
fuppofuigathing  that  is  not  at  all  iieccfTiry,  and  is  moreover  con- 
tradicted Oy  experience.  All  that  can  be  faid  on  this  fubjecSl,  is, 
that  the  moft  general  and  moft  important  maxims  of  the  law  of 
nature,  are  fo  clear  and  manifeft,  and  have  fuch  a  proportion  to 
our  ideas,  and  fuch  an  agreeablenefs  to  our  nature,  that  fo  foon  as 
they  are  propofed  to  us,  we  inftantly  approve  of  them  ;  and  as  we 
are  difpofed  and  accuflomed  from  our  infancy  to  feel  thcfc  truths, 
we  confider  them  as  born  with  us. 

Men  may        H*  But  wc  muft  take  care  to  obferve,  that  when  we  fay  mar» 
affift  one     may  acquire  the  knowledge  of  natural  laws,  byufing  his  reafon  ; 
another  in  vve  do  not  exclude  the  fuccours  he  may  receive  from  elfewhere. 
^^   '  Some  there   are,  who  having  taken  a  particular  care  to  cultivate 
their  minds,  are  qualified  to  enlighten  others,  and  to  fupply,  by 
their  inftrudlions,  the  rudencfs  and  ignorance  of  the  common  run 
of  mankind,     This  is  agreeable  to  the  plan  of  providence.     God 
having  defigned  man  for  fociety,  and  given  him  a  conftitution  rel- 
ative to  this  end,  the  different  helps  which  men  receive  of  one 
another,  ought  to  be  equally  ranked  among  natural  means,  v^'ith 
thofe  v/hich  every  one  hnds  within  himfelf,  and  draws  from  his 
own  fund. 

In  effcdl,  all  men  are  not  of  themfelves  capable  to  unfold  me- 
thodically the  principles  of  natural  lav/s,  and  the  confequences 
from  thence  refulting.  Itis  fufficient  that  middling  capacities  are 
able  to  comprehend  at  leaft  thofe  principles,  when  they  are  explain- 
ed to  them,  and  to  feel  the  truth  and  neceiHty  of  the  duties  that 
flow  from  thence,  by  comparing  them  v;ith  the  conftitution  of 
their  own  nature.  But  if  there  be  fome  capacities  of  a  (iill  inferi- 
or order,  they  are  generally  led  by  the  imprcflions  of  example, 
cudom,  authority,  or  lomeprcfent  and  fenfible  utility.  Be  this  as 
it  will,  every  thing  rightly  confidered,  the  law  of  nature  is  fuffici- 
ently  notified  to  impower  us  to  affirm,  that  no  man  at  the  age  of 
difcretion,  and  in  his  right  fenfes,  can  alledge  for  a  juft  excufe,  an 
invincible  ignorance  on  this  article. 

III.  Let  us  make  a  refîeélion,  which  prefents  Itfelf  here  very 
The  man-  j^j^jm-^Hy,  It  I.q^  that  whofoever  attends  ferioufly  to  the  manner 
which  the  in  which  we  have  eftablifhed  the  principles  of  the  laws  of  nature, 
principles  will  foon  find,  that  the  method  we  have  followed  is  a  frefh  proof 
of  the  laws  Qf  jj^g  certainty  and  reality  of  thofe  laws.  We  have  waved  all 
have  b«n    abftradt  and  metaphyfical  fpeculationF,  in  order  to  confult  plain  fa(ft, 

and 


Natural    Lav/.  113 

and  the  nature  and  ftate  of  things.     It  is  from  the  natural  confti-  eaablifted, 
tution  of  man,  and  from  the  relations  he  has  to  other  beings,  that   p^^^^^^f 
we  have  taken  our  principles  ;  and  the  fyftem  from  thence  refult-  the  reality 
ing,  has  fo  ftrict  and  fo  neceffary  a  connexion  with  this  nature  and  of  thofc 
ftate  of  man,  that  they  are  abfolutely  infeparable.     If  to  all  this  we  ^^^s. 
join  what  has  been  already  obferved  in  the  foregoing  chapters,  we 
cannot,  methinks,  miilake  the  laws  of  nature,  or  doubt  of  their 
reality,  without  renouncing  the  pureft  light  of  reafon,  and  running 
into  Pyrrhonifm. 

IV.  Butas  the  principles  of  the  laws  of  nature  are,  through  the  ^  , 
wifdom  of  the  Creator,  eafy  to  difcover,  and  as  the  knowledge  of  ]^y^^  ^rc 
the  duties  they  impofe  on  us,  is  within  the  reach  of  the  moft  ordi-  the  efFeél 
nary  capacities  :  it  is  alfo  certain,  that  thefe  laws  are  far  from  being  «f  the  di- 
impra£licab!e.  On  the  contrary,  they  bear  fo  manifeft  a  propor-  ^"l'^  2°° 
tion  to  the  light  of  right  reafon,  and  to  our  molt  natural  inclina- 
tions ;  they  have  alfo  fuch  a  relation  to  our  perfeftion  and  hap- 

pinefs  ;  that  they  cannot  be  conhdered  otherwife  than  as  an  efïe£t 
of  the  divine  goodnefs  towards  man.  Since  no  other  motive 
but  that  of  doing  good,  could  ever  induce  a  being,  who  is  felf- 
cxiftent,  and  fupremely  happy,  to  form  creatures  endowed  with 
underftanding  and  fenfe  ;  it  mud  have  been  in  confequence  of  this 
fame  goodnefs  that  he  firrt  vouchfafed  to  direél  them  by  laws. 
His  view  was  not  merely  to  reflrain  their  liberty  ;  but  he  thought 
fit  to  let  them  know  what  agreed  with  them  bed,  what  was  moft 
proper  for  their  perfecftion  and  happinefs  ;  and  in  order  to  add 
greater  weight  to  the  realonable  motives  that  were  to  determine 
them,  he  joined  thereto  the  authority  of  his  commands.  * 

This  gives  us  to  underfland  why  the  laws  of  nature  are  fuch  as 
they  are.  It  was  necefTary,  purfuant  to  the  views  of  the  Almighty, 
that  the  laws  he  prefcribed  to  mankind,  fliould  be  fuitaWe  to  their 
nature  and  flate  ;  that  they  fliould  have  a  tendency  of  themfelves 
to  procure  the  perfection  and  advantage  of  individuals,  as  well  as 
of  the  fpecies  ;  of  particular  people,  as  well  as  of  the  fociety.  In 
Ihort,  the  choice  of  the  end  determined  the  nature  of  the  means. 

V.  In  faâ:,  there  are  natural  and  necefiâry  differences  in  human  The  lawa 
allions,  and  in  the  effects  by  them  produced.  Some  agree  of  of  nature 
themfelves -with  the  nature  and  ftate  of  man,  while  others  difagree,  ^'^  notde- 
and  are  quite  oppofite  thereto  i  fome  contribute  to  the  produdion  arbitrary"* 

P  and  inttitu- 

"  ■        •  <  I.I,    , nil     I    ,  I     ^      Ml  .1     .-    tion. 

*  See  part  i-  chap.  Xf  §  3. 


114  ^^  Principles  of 

and  maintenance  of  onler,  others  tend  to  fubve  t  it  :  fc>me  procure 
the  perfection  and  happinefs  of  mankind,  Dthers  are  attended  with 
their  difgrace  a;id  mifery.  To  rcfufe  to  acknowledge  ihefe  diftcr- 
ences,  would  be  fliutting  one's  eyes  to  the  light,  and  confounding 
it  with  darkncfs.  Thele  are  differences  of  a  moft  fenfible  nature  ; 
and  whatever  a  perfon  may  fay  to  the  contrary,  fenfe  and  experi- 
ence will  always  refute  thofe  falfe  and  idle  fubtleties. 

Let  us  not  therefore  (cek  any  where  elfe  but  in  the  very  nature 
of  human  acftions,  in  their  cfl'ential  differences  and  confequence?, 
for  the  true  foundation  of  the  laws  of  nature,  and  why  Gqd  forbids 
fome  things,  while  he  commands  others.  Thcfe  are  not  arbitrary 
laws,  fuch  as  God  might  not  have  given,  or  have  given  others  of 
a  quite  different  nature.  Supreme  wifdom  can  no  more  than  fu- 
preme  power  aiSlany  thing  abfurd  and  contradi(5tory.  It  is  the  very 
rature  of  things  that  always  ferves  for  the  rule  of  his  détermina- 
tions. God  was  at  liberty,  without  doubt,  to  create  or  not  to 
create  man  ;  to  create  him  fuch  as  he  is,  or  to  give  him  a  quite 
different  nature.  But  having  determined  to  form  a  rational  and 
focial  being,  he  could  not  prefcribe  any  thing  unfuitable  to  fuch  a 
creature.  We  may  even  aiTirm,  that  the  fuppofition  which  makes 
the  principles  and  rules  of  the  law  of  nature  depend  on  the  arbitra- 
ry will  of  God,  tends  to  fubvert  and  deftroy  even  the  very  idea  of 
natural  law.  For  if  thefe  laws  were  not  a  neccflary  confequence 
of  the  nature,  con  titution,  and  ftate  of  man,  it  would  be  impolTible 
for  us  to  have  a  certain  knowledge  of  them,  except  by  a  very  clear 
revelation,  or  by  fome  other  formal  promulgation  on  the  part  of 
God.  But  agreed  it  is,  that  the  law  of  nature  is,  and  ought  to  be 
known  by  the  mere  light  of  reafon.  To  conceive  it  therefore  as 
depending  on  an  arbitrary  will,  would  be  attempting  to  fubvert  if, 
or  at  lealt  would  be  reducing  the  thing  to  a  kind  of  Pyrrhonifm  ; 
by  reafon  we  could  have  no  natural  means  of  being  fure  that  God 
commands  or  forbids  one  thing  rather  than  an  other.  Hence, 
if  the  laws  of  nature  depend  originally  on  divine  inftitution,  as  there 
is  no  room  to  qucftion  ;  we  mult  likewife  agree,  that  this  is  not  a 
mere  arbitrary  inftitution,  but  founded,  on  one  fide,  on  the  very 
«atnre  and  conftitution  of  man  ;  and,  on  the  other,  on  the  wifdom 
of  God,  who  cannot  defire  an  end,  without  dcfiring  at  the  fame 
time  the  means  that  alone  are  fit  to  obtain  it. 

VI.  It  is  not  amifs  to  obferve  here,  that  the  manner  in  which 
io"n^is*!fot''  "^^  cftablifh  the  foundation  of  the  law  of  nature,  does  not  differ  in 
very  wide  the  main  from  the  principles  of  Grctius.  Perhapsthis  great  man 
from  dut  rni'>^ht  have  explained  his  thoughts  a  little  better.  But  we  mnft 
oi  Grotuis.  ^^^^^  ^[^^^  j^jg  commentators,  without  excepting  Fuffcndorf  himfelf, 

have 


N  A  T  U  R  A  L    L  A  W.  I  1 1 

have  not  rightly  underflooJ  his  meaning,  and  confequently  have 
pafled  a  wrong  cenfure  on  him,  by  pretending,  that  the  manner  ia 
which  he  eftablilhed  the  foundation  of  the  law  of  nature,  is  reduced 
to  a  vicious  circle.  //  we  ajk^  i^y^  Puft'cndorf,  *  wJAch  arc  thofe 
things  that  form  the  matter  of  natural  laws  ?  The  anfwer  is,  that 
they  are  thofe  which  are  honejî  or  diPnonell  of  their  own  nature.  If 
zue  inquire  afterwards^  what  are  thofe  things  that  are  honcli  or  dif~ 
honeji  of  their  own  nature  ?  There  can  be  no  other  anfwer  givcn^ 
but  that  they  are  thofe  ivhichfortn  the  matter  of  natural  laws.  This 
is  what  the  critics  put  into  the  mouth  of  Grotius. 

But  let  us  fee  whether  Grotius  fays  really  any  fuch  thing.  The 
law  of  nature^  fays  he,  f  con  ft  fis  in  certain  pritjciples  of  right  rcafon^y 
•which  iyiform  us^  that  an  aSîion  is  morally  honefl  or  difoonc/i.,  ac- 
cording to  the  neceffary  agreeablcnefs  or  dijagrccahlenefs  it  ha:  with  a 
rational  and  fociable  nature  ;  and  confequently  that  GoJ^  who  is  the 
author  of  nature^  commands  or  forbids  fuch  a£lions.  Here  I  can  iee 
no  circle:  for  putting  the  queltion,  whence  comes  the  natural 
honefty  or  turpitude  of  commanded  or  forbidden  ailions?  Grotius 
does  not  anfwer  in  the  manner  they  make  him  ;  o\\  the  contrary, 
he  fays  that  this  honefly  or  turpitude  proceeds  from  the  necclfary 
agreeablenefs  or  difagreeablenefs  of  cur  adions  with  a  rational  and 
focial  nature.  § 

VII.  After  having  feen  that  the  laws  of  nature  are  practicable 
of  themfelves,  evidently  ufeful,   highly  conformable  to  the  ideas    /  *,  ^:'° 

.       -'  ^      .  '  O!  the  It^\^  3 

which  right  reafon  gives  us  of  God,  fuitable  to  the  nature  and  (late  of  nature 
of  man,  perfe^lly  agreeable  to  order,  and,  in  hnc,  fufEciently  noti-  i5  an  obli- 
fied  ;  there  is  no  longer  room  to  queftion,  but  laws  inverted  with  gat'^^f.  of 
allthefe  charadleriftics,  are  obligatory,  and  lay  men  under  an  indif-  ^°" 
penfible  obligation  of  conforming  their  conduct  to  them.     It  is  condu 
even  certain,  that  the  obligation  which  God  impofes  on  us  by  this 
means,  is  the  ftrongeft  of  all,  by  reafon  of  its  being  produced  by 
the  concurrence  and  union  of  the  ftrongeft  motives,  fuch  as  are 
moll  proper  to  determine  the  will.     In  fad,  the  counfels  and  max- 
ims of  reafon  oblige  us,  not  only  becaufe  they  are   in  themfelves 
very  agreeable,  and  founded  on  the  nature  and  iminutable  relations 
of  things  ;    bjt  moreover  by  the  authority  of  the  fupreme  Being, 
who  intervenes  here,  by  giving  us  clearly  to  underftand'he  is  wiU- 


*  See  Puffcndorf,  Law  of  Nature  aad  Nations,  book  ii.  chap.  iii.  §  4,     ApoJ. 

f  See  Grotius,  Rights  of  War  and  Peace,  book  i.   chap.  i.  §  to. 

§  See   Barbcyrac's  fifth  nots  on    the    Law  of  Nature  and  Nation?,  book  ii, 
c!.ap.  ili.  §4. 


(oniormiiiiç 
reio  our 


ïi6 


"The  Principles  of 


Natural 
Jaws  are 
obligatory 
inrcfpsdl 
to  all  men. 


Groti'us's 
opinion 
t^'ith  re- 
gard to  tU- 
■viDe,  pofi- 
tive,  and 
v.  ni  venal 
law. 


ing  wc  flioiild  obferve  them,  becaufe  of  his  being  the  author  of 
this  nature  of  things,  and  of  the  mutual  relations  ihey  have  among 
themfelves.  In  fine,  the  law  of  nature  binds  us  by  an  internal  and 
external  obligation  at  the  fame  time  ;  which  produces  the  higheft 
degree  of  moral  neceflity,  and  reduces  liberty  to  the  very  ftrongeft 
fubjcdion,  without  dedroying  it.  * 

Thus  the  obedience  due  to  natural  law  is  a  fincere  obedience, 
and  fuch  as  ought  to  arife  from  a  confcientious  principle.  The 
firft  efFc(5l  ofthofe  laws  is  to  direél  the  fentiments  of  our  minds, 
and  the  motions  of  the  heart.  We  fhould  not  difcharge  what  they 
require  of  us,  were  we  externally  to  abftain  from  what  they  con- 
demn, but  with  regret  and  againft  our  will.  And  as  it  is  not 
allowable  to  defire  what  we  are  not  permitted  to  enjoy  ;  fo  it  is 
our  duty  not  only  to  pra6life  what  we  are  commanded,  but  likewife 
to  give  it  our  approbation,  and  to  acknowledge  its  utility  and  juft- 
ice. 

VIII.  Another  eflential  charafleriftic  of  the  laws  of  nature  is, 
that  they  be  univerfal,  that  is,  they  fliould  oblige  all  men  v/ithout 
exception.  For  men  are  not  only  equally  fubje£ltoGod's  command  ; 
but  moreover,  the  laws  of  nature  having  their  foundation  in  the 
conftitution  and  ftate  of  man,  and  being  notified  to  him  by  reafon, 
it  is  plain  they  have  an  eflential  agreeablenefs  to  all  mankind,  and 
oblige  them  wihout  diftindion  ;  whatever  diîference  there  may  be 
between  them  in  fa£i,  and  in  whatever  (late  they  are  fuppofcd. 
This  is  what  diftinguifhes  natural  from  pofitive  laws  ;  for  apofitive 
law  relates  only  to  particular  perfons  or  focieties. 

IX.  It  is  true  that  Grotlus,.^f  and  after  him  feveral  divines  and 
civilians,  pretend  that  there  arc  divine,  pofitive,  and  univerfal 
laws,  which  oblige  all  men,  from  the  very  moment  they  are  made 
fufîîciently  known  to  them.  But  in  the  firft  place,  were  there 
any  fuch  law?,  as  they  could  not  be  difcovered  by  the  fole  light  of 
reafon,  thev  muft  have  been  very  clearly  manifefted  to  all  man- 
kind ;  a  thing  which  cannot  be  fully  proved  :  and  if  it  fnould  be 
faid,  that  they  oblige  only  thofc  to  whom  they  are  made  known  j 
this  deftroys  the  idea  of  univerfality  attributed  to  them,  by  fu^po- 
fing  that  thofelaws  were  made  for  all  men.  Secondly,  the  divine, 
pofitive,  and  univerfal  laws,  ought  to  be  moreover  ofthemlelves 
beneficial  to  all  mankind,  at  alftimes,  and  in  all  places  j  and  this 

the 


*  See  parti,  chap.  vi.  §  13. 
t  SeeRigV.s  of  War  and  Pe;icc,  book  j.  chap.  i.  §  15.  with  Barbeyrac's  notes. 


Natural    Law.  117 

the  v/iidom  and  goodnefs  of  God  requires.  But  for  this  purpofe 
thefe  laws  fliould  have  been  founded  on  the  conftitution  of  human 
nature  in  genera!,  and  then  they  would  be  true  natural  laws,  f 

X.  We  have  already  obfcrved,  that  the  laws  of  nature,  though  Natural 
edablifhed  by    the  divine  will,  are  not  the  cffe6l  of  an  arbitrary  l^^^^  arc 
difpofition,  but  have  their  foundation  in  the  very  nature  and  mutual  ^jg^  gj^j 
relations  of  things.     Hence  it  follows,  that  natural  laws  are  immu-  admitof  no 
table,  and  admit  of  no  difpcnfation.     This  isalfo  a  proper  charac-  d'fpcnfa- 
teriftic  of  thefe  laws,  which  diftinguifljes  them   from  all  pofitive  '"^°' 
law,  whether  divine  or  human. 

This  immutability  of  the  laws  of  nature  has  nothing  in  it  repug- 
nant to  the  indépendance,  fupreme  power,  or  liberty  of  an  all-per- 
fe£l  Being.  Since  he  himfelf  is  the  author  of  our  conftitution,  he 
cannot  but  prefcribe  or  prohibit  fuch  things  as  have  a  neceiTary 
agreeablenefs  or  difagrecablencfs  to  this  very  conftitution  ;  and 
confequently  he  cannot  make  any  change,  or  give  any  difpenfation, 
in  regard  to  the  laws  of  nature.  *  It  is  a  glorious  neceffity  in  him 
not  to  contraditl  himfelf;  it  is  a  kind  of  impotency  falfely  (o  called, 
which,  far  from  limiting  or  diminifhing  his  perfections,  adds  to 
their  external  charader,  and  points  out  all  their  excellency. 

XI.  Confidering  the  thing  as  has  been  now  explained,  we  may  of  the  e- 
fay,  if  we  will,  that  the  lav/s  of  nature  are  eternal  ;  though,  to  tell  ternity  of 
the  truth;  this    expreffion  is  very   incorretSt  of  itfelf,  and  more  '^^tural 
adapted  to  throw  obfcurity  than  clearnefs  upon  our  ideas.    Thofe         ' 
who  firft  took  notice  of  the  eternity  of  the  laws  of  nature,  did  it 
very  probably  out  of  oppofition  to  the  novelty  and  frequent  muta- 
tions of  civil  laws.     They  meant  only,  that  the   law  of  nature  is 
antecedent,  for  example,  to  the  laws  of  Mofes,  of  Solon,  or  of  any 
other  legiflator,  in  that  it  is  coeval  with  mankind  ;  and  (o  far  they 
were  in  the  right.     But  to  affirm,  as  a  great  inany  divines  and 
moralifts  have  done,  that  the  law  of  nature  is  coeternal  with  God, 
is  advancing  a  propofition,  which   reduced  to  its  juft  value   is  not 
exactly  true  ;  by  re:ifon  that   the  law  of  nature  being  made   for 
man,  its  a£lual  cxiftence  fuppofeth  that  of  mankind.     But  if  v/e 
are  only  to  underftand  hereby,  thit  God  had  the  ideas  thereof  from 
all  eternity,  then  we  attributs  nothing  to  the  laws  of  nature  but 

what 


t  Sse  Bàrbeyrac's  fixth  note  on    I'uiTendorf's    Law  of   Nature  and  Nations 
booki   chap.  xi.  §  i8. 

*   See  Puffendùrf,  Law  of  Nature   and  Nations,  book  ii.    chap,  iii.  ^  6.  and 
Ciotlus,  Rights  of  War   and  Peace,  book  i,  chap.  i.  §  ao- 


I â  'ïh  Principles  of 


• 


what  is  eqiially  common  to  every  thing  thatexifts. 

Wecanriot  finiOi  this  article  better  than  with  a  beautiful  pal- 
fageof  Cicero,  prcferved  by  Lailjntius.  f  Right  reafnn^  fays  this 
philofopher,  ii  indee4 a  true  law,  agreeable  to  nature^  common  to  all 
men^  confiant.,  immutable.,  eternal.  It  prompts  men  to  their  duty  by 
its  commands.y  and  deters  them  from  evil  by  its  prohibitions — It  is  not 
allowed  to  retrench  any  part  of  this  law.,  or  to  make  any  alteration 
ihcrcin.,  much  le fs  to  abolijh  it  entirely.  Neither  the  fenate  nor  pco^ 
pie  can  difftenfe  with  it  ;  nor  does  it  require  any  interpret. ition.,  being 
clear  of  itfeif  and  intelligible.  It  is  tl^e  fame  at  Rome  and  Athens  ; 
the  fame  to-day  and  to-morroiu.  his  the  fan^  eternal  and  invaria^ 
hie  law.,  given  at  all  times  and  places.,  to  all  nations  \  bccaufe  Gcd^ 
who  is  the  author  thereof.,  and  has  publifhed  it  himfelf, 
is  always  the  fole  mafîer  and  fovereign  of  mankind.  Whofoever 
violates  this  law.,  renounces  his  own  nature.,  divejls  himfelf  of  hu- 
manity., and  will  be  rigorouf^y  chafiifcdfor  his  difohedicnce.,  though  he 
IV ere  to  efcape  what  is  commonly  diflinguijhed  by  the  name  of  punifh- 
ment. 

But  let  this  fuffice  in  regard  to  the  law  of  nature  confidered  as 
a  rule  to  individuals.  In  order  to  embrace  the  intire  fyftem  of 
man,  and  to  unfold  our  principles  in  their  full  extent,  it  is  necefla- 
ry  we  fay  fnmething  likewife  concerning  the  rules  which  nations 
ought  to  obftrve  between  each  other,  and  are  commonly  called  thg 
law  oj  nations. 


CHAP. 


,  *  TIic  immutability  of  the  laws  of  nature  is  acknowkciged  by  all  thofe  who 
reafon  with  any  cca^nefi.  See  InRic.  lib.  I.  tit.  2.  §  II.  Noodt.  Probabll. 
Juris,  Ha.  a.  cap,  1 1. 

•j-  Eft  quidem  vera  lex,  re.Sa  ratio,  naturs  congruensi  diffufii  in  omncs  ecu-, 
ftans  fempitcma,  quas  vocet  ad  ot'icium  iubendo,  vetaudo  a  fraude  dctcrreat  1 
qux  tamen  neque  probes  fruftra  jubct,  ant  vetat  ;  nee  iniprobos  jubendo  aut 
vcrando  movet.  Huic  'egi  nee  obrcjvari  fas  eft.  n.'que  deroj^ari  ex  hac  aiiquid 
licet  :  r.cque  tota  abrograri  pottft.  Nee  vtro  aiit  per  fenattim,  aut  per  popu- 
Itim  folv;  hac  lege  poffumns  :  neque  eft  qiiicrendus  explanatcr  aut  ititerpres 
ejus  -iiius  Nee  crit  alia  lex  Roms,  alia  Athsnir-,  alia  nunc,  alia  poflhic  ;  fed 
ciniies  gfntes,  &  omni  te.iipore,  una  lex  &  fempiterna  &  inmiutabilis  continc- 
bit  ;  unufque  erit  coni'v.unis  quad  ni.igifter  &  impcrator  omnium  Deus.^  Ille 
legis  hujus  inventor)  difceprator.  lator  :  cui  qui  non  parebit  ipfe  fe  fugitt,  ac 
naturani  hominis,  afpernabitur  ;  atque  hoc  ipfo  luet  niaxinias  pœnas  etianifi 
estera  fnppticia,  qua:  putantur,  elFu^erit.  Cicero  de  RejjubL  lib.  3,  a^ud  La^ant^ 
Lijlit.  Di-vin.  Hi'.   6.caJ>.  8. 


Natural  Law.  'xrg 


CHAP.    VI.     V 

Of  the  hiiv  of  nations. 

'  _/\M0NG  the  various  eftablSfhmcnts   of  man,  the  moft  ""^^i^!;"''^ 
conlîdcrable  without  doubt  is  that  of  civil  fociety,  or  the  body  pol-  ^j-e  foiai- 
itic,  which  is  juftly  efteemed  the  mofl:  perfc<fl  of  focieties,  and  has  ej. 
obt^iined  the  name  of  State  by  way  of  preference. 

Human  fociety  is  fimply,  of  itfelf,  and  with  regard  to  thofe 
whocompofe  it,  a  ftate  ofequahtyand  independence.  It  is  fub- 
je£t  to  God  alone  ;  no  one  has  a  natural  and  primitive  right  to 
command  ;  but  each  perfon  may  difpofe  of  himfelf,  and  of  what 
he  poirelFes, as  bethinks  proper,  with  this  only  reftri6tion,  that  he 
keep  within  the  bounds  of  the  law  of  nature,  and  do  no  prejudice 
or  injuiytoany  man. 

The  civil  ftate  makes  a  great  alteration  in  this  ptintitive  one. 
Theeftablifhing  a  fovereignty  fubverts  this  indépendance  wherein 
men  were  originally  with  regard  to  one  another  ;  and  fubordina- 
tion  is  fubftituted  m  its  ftead,  The  fovereign  becoming  the  de- 
politory  as  it  were  of  the  will  arid  ftrength  of  each  individual, 
which  are  united  in  his  perf:)n,all  the  other  members  of  the  foci- 
ety become  fubjeits,  and  find  thcmfelves  under  an  obligation  of 
obeying  and  conducing  themfelves  purfuantto  the  laws  impofed 
upon  them  by  the  fovereign. 

n.  But  how  great  foever  the  change  may  be  which  govern-  ç^^^ç  ^^^^ 
mentand  fovereignty  make  in    the  (fate  of  nature,    yet  we  mufl:  notde- 
not  imagine  that  the  civil  ilate  properly  fubverts  all  natural  focitty,  ^foy»  ^"<= 
or  that    it  deftroys  the  effential  relations  which  men  have  among  jj^/J^^J^  ^f 
themfelves,  or  thofe   between  God  and  man.     This    would  be  nature. 
neither  phyfical  nor   morally  poffible  :    on  the  contrary,  the  civil 
ttate  fupp  Xc5  the  n  itureof  man,  fach  as  the  Creator  has  formed  it  ; 
it  fuppofes  the  primitive   (late  of  union  and  fociet)',   with  all  the 
relations  this  ftate  includes  ;    it  fuppofes,  in  fine,   the  natural  dé- 
pendance of  man  with  regard  to  God  and  his  law?.     Government 
is  fo   far  from   iubverting  this  firft  order,  that  it  has  been  rather 
eftablifhed  with  a  view  to  give  it  a  new  degree  of  force  and  con- 
fiftency.     It  was  intended  to  enable  us  the  better  to  difcharge  the 
dunes  prefcribed  by  natural  lav/s,  and  to  attain  more  certainly  the 
end  for  which  we  were  created, 

HI.  In 


I20 


TThe  Principles  oj 


True  ideas  HI.  In  order  to  form  a  juft  idea  of  civil  fociety,  we  mud  fay, 
citcy"^^*' ^°'  ^'^^'  ^'  ^^  "°  xnox^  than  natural  fociety  itfclf  modified  in  fuch  a 
manner,  as  to  have  a  fovercign  that  commands,  and  on  whofe  will 
whatever  concerns  the  happi  nefs  of  fociety,  ultimately  depends  i  to 
the  end  that  under  his  prote£lion  and  through  his  care  mankind  may 
furely  attain  the  felicity  to  uhich  they  naturally  afpire. 

States  arc        IV.  All    focieties  are  formed  by  the  concurrence  or  union  of 

imder^th     ^^  ^'^'^  °^  feveral  perfons,  with  a  view  of  acquiring  fome  advan- 

notionof    *^g^*     Hence  it  is  that  focieties  are  confidered  as  bodies,  and  re- 

jiioral  per-  ceivc  the  appellation  of  moral  perfons  ;  by  reafon  that  thofe  bodies 

icas.  are  in  cfFeéi  animated  with  one  fole  will,  which  regulates  all  their 

movements.     This  agrees  particularly  with  the  body  politic  or 

ftate.     The  fovereign  is  the  chief  or  head,  and  the  fubjecls  th  e 

members  ;  all  their  anions  that   have   any  relation  to  fociety,  arc 

direfted  by  the   will  of  the    chief.     Hence,  fo  foon  as  ftates  arc 

formed,  they  acquire  a  kind  of  perfonal  properties  :  and  we  may 

confequently,  with  due  proportion,  attribute  to   them   whatever 

agrees  in  particular  with  man  ;  fuch  as  certain  afliona  and  rights 

that  properly  belong  to  them,  certain  duties  they  are  obliged  to 

fulfil,  &c. 

Whatis  v.  This  being  fuppofed,  the  cftablifhmcnt  of  ftates  introduces 

the  law  of  a  kind  of  fociety  amongft  them,  fimilar  to  that  which  is  naturally 
*""  between  men  ;  and  the  fame  reafons  v/hich  induce  men  to  maintain 

union  among  themfelves,  ought  likewife  to  engage  nations  or  their 
fovereigns  to  keep  up  a  good  underflanding  with  one  another. 

It  is  neceflary  therefore  there  fhould  be  fome  law  among  nations, 
to  ferve  as  a  rule  for  mutual  commerce.  Now  this  law  can  be 
nothing  elfe  but  thehw  of  nature  itfelf,  which  is  then  diftinguiflied 
by  the  name  of  the  law  of  nations.  Natural  lazv,  fay,  Hobbes  very 
juftly,  ♦  is  divided  into  the  natural  law  ofman^  and  the  natural  law 
ifjiates  :  and  the  latter  is  what  we  call  the  laiu  of  nations.  Thus 
natural  law  and  the  law  of  nations  are  in  reality  one  and  the  fame 
thing,  and  differ  only  by  an  external  denomination.  We  muft 
therefore  fay,  that  the  law  of  nations  properly  fo  called,  and  confid- 
ered as  a  law  proceeding  from  a  fuptrior,  is  nothing  elfe,  but  the 
law  of  nature  itl'elf,  not  applied  to  men  confidered  fimply  as  fuch; 
but  to  nations,  ftates,  or  their  chiefs,  jn  the  relations  they  have 
together,  and  the  feveral  int-erefts  they  have  to  manage  between 
each  other. 

y  VI.  There 


nations. 


Dz  Civ«,  cap.  14.  §  4. 


Natural  Law.  121 

VI.  There  is  no  room  to  queflion  the  reality  and  certainty  of  Certainty 
fuch  a  law  of  nations  obligatory  of  its  own  nature,  and   to   which  o^^'^isuw. 
nations,  or  the  foVcreigns  that  rule  them,  ought  to  fubmit.        For 

if  God,  by  means  of  right  reafon,  iinpofes  certain  duties  between 
individuals,  it  is  evident  he  is  lilcewife  willing  that  nations,  which 
are  only  human  focieiies,  fhould  obfirve  the  fame  duties  between 
themfelves.  * 

VII.  But  in  order  to  fay  fomething  more  particular  concerning  ^  ^^^  . 
this  fubjedt,  letusobferve  that  the  natural  ft:ate  of  nations,  in  ref-  principle 
pe£l  to  each  other,  is  that  of  fociety  and  peace.       This  fociety  is  of  the  law 
lilcewife  a  ftate  of  equality  and   indépendance,  which  eftablifhcs  a  "f  nat'ons; 
parity  of  right  between  them  ;  and  en;îages  them  to  have  the  fame  ^  ^onûftT 
regard  and  refpe6l  for  one  another.     Hence  the  general  principle  in. 

of  the  law  of  nations  is  nothing  more  than  the  general  law  of  (ocia- 
bility,  which  obliges  all  nations,  that  have  any  intercourfe  with  one 
another,  to  praflife  thofe  duties  to  which  individuals  are  naturally 
fubjedl. 

Thefe  remarks  may  (erve  to  give  us  a  juft  idea  of  that  art,  (o 
neceflary  to  the  diredlors  of  ftates,  and  diftinguifhed  commonly  by 
the  name  ot  Polity.  Polity  confidered  with  regard  to  foreign 
Hates,  is  that  ability  and  adJrefs  by  which  a  fovereign  provides 
for  the  prefervation,  fafety,  profperity  and  glory  of  the  nation 
he  govern';,  by  refpeiting  the  laws  of  juflice  and  humanity  ;  that 
is,  without  doing  any  injury  to  other  (tates,  but  rather  by  procur- 
ing their  advantage,  fomuch  as  in  reafon  can  be  expe£led.  Thus 
the  polity  of  fovereigns  is  the  fame  as  prudence  amon.^  private 
people  ;  and  as  we  condemn  in  the  latter  any  art  or  cunning,  that 
makes  them  purfue  their  own  advantage  to  the  prejudice  of  others, 
fo  the  like  art  would  be  cenfurable  in  princes,  vvere  they  bent  upon 
procuring  the  advantage  of  their  own  people  by  injuring  other 
nations.  T'he  Reafon  of  flate^  fo  often  alledged  to  jultify  the  pro- 
ceedings or  enterprifes  of  princes,  cannot  really  be  admitted  for  this 
end,  but  inafmuchas  it  is  reconcileable  with  the  common  intereft 
of  nations,  or,  which  amotmts  to  the  fame  thing,  with  the  unalter- 
able rules  of  fmcerity,  juftice  and  humanity. 

VIII.  Grotius  indeed  acknowledges  that  the  la%v  of  nature  is  inquiry  In* 
common  to  all  nations  ;  yet  he  eftabhlhes  a  pofitive  law  <;f  nations  totirotms's 
contradiftin£l  from   the  law  of  nature  ;  and   reduces  this   law  of  opinion 
nations  to  a  fort  of  human  lav/,  v.'hich  has  acquired  a  power  of  "°"''"'°g 

Q_  obliging  nations. 

f  See  chap.  V,  §  8. 


1  22 


I'he    F  R  I  iN  C  1  P  L  E  s    of 

obliging  in  confL-qucnce  ofthewiMand  confcntofall  or  of  a  great 
many  nations.  *  He  aûd'=,  ihat  the  maxims  of  chis  law  of  nations 
are  proved  by  the  perpetual  practice  of  people,  and  the  teftimoay  of 
hiltorians. 

Hut  it  has  been  juftly  obfervcd  th"at  this  pretended  law  of 
nation?,  coi-.tradiRinit  from  the  law  of  nature,  and  inverted  ncver- 
thelefs  Willi  atorcc  of  obliging,  whether  the  people  confent  to  it 
or  nor,   is  a  fuppofuion  deftitp.te  of  all  i'oundation.  f 

For  I.  All  nations  are  with  regard  to  one  another  in  a  natural 
indépendance  and  equality.  If  there  be  therefore  any  common  lav/ 
between  them,  it  muft  proceed  from  God  their  common  fovercign. 

2.  Aa  for  what  relates  to  cufloms  eftablifhcd  by  an  cxprefs  or 
tacit  confent  among  nations,  thefe  culloms  are  neither  of  them- 
lelves  nor  univerfally,  nor  always  obligatory.  For  from  this  only 
that  feveral  nations  have  adled  towards  one  another  for  a  long 
time  after  a  particular  manner  in  particular  cafes,  it  does  not  fol- 
low that  they  have  laid  themfelves  under  a  neceffity  of  acting 
always  in  ihe  fame  manner  for  the  time  to  coine,  and  much  lefs  that 
other  nations  are  obliged  to  conform  tothofe  cuftoms. 

3.  Again  ;  thofe  cufloms  arc  fo  much  the  lefs  capable  of  being 
an  obligatory  rule  of  themfelves,  as  they  may  happen  to  be  bad  or 
unjiift.  The  proftffion  of  a  corfair  or  pirate  wa?,  by  a  kind  of 
confent,  effeemed  a  long  v.'hile  lawful,  between  nations  that  were 
not  united  by  alliance  or  treaty.  It  feems  likewife,  that  fome  na- 
tions aUowed  themfelves  the  ufe  of  poifoned  arms  in  time  of  war.  + 
Shall  we  fay  that  thcfe  were  cufloms  authoiifed  by  the  law  of  na- 
tions, and  really  obligatory  in  refpeft  to  different  people?  Or  fluill 
we  not  rather  co-nftJer  them  as  barbarous  praiSlices  ;  from  which 
every  juft  and  well-governed  nation  ought  to  refrain  ?  VVe  cannot 
therefore  avoid  appealing  always  to  the  law  of  nature,  the  only  one 
that  is  really  nniverfal,  whenever  we  want  to  judge  whether  the 
cufloms  eflablifhed  between  nations  have  any  obligatory  efFecf. 

4.  All  that  can  be  laid  on  this  fubjcâ  iî,  that  when  cufloms  of 
an  innocent  nature  are  introduced  among  nations  ;  each  of  them  is 
real'onably  fuppofed  to  I'ubmit  to  thofe  cufloms,  lo  long  as  they 
have  not  made  any  declaration  to  the  contrary.  This  is  all  the 
force  or  efFe(5l  that  can  be  given  to  received  cufloms  ;  but  a  very 
different  effefl  from  that  of  a  law  properly  fo  called. 

IX.  Thefc 

*  See  Grotios,  Riglits  of  War  and  Peace  :  preliminary  difcourfe,  §  18.  and 
book  i    cliap.  i    >5  14  . 

t  See  I'ulfiMidorf,  Law  of  Nature  and  Nations,  book  ii.  chap.  iii.  §  23.  with 
Baibeyrac's  notes. 

I  ijco  Virgil,  yiincid)  book  x,  ver.  139,  with  the  15th  not?  of  îhc  Abbts  d'-n 
Fontaine». 


N  A  T  U  R  A  L    L  A  W.  I  2  3^ 

ÎX.  Thefe  remarks  give  us  room  to  conclude,  that  the  whole  Tw"  f""» 
might  perhaps  be  rocoticilec',  by  dillinguilhing  two  Tpccies  of  la'A'S  '^^.^^-^^^l ." 
of  nati  )iis.     There  is  certainly  an    uiiivcrfal,  iiecellary,  and  felt-  „,,.  ç,f  î,^. 
obligatory  law  ol"  nation?,  which  differs  in  nothing  from  the  law  of  cdîity  and 
nature,  and  is  confequently  immutable,  infomuch  that'the  people  or  "'^''g^'Î^T 
fbverdgiis  cannot  difpenfe  with  it,  even  by  common  confent,  with-  J^^^    "^j^  ,^; 
out  trail fgrefrmg  their  duty.     There  i'^,  bchdes,  another  law  of  na-  arbitrary 
tions,  Vv'hich  we  may  call  arbitrary  and  free,  as  founded  only  on  an  and     coa- 
.exprefs  or  tacit  convention  ;  the  cfFeél:  of  which  is   not  of  itfelf  ^«"ntioiul. 
univerfal  ;  being  obligatory  only  in  regard  to  thofe  w!io  have  voU 
.untarily  fubmittcd  thereto,  and  only  fo  long  as  they  pleafe,  becaufe 
thev  are  always  at  liberty  to  change  or  repeal  it,     'f'o  wiiich  we 
muiî  likewife  add,  that  the  whole  force  of  this  fort  of  law  of  n-ations 
ultimately  depends  on   the  law  of  nature,  which  commands  us  to 
be  true  to  our  engagements.     Whatever  really  belongs  to  the  lav^r 
of  nations,  may  be  reduced  to  one  or  other  of  thefc  two  fpecies, 
and  the  ufe  of  this  diftin^^lion  will  eafily  appear  by  applying  it  to 
particular  queltions   which  relate   either  to  war,  for  example,  to 
ambafTadors,  or  to  public  treaties,  and  to  the  deciding  of  diujutes 
which  fometimes  arife  concerning  thefe  matters  betv/een  fover-  . 
eigns.  * 

X.  It  is  a  point  of  importance  to  attend  to  the  origin  aijd  nic 
ture  of  the  law  of  nations,  fuch  as  we  have  now  explained  them.  f^)'^..ro;n,-^ 

('!■  icniaik:.. 
r  ■  — — — — ^— — — — — —  • 

*  Let  us  rerrark  Ji:re  by  the  way,  that  the  ideas  of  the  ancient  Roman  I.tw- 
yer9  concerning  the  law  of  nations  are  not  always  uniform  ;  wliich  cre;;tes 
fome  confiifion.  Some  there  are  that  onderftand  by  the  law  or  NATioNa 
ihofe  rules  of  right  that  are  common  to  all  mea,  and  eftablifhed  amongft  theni- 
felvi;s  purfuant  to  the  li;^ht  of  reafon  ;  in  oppofition  to  the  jiaiticiilar  laws  of 
each  peop'e.  (Seethe  9.  h  IdW  in  the  Digeft.  dcjuilitii  Sc  Jure, hook  I.  tit.  1.) 
And  then  the  law  of  nitions  llgnificd  alfo  the  law  of  nature.  Others  diftiu- 
guifhcd  between  thefe  two  fpecies,  as  Ulpianlvùs  done  in  law  I.  of  the  title  novv 
mentioned.  They  gave  the  name  of /j'U' o/'nj//c>/7/ to  tijac  which  agrees  witli 
man  as  fuch;  In  oppofuion  to  that  which  fuits  him  as  an  animal.  (See  Pujfct- 
dcrf,  Law  of  Nature  and  Nations,  book  2.  chaj).  3.  §  3.  note  10.)  Some,  in 
fine,  comprifed  the  one  nnd  the  other  under  the  idea  of  luiturid latv,  (.See  hvi' 
XI.  Digefl  de  Juftitia  <fk  Jure.)  And  hence  it  comes,  that  the  better  fort  of 
Latin  writers  give  indifFerently  the  name  cf  natural  law,  or  the  law  of  uation>, 
to  that  which  relates  to  either.  This  wc  lind  in  the  following  palTrge  of  Ciiero, 
where  he  fays,  that  by  th:  liw  of  nature,  that  is,  by  the  law  of  nations,  one  man 
is  not  allowed  to  purfue  his  advantage  at  the  expenfe  of  another.     JtJeque  vero 

hoc  folum  NATOiiA,  id  eil,  jURt  geni  ium conftitutuui  eft,  ut  non  lice-it 

fui  comniodi  caufa,  aUtri  noc;re  De  OfHc.  lib,  3  cap.  5.  Se<j  Mr  Noodt's 
eomaieiit.iry  on  the  J^igcft.  book  i.  lit.  1.  where  this  able  lawyer  explains  very 
well  the  ambiguity  of  the  diflindlion  of  natural  law,  and  the  law  ol  nations  a,;  • 
xcrding  to  the  d:fterer,t  Lnguage  of  ancient  cWiliaus. 


1 24  n^e  Principles   oj 

For  befiJes  that  it  is  always  advantageous  to  form  juft  ic'tas  cf 
things,thisis  (till  mcreneccflary  in  matters  of  pr^étice  and  morality. 
It  is  owing  perhaps  to  our  di{l:inguifl-,ing  the  law  pf  nations  from 
natural  law,  that  we  have  infenfibly  accultomed  ourftlves  to  form 
quite  a  different  judgment  between  the  aétions  of  fovereigns  and 
thofc  of  private  people.  Nothing  is  more  ufual  than  to  fee  men 
condemned  in  common,  for  things  which  we  praife,  or  at  leaft  ex- 
cufe  in  the  perfons  of  princes.  And  yet  it  is  certain,  as  we  have 
already  fliewn,  that  the  maxims  of  the  law  of  nations  have  an  equal 
authority  with  thofe  of  the  law  of  nature,  and  are  equally  rcfpeéla- 
ble  and  facred,  becaufe  they  have  God  alike  for  their  author.  In 
fliort,  there  is  only  one  fole  and  the  fame  rule  of  jufticefor  all  man- 
kind. Princes  who  infringe  the  law  of  nations,  commit  as  great 
a  crime  as  private  people,  who  violate  the  law  of  nature  :  and  if 
there  be  any  difference  in  the  two  cafes,  it  muft  be  charged  to  the 
prince's  account,*  whofe  unjult  allions  are  always  attended  with 
more  dreadful  confequences  than  thofe  of  private  people,  f 


CHAP.     VII. 

Whether  there  is  any  morality  of  notions,  any  obligation  or  duty^ 
ANTECEDENT  TO  THE  LAWS  OF  NATURE,  ayid  independent  if 
the  idea  of  a  legiflator  ? 

DifTcrent      ^'    '  I  "^ 

opinions  of  j[   HE  morality  of  human  a(Stions  being  founded  in  general, 

^ers"^  whh  ""  ■^'^*"  relations  of  agreeablenefs  or  difagrecablenefs  between  thofe 
reipeft  to  '"-^'^'"'^  anfl  the  law,  according  as  we  have  (hewn  in  the  eleventh 
the  fird  chapter  of  the  firfl  part  ;  there  is  no  difficulty,  when  once  we 
principle  of  acbv.wledge  the  laws  of  nature,  to  affirm,  that  the  morality  of 
lora  UY-    actions  dej^ends  on  their  conformity  or  oppofition  to  thofe  very 

laws. 

*  See  part  i    chap    >i   §  la. 

f  It  is  Monfiecir  Bernard, that  furniflies  us  with  thofe  refleflions  :  if  a-  private 
p?rfi^n  f.iys  be,  offends  without  caufe  a  perfon  of  the  fame  ftation  his  atflion  is 
termed  an  injudice  ;  but  if  a  prince  attacks  another  prince  without  caufe,  if  he 
invades  his  ttrritr rlcs,  and  ravages  his  towns  and  provinces,  ihisiscaled  waging 
war,  and  it  would  ht  temerity  to  think  it  juft.  To  break  or  violate  contradls 
er  agreements,  is  eficenied  a  crime  among  private  people  :  hut  among  princes, 
to  infringe  the  mod  folemn  treaties,  is  prudence,  is  uiidcrftanding  the  art  of  gov- 
ernment. True  it  is,  that  fome  pretett  is  always  fought  for.  but  thofe  who 
trump  up  thcfe  pretexts  give  thcmfelves  very  little  trouble  whether  they  are 
thought  jufl  or  notj  &:.  Nouvelles ^  de  L  republique  Jes  lettres  Alars  l'^04  page 
340,  341- 


NaturalLaw.  125 

laws.  This  is  a  point  on  which  all  civilians  and  ethic  writers  are 
agreed.  But  they  are  not  fo  unanimous  in  regard  to  the  firft 
principle  or  original  caufe  of  obligation  and  morality. 
,.  A  great  many  are  of  opinion,  that  there  is  no  other  principle  of 
morality  but  the  divine  will,  manifefted  by  the  laws  of  nature. 
The  idea  of  morality^  they  fay,  neceflarily  includes  that  of  obliga- 
tion ;  obligition  fuppcfes  law  ;  and  law  a  legiflator.  If  therefore  v/e 
abflraél  from  all  l:iw,  and  confcquently  from  a  legiflator,  we  (laall 
have  no  fuch  thing  as  rigîit,  obligation,  duty,  or  morality,  proper- 
ly fo  called.  * 

Others  there  are,  who  acknowledge  indeed  that  the  divine  will  is 
really  a  principle  of  obligation,  and  confcquently  a  principle  of  the 
morality  of  human  a£lions  ;  but  they  do  not  (top  here.  They 
pretend,  that  antecedent  to  all  law,  and  independent  of  a  legiflator, 
there  are  things  which  of  thetnfclves,  and  by  their  own  nature,  are 
honefl:  ordiflîoneft;  that  reafon  having  once  difcovered  this  eflfen- 
tial  and  fpecific  difference  of  human  aélions,  it  impofes  on  man 
a  necellity  of  performing  the  one  and  omitting  the  other  ;  and  that 
this  is  the  firft  foundation  of  obligation,  or  the  original  fource  of 
morality  and  duty. 

II.  What  we  have  al ready  faid  concerning  the  primitive  rule  of  ^^'"f'P'^ 
human  adions,  and  the  nature  and  origin  of  obligation,  f  may  help  ^^j^  'q^g^ 
to  throw  feme  light  on  the  prefcnt  queftion.     But  in  order  to  illuf-  tioa- 
trate  it  better,  let  us  turn  back  and  refume  the  thing  from  its  firft 
principles,  by  endeavouring  to  aflemble  here,  in  a  natural  order,  the 
principal  ideas  that  may  lead  us  to  a  juftconclufion. 

1.  I  obferve  in  the  firft  place,  that  every  aftion,  confidered 
purely  and  fimply  in  itfelf  as  a  natural  motion  of  the  mind  or  body, 
is  abfolutcly  indiflFcrent,  and  cannot  in  this  refpe£l  claim  any  fhare 
of  morality. 

This  is  what  evidently  appears  ;  forafmuch  as  the  fame  natural 
a£lion  isefteemeJ  fomeiimes  lawful  and  even  good,  and  at  other 
times  unlawful  or  bad.  To  Icil!  a  man,  for  inftance,  is  a  bad  ac- 
tion in  a  robber  ;  but  it  is  lawful  or  good  in  an  executioner,  or  in  a 
citizen  or  foUlicr  that  defends  1.  :.  life  or  country,  unjuftly  attacked  : 
a  plain  demonftration,  that  this  aflion  confidered  in  itfelf,  and  as  a 
fimple  operation  of  the  natural  faculties,  is  abfolutely^  indifferent 
and  deflitute  of  all  morality. 

2.  We  muft  take  care  to  diftinguifh  here  between  the  phyfical 
and  moral  confideration.     There  is  undoubtedly  a  kind  of  natural 

goodntfs 

•  Sea  FufTendorf,  Law  of  Nature  and  Nations,  book  i.  chap.  ii.  §  6. 
f  S-c  part  i.  chap,  v.  and  vi. 


12  6  7&  Principles  cf 

goodnefs  or  malignity  in  a(S^ion^,  which  by  their  own  proper  and 
internal  virtue  are  beni-ficial  or  hurtful,  and  produce  the  phyfical 
good  or  evil  of  man.  But  this  relation  between  tlie  action  and  its 
cffedl  is  only  phyfical  ;  and  if  we  flop  here,  we  are  not  yet  arrived 
at  morality.  It  is  pity  we  are  frequently  obliged  to  ufe  the  fame 
expreflions  for  the  phyfical  and  moral  ideas,  which  is  apt  to  create 
fome  confufion.  It  were  to  be  wifhed  that  languages  had  a  great- 
er exa6lnefs  indiftinguifhing  the  nature  and  diiFcrent  relati-ons  of 
things  by  different  names. 

3.  If  we  proceed  further,  and  fuppofe  that  there  is  lome  rule 
oi  human  aâions,  and  compare  afterwards  thefe  anions  to  the  rule  j 
the  relation  refulting  from  this  comparifon  is  what  properly  and 
cflcntially  conftiîutes  morality.  * 

4.  From  thence  it  follows,  that  in  orde-r  to  know  which  is  thç 
principal  or  efficient  caufe  of  the  morality  of  human  anions,  we 
muft  previoufly  be  acquainted  with  their  rule. 

5.  Finally  let  us  add,  that  this  rule  of  human  acilions  may  in 
general  be  of  two  forts,  either  internal  or  external  ;  that  is,  it  may 
be  either  found  in  man  himfelf,  or  it  niu(t  be  fought  for  I'omewhtre 
clfe.     Let  us  now  make  an  application  of  thefe  principles. 

Three  III.  We  have  already  feen  f  that  man  fi.ids  within  himfelf  fev- 

rules      of  gf  j|  principles  to  difcern  good  from  evil,  and  that  thefe  principles 
uman  ac-  ^^^  ^^  many  rules  of  his  conduit.     The  fîrfl  dircdlive  principle  we 
1.  Moral    find  within  ourfelvcs  is  a  kind  of  inftin<5l,  commonly"  called  moral 
lenfe.  fenfe  ;  which  pointing  out  readily,  though  confufedly  and  without 

*•  .^"^^'?'  refleflion,  the  mod  fenfible  and  moft  ftriking  part  of  the  difference 
vncwill/"  between  good  and  evil,   makes  us  love  the  one,  and  gives  us  an 
averfion  for  the  other,  by  a  kind  of  natural  fentiment. 

The  fécond  principle  is  reafon,  or  the  refle(5lion  u'e  make  on 
the  nature,  relations,  and  confequences  of  things;  which  give  usa 
morediftin6l  knowledge,  by  principles  and  rule?,  of  the  diftinftion 
between  good  and  evil  in  all  pofTible  cafes. 

But  to  thefe  two  internal  principles  we  muft  join  3  third,  namely, 
the  divine  will.  For  man  being  the  handy  work  cf  God,  and  de- 
riving from  the  Creator  his  exift(^."e,  his  reafon,  and  all  his  facul- 
ties ;  he  finds  himfelf  thereby  in  an  abfolute  dépendance  on  that 
fupreme  being,  and  cannot  help  acknowledging^  him  as  his  lord  and 
fovereign.  Therefore,  as  foon  as  he  is  acquainted  with  the  inten- 
tion of  God  in  regard  to  his  creature,    this  will  of  his  mafter  b.-- 

comes 

•  Sec  part  i.  chap.  xi.  §  I. 

f  Part  i.  cliap.  v,  &  part  ii    chip  iii. 


Natural     Law.  127 

CDmes  his  fupreme  rule,  and  ought   abfolutely  to  determine  his 

condu(5V. 

I V.  Let  us  not  feparate  thefe  three  principles.    They  are  indeed  jy^^ç^ 
diflinc^  from   one  another,  and  have  each  their  particular  force;  three  prin- 
but  in  the  a6lual  ftate  of  man  they  are  necelTarily  united.        It  is  ciples 
lenfe  that  gives  us  the  firii-  notice  ;    our  reafon  adds  more  light  ;  ought  to  be 
.^iid  the  will  of  Cod,  who  is  rtiflitude  itfelf,  gives  it  a  new  degree  "°*"^  ' 

of  certainty;  adding  withal  the  weight  of  his  authority.  It  is  on 
:ill  thefe  foundations  united,  we  ought  to  raife  the  edifice  of  natural 
law,  or  the  fyflem  of  morality. 

Hence  it  follows,  that  man  being  a  creature  of  God,  formed 
with  defigri  and  wiidom,  and  endowed  with  fenfe  and  reafon  ;  the 
rule  of  human  adtion»^  or  the  true  foundation  of  morality,  is  prop- 
erly the  will  of  the  fupreme  being,  m?.nifefted  and  interpreted, 
either  by  moral  fenfe  or  by  rea{()n.  Thefe  two  natural  means,  by 
teaching  us  to  diitingui{h  the  relation  which  human  actions  have 
to  our  conftitution,  or  which  is  the  fame  thing,  to  the  ends  of  the 
Creator,  inform  us  what  is  morally  good  or  evil,  honefl  or  diûion- 
cft,  commanded  or  forbidden. 

V.  It  is  already  a  great  matter  to  feel  and   to  know   good  and  ofti,epj.j, 
evil  ;  but  this  is  not  enough  :  we  mart:  likewife  join  to  this  fenfe  niitive 
and  knowlcd2;e,  an  obli^'acion  ofdoino-   the  one,  and   abftainine  caufe      of 
from  tlie other.     It  is  this  obligation  that  conftitutes  duty,  without  obligation, 
which  there  would  be  no  moral  praftice,  but  the  whole  would  ter- 
minate in  mere  fpeculation.  .  But  which  is  the  caufe  and  principle 

of  obligation  and  duty  ?  Is  it  the  very  nature  of  things  difcovered 
by  reafon  ?  Or  is  it  the  divine  will  ?  This  is  what  we  muft  en- 
deavour here  to  determine. 

VI.  The  firft  rcflecSlion  that  occurs  to  us  here,  and  to  which     .. 
very  few,  methinks,  are  fufficiently  attentive,   is,  that  every  rule  g^e  of 
whatfoever  of  human  a£lions,  carries  with  it  a  moral  neceflity    of  themfelves 
conforming  th  reto,  and  produces  confequently   a   fort  of  obliga-  «bligatory. 
tion.     Lit  us  illuftrate  this  remark. 

The  general  notion  of  rule  prefents  us  with  the  idea  of  a  fure 
and  expeditious  method  to  attain  a  particular  end.  Every  rule 
fuppofes  therefore  a  defisn,  or  the  will  ofattaining  to  a  certain  end, 
as  the  efFeft  we  want  to  produce,  or  the  objetSt  we  intend  to  pro- 
cure. And  it  is  perfe<5ily  evident,  that  were  a  perfon  to  z6i  mere- 
ly for  the  fake  of  aâing,  v/ithout  any  particular  defign  or  determi- 
nate end  j  hç  ought  not  to  trouble  his  head  about  dire<5ling  his  ac-  • 

tiens 


1 28  7^^  Principles  of 

lions  one  way  more  than  another  ;  he  (hould  never  mind  either 
counfel  or  rule.  This  being  premifcd,  I  affirm  that  every  man  who 
propofis  tohimfelfa  particular  end,  and  knows  the  means  or  rule 
which  alone  can  conduit  him  to  it,  and  put  him  inptfTcfiion  cf 
what  he  defires,  fuch  a  man  finds  himfelf  under  a  neceffity  of  fol- 
lowing this  rule,  and  of  conformins;  his  aillions  to  it.  Otherwife 
he  would  contradi(fl  himfelf;  he  would  and  he  would  not  ;  he  would 
defirethe  end,  and  ncgledl  the  only  means  which  by  his  ov/n  con- 
feflion  are  able  to  conduct  him  to  it.  Hence  1  conclude,  that 
every  rule  acknowledged  as  (uch,  that  is,  as  a  fure  and  only  means 
of  attaining  the  end  propofed,  carries  with  it  a  fort  of  obligation  of 
being  thereby  direJled.  For  fo  foon  as  there  is  a  rcafonable  neceJpAy 
to  prefer  one  manner  ofa£ting  to  another,  every  rcafonable  man, 
and  who  intends  to  behave  as  fuch,  finds  himfelf  thereby  engaged 
and  tied,  as  it  were,  to  this  manner,  being  hindered  by  his  reafon 
from  acting  to  the  contrary.  That  is,  in  other  terms,  he  is  really 
obliged  ;  becaufe  obligation,  in  its  original  idea,  is  nothing  mca^e 
than  a  reftriclion  of  liberty,  produced  by  reafon,  inafniuch  as  the 
counfels  which  reafon  gives  us,  are  motives  that  determine  us  to  a 
particular  manner  of  aéling,  preferable  to  any  other.  It  is  there- 
fore true,  that  all  rules  are  obligatory. 

Otligation      VII.  This  obligation,  indeed,  may  be  more  orlefs  ft rong,  moTC 
ftiay  be      or  lefs  ftriéï,  according  as  the  reafons  on  which  it  is  founded  are 
??^^  ^^     more  or  lefs  numerous,  and  have  more  or  lefs  power  and  efficacy 
of  themfelves  to  determine  the  will. 

If  a  particular  manner  of  aâing  appears  to  me  evidently  fitter 
than  any  other  for  my  prefervation  and  pcrledtion,  fitter  to  procure 
my  bodily  health  and  the  welfare  of  my  foul;  this  motive  alone 
obliges  me  to  aci  in  confornnitv  to  it  :  And  thns  we  have  the  flrfl 
degree  of  obligation.  If  I  find  after%vard«,  that  befides  the  advan- 
tage now  mentioned,  fuch  a  condudl  will  fecure  the  refpedt  and 
approbation  of  thofe  with  whom  I  converfe  ;  this  is  a  new  motive 
which  flrengthens  the  preceding  obligation,  and  adds  ftill  more  to 
my  engagement.  But  if,  by  puflaing  my  reflections  flill  farther, 
I  find  at  length  that  this  manner  of  ading  is  perf^iSlly  agreeable  to 
the  intention  of  my  Creator,  who  is  willing  and  intends  I  fhould 
follow  the  counfels  which  reafon  gives  me,  as  fomany  real  laws  he 
prcfcribes  to  me  himfelf  ;  it  is  vifible,  that  this  new  confideration 
ftrengthens  my  engagement,  ties  the  knot  ftill  falkr,  and  lays  me 
under  an  indifpenfible  neceiTity  ofading  after  fuch  or  fuch  a  man- 
ner. Fot  what  is  there  more  proper  to  determine  finally  a  rational 
being,  than  the  aflurancehe  has  cf  procuxing  the  approbation  and 

benevoknce 


Natural    Law.  129 

benevolence  of  his  fuperior,  by  afling  in  conformity  to  his  will  and 
orders  ;  and  of  efcaping  his  indignation,  which  rauft  infallibly 
purfue  a  rebellious  creature. 

VIII.  Let  us  follow  now  the  thread  of  the  confequences  arifing  Rcafon  a- 
from  thefe  principles.  lone  is  fuf- 

If  it  be  true,  that  every  rule  is  of  Itfelf  obligatory,  and  that  fi"<="'     " 
reafon  is  the  primitive  rule  of   human   allions  ;    it  follows,  that  ^'^^^^  ^i^jj. 
reafon  only,  independent  of  the  law,  is  fufficient  to  impofc  fome  gaiion    oa 
obligation  on  man,  and  confcquently  to  furnifti  room  for  morality  man. 
and  duty,  commendation  and  cenfure. 

There  will  remain  no  manner  of  doubt  on  this  fubje£l,  ifab- 
ftracling  for  a  moment  from  fuperiority  and  law,  we  examine  at 
firft  the  (late  of  mnn  alone,  confidered  merely  as  a  rational  being. 
Man  propofes  to  himfelf  his  own  good,  that  is,  the  welfare  of  his 
body  and  foul.  He  fearches  afterwards  for  the  means  of  procuring 
thofe  advantages  ;  and  fo  foon  as  he  has  dilcovered  them,  he 
approves  of  fome  particular  a6tions,  and  condemns  others  ;  and 
confequently  he  approves  or  condemns  himfelf,  according  as  he 
a£ls  after  a  manner  conformable  oroppofite  to  the  dictates  of  his 
reafon.  Does  not  all  this  evidently  demonftrate,  that  reafon  puts  a 
reftraint  on  liberty,  and  lays  us  therefore  under  an  obligation  of 
doing  or  abftaining  from  particular  things  ? 

Let  us  proceed.  Suppofe  that  man  in  the  fore-mentioned  ftate 
becomes  the  father  of  a  family,  and  has  a  mind  to  aft  reafonably  ; 
would  it  be  an  indifferent  thing  to  him,  to  take  care  of,  or  to  ncg- 
le(5lhis  children,  to  provide  for  their  fubfiftence  and  education,  or 
to  do  neither  one  nor  the  other  r  Is  it  not,  on  the  contrary,  evi- 
dent, that  as  this  different  condu£l  neceflarily  procures  either  the 
good  or  evil  of  his  family  ;  the  approbation  or  cenfure  which  rea- 
fon gives  it,  renders  it  morally  good  or  bad,  worthy  of  praife  or 
blame  ? 

It  would  be  an  eafy  matter  to  purfue  this  way  of  arguing,  and 
apply  it  to  all  the  dates  of  man.  But  what  we  have  already  faid, 
lliew  it  is  fufficient  to  confider  man  a5  a  rational  beins,  to  be  con- 
vinced that  reafon  pointing  out  the  road  which  alone  can  lead 
him  to  the  end  he  aims  at,  lays  him  under  a  neceffity  of  following 
this  road,  and  of  regulating  thereby  his  conduft  :  that  confequently 
reafon  alone  is  fufficient  to  eftablifh  afyftem  of  morality,  obliga- 
tion, and  duties  ;  becaufe  when  once  we  fuppole  it  is  reafonable 
to  do  or  to  abflain  from  certain  thing"^,  this  is  really  owning  our 
obligation. 

R  IX,  "  But 


1 30  "The  Principles  oj 

Ohjeftion.  IX.  "  But  the  idea  of  obligation,  feme  will  fay,  imports  nccef- 
^â°^obllo-  *'  ^^'^''^  ^  '^^'"^  ^'^^^  obliges  and  who  ought  to  be  diftinft  from 
lumfdf.°  *'  *^^  pcrfon  obliged.  To  fuppofe  that  he  v^ho  obliges,  and  he 
*'  who  is  obliged.are  one  and  the  fame  perfon,  is  fuppofingthata  man 
*'  may  make  a  contracl:  wiih  hiaifeU  ;  which  is  quite  abfurd. 
"  Right  reafon  is,  in  reality,  nothing  but  an  attribute  of  the  per- 
"  fon  obliged  ;  it  cannot  be  therefore  a  principle  of  obligation  j 
**  nobody  being  capable  ofimpofing  on  himfelf  an  indifpcnfible 
"  necedity  of  adling  or  not  acting  after  fuc h  or  fuch  a  manner. 
*'  For  fuppollng  a  neceffity,  it  mult  not  be  removeable  at  the  will 
*'  and  plcafure  of  the  perfon  fubje£l  to  it  ;  otherwife  it  would  be 
**  void  of  efFeiSV.  If  therefore  the  perfon  on  whom  the  obligation 
''  is  impofed,  is  the  fame  as  he  who  impofes  it,  he  can  difengage 
*'  himfelf  from  it  whenever  he  pleafes  ;  or  rather,  there  is  no  ob- 
"  ligation  ;  as  when  a  debtor  inherits  the  cltate  and  rights  of  his 
"  creditor,  the  debt  is  void.  Now  duty  is  a  debt,  and  neither  of 
"  them  can  be  admitted  but  between  different  perfons."  * 

Aiiiwer.  ■^*  This  obje£^ion  is  more  fpecious  than  folid.  In  fa£t,  thofc 
who  pretend  that  there  is  properly  neither  obligation  nor  morality 
without  a  fuperior  and  law,  ought  nccefTariiy  t)  fuppofe  one  of 
thefc  twothiiîgs  :  i.  either  that  there  is  no  other  rule  of  human 
actions  befidcs  law  :  2.  or  if  there  be  any  other,  none  but  law  is 
an  obligatory  rule. 

The  fîrft  of  thcfe  fuppofitions  is  evidently  unfupportable  :  and 
after  all  that  has  been  faid  concerning  this  fubjeit,  we  think  it 
quite  ufelefs  to  (top  here  to  refute  it.  Either  reafcm  has  been  idly 
and  without  a  defign  beftowed  upon  man,  or  we  muft  allow  it  to 
be  the  gcnj'.al  and  primitive  rule  ofhisa£tionsand  conduft.  And 
what  is  there  more  natural  than  to  think  that  a  rational  being  ought 
to  be  directed  by  reafon  r  If  we  fhould  endeavour  to  evade  this 
argument,  by  faying,  that  though  reafon  be  the  rule  of  human  ac- 
tions, yet  there  is  nothing  but  law  that  can  be  an  obligatory  rule  ; 
this  propofition  cannot  be  maintained,  unlefs  we  confent  to  give 
the  name  of  obligation  to  fome  other  rcftriftion  of  liberty,  as  well 
as  to  that  which  is  produced  by  the  will  and  order  of  a  fuperior  ; 
and  then  it  would  be  a  mere  difpute  about  words.  Or  elfe  we 
muft  fuppofe,  that  there  neither  actually  is,  nor  can  even  be  con- 
ceived, any  obligation  at  all,  without  the  intervention  of  the  will 
of  a  fuperior  ;  which  is  far  from  being  exadtly  true. 

The 

"  Nemo    fihi  debet  (fays  Seneca  dt    Line/,    lib,  J.  cap,  %.j   hoc  Verbum  Mift 
ran  habst  iiifi  inter  duos  locum. 


N  A  T  U  R  A  L    L  A  \V.  I  3  I 

The  foLirce  of  the  whole  miflake,  or  the  caufe  of  the  ambiguity, 
is  our  not  afcenc'ing  to  tlie  firft  principlef,  in  order  to  determine 
Ihe  original  idea  of  obligation.  We  have  already  faid,  and  again 
wc  fay  it,  that  every  reltriéVion  of  liberty,  produced  or  approved 
by  right  reafon,  farms  a  real  obligation.  That  which  properly 
*nd  formally  obliges,  is  thj  diiSlate  of  our  confcience,  or  the  inter- 
nal judgment  we  pafs  on  fuch  or  fuch  a  rule,  the  obfervancc  where- 
of appears  -to  us  juir,  that  is,  coniurmable  to  the  light  of  right 
reafon. 

XI.  "  But  does  not  this  manner  of  reafoning,  fome  will  reply,  a  /  «, 

"  contradict  the  cleareff   notions,  and  fubvert  the  ideas  generally  obi^aion. 

"  received,  which  make  obligation  and  duty  depend  on  the  inter- 

"  vention  of  a   fuperior,  whofe  will  manifefts  itfelf  by  the  law  ? 

"  What  fort  of  thing  is  an  obligation  impofed  by  reafon,  or  whic.h 

*'  a  man  impofeth  upon  hiiiifelf  ?     Cannot  he  alv/ays  get  lid  of 

"  it,  when  he  has  a  mind  ;  and  if  the  creditor  and  debtor,  as  we 

"  have  already  obferved,    be  one  and  the    fame  perfnn,  can  it  be 

*•  properly  laid  that  there  is  any  fuch  thing  as  a  debt  ?" 

This  reply  is  grounded  on  an  ambiguity,  or  fuppofcs  the  thing  Anfwer. 
in  queilion.  It  fuppofes  all  along,  that  there  neithe;:  is,  nor  can 
be,  any  other  obligation,  but  that  which  proceeds  from  a  fuperior 
or  law.  I  agree,  that  fuch  is  the  common  language  of  civilians  ; 
but  this  makes  no  manner  of  alteration  in  the  nature  of  the  thing. 
What  comes  afterwards  proves  nothing  at  all.  It  is  true  that  man 
may,  if  he  has  a  mind,  withdraw  himfclf  from  the  obligations 
vvhich  reafun  impofes  on  him  ;  but  if  he  does,  it  is  at  his  peril,  and 
he  is  forced  himfelf  to  acknowledge,  that  fuch  a  conduit  is  quite 
unreafonable.  But  to  conclude  from  thence  that  reafon  alone 
cannot  oblige  us,  is  going  too  far  ;  becaufe  this  confequence 
would  equally  invalidate  the  obligation  impofed  by  a  fuperior. 
For,  in  fine,  the  obligation  produced  by  law  is  not  fubverfive  of 
liberty  ;  we  have  always  a  power  to  fubmit  to  it  or  not,  and  run 
the  hazard  of  the  confequence.  In  iliort,  thequeftion  is  not  con- 
cerning force  or  conftraint,  it  is  only  in  relation  to  a  moral  tic, 
v.'hich  in  what  manner  foever  it  be  confidercd,  is  always  the  work 
of  reafon. 

XII.  True  it  is,  that  duty,  purfuant  to  its  proper  and  ftri£l  Dury  may 
fignification,  is  a  debt  ;  and  that  when  we  confider  it  thus,  it  pre-  '^'^  ^'''-'^n  i'» 
fents  the  idea  of  an  adtion  which  fomebody  has  a  right  to  require  Qj.j^  r^^r^ 
of  us.     I  agree  likewifc,  that  this  manner  of  confidering  duty    is 

juft  in  itf.'lf.     Man  conflitutes  part  of  a  fyfiem,  or  whole  ;  in 

coiifoquencG 


132  1%e  Principles  of 

confequence  whereof  he  has  nccefTary  relations  to  other  beings; 
anil  t.ie  anions  of  man  viewed  in  this  light,  having  always  fome 
relation  to  another  perfon,  the  idea  of  duty,  commonly  fpeaking, 
includes  this  relation.  And  yet,  as  it  irequently  happens  in 
morality,  that  we  give  fometimes  a  more  extenfive,  and  at  other 
times  a  more  limited  fenfe  to  the  fame  term,  nothing  hinders  us 
from  befiowing  the  more  ample  fignification  on  the  word  duty^  by 
taking  it  in  general  for  an  aâion  conformable  to  right  reafon. 
And  then,  it  may  be  very  well  faid,  that  man,  confidcred  even 
alone,  and  as  a  fcparate  being,  has  particular  duties  to  fulfil.  It 
is  fufvicient  for  this  end,  that  there  be  fome  aidions  which  reafon 
approves,  and  others  which  it  condemns.  Thefe  different  ideas 
have  nothing  in  them  that  is  oppofite  ;  on  the  contrary,  they  are 
perfeflly  reconciled,  and  receive  mutual  ftrength  and  afTiftance 
irom  each  other. 

Refult    of      XIII.  The  refult  of  what  we  have  been  now   faying,  is  as 

what      has  follows. 

erwfaid  I .  Reafon  being  the  firft  rule  of  man,  it  is  alfo  the  firft  principle 

of  morality,  and  the  immediate  caufe  of  all  primitive  obligation. 
2.  Man  being,  by  bis  nature  and  ftate,  in  a  necefTary  dépendance 
on  the  Creator,  who  has  formed  him  with  defign  and  wifdom,  and 
propnfed  (ome  particular  views  to  himfelf  in  creating  him;  the 
will  of  God  is  another  rule  of  human  aâions^  another  principle  of 
moralit»',  obligation,  and  duty. 

-.  .  3.  We  may  therefore  fay,  there  are  in  general  two  forts  of  mor- 

ality or  obligation;  one  antecedent  to  the  law,  and  the  work  of 
reafon;  the  oiher  fubfcquent  to  the  law,  and  properly  the  effc<£l 
thereof;  it  is  on  this  that  the  forementioncd  diftinâion  of  internal 
and  external  obligation  is  founded,*^ 

4.  True  it  is,  that  thofe  different  fpecies  of  obligation  have  not 
dl  tae  fame  force.  That  which  arifes  from  the  law,  is  without 
doubt  the  moft  perfeifl  ;  it  lays  the  flrongeft  reftriflion  on  liberty, 
and  merits  therefore  the  name  of  obligation  by  wav  cf  preference. 
But  v.'e  muft  not  from  thence  infer  that  it  is  the  only  one,  and  that 
there  can  be  none  of  any  other  kind.  One  obligation  may  be  real, 
though  it  be  different  from,  and  even  weaker  than  another. 

5.  It  is  fo  riiuch  the  more  necefTary  toadmit  thefe  two  forts  of 
obligation  and  morality,   as  thatuhich  renders  the  obligation  of 
lavv  the  mofl:  perfeâ,  isitsuniting  the  two  fpecies  ;  being  internal 
and  external  both  at  the  fame  time,  f     For  were  there  no  atten- 
tion 

•  Zit  part  i.  chap.  vi.  §  13.  f  See  part  i.  ch^p.  ii,  §  i*. 


NaturalLaw.  133 

tlon  given  to  the  very  nature  of  ilic  laws,  and  were  the  things  they 
command  or  prohibit,  not  to  merit  the  approbation  or  cenlure  of 
reafon  ;  the  authority  of  the  legiflntor  would  have  no  other  foun- 
dation but  that  of  power  ;  and  laws  being  then  no  more  than  the 
efFcci:  of  an  arbitrary  will,  they  would  produce  rather  a  conflraint, 
properly  fo  called,  than  any  real  obligation. 

Thefe  remarks  are  efpecially,  and  in  the  exa(fleft  manner, 
applicable  to  the  laws  of  nature.  The  obligation  thefe  produce 
is  of  all  others  the  moll  efficacious  and  exteniive  ;  becaufe,  on  one 
fide,  the  dirpofuion  ofthcfe  laws  is  in  itfelf  very  reafonable,  being 
founded  on  the  nature  of  the  anions,  their  fpecific  differences,  and 
the  relation  or  oppofition  they  have  to  particular  ends.  On  the 
other  fuie,  the  divine  authority,  which  enjoins  us  to  obferve  thefe 
rules  as  laws  he  prefcribes  to  us,  adds  a  new  force  to  the  obligation 
they  produce  of  themfelves,  and  lays  us  under  an  indifpenfiblc 
necefliry  of  conforming  our  anions  to  them. 

7.  From  thefe  remarks  it  follows,  that  thofe  two  ways  of  eflab- 
lifhing  morality,  whereof  one  fets  up  reafon  and  the  other  the  will 
of  God  for  its  principle, ought  not  to  be  placed  in  oppofition,  as 
tvi'o  incompatible  fyftems,  neither  of  which  can  fubfifl:  without 
deflroying  or  excluding  the  other.-  On  the  contrary,  we  fhould  join 
thefe  two  methods,  and  unite  the  two  principles,  in  order  to  have  a 
complete  fyftem  of  morality,  really  founded  on  »he  nature  and  (late 
of  man.  For  man,  as  a  rational  being,  is  fubje£t  to  reafon  ;  and 
as  a  creature  of  God,  to  the  will  of  the  fupreme  Being.  As  thefe  . 
two  qualities  have  nothing  oppofiteor  incompatible  in  their  nature, 
confequently  thefe  two  rules,  reafon  and  the  divine  will,  are  per- 
fedlly  reconciled  ;  they  are  even  naturally  connedted,  and  ftrength- 
ened  by  their  jundion.  And  indeed  it  could  not  be  othervvife  : 
for,  in  fine,  God  himfelf  is  the  author  of  the  nature  and  mutual 
relations  of  things  ;  and  particularly  of  the  nature  of  man,  of  his 
conditution,  ftate,  reafon,  and  faculties  :  the  v/hole  is  the  work,  of 
God,  and  ukimacely depends  on  his  rill  and  inftituticn. 

XIV.  This  manner  of  eflablifliing  the  foundation  of  cbli2:ation 
and  duty,  is  (o  far  from  weakening  the    (vflcm  of  natural  faw  or  "^^''^  "-si- 
morality,  that  we  may  affirm,  it  rather  gives  it  a  greater  folidity  tfifliff,"'^' 
and  force.    This  is  tracing  the  thing  to  the  very  fburce  ;  it  is  lading  mora'lify 
the  foundation  of  the  edifice.     I  grant,  that  in  order  to  reafon  wefl  <i<J«  not 
on  morality,  we  ought  to  take  things  as  they  are,  without  makina  v'calcc-iuhc 
abftraaions-,  that  is,  we  fhould  attend  to  the  nature  and  adual  [fa^v,"ai  °^ 
fbte  of  man,  by  uniting  and  combining  fdl  the  clrcumftances  that  law. 
cfT-ntially  enter  into  the  fyfrem  of  humanity.     But  this  does  not 
hinder  us  from  confidering  likev.ife  the  fyf'.em  of  man  in  its  par- 
ticulars. 


134  ^^  Principles   of 

titulars,  and  as  it  were  by  parts,  to  the  end,  that  an  exad  knowl- 
edge of  each  cf  thofe  parts  may  help  us  lo  undeiftand  better  the 
whole.  It  is  the  only  method  we  can  take  in  order  to  attain  this 
end. 

,    ^  XV.  What  has  been  hitherto  kt   forth,  miy  help  to    explain 

opScx.  ^"'^  J'.'^'^y  ^t  t'i=  ^''^'"e  time  a  thought  ol  Grotius  in  his  prelimin- 
aaiiiKd.  ary  difcourle,  §  ii.  l>/is  author  having  ettabliflied,  after  his 
manner,  the  principles  and  foundation  of  natural  law,  on  the  con- 
ilitution  of  human  nature,  adds,  that  all  he  has  been  [a)ing  would  in 
fome  meofure  take  place^  zverc  ue  even  to  grant  there  was  7,0  God  j 
or  that  he  did  not  concern  himfelf  about  human  affairs.  It  is  obvious, 
by  his  very  manner  of  expre/îing  himfeU,  that  he  does  not  intend 
to  exclude  the  divine  will  from  the  fyftem  of  natural  law.  This 
v/onld  be  millaking  liis  meaning  ;  becaufe  he  himfelf  eftablifho 
this  will  of  the  Creator  as  another  fource  of  right.  All  he  means 
is,  that  independent  of  the  interveniior;  of  God,  confidered  as  a 
legillator,  the  maxims  of  natural  law  having  their  foundation  in 
the  nature  cf  things,  and  in  the  human  conftitution  ;  realon  alone 
impofes  already  on  man  a  necellity  cf  following  thofe  maxims, 
and  lays  him  under  an  obligation  of  conforming  his  conduit  to 
them.  In  fadt,  it  cannot  be  denied  but  that  the  ideas  of  order, 
agreeablenefs,  honefly,  and  conformity  to  right  reafon,  have  at  all 
times  made  an  impreiilon  on  man,  atlealt  to  a  certain  degree,  and 
amonp;  nations  fomewliat  civilized.  The  human  mind  is  formed 
in  fuch  a  manner,  that  even  thofe  who  do  not  comprehend  thefe 
ideas  in  their  full  cxa6tnefs  and  extent,  have,  neverthelcfs,  a  confu- 
fed  notion  thereof,  v^-hich  inclines  them  to  acquiefcence  fo  foon  as 
they  are  propofed. 

In  order  to      XVI.  But  v/hile  we   acknowledge  the  reality  and  certainty  of 

have  a  per-  thofe  principles,  we  ought  likewife  to  own,  that  if  we  proceed  no 

fert  fyftem  farther,  we  are  got  but  half  way  our  journey  ;   this  would  be  un- 

ofmorali-   j-cafonably  attempting  to  edablifli  a  fyftem   of  morality  indepen- 

flmuid  join  ^^"^  ^^  religion.     For  were  v;e  even  to  grant,  that  fuch  a  fyftem  is 

it  with  re-  not  deftitute  of  all  fountiation  ;  yet  it  is  certain  it  could  never  pro- 

î^iion.         duce  of  itfelffo  effectual  an  obligation,  as  when  it  is  joined  with 

lh2  divine  will.     Since  the  authority  of  the  fuprenie  Being  gives 

the  force  of  laws,  properly  fo  called,  to  the  maxims  of  reafon,  thefe 

maxims   acquire   thereby   the  highcft  degree  of  flrength  they  can 

pofîîblv  have  to  bind  and  fubjeft  the  will,  and  to  lay  us  under  the 

ilricted  obligation.       But  (once  more  we  repeat  it)  to  pretend 

therefore,  that  the  maxims  and   counfds  of  reafon  confidered  \vi 

themfelvef, 


Natural  Law.  13S 

themfelves,  and  detached,  as  it  were,  from  God's  command,  are 
not  at  all  obligatory,  is  carrying  the  thing  too  far  ;  it  is  concluding 
beyond  our  preiniles,  and  adinitting  only  one  fpecies  of  obligation. 
Now  this  is  not  only  unconformable  to  the  nature  of  things,  but 
as  we  have  already  obferved,  it  is  weakening  even  the  obligation 
refulting  from  the  will  of  the  legiflator.  For  the  divine  ordinances 
mike  a  much  ftronger  impreiïion  on  the  mind,  and  are  followed 
wiih  a  greater  fubjeclion  in  the  will,  in  proportion  as  they  are  ap- 
proved by  reafon,  as  being  in  themfelves  perfe£Hy  agreeable  to  our 
nature,  and  extremely  conformable  to  our  conftitution  and  ftate. 


CHAP.     VIII. 

Confequcnces  of  the  preceding  chapter  :  refieSîions  en  the  dj/Iînâîions 
ofiufl^  ho?ieJî  and  ufeful. 


I.  rp 

JL   HE  refleélions  contained  in  the  foregoing  chapter  give  us  There  U  a 
to  underftand,  that  there  is  a  vaft  deal  of  ambiguity  and  miflake  great   deal 
in  the  diffijrent  fcntiments  of  writers,  in    relation  to  morality  or  '^t'an'dl|"â 
the  foundation  of  natural  laws.     They  do  not  always  afccnd  to  the  take    con- 
firft  principles,  neither  do  they  define  and  diftinguilh  exactly  ;  they  cemingthi* 
fuppofe  an   oppolition  between  ideas  that  are  reconcileable,  and  f^''^je<^'' 
ought  even  to  be  joined  together.     Some  reafon  in  too  abftradl  a 
manner   on    the  human  fylfem  ;  and  following  only   their  own 
metaphyfical  fpeculations,  never  attend  fufficiently  to  the  adual 
flate  of  things,  and  to  the  natural  dépendance  of  man.   Others  con- 
fidering  principally  this  dépendance,  reduce  the  whole  to  the  will 
and  orders  of  the  fovereign  mafter,  and  feem  dius  to  lofe  fight  «f 
the  very   nature  and  internal  conltitution  of  man,  from  which  it' 
cannot  however  be  feparated.     Thcfe  different  ideas  are  juft  in 
themlelves  ;  yet  we   mu(l  not  eftablifh  the  one,  by  excluding  the 
other,  or  by  explaining  it   to  the  other's  prejudice.     Reafon,  on 
the  contrary,  requires  us  to  unite  them,  in  order  to  find  the  true 
principles  of  the  human  fyflem,  whofe  foundations  mufî  be  fought 
for  in  the  nature  and  ftate  of  man. 

II.  It  is  very  common  to  ufe  the  words  utility^jujîïce^honejîy^orderf  jj^n^f^  \^^^ 
znd  Jitnefs  ;  but  the  fe  different  notions  are  feldom  defined  in  an  ful,  order, 
exadl   manner,  and   fome  of  them  are  frequently  confoimded.  and  fitnefs. 

This 


136  "The  Principles   of 

This  want  of exaiSlnefs  muft  neccfTaiil y  create  ambiguity  and  con- 
fufion  J  wherefore,  if  we  intend  to  make  things  clear,  we  muft  take 
care  to  define  and  diftinguilh  properly. 

An  ufeful  aâion  may,-  methinks,  be  defined,  that  which  of  itfelf 
tends  to  the  prefervation  and  perfection  of  man. 

Ajuft  action,  that  which  is  confidered  as  conformable  to  the 
will  of  a  fuperior  who  commands. 

An  adlion  is  called  honeft,  when  it  isconfrdered  as  conformable 
to  the  maxims  of  right  reafon,  agreeable  to  the  dignity  of  our  na- 
ture, dcferving  of  the  approbation  of  man,  and  confequeniiy  pro- 
curing refpecl  and  honour  to  the  perfon  that  does  it. 

By  order,  we  can  underftand  nothing  elfe  but  the  difpofition  of 
feveral  things,  relative  to  a  certain  end,  and  proportioned  to  the 
effjdt  we  intend  to  produce. 

Finally,  as  to  ntnefs  or  agreeablenefs,  it  bears  a  very  great  affinity 
with  order.  It  is  a  relation  of  conformity  between  feveral  things, 
one  of  which  is  of  iifelf  proper  for  the  prefervation  and  perfe6liun 
of  the  other,  and  contributes  to  maintain  it  in  a  good  and  advan- 
tageous [late. 

III.  We  muft  not  therefore  confound  the  words  _/w/?,  ufeful^  and 
jdfl,  hon-  })oneJi  ;  for  they  are  three  diftin£t  ideas.     But  though  diftindt  from 
^ffP  r    one  another,  they  have  no  oppofition;  they  are  three  relation?, 
diftinà        which  may  all  agree,  and  be  applied  to   one  fingle  aflion,  confid- 
things,  and  ered  under  different   refpedts.     And  if  we  afcend  fo  high  as  the 
muft  not  be  f^rft  origin,  we  fhall  find  that  they  are  all  derived  from    one  com- 
con  oun  -    ^^^^  fource,  or  from  one  and  the  fame  principle,  as  three  branches 
from  the  fame  ftock.     This  general  principle  is  the  approbation 
of  reafon.     Reafon  neceflarily  approves  whatever  conduits  us  to 
real  happinefs  :  and  as  that  which   is  agreeable  to  the  prefervation 
and  perfection  of  man;  that  which  is  conformable   to  the  will   of 
the  fovereign  matter  on  whom  he  depends  ;   and  that  which  pro- 
cures him  the  efteem  and  refpeCt  of  his  equals  ;  as  all  this,  I  fay, 
contributes  to  his  happinef>,  reafon  cannot  but  approve  of  each 
of  thefe  things  feparately  confidered,  much  lefs  can  it  help  approv- 
ing, under  difterent  refpedts,  an  action  in  which  all  thefe  properties 
are  found  united. 

Eutthoiijrh  I  v.  For  fuch  is  the  ftate  of  thing?,  that  the  ideas  of  juft,  honeft, 
theyaredi-  and  ufeful,  are  naturally  Connected,  and  as  it  were  infeparable  ;  at 
ilina.  yet  leaf!  if  we  attend,  as  we  ought  to  do,  to  real,  general,  and  lafting 
naturd^y  "^'''7'  We  may  fay,  thatfueh  an  utility  becomes  a  kind  of  cha- 
conneaed.  ra^eiiftic  to  diltingui'lh  what  is  truly  juft,  or  honeftj  from  what  is 


Natural    L  a  w.  137 

fo  only  in  the  erroneous  opinions  of  men.     This  is  a   beautiful 

and  judicious  remark  ol  Cicero.     *  TZy  language  and  opinions  of 

7nen  are  very  wide,  fays  he,  from  truth  and  right  reajon,   in  fipar^ 

athig  the  honeji from  the   vjeful,   and  in  perjuadlng  thcmfclves  that 

finie  honejî  thing i  are  not  upful,  and  other  things  are  ufcfidbut  nothon- 

efl.     7  his  is  a  dangerous  notion  to  human  Uje. — H^.r.ce  we  fee  that  ^j 

'Socrates  dctejlcd  thofe  fophlfts^  ivho  f.rjl feparated  thofc  two  things  in  i^"**^ 

opinion,  which  In  nature  are  really  julned. 

In  fû6l,  the  more  we  invcitigate  the  plan  of  divine  providence^ 
the  more  we  find  the  Deity  has  thought  proper  to  conncil  the 
moral  good  and  evil  with  the  phyfical,  or,  which  is  the  fame  thing, 
the  juft  with  the  ufeful.  And  though  in  fome  particular  cafes  the 
thing  feems  otherwife,  this  is  only  an  accidental  diforder,  which  is 
much  lefs  a  natural  confequence  of  the  fyftcm,  than  an  effedl  of 
the  ignorance  or  malice  of  man.  Whereto  we  mud  add,  that  in 
cafe  wc  do  not  Hop  at  the  firft  appearances,  but  proceed  to  confid- 
er  the  human  fyftem  in  its  full  extent,  we  {hall  find,  rhat  every  thing 
well  confidert-d,  and  all  compenO.tions  made,  thcfe  irregularities 
v.'ill  be  one  day  or  other  redrefled,  as  we  fliall  more  fully  {hew 
when  we  come  to  treat  of  the  faniSlions  of  natural  laws. 

V.  Here  a  qneftionis  fometimes  propofed  ;  whether  a  thing  be 

juft,  becaufe  God  comn^ands  it,  or  whether  God  commands  it,  Whether 

becaufeitisjud  ?  _  '"ft^'tt"'' 

Purfuant  to  our  principles,  the  queftion  is  not  at  all  difRcult.  ^J^^J.^  q^^ 
A  thing  is  juft,  becaufe  God  commands   it  ;  this    is    implied  by  commands 
the  definition  we  gave  of  juftice.      But  God  commands  fuch  or  it. 
fuch   things,  becaufe  thefe  things    are  reafonable   in  themfclvcs, 
conformable  to  the  order  and  ends  he  propofed   to  himfclf  in  cre-^ 
ating   mankind,   and  agreeable   to  the  nature   and  (Lite  of  man. 
Thcfe  ideas,  though  dillinclin  themfelves,  are  necefiarily  connec- 
ted, and  can  be  feparated  only  by  a  metaphyfical  abllra61ion. 

VI.  «Let  us,  in  fine,  obferve  that  this  harmony  or  furprifing 
agreement,  which  naturally  occurs  between  the  ii^eas  of  iufl,  hon-    "  " 

.  ''  -     .  ^     .     -  the  bcoutv 

eft,  and  ufeful,  conftitutes  th;  wholfi  beauty  of  virtue,  and  informs  „(■   virtue 

S  us  and    the 

»i_— __— . «_— -. pcrledion 

*  In  quo  lapfa  confuetudo  d  flexit  de  via  fenfin  que  eo  ricduila  eft,  ut  honef-  '^'  ^'n'"* 
tatem  ab  utilitate  fecernens,  &  conflituerit  hoileftuin  elle  nliquod  quod  utile  non  *^°^""S. 
effot,  &  utile  quod  non  honeftum  :  qua  nulla  pcmicies  major  honiinum  vitre 
potuii  adferri.  Ck.  de  Offic  lib  2  cup  t,  Itaque  accepimus,  Socratem  exfe- 
crari  rditum  eos,  qui  primum  hjec  natura  cohœrcntia  opinione  diftraxiflenc. 
Jdsm.  lib  3.  cap.  13.  Sec  likewifc  Grotius,  Uivçhtsof  War  :ind  Peace,  prelimi- 
nary difcourfc    §  17.  and  following  ;   and  Puffcndorf,  Lev;-  of  Nature  and  Na- 

tiont,  book  ii,  chap.  iii.  §  lo^  si. 


138  T.'he  Principles  of 


usât  the  fame  time  in  what  the  pcrfeé^ion  of  man  confifts. 

In  confequence  of  the  different  fyftems  above  mentioned,  mor- 
aliftsare  divided  with  regard  to  the  latter  point.  Some  place  the 
perfedlion  of  man  in  fach  a  ufe  of  his  faculties  as  is  agreeable  to 
the  nature  of  his  being.  Others  in  the  ufc  of  our  faculties  and  the 
intention  of  our  Creator.  Some,  in  fine^  pretend  that  man  is 
perfcdV,  only  as  his  manner  of  thinking  and  a(£ling  is  proper  to 
conduit  him  to  the  end  he  aims  at,  naniel)',  his  happinels. 

But  what  we  have  above  faid  fufficiently  (hews,  that  thefe  three 
methods  of  confidering  the  perfedlion  of  man,  are  very  little  dificr- 
cnt,  and  ought  not  to  be  fet  in  oppofition.  As  they  are  interwoven 
with  one  another,  we  ought  mther  to  combine  and  unite  them. 
The  perfe<5tion  of  man  confifts  really  in  the  pofleflion  of  natural 
or  acquired  faculties,  which  enable  us  to  obtain,  and  actually  put 
us  in  poflèfïïon  of  folid  felicity;  and  this  in  conformity  to  the  inten- 
tion of  our  Creator,  engraved  in  our  nature,  and  clearly  manifeflecl 
by  theftate  wherein  he  has  placed  us.  * 

A  modern  writer  has  judicioufly  faid  ;  that  to  obey  only  threugh 
fear  of  authority^  or  for  the  hope  ofrecompcnfe^  zvithoi^t  ejieemiug  or 
loving  virtue  for  the  fake  of  its  own  excellency  ;  is  mean  and  merce- 
nary. On  the  contrary^  to  praSlife  virtue  with  an  ahfïraSî  view  of 
its  fit  nefs  and  natural  beauty.,  without  having  any  thought  cf  the  Cre- 
ator and  Condu£îorofthe  univerfe  ;  is  failing  in  our  duty  to  the  firfi 
and  greatefl  of  Beings.  He  only  zvho  a^s  jointly  through  a  principle 
ofreafcn.^  through  a  motive  of  piety.,  and  with  a  view  of  his  principal 
inter eji.,  is  an  honed,  wife.,  and  pious  man  ;  which  conflitutes^  with' 
eut  comparijon.^  the  worthiejl  and  complete  ft  of  charaâîers. 


CHAP.    IX. 

Of  the  application  of  natural  laws  to  human  a£iions  ;   and  firfi  ef 
confcience  t 

What  is       I.      A  ,     .  J      1       r 

meant  by  /jL^  ^°"^  ^^  ^^  ^^^®  dlfcovered  the  foundation  and  rule  of 
applying  our  duties,  we  have  only  to  recolleft  what  has  been  already  faid  in 
tu^lTlr  the  eleventh  chapter  of  the  firft  part  of  this  work,  concerning  the 
tions.  morality 


•  Theory  of  agreeable  fenfation s  chap    viii. 

f  See  the  Law  of  Nature  and  Nations  book  i.  chap.  iii.  §  4.  and  following: 
and  the  Duties  of  Man  and  a  Citizen,  book  i.  chap,  i,  §  5,  6. 


Natural  Law.  139 

morality  of  allions,  tor:;e  in  what  manner  natural  laws  are  applied 
to  human  adlioni;,  and  what  effe£l  ought  from  thence  to  refult. 

The  application  of  the  laws  to  hu  nan  adiions  is  nothing  elfe, 
but  I  he  judgment  we  pafs  on  th-'ir  morality,  by  comparing  then» 
with  the  law  ;  a  juds,ment  whereby  we  pronounce  that  thofe  ac- 
tions being  either  good,  bad,  or  indifferent,  we  are  obliged  either  to 
peif  >rm  or  omit  them,  or  that  we  may  ufe  our  liberty  in  this  re- 
fpc(fl  and  that  according  to  the  fide  we  have  taken,  we  are  worthy 
of  praifeor  blame,  approbation  or  cenfure. 

This  is  done  in  two  different  manners.  For  either  we  judge  on 
this  footing  of  our  own  adlion^,  or  of  thofe  of  another  peifon.  In 
the  firif  caff,  our  judgment  is  called  confcience  :  but  the  judgment 
We  pafs  on  other  men's  afflions,  is  termed  imputation.  Thefe  arc, 
undoubteiily,  fubjef^s  of  great  importance,  and  of  univerfal  ufe  in 
morality,  which  defcrve  therefore  to  be  treated  with  fome  care 
and  circumfpcdlion. 

II.  Confcience  is  properly  no  more  than  reafon  itfelf,  confider-  ■^Y^^^^  j^ 
cd  as  inftru(51ed  in  regard  to  the  rule  we  ought  to  follow,  or  to  the  confcience 
law  of  nature;  and  judging  of  the  morality  of  our  own   allions,  ^ 
and  of  the  obligations  we  are  under  in  this  refpeit,  by  comparing 

them  to  this  rule,  purfuant  to  the  ideas  we  entertain  thereof. 

Confcience  is  alfo  very  frequently  taken  for  the  very  judgment 
we  pafs  on  the  morality  of  aélions  ;  a  judgment  which  is  the  refult 
of  perfect  reafoning,  or  the  confcquence  we  infer  from  two  exprefs 
or  tacit  premifTss.  A  perfon  compares  two  propofitions,  one  of 
which  includes  the  law,  and  the  other  the  a<ftion  ;  and  from  thence 
he  deduces  a  third,  which  is  the  judgment  he  makes  of  the  quality 
of  his  action.  Such  was  the  reaf>ning  of  Judas  :  JVhofocver  deliv- 
ers up  an  innocent  perfon  to  deaths  commits  a  crime  ;  here  is  the  law. 
I^oiv  this  is  luhat  I  have  done  ;  here  is  the  aiStion.  /  have  there- 
fore committed  a  crime  %  this  is  the  confequence,  or  judgment 
which  his  confcience  pafled  on  the  action  he  committed. 

III.  Confcience  fnppofes  therefore  a  knowledge  of  the  law  ;  Confcience 
and  particularly  of  the  law  of  nature,    which  being  the  primitive  fuppofes  a 
fource  of  juftice,  is  likewife  the  fupreme  rule  of  conduit.     And  knowledge 
as  the  laws  cannot   ferve   us  for  rules,  but  inafmuch  as  they  are 
known,  it  follows  therefore,  that  confcience  becomes  thus  the  im- 
mediate rub  of  our  actions  :  for  it  is  evident  we  cannot  conform 

Co  the  law,  but  fo  far  as  we  have  notice  thereof. 

IV.  This 


1 40  l^'he  Principles  of 

Fird  ni'.e,  IV.  This  being  premifed,  the ^r/?  rule  we  have  to  lay  oo'.vn 
concerning  this  n. utter,  i?,  that  wc  muii  enlighten  oui  confcience, 
as  well  as  confult  ir,  and  fillow  ics  counfels. 

Wc  muft  enlighten  our  confcience  ;  that  is,  v^e  rruft  fpsre  no 
care  or  pains  to  be  exadly  infcructed  with  regard  to  the  will  of  the 
Icgiflator,  and  the  difpojition  of  his  laws  in  order  to  acquire  jufl 
ideas  of  whatever  is  comrnnnded,  forbidden,  or  permitttd.  For 
plain  it  is,  that  were  we  in  ignorance  or  error  in  this  refpeâ,  the 
judgTieiit  we  fhould  form  of  our  a£lions  would  be  neceflarily  vi- 
cious, and  confcquenily  lead  us  aflray.  But  this  is  not  enough. 
VV'^e  muft  join  to  this  firfi  knowledge,  the  knowledge  alfo  of  the 
action.  And  foi  this  purpofe  it  is  not  only  neccflary  to  examine 
this  action  in  itfelf  ;  but  we  ought  likewife  to  be  attentive  to  the 
particular  circum(tances  that  accompany  it,  and  the  confequences 
that  from  thence  may  follow.  Oiherwife  we  (hould  run  a  rifle 
of  being  miîtakcn  in  the  application  of  the  laws,  whofe  general 
aecifions  admit  of  feveral  niodihcations,  according  to  the  differ- 
ent ci  re  um (tances  that  accompany  our  actions  ;  which  neccflarily 
influences  their  moralit)-,  and  of  courfe  our  duties.  Thus  it  is  not 
fufHcient  for  a  judge  to  be  well  acquainted  v.'iih  the  tenor  and 
purport  of  the  law,  before  he  pronounces  fentence  ;  he  fliould 
iikewifchaycan  exadi  |;no\vledge  ofthefa£t  and  all  its  différent 
circumflanccs. 

But  it  is  not  merely  vvjth  a  view  of  enlightening  our  reafon, 
tbr.t  we  ought  to  acquire  all  tins  kiiowlcdge  j  it  is  principally  ir» 
order  to  apply  it  occalionally  to  the  direction  of  ()ur  conduct. 
Weiliould  tl^erefore,  v.  henever  it  .concerns  us  to  act,  confult  pre- 
vioufly  our  confcience,  apd  be  dij-ecEted  by  its  counfels.  This 
is  propcily  an  indifpenfible  obligation.  For,  in  fine,  confcience 
being,"  '4S  it  were,  the  miniftijr  ard  interpreter  of  the  will  of  the 
leoiflutor,  the  counfels  it  gives  us,  have  aH  the  force  and  authority 
of  a  law,  and  ought  to  produce  ilic  fome  eftcdt  upon  us. 

Second  V.  It  is  only  therefore  by  enlightening  our  ccnfcience,  that  it 

and    thud  becomes  a  fuic  rule  of  conduct,  whofe  ditlates  may  be  follov.ed 
rules.  vvith  a  pel f'-dl  coniiJence  of  exactly   fulfilling  our  duty.      For 

wo  ftiould  begrofly  miftaken,  if,  under  a  notion  that  confcience  is 
the  immediate  rule  of  our  actions,  we  were  to  believe  that  every 
jnan  may  lawfully  do  v.harevcr  he  imagines  the  law  commands  or 
permiis.  VV-  cu.;htfiri't  to  know  whether  this  notion  or  perfua- 
lion  is  iiiOly  fn-Ju'L-d.  For.  as  PL.fehdorf  *  obferves,  confcience 
has  noVliare  in  the  circclicn  cfhun-ian  action-^,  but  inafnuich  as  it 

is 


*  See  ihe  Law  of  Nature  2nd  Nations,  bock  i.  chap.  iii.  §  4. 


Natural  Law.  i\i 

is  inftru£lcd  concerning  the  law,  whofe  office  it  properly  is  to  di- 
rect our  aiftions.  Ifv/e  have  therefore  a  mind  to  determine  and 
a6\  with  fafety,  we  murt  on  every  particular  occafion  obferve  the 
two  following  rules,  which  are  very  fimple  of  themfelves,  eafy  to 
praclice,  and  naturally  follow  our  firft  rule,  of  which  they  are  only 
a  kind  of  elucidation,  f 

Second  rule.  Before  we  detertnine  to  follow  the  didatcs  of 
confcience,  we  Ihould  examine  thoroughly  whether  we  have  the 
neceflarylightsand  helps  to  judge  ofihe  things  before  us.  If  we  hap- 
pen to  wantthefs  lights  an  1  helps,  we  can  neither  decide,  nor  much 
jefs  undertake  anything,vvithout  an  inexcufableand  dangerous  temer- 
ity. And  yet  nothing  is  commoner  than  to  tranfgreis  againft  this 
rule.  What  multitudes,  for  example,  determine  on  religious  dif- 
putes,  or  diflicult  qu.^ltions  concerning  morality  or  politics,  though 
they  are  no  way  capable  of  judging  or  reafoning  about  them  ? 

Third  rule.  Sisppofing  that  in  general  we  have  neccflary  lights 
a'Dd  helps  to  judge  of  the  affair  before  us,  we  muft  aftervvardi  fee 
whether  we  have  aflually  made  ufe  of  ihem  ;  infomuch,  that  with- 
out a  new  inquiry  we  may  follow  what  our  confcience  fuggefts. 
It  happens  every  day  that  for  war.t  of  attending  to  this  rule,  we  let 
purfelvcs  be  quietly  prevailed  upon  to  do  a  great  many  things, 
which  we  might  eafdy  difcover  to  be  unjufl,  had  we  given  heed  to 
certain  clear  principles,  the  judicè  and  neceilîty  of  which  is  univer- 
fally  acknowlLdged. 

When  we  have  made  ufe  of  the  rules  here  laid  down,  we  have 
done  whatever  we  could  and  ought  ;  and  it  is  morally  certain,  that 
by  thus  proceeding  u'e  can  be  neither  miltaken  in  our  judgmenr, 
nor  wrong  in  our  determinations.  But  if,  notwithftanding  all 
thefe  precaution"^,  we  fhould  happen  to  be  miftaken,  which  is  not 
abfolutely  impoffible  ;  this  would  be  an  infirmity,  infeparablefrom 
human  nature,  and  woulii  carry  its  excule  along  with  it  in  the  eye 
of  the  fupreme  legiflator. 

VI.  We  judge  of  our  actions  either  before,  or  after  we  have  ^^^^  g^j 
done  them  ;  wherefore  there    is  an  antecedent  and  a    fubfequent  fubfequent 
confcience.  confcience. 

This  diftincflion  gives  us  an  opportunity  to  lay  down  a  fourth 
rule  ;  which  is,  that  a  prudent  njan  ought  to  confult  his  confcience 
before  and  after  he  has  aiSled. 

To   determine   to  a6t,  without  having   previoufly  examined, 
whether  what  we  are  going  to  do  be  good  or  evil,  manifeftly  indi- 
cates 


Fourth 
rule. 


f  See  Barbeyrac'5  firft  note  o;j   the  Dutieo  of  Man  and  a  Citizen,  book    i, 
'■•'P'.  §5. 


14^2  The  Principles  oj 

cntes  an  indifFerence  for  our  duty,  which  is  a  moft  dangerous  Rate 
in  rcfptdl  toman  ;  a  ftate  capable-  of  throwing  him  into  them-'ft 
fatal  exctfles.  But  a«,  in  this  firft  judgment,  we  may  happen  to 
be  determined  by  pafTion,  and  to  proceed  with  precipitation,  or 
upon  a  very  flight  eximen  ;  it  is  therefore  ncceiïary  to  reflect 
again  on  what  we  have  done,  either  in  order  to  be  confirmed  in 
tlie  right  fide,  If  we  have  embraced  it  j  or  to  corredl  our  miftake 
if  pofilble,  aiid  to  guard  again  ft  the  like  faults  for  the  future. 
This  is  fj  much  the  more  important,  as  experience  {hews  us,  that 
we  frequently  judge  quite  differently  between  a  paft  arid  future 
tranfadtion  ;  and  that  the  prejudices  or  puffions  which  may  lead 
Vsaftray,  when  we  are  totalce  our  refolu'ion,  oftentimes  difappear 
cither  in  the  whole  or  part,  when  the  adlion  is  over  ;  and  leave  us 
then  more  at  liberty  to  judge  rightly  ot  the  nature  and  conlcquenccs 
of  the  action. 

The  habit  of  tnaljing  this  double  examen,  is  the  effentia!  cha- 
ra£lcr  ot  an  honefl  man  ;  and  indeed  nothing  can  be  a  better  proof 
of  our  being  ferioufiy  inclined  to  difchargc  our  feveral  duties. 

confcience  ^^^-  '^^^  effed  reful ting  from  this  revifal  of  our  ccndufl,  is 
is  cither  very  different,  according  a,s  the  Judgment  we  pafs  on  it,  abfolves  or 
^uiet,  or  condemns  us.  In  the  firft  cafe,  we  find  ourfelves  in  a  ftate  of  fat- 
ancaf/.  isf,)6tion  and  tranquillity,  which  is  the  fureft  and  fweetefl  recom- 
pence  of  virtue.  A  pure  and  untainted  pleafure  accompanies 
always  thofe  allions  that  are  approved  by  reafon  ;  and  reflection 
renews  tSe  fwects  vvc  have  tafted,  together  with  their  remembrance. 
And  indeed  what  greater  happinefs  is  there  than  to  be  inwardly 
fatiffied,  and  to  be  able  with  a  juft  confidence  to  promife  curfelves 
the  approbation  ai)d  benevolence  of  the  fovereign  Lord  on  whom 
we  depend  ?  \'i,  on  the  contrary,  confcience  condemns  u>,  this  con- 
cJemnation  miift  be  accompanied  with  inquietude,  trouble,  re- 
proached, fear,  and  remorfe  ;  a  ftr.te  fo  difmal,  that  the  ancients 
have  compared  it  to  that  of  a  man  tormented  by  the  turies.  Ev- 
ery cr'ime^  f^ys  the  fatyrifJ,  is  d'.fapproved  hy  the  very  perfen  that 
commits  it  ;  ar.dîhefir/TpUJ'àfbmcntthe  crijninal  feels ^  is^  that  he  cart- 
ret  avoid  being  felf-condemnedy  ivere  he  even  to  find  means  of  being 
acquitted  before  the  prators  tribunal. 

Exemplo  quodcungue  molo  committitii'-,  ipfi 
Difplicet  auifori  :  prima  hac  ejl  ultio^  quod^  fe 
yndice^  nemo  nocens  ahfolvitiir'^  improha  quamvis 
Gratia  fallaci  prccioris  vicerit.  urna. 

Tuv.  Sat.  13.  ver.  i. 
He 


Natural  Law.  I43 

He  thfJt  commits  a  fm^  Jl^all  quickly  find 
^he  pre/Jing  guilt  lie  heavy  on  his  miad  ; 
Though  bribe:  or  favour  Jhall  offert  his  caufe. 
Pronounce  him  guililefsy  and  elude  the  laws  : 
t  None  quits  him[i'lf\  his  oivn  impartial  thought 
IFill  damn,  and  confcience  will  record  the  fault. 

Creech. 
Hence  the  fubfcquent  confcience  is  faid  to  be  quiet  or  uneal'y, 
good  or  bad. 

VIII.  The  judgment  we  pafs  on  the  morality  of  our  a£lions  is  D.^jgy^ 
likewife  fufceptible  of  feveral  different  modifications  that  produce  and    dubi- 
new  diftin£lions  of  confcience,   which  we  (hould  here  point  out.  ous    con- 
Thefediflinctions  may,  in  general,  be  equally    applied  to  the  two  O;.'^""' 
firft  fpecies  of  confcience  above  mentioned  ;  but  they  feem  more  fj^'^j,*    ^^^^ 
frequently  and  particularly  to  agree  with  the  antecedent  confcience.  feventK 

Confcience  is  therefore  either  decifive  or  dubious,  according  to  rule, 
the  degree  of  perlUafion  a  perfon  may  have  concerning  the  quality 
of  the  aflion. 

When  we  pronounce  decifively,  and  without  any  hefitation,  that 
an  a6iion  is  conformable  or  oppofite  to  the  law,  or  that  it  is  permit- 
ted, and  conftquently  we  ought  to  do  or  omit  it,  or  elfe  that  we 
are  at  liberty  in  this  refpecSl  ;  this  is  called  a  decifive  confcience. 
If,  on  the  contrary,  the  mind  remains  in  fufpenfe,  through  the  con- 
flit of  reaf  )ns  we  fee  on  both  fides,  and  which  appear  to  us  of 
equal  weight,  infomuch  that  we  cannot  tell  to  which  fide  we  ought 
to  incline;  this  is  called  a  dubious  confcience.  Such  was  the 
doubt  of  the  Corinthians,  who  did  not  know  whether  they  could 
eat  things  facrificed  to  idols,  or  whether  they  ought  to  abftaia 
from  them.  On  the  one  fide,  the  evangelical  liberty  feemed  to 
permit  it  ;  on  the  other,  they  were  reftraincd  through  apprehen- 
fion  of  feeming  to  give  thereby  a  kind  of  confent  to  idolatrous  acls« 
Not  knowing  what  refolution  to  take,  they  wrote  to  St.  Paul  to 
remove  their  doubt. 

This  diftindion  rriakes  room  affo  for  fome  rules. 
Fifth  Rule.  We  do  not  intirely  difcharge  our  duty,  by  doing 
with  a  kind  of  difficulty  and  relu<5tance,  what  the  decifive  con- 
fcience ordains -,  we  oui^ht  to  fet  about  it  readily,  willingly,  and 
with  pleafure.  *  On  the  contrary,  to  determine  without  hefitation 
Of  repugnivnce,  againfl  the  motions  offuch  a  confcience,  is  (hew- 
ing the  higheli  degree  of  depravation  and  malice^  and  renders  a. 

perfon 
«I  '        ■  ■-  'i'i       1  >  I         I    I      I,    I  ■  II     ■«  I     I 

•  See  part  ii.  cliap  v.  §  7, 


1 44  The  Principles  of 

perfon  incomparably  more  criminal  than  if  he  were  impelled  by  a 
violent  pafllon  or  temptation,  f 

Sixth  Rule.  With  regard  to  a  dubious  confcience,  we  ought  to 
ufe  all  endeavours  to  get  rid  of  our  uncertainty,  and  to  forbear  a(5t- 
ing,  fo  long  as  we  do  not  know  whether  we  do  good  or  evil.  To 
behave  otherwife,  would  indicate  an  indirccft  contempt  of  the  law, 
by  expofing  one's  felf  voluntarily  to  the  hazard  of  violating  it,  which 
is  a  very  bad  condudl.  The  rule  now  mentioned  ought  to  be 
attended  to,  efpecially  in  matters  of  great  importance. 

Seventh  Rule.  But  if  we  find  ourfelves  in  fuch  circumftances 
as  neceflarily  oblige  us  to  determine  to  a£t,  v.'e  muft  then,  by  a 
new  attention,  endeavour  to  diftinguilh  the  fafeft  and  moft  probable 
fide,  and  whofe  confequences  are  the  leaft  dangerous.  Such  is 
generally  the  oppofite  fide  to  paffion  ;  it  being  the  fafell  way,  not 
to  liften  too  much  to  our  inclinations.  In  like  manner,  we  run 
very  little  riik  of  being  miftaken  in  a  dubious  ca("e,  by  following 
rather  the  didlates  of  charity  than  the  fuggcflion  of  felf-love. 

.  IX.  Befides  the    dubious  confcience,  properly  fo    called,  and 

confcience.  which  we  may  likevvife  diftinguiOi  by  the  name  of  irrefolute,  there 
Eight  rule,  is  a  fcrupulous  confcience,  produced  by  flight  and  frivolous  difficul- 
ties that  arife  in  the  mind,  without  feeing  any   foliil  rcafon  for 
doubting. 

Eighth  Rule.  Such  fcruples  as  thefe  ought  not  to  hinder  us 
from  aéting,  if  it  be  necellary  ;  and  as  they  generally  arife  either 
from  a  falfe  delicacy  of  confcience,  or  from  grofs  fupcrfiition,  we 
Ihould  foon  get  rid  of  them,  were  we  to  examine  the  thing  with 
attention. 

Right  and      X.  Let  US  afterwards  obferve,  that  the  decifive  confcience,  ac- 
erroneous    cording  as  it  determines  good  or  evil,  is  either  right  or  erroneous. 
N'mhnils'       Thofe,  for  example,  who  imagine   \vc   ought  to  abftain  from 
'  flriél  revenge,   though   the    law   of  nature  permits  a    legitimate 
defence,  have  aright  confcience.     On  the  other  hand,  thofe  who 
think  that  the  law  which  requires  us  to  be  faithful  to  our  engage- 
ments, is  n')t  obligatory  tov/ards  heretics,  and  that  we  may  lawfully 
break  through  it  in  refpe£l  to  them,  have  an  erroneous  confcience. 
But  whatmufl  we  do  in  cafe  of  an  erroneous  confcience  ? 
Ninth  Rule.  I  anfwer,   that  we   ought  always  to   follow   the 
diifl-ites  of  confcience,  even  when  it  is  erroneous,  and  whether  the 
error  be  vincible  or  invincible. 

This 

t  See  Grotius,  Rights  of  War  and  Peace,  book  ii.  chap.  ïx.  §  l^. 


Natural    Law.  i 4 ^5 

This  rule  may  appear  firange  at  firft  Hght,  fince  it  feems  to  pre- 
fciibe  evil  ;  becaufe  there  is  no  ma. met  ot  qneftioM,  but  that  a  man 
who  a<5ts  according  to  an  erroneous  confcience,  efpoufes  a  bad 
caufe.  Yet  this  is  not  fo  ba;I,  as  if  we  were  to  determine  to  do  a 
thing,  with  a  firm  perfuafion  of  its  being  contrary  to  the  dccifion 
of  the  law  ;  for  this  would  denote  a  diredl  contempt  of  the  legifla- 
tor  and  his  orders,  which  is  a  mofl  criminal  difpofition.  Whereas 
the  firft  refolution,  though  bad  in  itfelf,  is  neverthelefs  the  efFe£l 
of  a  laudable  difpofition  to  obey  the  legiflator,  and  conform  to 
his  will. 

But  it  does  not  from  thence  follow,  that  we  are  always  excufa- 
ble  in  being  guided  by  the  diiStates  of  an  erroneous  confcience  ; 
this  is  true  only  -«hen  the  error  happens  to  be  invincible.  If  on 
the  contrary  it  is  furmountable,  and  we  are  miftaken  in  refpeft  to 
what  is  commanded  or  forbidden,  we  un  either  way,  whether  we 
a6l  according  to,  or  againit  the  decifions  of  confcience.  This 
fhews  (to  mention  it  once  more)  what  an  important  concern  it  is 
to  enlighten  our  confcience,  becauf:',  in  the  cafe  juft  now  mention- 
ed, the  perfon  with  an  erroneous  confcience  is  actually  under  a 
melancholy  neceffity  of  doing  ill,  whichever  fide  he  takes.  But  if 
we  fhould  happen  to  be  miftaken  with  regard  to  an  indifferent 
thing,  which  we  are  erroneoufly  perfuaded  is  commanded  or  for- 
bidden, we  do  not  fin  in  that  cafe,  but  when  we  adl  contrary  to 
the  light  of  our  own  confcience. 

XI.  In  fine,  there  are  two  forts  of  right  confcience  ;  the  one 
cle.ir  and  demonltrative,  and  the  other  merely  probable.  Demon* 

The  clear  and  demonllrative  confcience  is  that  which  is  foimd-  and  prob. 
ed  on  certain  principles,  and  on  demonftrative  reafons,  fo  far  as  the  able  con. 
nature  of  moral  things  will  permit  ;  inf)muchthat  one  may  clear-  fcience. 
ly  and  diftinully  prove  the  redituJe  of  a  judgtient  made  on   fuch  Tenthrule, 
or  fuch  an  action,     O  i  the  contrary,  though  we  are  convinced  of 
the  truth  of  a  judgment,  yet  if  it  be  founded  only  on  verifimilitude, 
and  we  cannot  demindrate  its  certainty  in  a  methodical  manner, 
and  by    inconteftable  principles,  it  is   then  only  a  probable  con- 
fcience. 

Tlie  found  itions  of  probable  confcience  are  in  general  authority 
and  example,  fupported  by  a  confafed  notion  of  a  natural  fitnefs, 
and  fometimes  by  popular  reafons,  which  feem  drawn  from  the  very 
nature  of  things.  It  is  by  this  kind  of  confcience  that  the  greatert 
part  of  mankind  are  conducted,  there  being  very  few  who  are  ca- 
pable of  kno\\'ing  the  indif^enfible  neceffity  of  their  duties,  by  de- 
ducing them  from  their  firit  fources  by  regular  confcquences  ; 
T  efpecially 


146  ^he  Principles   oJ 

erpecially  when  the  point  relates  to  maxims  of  mofaKty,  which 
being  fomewhat  remote  fnjm  the  firft  principles,  require  a  longer 
chain  of  rear;:)ning<;.  This  conduiEt  is  far  from  bein^  unrcafonable. 
Forthufe  who  have  n--)t  fufficient  light  of  themfclves  to  judge 
properly  of  the  nature  of  thin^«,  cannot  do  better  than  recur  to 
the  jjdgmcnt  of  enlightened  perfons  ;  this  being  the  only  refource 
left  them  to  aé\  with  fafety.  We  might  in  this  refped  compare 
the  perfons  above  mentioned  to  young  people,  vvhofe  judament  has 
not  yet  acquired  its  fui!  maturity,  and  who  ought  to  Hilen  and 
conform  to  the  counfels  of  their  fuperiors.  The  authority  there- 
fore, and  example  of  fage  and  enlightened  men,  may  in  fome  cafe?, 
in  default  of  our  own  lights,  prove  a  reufonable  principle  of  deter- 
mination and  condu6l. 

But,  in  fine,  fmce  thofe  foundations  of  prob3l)le  confcience  are 
not  [o  folid  as  to  permit  us  abfjlutely  to  build  upon  them,  we 
mud  therefore  eftabliOi,  as  a  Tenth  Rule^  that  we  ought  to  wit  all 
our  endeavours  toincreafe  the  degree  of  verifirailitude  in  our  opin- 
ions, in  order  toapproach  as  near  as  polîîble  to  the  clear  and  de- 
monltrativeconfrience  j  and  we  mud  not  be  Ltisfied  with  proba- 
bility, but  v.'hen  we  can  do  no  better. 

aamnwi  — 


CHAP.     X. 


OJ  the  merit  and  demerit  of  human  anions  ;   and  of  their  imputation 
relative  to  the  laws  of  nature.  * 

tion  of  ,"m-  X^  explaining  the  nature  of  human  actions,  confidered  with 
pntabiiiiy  regard  to  right,  f  we  obfervcd,  that  an  efl'^ntial  quality  ofthtfe 
and  inipu  adlions  is  to  be  fufceptible  of  imputation  ;  that  if,  the  agent  may 
tacion.    Of  i^g  reafonably  looked  upon  as  the  real  author  thereof,  may  have  it 

the    mtiire     ,  ,,•  '^,1  ,  r  \\     e       ■        ■    r  1 

of  a  moral  charged  to  his  account,  and  be  made  anlwerable  tor  it;  inlom.uch 

caufc.  that  the  good  or  bad  effects  from  thence  arifmg,  may  be  juftly  at- 

tributed and  referred  to  him,  as  to  the  efficient  caufe,  concerning 
which  we  have  laid  down  this  principle,  that  every  voluntary  ac- 
tion is  of  an  imputable  nature. 

We  give  in  general  the  name  of  moral  caufe  of  an  action  to  the 
perfon  that  produced  it,  either  in  the  whole  or  part,  by  a  determi- 
nition  of  his  will  ;  whether  he  executes  it  himfelf  phyfically  and 
immediately,  fo  as  to  be  author  thereof  ;    or  whether  he   procures 


*  See  on  ûw,  and   the  foliowii'g  chapter,  Puffendori's   Law   of  Nature  and 
Nations,  boot:  i.  fh.ip.  v.  and  chap,  ix. 
•}  Part  i.  chiip.  iii. 


Natural  Law.  147 

it  by  thea£l  of  fonae  other  pcrfon,  and  becomes  thereby  its  caufc. 
Thus  whetner  we  wound  a  man  u-ith  our  own  hand',  or  fet  ailal- 
fins  to  way-lay  him,  vvc  arc  equally  the  moral  caufe  of  the  evil 
from  ihonce  refuUing. 

It  v/as  cbferved  likewife,  that  we  mufl  not  confound  the  imputa- 
bility  of  human  a6tions  with  their  actual  imputation.  The  loraicr, 
as  has  been  juit  now  mentioned,  is  a  quality  of  the  a6lion  ;  the  lat- 
ter is  an  aét  of  the  legirtator,  or  judge,  who  lays  to  a  perfon's 
charge  an  adion  that  is  of  an  imputable  nature. 

II.  Imputation  is  properly  therefore  a  judgment  by  which  we  ofthena- 
declare,  that  a  perfon  being  the  author  or  moral  caiife  of  an  ac-  ture  of  iift- 
t  on  commanded  or  fjrbiddcn  by  the  laws,  the  good  or  b3defF,.^£ts  putirion, 
that  refnlt  from  this  adlion,  oueht  to  be  a6tually  attributed  to  him  ;  '"^  fu]^r<n.cs 
tiiat  he  is  confequently  anfv.'erabje  for  them,  and  as  fuch  is  worthy  icdgeoithe 
of  praife  or  blame,  of  recompenfe  or  punifnment.  law,    a» 

This  judgment  of  imputation,  as  well  as  that  of  confcience,  is  well  n?  of 
made  by  applying  the  law  to  the  adtion,  and  comparing  one  with  *^^^  '^" 
thj  Ouicr,  in  ordt-r  to  decide  afterwards  the  merit  of  the  fa£l,  and 
to  make  the  author  confequently  feel  the  good  or  evil,  the  puuilh- 
ment  or  recompenfe  which  the  law  has  thereto  annexed,  All 
this  necefl'arily  fjppofes  an  exacSl  knowledge  of  the  law  and  of  its 
right  fenfc,  as  well  as  of  the  fadt  and  fuch  ciicumflances  thereof,  as 
may  any  way  relate  to  the  determination  of  the  liw.  A  want  of 
this  Icnowledge  mud  render  the  application  falfe,  and  the  judgment 
e.Toneous. 

III.  Let  us  proîiuce  a  few  examples.     One  of  the  Horatii,  who 
remained  conqueror  in  the  combat  between  the  brothers  of  this  Examples. 
na:ne,  and  the  three  Curiatii,  iiii^lamed  with  anger  a'^ainit  his  fifter 

for  bewailing  the  death  ofoneof  the  Curiaiii  her  lover,  and  for  bit- 
terly leproaching  him  therewith,  inftead  of  congratulating  him 
for  his  vidlory,  ftc'W  her  with  his  own  hand.  He  was  acciiicd  bi'- 
fore  the  Duumvirs  ;  and  the  qiieUlon  was,  whether  the  lawagninft 
murderers  oiiglit  to  be  applied  to  the  prefent  cafe,  in  order  to 
mjkehim  undergo  the  punifhment  r  Thi".  was  the  opinion  of  t;;e 
judges,  who  in  fact  condemned  the  young  Roman.  But  an  appeal 
being  lïiade  to  the  people,  they  judged  quite  otherwife.  Their 
notion  was,  that  the  law  ought  not  to  be  applied  to  the  hc\  ;.be- 
caiife  a  Roman  liidy,  who  ftemed  to  be  more  concerned  about  her 
own  particular  interei^-,  than  f;nlihle  of  the  good  of  her  country, 
might  in  (o.ne  meafure  be  confidered  and  treated  as  sn  enemy  ; 
wh.Tcforethcy  pronounced  the  young  man  innoccnr.     Let  us  add 

anoihçf 


148  'The  Principles  of 

another  example  of  an  advantageous  imputation,  or  of  a  judgment 
of  rccompenfe.  Cicerc^,  in  th(r  beginning  of  his  conAnatc,  (iif- 
covcred  ihcconfpirac)  ot  Catalir.i-,  which  menaced  th.e  republic 
with  ruin.  In  thisdeHcate  cunjui.£lure  he  behaved  v-'iih  fo  much 
prudence  and  addr.  fs,  that  the  cjnfpir.icy  was  (tifli-d  without  any 
nolle  or  fedition,  by  the  death  of  a  few  of  the  criminals.  And  yet 
J.  Cjifar.and  fome  other  enemies  of  Cicero,  accufed  him  betore 
the  people,  for  having  put  citiz^^ns  to  di-ath  contrary  to  rule,  and 
before  the  fenate  or  people  had  puiïed  judgment  againft  ihem. 
But  the  people  attending  to  the  circumilances  of  the  t<i£l,  to  the 
danger  the  republic  had  efcaped,  and  to  the  important  fervice 
Cicero  had  done,  fo  far  from  condemining  liim  as  an  infringer  of 
the  bvvs,  decreed  him  the  glorious  title  oi father  cf  his  country. 

Principles        J y^  jp  Order  to  fettle  the  principles  and  foundations  of  this  mat- 

oiight   not  *^'"»  ^^^  mull  obfcrve,  i.  That  we  ought  not  to  conclude  the  ac- 

to    infer      t''^!  imputation  of  an  ?.£tion  merely  from   its  imputâbility.     All 

a<flual  iiiï-  a<$\ion,  to  merit  a£i:ual  imputation,  mufl:  nect-fTirily  have  the  con- 

putation      currence  ofthefe  two  conditions  -,   fîrft,  that  it  be  of  an  imputable 

pi-tabiUty    mature,  and  fecondly,  that  the  sgent  be  under  fome  obligation  of 

oiily.  doing  or  omitting  it.      An  example  will  clear  up  the  thing.    Let 

us  fuppofe  two  young  men  with  tiie  fame  abilities  and  convenien- 

cieSj  but  under  no  obligation  of  knowing  algebra  ;   one    ol  them 

applies  himfL-if  to  this  fcience,  and  the  other  does  not  ;  though  tlîc 

action  of  the  one  and  the  other's  cmiirion,  are  by  themlelvejv>f  an 

imputable  nature  ;  yet  in   this  c<'fe  they  can  be  neither  good  nor 

bad.      But  were  we  to  fuppofe  that  tht(è  two  yonn;i  men  are  de- 

ligned  by  their  prince,  the  one  for  fome  office  of  ftate,  and  the 

other  for  a  military  einployri-;cnt  :  in  this  c-afe,  their  application 

ornegle6t  ininflmctingtaenf-'lvesinjurifprudiince,  for  example,  or 

in  the  mathematics,  would  be  juHly  imputed  to  them.    T  he  rcafcn 

is,  they  sre  both   indifpenfibly  c>bliged  to  acquire  fuch   knowlecigc 

as  isneceilary  for  difch.îrging  properly  the  offices  or  employmc-nts 

to  which  rhey  are  called.     Hence  it  is  evident,  that  as  imputabiiity 

luppnfeth  the  power  of  ai51:ing    or  not  ailing  ;  actual    imputation 

requires,  moreover,  that  a  pcrfon  be    under  an  obligation  of  doing 

either  one  or  the  other. 

2.  Tmputn.  y^  ^^  When  We  i'Tipu'e  an  af^ion  to  a  perfon,  we  render  him, 
ies"ioniè'°  ^^  ^^^  ^^^"  already  cbf-'rvcdjar.rwerable  for  the  good  or  bail  confe- 
conne^ion  quences  of  what  he  has  done.  From  thence  it  f>jl!o.w?,  that  in  or- 
bjtwten  .  (jer  to  make  a  juîi:  imputation,  there  muft  be  fome  neceiVary  cr 
uie  action  ^ccidciit;;!  coimtxion   between  the  thinsrdone  or  on-.i:tcd,  and  the 

^  g-)OJ 


Natural  Law.  149 

good  or  bad  confequences  ofthe  aflion  or  omifTion  ;  and  befides,  ^"^  its 
the  agent  muft  have  hadfome  knowledge  of  this  connexion,  or  at  con.equcn- 
leaft  he  mufl:  have  been  able  to  have  a  probable  forefight  of  the 
effects  of  his  a6lion.  Otherwife  the  imputation  cannot  take  place, 
as  will  appear  by  a  few  examples.  A  gunf.uith  L-lls  arms  to  a 
man  who  has  the  appearance  of  a  fenfible,  fedate  perfon,  and 
does  not  feem  to  have  any  bad  dcfign.  And  yet  this  man  goes 
inflantly  to  make  an  unjuH:  attack  on  another  perfon,  and  kills 
him.  Here  the  gunfmith  is  not  at  all  chargeable,  having  done 
nothing  but  what  he  has  a  right  to  do  ;  and  befides,  he  neither 
could  nor  ought  to  have  forefeen  what  happened.  But  if  a  perfon 
carelefsly  leaves  a  pair  of  pidols  charged  on  the  table,  in  a  place 
expofed  to  every  bcdy,  and  a  child  infenfible  ot  the  danger  happens 
to  wound  or  kill  himfeU"  i  the  lormer  is  certainly  anfwerable  for 
the  misfortune  :  by  reafon  this  was  a  clear  and  immediate  confe- 
quenceof  what  he  has  done,  and  he  could  and  ought  to  have  fore- 
Iccn  it. 

We  muft  reafon  in  the  fame  manner  with  refpc-<Sl  to  an  aélion 
produ]6tive  of  fome  good.  This  good  cannot  be  attributed  to  a 
ptrfon,  that  hiS  been  the  caufeof  it  without  knowledge  (^r  thought 
thereof.  But  in  order  to  merit  thanks  and  acknowledgment,  there 
is  no  necelTity  of  our  being  intirely  fure  of  fuccefs  ;  it  is  fufficient 
there  w^s  room  to  reafonably  prcfume  it,  and  were  the  effe6t  abfo- 
lutely  to  f^i.'j  the  intention  v;ould  not  be  the  lefs  commendable. 

VL  3.  But  in  order  to  afcend  to  the  firfl  principles  of  this'the-  o-  ^oun- 
ory,  we  muft  obferve,  that  as  man  is  fuppofed  to  be  obiiped  by  his  ^^"?"*  °\ 
nature  and  Itate  to  tullow  certam  rules  of  conduct  ;  the  obiervance  dcn-.cnt. 
of  thofe  rules  conditutes  the  perfection  cf  his  nature  and  ftate  ;  and,. 
on  îhi  contrar)-,  the  infringing  of  them  forms  the  degradation  of 
both.  Now  wc  are  mad^  after  fuch  a  manner,  that  pcrfecStion 
and  order  pleafe  us  of  therrfelves  ;  while  impcrfeâicn  and  (iifurdcr, 
and  whatever  relates  thereto,  naturally  difpieafe  us.  Confequently, 
wc  acknowledge  that  th(,fe  who,  anfwcring  the  end  they  were 
GeHgntd  for,  perforni  their  duty,  and  contribute  thus  to  the  gccd 
and  perfection  ofthe  human  fyftem,  are  dcferving  of  our  approba- 
tion, efteem,  and  benevolence;  ih.at  they  may  reafonably  expeCl 
ihefef-ntimentsin  their  favour,  and  hive  fome  iort  cf  rigltt  to  the 
advantageous  eft"ccts  which  naturally  arifc  from  thence.  We  can- 
not, on  the  contrary,  avoid  condemning  thofe,  who,  through  a 
baJ  r.lc  of  their  faculties,  dc&rade  their  own  ftate  and  nature  ;  wc: 
contef;  they  are  wen  thy  of  diiapprobation  and  blame,  and  that  it  Is 
:gr-2ibL*  t  J  rcai'jn,  the  bad  ? fFccls  of  their  cunduCl  fhou'.d  L\\  up- 


150  Tl)e  Principled  of 

on  themfelvcs.     Such  arc  the  foundations  of  merit  and  demerit. 

In  what  VII.  M^rit  ther-:for3  is  a  quah'ty  which  intitles  us  to  the  ap- 

nierit  and  probation,  eiteem,  and  benevolence  of  our  fiperiors  or  equals,  and 
deinerit  jq  the  aJ^^antagcs  from  thence  refulting.  Demerit  is  an  oppofite 
Goaiis.  q-jjlity,  which  rendering  us  worthy  of  ihe  ccnfure  and  blame  of 
thofj  with  wnom  we  converfe,  obliges  u^,  as  it  were^  to  ackn  'w- 
Icdge  that  it  is  reafonabls  they  fhould  entertain  thofe  f-numents 
tO'Vards  us  ;  and  that  we  are  under  a  melanchi>!y  obligation  ol  bear- 
ing the  bad  effefls  that  flow  from  thence. 

Th'îfe  notions  of  merit  and  dem.Tit,  have  therefKe,  it  is  pljin, 
their  foundation  in  th^  very  nature  of  thing',  and  are  perf.ifliy 
agreeable  t^  com  non  fenfe  and  th;  notions  generally  received. 
Praife  and  bla.iie,  where  people  judge  rcafonab'y,  always  follow 
t'le  qiality  of  a>l:ions,  according  as  they  are  morally  good  or  bad. 
This  is  clear  wit'T  refped  to  the  legifi.itor  :  he  mull  contradi6i 
himfelf  in  the  grofl'.'ft  manner,  were  he  pot  to  approve  what  is 
conformable,  and  to  conJemn  v/hat  is  oppofite  to  his  laws.  And 
£S  for  thofe  that  depend  on  him,  this  very  dépendance  obliges  them 
to  regulate  their  judgment  on  this  fubjjct. 

VIII.  4.  We  have  already  *  obferved,  that  fome  actions    are 
4.  Merit    better  than  others,  iml  that  bad  ones  may  likewife  be   more  or  lef> 

anduemor-  ^  ,.  ■       1  rr  ■  n  \  11  1 

it  have       '°'  according  to  the  d  iFerent  circumltanccs  that  attf  nd  them,   and 
tlieir    dc-    the  difpohtion  of  the  perfon  that  does  them.     Merit  and  demerit 
gi-ccs;  and  have  therefore  their  degrees  j     they    may  be   greater  or  lefTer. 
fo  has  im-  VVhercfore  when  we  are  to  determine  cxjclly  how  far  an.  aâion 
»^"  ■*  '^  '     ouj,ht  to  be  i.nputed   to  a  pcrfon,  we  fiiould  have  regard  to  thcfe 
diiîl;rences  ;  and  the  praife  or  blame,  the  recompence  or  punifli- 
nient,  ought  likewife  to  have  their  degrees    in  proportion  to  the 
merit  or  demerit.     Thus,  according  as  th?  good  or  evil  proreed- 
ingfrom  an  adion  is  more  or  Icfs  confiderable  ;  according  as  there 
WiS  more  or  lefs  facility  or  dilTiculty  to  perform  or  to  abltain  from 
this  a'Sfion  ;  according  as  it  w.;s  done  v/ith  more  or  X^.'ii  refle(5tion 
and  liberty  ;  and    fm^Hy,  according  as  the   reafons  that  ought   to 
have  determined  iis  thereto,  or  diverted  us  fro:ii   it,  were  more  or 
Icfs  llrong, and  the  intention  and  motives  were  more  or  lefs  noble 
and  gen-^rous  ;  the  imputation  is  made  after  a  more  or  lefs   effica- 
cious manner,  and  its  efiecls  are  more  or  lefs  profitable  or  perni- 
cious. 

IX.  5. 

•  Part  i.  chjp.  xi,  §  12. 


"Natural  Law.  151 

IX.  5.  rmputation,  as  we  have  already  hinted,  miy  be  made  by  jf.  Imputa- 
diff.reni  pc-rfons  :  and  it  is  eafy  to  comprehend,  that  in  thofe  dif-  ^'""  's^''^* 
reroatCAics,  tie  err.  CIS  thereot  are  net  always  the  lame:  but  that  cf^^^j^gyg, 
they  mult  be  more  or  lefs  important,  according  to  the  quality  of  ^ 
the  perfons,  and  the  different  right  they  have  in  this  refpeil.  Wr 
Sometimes  imputation  is  confined  fimply  to  praife  or  blame  ;  and 

at  other  times  it  goes  further.  This  gives  us  room  to  diltinguifh 
two  I'orts  of  imputation,  one  firiplc-,  and  the  other  efficacious. 
Tne  firft  conflits  only  in  approving  or  difipproving  the  action  ; 
infomuch  that  no  other  efFi.61  ariGs  from  thence  with  regard  to 
the  agent.  But  the  fécond  is  not  confined  to  blame  or  praife  ;  it 
produces  moreover  fome  good  or  bad  eff^cil:  with  regard  to  the  agent  « 
that  i«,  fome  real  and  poiitive  good  or  evil  that  befals  him. 

X.  6.  Simple  imputation   may  be  made  indifferently  by  every 

one,  whether  they  have  or  have  not  a  particular  and  perfonal  in-  "^^««^sof 
terefl  in  the  doing  or  omitting  of  the  aâion  :  it  is  fufficient  they  ^^^l^^  ^-^ 
have  a  general  and  indiredt  intereft.  And  as  we  may  affirm  that 
all  the  members  of  (ociety  are  interefted  in  the  due  obfervance  of 
the  laws  of  nature,  hence  they  have  all  a  right  to  praife  or  condemn 
another  man'?  aétions  according  as  they  are  conformable  or  con- 
trary to  thofe  laws.  They  have  even  a  kind  of  obligation  in  this 
refpedl.  The  regard  they  owe  to  the  legiflator  and  his  laws,  re- 
quires it  of  them  ;  and  they  would  be  wanting  in  their  duty  to 
lociety  and  to  individuals,  were  they  not  to  teflify,  at  leaft  by  their 
approbation  c  r  cenfure,  the  eftecm  they  have  for  probity  and  vir- 
tue, and  their  averlion,  on  the  contrary,  to  iniquityand  vice. 

But  with  reganl  to  efficacious  imputation,  in  order  to  render  it 
lawful,  we  {hould  have  a  particular  and  direct  intereft  in  the  per- 
forming or  omitting  oftheadtion.  Now  thofe  who  have  fuch  an 
intereft,  are,  firftly,  perfons  whom  it  concerns  to  regulate  the  ac- 
tions ;  fecondly,  fuch  as  are  the  objeft  thereof,  namely,  thofe  to- 
wards whom  we  a£f,  and  to  whofe  advantage  or  prejudice  the 
thing  may  turn.  Thus  a  fovereign  who  has  enabled  laws,  who 
commands  certain  things  with  a  promife  of  recompence,  and 
prohibits  others  under  a  commination  of  punifhment,  ought  with- 
out doubt  to  concern  himfelf  about  the  obfervance  of  his  laws, 
and  hasconfequently  a  right  to  impute  the  actions  of  his  fubjeds 
after  an  efficacious  manner,  that  is,  to  reward  or  punilh  them. 
The  fame  may  be  faid  of  a  perfon  who  has  received  fome  injury  or 
damage  by  another  man's  aflion  :  this  very  thing  gives  him  a 
right  to  impute  the  adtion  efficacioufly  to  its  author,  in  order  to 
obtain  a  juft  fatisfa^lion,  and  a  reafonabk  indemnification. 

XI.  7. 


♦» 


152  The  Principles^/* 

7.  If  All        XI.  7.  It  may  therefore  happen,  that  feveral  pcrfons  have  a 
thofe  who  j-jght  to  impute  each  on  his  fide,  the   fame   aclion  to  the   perfon 


are  con- 


cerned, do  ^'^^  ^^'^  '^  >  hecaufe  this  a£lion  may  interefl  them  in  different  re- 

»  impute  fpecSls.  And  in  that  cafe,  if  any  of  the  perfons  concerned  has  a 
aaion,  mind  to  relinquilh  his  right,  by  not  imputing  the  adion  to  the 
itis  uppo-  aggpjt  Cq  f3^  ^5  |j  concerns  himfelf  ;  this  does  not  in  any  fhape 
have  been  Prejudice  the  right  of  the  lefl,  which  is  no  way  in  his  power. 
*io:ie.  When  a  m-indoes  me  an  injury,  I  may  indeed  forgive  him,  as  to 

what  concerns  myfelf  ;  but  this  does  not  diminifh  the  right  the 
fovereign  may  have  to  take  cognizance  of  the  injury,  and  to  punifli 
the  author,  as  an  infringer  of  the  law,  and  a  difturber  of  the  civil 
order  and  government.  But  if  thofe  who  are  interelled  in  the  ac- 
tion, are  willing  not  to  impute  it,  and  all  jointly  forgive  the  inju- 
ry and  the  crime  ;  in  this  cafe  the  aclion  ought  to  be  morally 
efteemed  as  never  committed^  becaufe  it  is  not  attended  with  any 
moral  efFeiSl. 

8.    BlfTtr-       XII.  8.   Let  US,  in  fine,  obferve,  that  there  is  fome  difference 

cnce  be-     between  the  imputation    of  good  and  bad   acElions.      When  the 

tween   the  legiflator  has  eftablifhed  a  certain  recompence  for  a  good  aftion,  he 

oT^"ood°"  obliges  himfelf  to  give  this  recompence,  and  he  grants  a  right  of 

and°  bad    demanding  it  to  thofe  who  have  rendered  themfelves  worthy  there- 

s-dions,       of  by  their  fubmiffion  and  obedience.     But  with  refpeft  to  penalties 

enafled  againft  bad  actions,  the  legiflator  may  a<5lually  infîi6l  them, 

if  he  has  a  mind,  and  has  an  inconteftable  right  to  do  it  ;  infomuch 

that  the  criminal   cannot  reafonably  complain  of  the  evil    he    is 

marie  to  undergo,  becaufe  he  has  dravi'n  it  upon  himfelf  through 

,     his  difobedience.     But  it  does  not   from  thence  enfue,  that  the 

fovereign  is  obliged  to  punifh    to  the   full  rigour  ;  he  is  always 

niaftertoexercife  his  right, or  to  fhevv  grace  ;  to  intirely  remit,  or 

to  diminifh  the  punifhment  ;  and'he  may  have  very  good  reafons 

for  doing  either. 

CHAP.    XI. 

Application  of  thofe  principles  to  different  [pedes  of  aâîionsy  in  order 
to  judge  in  what  manner  they  ought  to  he  imputed. 

-^ru  .    o-  W  E  might  be  fatisfied  with  the  general  principles  âbovr 

What  afci-  ,.,,'*  .='  r  r  1  1  1-      ^-  r  .u  j 

ons  arc  ac-  '^'^'  down,  vvere  It  notufeful  to  make  an  applicitioa  or  them,  ana 

tually  im-  to  point  out  patricularly  thofe  a  étions  or  evcnis  for  which  we  are, 

puted  ?       or  are  not  anfwcrable. 

I.  And 


^ 


Natural  Law.  153 

1.  And  in  the  firft  place  it  follows,  from  what  has  been  hither- 
to faici,  that  we  may  impute  to  a  perfon  every  a£l!on  or  omiflion, 
of  which  he  is  the  author  or  caufe,  and  which  he  could  or  ought  to 
have  done  or  omitted. 

2.  Theadlionsof  thofe  who  have  not  the  iife  of  reafon,  fuch  as  Aflioris  of 
infants,  fools,  and  madmen,  ought   not  to  be  imputed  to  them.  ^^^^   ^^^^ 
The  want  of  knowledge  hinder?^  in  fuch  cafes,  imputation.     For  the  ufe  of 
thefe  perfonsbeing  incapabfe  of  knowing  what  they  are  doing,  or  reafon. 

of  comparing  it  with  the  laws  ;  their  adtions  are  not  properly  hu- 
man actions,  nor  do  they  include  any  mo-^ality.  If  wefcold  or 
beat  a  child,  it  is  not  by  way  of  puniihment  ;  it  is  only  a  fimple 
correflion,  by  which  we  propofe  prirKipally  to  hinder  him  from 
contraéting  a  bad  habit. 

3.  With  regard   to  what  is  done  in  drunkennefs,   this  flate  ^^  what's 
voluntarily   contraded   does  not   hinder  the   imputation  of  a  bad  ^j^unkca- 
adion.  nefs. 

II.  4.  We  do  not  impute  things  that  are  really  above  a  perfon's  Of   thing» 
ftrength  ;  no  more  than  the  omiflion   of  a  thing  commanded,  if  that  are 
there  has  been  no  opportunity  of  doing  it.       For  the  imputation  of  >^po'=''hle. 
an  omiflion  manifeftly  fuppofes  thefe  two  things  j  firft,  that  a  per-  ■^antofon- 
fon  has  had  (ufficient  ftrength  and  means  to  act  ;  and  fccondly,  that  portunity. 
he  could  have  made  ufe  of  thofe  means,  without   any  prejudice  to 

fomc  other  more  indifpenfible  duty,  or  without  drawing  uponhim- 
felf  a  confiderablc  evil,  to  which  there  was  no  obligation  of  being 
expufed.  It  muft  be  underftood  however,  that  the  perfbn  has  not 
brought  himfelf  into  an  incapacity  of  afling  through  his  own  fault  ; 
for  then  the  legiflator  might  as  lawfully  punifh  thofe  who  have 
reduced  themfelves  to  this  incapacity,  as  if  they  had  refufed  to  a£l 
when  they  were  capable  of  complying.  Such  was  at  Rome  the 
cafe  of  thofe  who  cut  off  their  thumbs,  in  order  to  difable  themfelves 
from  handling  arms,  and  to  be  exempted  from  the  fervice.  In  like 
manner  a  debtor  is  not  excufable,  when,  through  hisown  mifcon- 
du£l,  he  has  rendered  himfelf  unable  to  difchargc  his  debts.  And 
we  even  become  defervedly  refponfible  for  a  thing  in  itfelf  impoffi- 
ble,  if  we  have  undertaken  to  do  it,  when  we  knew,  or  might  ea- 
fily  have  known,  that  itfurpaflcd  our  ftrength  ;  in  cafe  any  body 
happens  by  this  means  to  be  injured. 

III.  5.  The  natural  qualities  of  body  or  mind  cannot  of  ihem-  Of  natural 
felves  be  imputed,  either  as  good  or  evil.     But  a  perfon  is  deferv-  l^ahiies, 
ing  of  praife,  when  by  his  application  and  care  thefe  qualities  are 
perfected,  or  thefe  defeats  are  mended  j  and,  on  the  contrary,  one 

U  is 


154-  ^^  Principles  of 

is  juftly  accountable  for  the  imperfe(5lions  aind  infirmities  that  arifc 

from  bad  conduit  or  neglefl. 
Cf   events      6.  The  effects  of  external  caufos  and  events,  of  what  kind  fo- 
produced     ever,  cannot  be  attributed  to  a  perfon,  either  as  good  or  evil,  but 
by  external  Jnafmuch  as  he  could  and  ought  to  procure,  hinder,  or dircdl  them, 

and  as  he   has  been  either   careful  or   nek,ligent  in  this   refptft. 

Thus  we  charge  a  good  or  bad  harveft  to  a  hufbandman's  account, 

according  as  he  has  tilled  well  or  ill  the  ground,  vhofe  culture  was 

committed  to  his  care. 

Of  what  i»      IV.  7.  As  for  things  done  through  error  or  ignorance,-  we  may 
^°^^  affirm  in  general,  that  a  perfon  is  not  anfwcrable  for  what  he  has 

ignorance  ^^nc  through  invincible  ignorance,  efpecially  as  it  \'^  invokmiary 
«r  error,  ir'  its  origin  and  caufe.  If  a  prince  travels  through  his  own  do- 
minions difguifcd  and  Incogynto-,  hiâ  fubje£ls  are  not  to  blame  for 
not  paying  him  the  refpedl  and  honour  due  to  him.  But  we  Oiould 
rcaionably  impute  an  unjuft  fcntence  to  a  judge,  who  negleéting  to 
infh'udl  himfelf  either  in  the  fa£l  or  the  law,  fhould  happen  to  want 
the  knowledge  neceflary  to  decide  with  equity.  But  the  poflibiiity 
cf  getting  inftruiStion,  and  the  care  we  ought  to  take  for  this  pur- 
f>ofe,  are  not  (Iriétly  confidered  in  the  common  run  of  life;  we  on- 
ly look  upon  what  is  poflible  or  impoffible  in  a  çnoral  fenfe,  and 
with  a  due  regard  to  the  a6lual  flate  of  humanity. 

Ignorance  or  error,  iiï  point  of  laws  and  duties,  generally  paffes 
for  volimtary,  and  does  not  ob(lru£t  the  imputation  of  a6tions  or 
omiiTions  from  thence  arifmg.  This  is  a  conftquence  of  the  prin- 
ciples *  already  enabliflied.  But  there  may  happen  fome  particular 
cafes,  wherein  the  nature  of  the  thing,  which  of  itfelf  is  difficult 
to  inveftigate,  joined  to  the  chara£ïer  and  flate  of  the  perfon  whofe 
faculties  being  natu.*ally  limited,  have  likewife  been  uncultivated 
for  want  of  education  and  alTiflance,  renders  the  error  utifurmount- 
able,  and  confequently  worthy  of  ejccufe.  It  concerns  the  pru- 
dence of  the  legiflator  to  weigh  thefc  circumftancesi  and  to  modify 
the  imputation  on  this  footing. 

Of  the  cf.  ^ •  8.  Though  temperament,  habits,  and  pafïîons,  have  of 
fedoftcm-  themfelves  a  great  force  to  determine  fome  adlions  ;  yet  this 
perament,  force  is  not  fuch  as  abfolutely  hinders  the  ufe  of  reafon  and  liberty, 
hajits  or  ^^  i^^j^  j^  refpeft  to  the  execution  of  the  bad  dcfigns  they  infpire. 
That  is  what  all  legiflators  fuppofe  ;  and  a  very  good  reafon  they 
have  to  fuppofe  it.  f     Natural  difpofitions,  habits,  and  pafllon?,  do 

not 

•   See  j)art  i.    chap.  i.  §  iz, 
•f  Ssc  fart  J.  cljap,  ji   5  i<^- 


^^ifiuiis. 


Natural  Law.  155 

not  determine  men  invincibly  to  violate  the  laws  of  nature.  Thefa 
diforders  of  the  foul  are  not  incuriible  ;  with  fome  pains  and  afliJui- 
ty  one  may  contrive  to  remove  them,  according  to  Cicero's  obfer- 
vation,  who  alledges  to  this  purpofe  the  example  of  Socrates.  § 

But  ifvjiiftead  of  endeavouring  to  C(^rre6l  ihefe  vicious  dilpofi- 
tions,  we  ftrengthen  thsm  by  habit,  this  does  not  render  us  inexcu- 
iable.  The  power  of  habit  is,  indeed,  very  great  ;  it  even  ri;ems  to 
impel  JUS  by  a  kind  of  neceflity.  And  yet  experience  fhcws  it  is 
not  impoflible  to  mailer  it,  when  we  are  ferioully  refolved  to  make 
the  attempt.  And  were  it  even  true  that  inveterate  habits  had  a 
greater  command  over  us  than  reafon  ;  yet  as  it  was  in  our  power  not 
to  contrail  them,  they  do  not  at  all  diminifh  the  immorality  of 
bad  aclions,  and  confequently  they  cannot  hinder  them  from  being 
imputed.  On  the  contrary,  as  a  virtuous  habit  renders  aélions 
more  commendable  ;  fo  the  habit  of  vice  cannot  but  augment  its 
blam.e  and  demerit.  In  {hort,  if  inclinations,  paflions,  or  habits, 
could  fruflrate  the  efFedl  of  laws,  it  would  be  needlefs  to  trouble  - 
our  heads  about  any  direéllon  of  human  adlions  ;  for  the  principal 
objefl  of  laws  in  general  is  to  corre£l  bad  inclinations,  to  prevent 
vicious  habits,  to  hinder  their  effeifls,  and  to  eradicate  the  pafîions  ; 
ùr  at  lead  to  contain  them  within  their  proper  limits. 

VI.  9.  The  different  cafes  hitherto  expofed,  contain  nothing  Of  forced 
very  difficult  or  puzzling.      There  are  fome  others  a  little  more  2<aion». 
cmbarraflîng  which  require  a  particular  difcuflion. 

The  firfl  queflion  is,  what  we  are  to  think  of  forced  allions; 
whether  they  are  of  an  imputable  nature,  and  ought  aétually  to  be 
imputed  ? 

lanfwer,  i.  That  a  phyfical  violence,  and  fuch  as  abfolutely 
cannot  be  redded,  produces  an  involuntary  ailion,  which  fo  far 
from  meriting  to  be  adlually  imputed,  is  not  even  of  an  imputable 
nature.  +  In  this  cale,  the  author  of  the  violence  is  the  true  and 
only  caufe  of  the  a£lion,  and  as  fuch  is  the  only  perfon  anfwerable 
for  it;  whilft  the  immediate  agent  being  merely  palTive,  the  fa(5l 
can  be  no  more  attributed  to  him  than  to  the  fword,  to  the  flick, 
or  to  any  other  weapon  with  which  the  blow  or  wound  was  given. 

2.  But  if  the  con  (Irai  ntarifes  from  the  apprehenfion  or  fear  of 
fome  great  evil,  with  which  we  are  menaced  by  a  perfon  more 
powerful  than  ourfelves,  and  who  is  able  inftantly  to  infîi£l  it  ;  it 
muft  be  allowed,  that  the  a£lion  done  in  confequence  of  this  fear, 
does  not  ceale  to  be  voluntary,  and  therefore,  generally  fpeaking, 

it 


§  Tufcul  quaift.  lib.  4.  cip.  37. 
t    See§l. 


ISO  TÏjc  Principles  of 

it  is  of  an  imputable  nature.  *  ^ 

In  order  to  know  afterwards  whether  it  ought  actually  to  b.e 
impvited,  It  is  necefTary  to  inquire,  whether  the  perfon  on  whom 
the  ccn(traint  is  laid,  is  under  a  rigorous  obligation  of  doing  or  ab- 
ftaining  from  a  thing,  at  the  hazard  of  (uffering  the  evil  with 
which  he  is  menaced.  If  fj,  and  he  determines  contrary  to  his 
duty,  the  conflraint  is  nota  fufficienj:  reafon  to  fcreen  him  abfo- 
hitely  from  imputation.  For  generally  'fpeaking,  it  cannot  be 
queflioned  but  a  lawful  fuperior  can  lav  us  under  an  indifpennble 
obligation  of  obeying  his  orders,  at  the  hazard  of  bodily  pain,  an.d 
even  at  the  rifk  of  our  lives. 

tior"are'in  ^^^'  PiJi'^^ani  to  thefe  principles,  we  mufl  diftinguifh  between 
thenifclv  es  indifferent  alliens,  and  thole  that  are  morally  neceflary.  An  a6tion 
either  indifferent  in  its  nature,  extorted  by  main  force,  cannot  be  impu- 
gcod  bad,  ^gj  J  J  jj^g  perfon  conflrained  j  becaufe,  not  being  under  any  ob? 
ent"  '  '  ligation  in  this  refpeft,  the  author  of  the  violence  has  no  right  to 
require  any  thing  of  him.  And  as  the  law  of  nature  exprefsly  for- 
bids all  manner  of  violence,  it  cannot  authorife  it  at  the  fame 
time,  by  laying  the  perfon  thatfufFers  the  violence,  under  a  nece{- 
iity  of  executing  a  thing  to  which  he  has  given  only  a  forced  con- 
fent.  Thus  every  forced  promife  or  convention  is  null  of  itfelf, 
and  has  nothing  in  it  obligatory  as  a  promife  or  convention  ;  on 
the  contrary,  it  may  and  o^ight  to  be  imputed  as  a  crime  to  the 
author  of  the  violence.  But  were  we  to  fuppofe  that  the  perfon 
who  ufes  the  conflraint,  cxercifes  in  this  refpe£l  his  own  right, 
and  purfues  the  execution  thereof;  the  a£fion,  though  forced,  is 
ftill  valid,  and  attended  with  ail  its  moral  tfFcfls.  Thus  a  debtor, 
who  void  of  any  principle  of  honefly,  fatisfies  his  creditor  only 
through  imminent  fear  of  imprifonment,  or  of  execution  on  his 
good?,  cannot  complain  againft  this  payment,  as  made  by  con- 
iiraint  and  violence,  for  being  under  an  obligation  of  paying 
his  juft  debts,  he  ought  to  have  done  it  willingly  and  of  his  own 
accord,  inflead  of  being  obliged  to  it  by  force. 

As  for  good  a61ions,  to  which  a  perfon  is  determined  by  force, 
and,  3S  it  were,  through  fear  of  blows  or  punifhment,  they  pafs  for 
nothing,  and  merit  neither  praife  nor  recompence.  The  reafon 
hereof  is  obvious.  The  obedience  required  by  the  law  ought  to 
be  fmccre  ;  and  we  fhould  difcharge  our  duties  through  a  confci- 
entious  principle,  voluntarily,  and  with  our  own  confcnt  and  free 
will. 

Finall}', 

•  See  part  i.  chap.  ii.  §  12. 


Natural  Law.  157 

Finally,  \Aith  regard  to  anions  manifeftly  bad  or  criminal,  to 
which  aperfon  is  forced  through  fear  of  fome  great  evil,  and  ef* 
pecially  death  ;  we  muft  lay  down  as  a  general  rule,  that  the  unhap- 
py circumftances  under  which  a  perfon  labours,  may  indeed  dimin- 
ifli  the  crime  of  a  man  unequal  to  this  trial,  who  commits  abad 
a£lioii  in  fpite  of  himfeU,  and  againft  his  own  inward  conviction  ; 
yet  (lie  a<5tion  remains  intrinfically  vicious,  and  worthy  of  cenlure  ; 
"ivhcrefore  it  may  be,  and  aiflually  is  imputed,  unlefs  the  exception 
of  nccefïity  can  be  alkdged  in  the  person's  favour, 

VIII.  This  laft  rule  is  a  confcquence  of  the  principles  hitherto  ^\^^ya 
eftablifhed.  A  man  who  determines  through  fear  ot  fome  great  bid  aâîoa, 
evil,  but  without  fufFering  any  phyfical  violence,  to  do  a  tning  vif-  ^^^"^^^ 
ibiy  criminal,  concurs  in  f<;me  manner  to  the  a6t;on,  and  a£ls  vol-  ^  '^^ 
untarily,  though  witii  regret.  It  dots  not  abfoluttly  furpafs  the  iaipuied. 
fortitude  of  the  human  mind  to  refolve  to  fufFer,  nay  to  die,  rather 
than  be  wanting  in  our  duty.  We  fee  a  great  many  people  who 
have  a  courage  of  this  kind  for  very  frivolous  fubjeéls,  which 
make  a  lively  impreflion  on  them  ;  and  though  the  thing  be  really 
difficult,  yet  it  is  not  impoffible.  The  legiflator  may  therefore, 
impofe  a  rigorous  obligation  of  obeying,  and  have  juft  reafons  for 
fo  doing.  Theintereft  of  fuciety  frequently  requires  examples  of 
undaunted  conftancy.  It  was  never  a  queftion  ainong  civilized 
nations,  and  thofe  that  had  imbibed  any  principles  of  morality, 
whether,  for  example,  it  was  lawful  to  betray  one's  country  for  the 
prefervation  of  life  ?  And  it  is  well  known  that  the  oppofite  max- 
im was  a  received  principle  among  the  Greeks  and  Romans. 
Sever::!  heathen  moral  ids  have  (Irongly  inculcated  this  do>5trine, 
namely,  that  the  dread  of  pains  and  torments  ought  not  to  prevail 
upon  any  man  to  make  hiin  do  things  contrary  to  religion  or 
juftice.  If  you  are  futnmined  as  a  U'itne/s^  fays  a  Latin  poet,  in 
a  dubious  ayid  equivocal  cff-iir^  tell  the  truth,  and  do  not  be  afraid  ^ 
tell  it^  were  even  Phalai'is  to  menace  you  with  his  bull  unlefs  you 
bore  falfe  witncfs.  Fix  it  as  a  maxim  in  your  mind^  that  it  is  the 
grcatcji  of  evils  to  prefer  life  to  honour  ;  and  never  attempt  to  pre^ 
fervc  it  at  the  expence  of  the  only  thing  that  can  render  it  defirahle. 

Ambiguës  fi  quando  citahere  tejlis 
Jncertxque  rei  ;    Phalaris  licet  imperet^  ut  fis 
Falfus^  CSf  admoto  diéfet  perjuria  taurs^ 
fummufn  crede  nefas  animafnpresferre  p'udori', 
pt  propter  vitam  vivendi  perdere  caujas. 

JuvEN,  fat.  viii.  ver.  ^o. 
And 


5 8  l*he  Principles  of 

And  if  a  wttnefs  in  a  doubtful  caufe^ 

IVhere  a  bribed  judge  means  ti  elude  the  laws  ; 

Though  Phalaris's  brazen  hull  v:ere  there^ 

And  he  would  diâlate  what  he\l  have  you  fiuear. 

Be  not  Jo  profligate^  but  rather  chufe 

To  guard  your  ho?iour^  and  your  Itfe  to  lofe^ 

Rather  than  let  your  virtue  be  betrayed^ 

Virtue  !  the  noblejl  can fe  for  which  you're  made. 


Stepney, 


Such  is  the  rule.  It  may  happen  neverihelefj,  as  we  have  already 
hinted,  that  the  neceflity  a  perfon  is  under,  may  furnifh  a  favour-r 
able  exception,  fo  as  to  hinder  the  a£lion  from  being  imputed. 
To  explain  thiF,  we  {hou'd  be  obliged  to  enter  into  fome  particulars 
that  belong  to  another  place.  It  is  fufficient  here  to  obferve,  that 
the  circumftances  a  perfoii  is  under,  give  us  frequent  room  to  form  a 
reafonable  prefumption,  that  the  Icgiflator  himfelf  excufes  him  from 
fufFering  the  evil  with  which  he  is  menaced,  and  therefore  allows 
him  to  deviate  from  the  decifion  of  the  law;  and  this  may  be  al- 
ways prefumed,  when  the  fide  a  perfon  take?,  in  order  to  extricate 
himfelf  from  his  perplexity,  includes  a  lefTer  evil  than  that  with 
which  he  is  menaced. 

Puffeir-  ^^'  But  PufFendorf's  principles  concerning  this  quefi ion  feem 

dorf'sopin,  to  be  neither  jult  in  themfelves,  nor  well  connected.        He  lays 
ion.  down  as  a  rule,  that  conftrainr,  as   well  as   phyfical  and  aflual 

violence,  excludes  all  imputation,  and  that  an  aétion  extorted 
through  fear,  ought  no  more  to  be  imputed  to  the  immediate 
agent,  than  to  the  fword  which  a  perfon  ufes  in  giving  a  wound. 
To  which  he  add?,  that  v/ith  regard  to  fome  very  infamous  aclion?, 
it  is  a  mark  of  a  generous  mind  to  chufe  rather  to  die  than  to  ferve 
as  an  inllrument  to  fuch  flagitious  deed?,  and  that  cafes  like  thefe 
ought  to  be  excepted.*  Bat  it  has  been  jurtly  obferved,  that  this 
author  gives  too  great  an  extent  to  the  efFe<St  of  conftraint  ;  and 
that  the  example  of  the  ax  or  fword,  which  are  mere  pafïïve  in- 
ftruments,  proves  nothing  at  all.  Befides,  if  the  general  principle 
is  folid,  we  don't  fee  why  hefhould  have  excepted  particular  cafes  ; 
or  at  lead  he  ought  to  have  given  us  fome  rule  to  diftinguifh  thofe 
exceptions  with  certainty. 

X.  10.  But 

•  See  the  Duties  of  Man  and  a  Citizen,  book  i.  chap  i.  §  14.  and  the  Law 

•f  Nature  and  Nations,  book  i.  chap,  v,  §  9.  with  Earbeyrac's  Botes. 


N  A  T  U  R  A  L    L  A  W«  159 

X.  10.  But  If  the  perfon  who  does  a  bad  a£lion  through  fear,  Of  aflioni 
is  generally  anfwerable  for  it,  the  author  of  the  conflraint  is  not  '"  which 
lefs  fo  ;  and  we  may  juftly  render  him  accountable  for  the  (hare  f^ng^than 
he  has  had  therein.  one  arc 

This  çives  an  opportunity  to  add  a  few  reflections  on  ihcfe  cafes  coDceroed- 
ift  which  feveral  perfons  concur  to  the  fame  a£tion  ;  and  to  eftab- 
lifli  fotne  principles  whereby  we  may  determine  in  what  manner 
the  aéîion  of  one  perfon  is  imputable  to  another.  This  fubjedt 
being  of  great  ufc  and  importance,  deferves  to  be  treated  with 
exaéînefs. 

1.  Every  man,  {lri(Stly  fpeaking,  is  anfwerable  only  for  his  own 
aftions,  that  is,  for  what  he  himfelf  has  done  or  omitted  :  for  with 
regard  to  another  perfon's  adions,  they  cannot  be  imputed  to  us, 
but  inafmuch  as  we  have  concurred  to  them,  and  as  we  could  and 
ought  to  have  procured,  hindered,  or  at  leaft  dire£led  them  after  a 
certain  manner.  The  thing  fpeaks  for  iifelf.  For  to  impute  ano- 
ther man's  a£lions  to  a  perfon,  is  declaring  that  the  latter  is  the 
efficient,  though  not  the  only  caufe  thereof;  and  confequently 
that  this  action  depended  in  fome  meafure  on  his  will,  either  in  its 
principle,  or  execution. 

2.  This  being  premifed,  we  may  affirm  that  every  man  is  un- 
der a  general  obligation  of  doing  all  he  can  to  induce  every 
other  perfon  to  difcharge  his  duty,  and  to  prevent  him  from  ccm- 
initting  a  bad  adtion,  and  confequently  not  to  contribute  thereto 
himfelf,  either  dire(5lly  or  indirciSlly,  with  a  premeditated  purpofe 
and  will. 

3.  By  a  much  ftronger  reafon  we  are  anfwerable  for  the  aélions 
of  thofe  over  whom  we  have  a  particular  infpeé^ion,  and  whofe  di- 
reétion  is  committed  to  our  care  j  wherefore  the  good  or  evil  done 
by  thofe  perfons,  is  not  only  imputable  to  themfelves,  but  likewife 
to  thofe  to  whole  dire£lion  they  are  fubjeél  ;  according  as  the  lat- 
ter have  taken  or  negle£ted  the  care  that  was  morally  neceflary, 
fuch  as  the  nature  and  extent  of  their  commiffion  and  power  re- 
quired. It  is  on  this  footing  we  impute,  for  example,  to  the  father 
of  a  family,  the  good  or  bad  condudl  of  his  children. 

4.  Let  us  obferve  likewife,  that  in  order  to  be  reafonably  ef- 
teemed  to  have  concurred  to  another  man's  aftion,  it  is  not  at  all 
neceflfary  for  us  to  be  fure  of  procuring  or  hindering  it,  by  doing  or 
omitting  particular  things  ;  it  is  fufficient,  in  this  refpe£l,  that  we 
hive  fome  probability,  or  verifimilitude.  And  as,  on  the  one 
fide,  this  default  of  certainty  does  not  excufe  neglect  j  on  the 
other,  if  we  have  done  all  that  we  ought,  the  want  of  fucccfs  can- 
rot  be  imputed  to  us  ;  the  blame  in  that  cafe  falls  intirely  upon  the 
immediate  authpr  of  the  adtion, 


Three 
fort^  of 
moral 
caufes  , 
principal 
fubaltern  ; 


1 60  The  Principles  of 

5.  In  fine,  it  is  proper  alfoto  remark,  that  in  the  queftion  n-^w 
before  u>,  we  are  not  inqiiiriiig  into  the  degree  of  virtue  or  rr^alice 
which  is  found  in  the  adtion  itielf,  and  rendering  it  better  or  worfe, 
augments  its  praife  or  cenfure,  its  recompenfe  or  punifhment.  All 
that  we  '.vant,  is  to  make  a  proper  ellimate  of  the  degree  oï  influ- 
ence a  perfon  has  had  over  another  man's  adlion,  in  order  to  know 
^vhsther  he  can  be  confidered  as  the  moral  caufe  thereof,  and  whcih- 
er  this  caufe  is  more  or  lefs  efficacious.  To  diftinguifh  this  prop- 
erly, is  a  matter  of  fome  importance. 

XI.  In  order  to  meafure,  as  it  v/cre,  this  degree  of  influence, 
which  decides  the  manner,  wherein  we  can  impute  to  any  one, 
another  man's  a6lion,  there  are  feveral  circumflances  and  diflinc- 
tions  to  obferve,  without  which  we  fliould  form  a  wrong  judg- 
ment of  things.     For  example,  it  is  certain  that  a  fimple  approba- 

and  collât-  tion,  generally  fpeaking,  has  much  lefs  efficacy  to  induce  a  perfoa 
cral.  to  a£t,  than  a  ftrong  perfuafion,  or  a  particular  instigation.     And 

yet  the  high  opinion  we  conceive  of  a  perfon.and  the  credit  from 
thence  arifing,  may  occafion  a  fimple  approbation  to  have  ft>me- 
times  as  great,  and  perhaps  a  greater  influence  over  a  man's  acSlion, 
than  the  moft  prefling  perfuafion,  or  the  flrongeft  inltigation 
from  another  quarter. 

We  may  range  under  three  different  clalTes,  the  moral  caufes 
that  influence  another  man's  a6lion.  Sometimes  it  is  a  principal 
caufe,  infomuch  that  the  perfoa  who  executes  is  only  a  fubaltern 
agent  ;  fometimes  the  immediate  agent,  on  thccontrar}',  is  the  prin- 
cipal caufe,  while  the  other  is  only  the  fubaltern  ;  and  ot  other 
times  they  are  both  collateral  caufes,  which  have  an  equal  influence 
over  the  ailion. 

XII.  A  perfon  ought  to  be  efleemed  the  principal  caufe,  who 
iîy  doing  or  omitting  foms  things,  influences  in  fijch  a  manner 
another  man's  a6lion  or  omiflion,  that,  were  it  not  for  him,  this 
aÛion  or  omiflion  would  not  have  happened,  though  the  immediate 
agent  has  knowingly  contributed  to  it.  An  officer,  by  cxprefs 
order  of  his  general  or  prince,  performs  an  action  evidently  bad  : 
in  this  cafe  the  prince  or  general  is  the  principal  caufe,  and  the 
officer  only  the  fubaltern.  David  was  the  principal  caufe  of  the 
death  of  Uriah,  though  Joab  contributed  thereto,  being  (ufficiently 
apprized  of  the  king's  intention.  In  like  manner  Jezebel  was  the 
principal  caufe  of  the  death  of  Naboth.  * 

I 


•  Sec  a.  Sam.  chap,  ji,  and  I  Kings,  chap,  xxi, 


Natural  Law.  i6i 

Î  mentioned  that  the  immediate  agent  mufl  have  contributed 
knowingly  to  ths  af^ion.  For  fnppofe  he  could  not  know  whether 
the  aiStion  be  good  or  bad,  he  can  then  be  conlidired  only  as  a  fiiri- 
ple  inltrunent;  but  the  perfon  who  gave  the  orders,  beinj  in  that 
cafe  the  (inly  anJ  abfolute  cayfe  of  the  a6lion,  is  the  only  one  an- 
fwerable  for  it.  S  jch  in  g:rleral  is  the  cafe  of  fubjeéls,  who  ftrve 
by  ordt-T  of  their  fovereign  in  an  unjuft  war. 

But  the  reafon  why afuperior  is  d^ened  the  principal  caufe  of 
what  is  done  by  thofe  that  depend  on  him,  is  not  propsrly  their  dé- 
pendance j  it  is  the  order  he  gives  them,  without  which  it  is  fup- 
pofed  th'iy  would  not  of  thjmfelves  have  attempted  the  aélioii. 
From  whence  it  follows,  that  every  other  peifon,  who  has  the  fame 
influence  over  the  adtions  of  his  equals,  or  even  of  his  fuperiors, 
may  for  the  fame  reafon  be  conddered  as  the  principal  caufe. 
This  is  what  we  may  very  well  apply  to  the  counfellors  of  princes, 
or  to  ecclefiaflics  that  have  an  afcendency  over  their  minds,  and 
who  make  a  wrong  ufe  of  it  fometimes,  in  order  to  perfuade  them 
to  things  which  they  would  never  have  determined  to  do  of  them- 
felves.  In  this  cafe,  praife  or  blame  falls  principally  on  the  author 
of  the  fuggeftion  or  counfe!.  * 

XIII.  A  collateral  caufe  is  he  who  in  doing  or  omitting  certain 
things,  concurs  fufficiently,  and  as  much  as  in  him  lies,  to  another 
man's  a£tion  :  infomuch  that  he  is  fuppofed  to  co-operate  with 
him  ;  though  one  cannot  abfolutely  prcfume,  that  without  his  con- 
currence the  adtion  would  not  have  been  committed.  Such  are 
thofe  who  furnifh  fuccours  to  the  immediate  agent;  or  thofe  who 
ftielter  and  prote<fl  him  ;  for  example,  he  who,  while  another 
breaks  open  the  door,  watches  all  the  avenues  of  the  houlc,  in  order 
W  to 

•  Wc  (hall  tranfcribc  here  with  pleafure,  the  judicious  refleilionsof  M.  Ber- 
nard (Nouvelles  dc  la  republique  des  lettres,  Auguft  170a  p.  a9r.)  In  En- 
gland it  is  very  common  to  charge  the  fault*  of  the  prince  to  the  minifters  ;  and 
1  own,  that  very  often  the  charge  is  jufi:  But  the  crimes  of  the  niinifters  do  not 
always  excufe  the  faults  of  the  fovjrcign  ;  for  after  all,  they  have  reafon  and 
underftaoding^  as  well  as  other  people,  and  are  mafters  to  do  as  they  pteafe.  If 
they  let  themfelves  be  too  much  governed  by  thofe  ihat  have  the  freeib  accefs  to 
them,  it  is  their  fault  They  ought  on  feveral  occafions  to  fee  with  their  own 
eyes,  and  not  to  be  led  by  the  nofe  by  a  wicked  and  avaricious  courtier.  But  if 
they  are  incapable  to  manage  matters  themfrlvcs,  and  to  diftinguifli  good  froni 
evil,  they  ou^ht  to  refign  the  care  of  government  to  others  that  are  capable;  for 
I  do  not  know,  why  we  may  not  app'y  to  princes  who  govern  ill,  the  faying  of 
Charles  Borromeu»,  in  relpoft  to  birtiops  whodo  notfeed  properly  their  flocks: 
If  raer  are  incapable  ofsuca  an  employm«nt,  wuï  so  much  ajibi- 
Tio.N  ?  le  ratif  ars  capahle,  why  so  much  neglect  ? 


i62  I'he  Principles  of 

to  favour  the  robbery,  &c.  A  confpiracy  among  feveral  people, 
renders  them  generally  all  guilty  alike.  They  are  all  fiippoled 
equal  and  collateral  caufe?,  as  being  aflbciated  for  the  f.Mue  fadl, 
and  united  in  intereft  and  will.  And  though  each  of  them  has 
not  an  equal  part  in  the  execution,  yet  their  actions  may  be  very 
well  charged  to  one  another's  account. 

XIV.  Finally,  a  fubaltern  caufe  is  he  who  has  but  a  fmall  in- 
fluence or  fhare  in  another  man's  a6tion,  and  is  only  a  flight  t  cca- 
fion  thereof  by  facilitating  its  execution  ;  infomuch  that  the  agent, 
already  abfolutily  determined  to  a<St,  and  having  all  the  neceir.ry 
iTieaus  forfodoing,  is  oily  encouraged  to  execute  hi=;  rcfoluiion  ; 
as  when  a  perfon  tells  him  the  manner  of  going  about  it,  the  fa- 
vourable m(>ment,  the  means  of  efcaping,  &c.  or  when  he  com- 
mends his  de.fign,  and  animates  him  topuifue  it. 

May  not  we  raisk  in  the  fame  clafe  the  aélion  of  a  judge,  who, 
rnrtead  of  oppofing  an  opinion  fupporied  by  a  geiierality  of  votes, 
but  by  himielf  adjudged  erroneous,  (hould  acquiefce  therein,  either 
through  fear  or  complaifance  ?  Bad  example  mufl  be  alfo  ranked 
among  the  fubaltern  caufes.  For  generally  (peaking,  examples  of 
this  nature  make  imprefiîon  only  on  thofe  who  are  otherwife  in- 
clined to  evil,  or  fubjedl  to  beeafily  led  adray  \  infomuch  that  thofe 
who  fet  fuch  examples,  contribute  but  very  weakly  to  the  evil 
committed  by  imitation.  And  yet  there  are  fome  examples  fo 
very  efScacious,  by  rtafonof  the  charader  of  the  perfons  that  fet 
them,  and  the  difpofition  of  thofe  who  follow  them,  that  if  the 
former  had  refrained  from  evil,  the  latter  would  never  have  thought 
cl  committing  it.  Such  are  the  bad  examples  of  fuperiors,  or  of 
men  who  by  their  knowledge  and  reputation  have  a  great  afcen- 
dency  over  others  ;  thefe  are  particularly  culpable  of  the  evil  w  hich 
enfues  from  the  imitation  of  their  a61ions.  We  may  reafon  in  the 
fame  manner  with  refpe6t  to  feveral  other  cafes.  According  as 
circumftances  vary,  the  fame  things  have  more  or  Icfs  influence  on 
other  men's  adiions,  and  confequently  thofe  who  by  fo  doing  con- 
cur to  thefe  a6lions,  ought  to  beconfidered  fometimesas  principal, 
fomeiimes  as  collateral,  and  fornetimes  as  fubaltern  caufes. 

Applica-  XV.  The  application  of  thefe  diftindlions  and  principles  isob- 

tion  of        vious.      Suppoimg  every  thing  elle  equal,  collateral  caufes  ought 

îhefe  dif-    j-Q  bg  jyj(,^j|   alike.       But  principal  caufes  merit   v\iihout   doubt 

more  iiraile  or  blame,  and  a  higher  degree  of  recompence  or  pun- 

ifliment  than   fubaltern  caufe.     I  faid,  fuppofing  every    thvig  elft 

equal  j  for  it  may  happen,  through  a  diversity  of  circumftances, 

whiclî 


Natural  Law.  163 

which  augment  ordiininifh  the  merit  or  demerit  of  an  afllon,  that 
thefubalte.n  caufe  acSts  with  a  greater  degree  of  malice  than  the 
principal  one,  and  the  imputation  is  thereby  aggravated  in  rcfpeit 
to  the  fiibaifjrn.  Let  us  fuppofe,  for  example,  that  a  perfon  in 
cool  blood  afTiffinates  a  man,  at  the  inRigation  of  one  who  was 
animated  thereto  by  fome  atrocious  injury  he  had  received  trom 
his  enemy.  Though  the  inftigator  is  the  principal  author  of  the 
murder,  yet  his  aftion,  done  in  a  tranfport  of  choler,  will  be  ef- 
tecmed  !efs  heinous  than  that  of  the  murderer,  who,  calm  and  fe- 
rene  himfelf,  was  the  bafe  inftrument  of  the  other's  paflion. 

We  fhiU  clofethis  chapter  with  a  few  remarks  :  and  i.  though 
the  d,fti!icli.)n  ot  three  clalfes  ot  moral  caufes,  in  refpe«5l  to  another 
fiiin's  adion,  be  in  itf^lf  very  well  founded,  we  muft  own,  never- 
thelef-j,  that  the  application  thereof  to  particular  cafes  is  fometimes 
difficult.  2  In  dubious  cafes,  we  fliould  not  ealily  charge,  as  a 
principal  caufe,  any  other  perfon  but  the  immediate  author  of  the 
a6lion  ;  we  ought  to  confider  thofe  who  have  concurred  thereto, 
rather  as  fubaltern,  or  at  the  moft  as  collateral  caufes.  3.  In 
fine,  it  is  proper  to  obferve,  that  PufFendorf,  whofe  principles  we 
have  followed,  fettles  very  jnftly  the  diflin£lion  of  moral  caufes  ; 
but  not  having  exadly  defined  thefe  different  caufes,  in  the  partic- 
ular examples  he  alleJges,  he  refers  fometimes  to  one  clafs  what 
properly  belonged  to  another.  This  has  not  efcaped  Monf.  Bar- 
beyrac,  whofe  judicious  remarks  have  been  here  of  particular  ufe 
to  us.  f 


CHAP.      XIL 

Of  the  authority  anifan£tton  of  natural  laws  :  *  a^td  i.  of  the  good 
or  evil  that  naturally  and  generally  follows  from  virtue  or  vice. 

y  y    E  underhand  here,  by  the  authority  of  natural  lawr,  the  What  is 
force    they   receive  frotil    the    approbation   cf  reafon,     and    ef-  «"tant  hy 
pecially  from    their   being  acknowledged   to  have  God    for  their  ^^  ^f 'iml 
author  ;  this  is  what  lays  us  under  a  ftridl  obligation  of  conform-  jur^i  jaw. 
ing  our  condu(5l  to   them,  becaufe  of  the  fovereign  righi    which 
God  has  over  his  creatures.      What  has  been  already  explained, 

concerning 

f  See  Barbeyrac's  notes  on  the  Duties  of  Man  and  a  Citizen,  book  i.  cluip  i, 
§  17. 
•  See  PufFendorf,  Law  of  Nature  and  Nations,  book  ii.  chap,  iii,  §  u, 


1 64  IIdb  Principles  of 

concerning  the  origin  and  nature,  reality  and  certainty  oftbofe 
laws,  is  fufficienf,  rrietbinks,  to  eftablifh  alfo  their  authority.  Yet 
we  have  IHU  feme  {mall  matter  to  fay  in  relation  to  this  fubje<St. 
The  force  oflaws,  properly  fo  cajkd,  depend»  principally  on  their 
fantflion.  f  Tliis  is  what  gives  a  ftamp,  as  it  were,  10  their  autho- 
rity. It  is  therefore  a  very  necefiary  and  important  point,  to  in- 
quire whether  there  be  really  any  fuch  thing  as  a  dnâipn  of  nat- 
ural laws,  that  is,  whether  they  arc  accompanied  with  commina» 
tlons  ajid  proir.if^s,  punifhmentt,  and  rewards, 

Tlie  oh-  ÎÏ*  ^'^^  '^^^  refle(5lion  that  prefents  itfelf  to  our  minds  is,  that 

ftrvance  of  thc  rules  of  conduct,  diftinguiOied  by  the  name  of  natural  laus,  are 
natural  proportioned  in  fuch  a  manner  to  our  nature,  to  the  original  difpo- 
'"'*,  ""^"^  iitions  and  natural  defnes  of  ourfnul,toourconftitution,  to  cur  wants 
rcfsofman  ''"^  atSl'.ial  fituation  in  life,  that  it  evidently  appears  ihey  are  made  for 
and  focie-  s.  For  in  general,  and  every  thing  well  confidered,  the  obfervancc 
^y*  of  thofe  laws  is  the  only  means  of  procuring  a  real  and  folid  ha|  pir 

nefs  to  individuals,  as  well  as  to  the  public  ;  whereas  the  infrac- 
tion thereof  precipitates  men  into  difordtrs  prejudicial  a' ike  to  ir.di- 
vidua!",  as  to  the  whole  fpecics.  This  is,  as  it  were,  the  firfl  fane- 
tion  of  natural  laws. 

Edaircifle-       ^^^'   -^^  Order   to  prove  our  point,  and   to  eflablifh  rightly  the 
mer.ts    on  ftate  of  the  queftioi),  we  muft  obferve,  i.  that  vhen  the  obferv- 
the  Gate  of  aiice  of  natural  laws  is  faid  to  be  capable  alone  of  forming  the  hap- 
thequef-      pinefs  of  man  and  (ociei)',  we  do  not  mean  that  this  happinefs  can 
be  ever  perfiét,  or   fuperior  to  all  expedtation  ;    humanity  having 
no  pretence  to  any  thing  of  this  kind  ;  and  if  virtue  itfelf  cannot 
,    produce  this  efFeél,  it  is  not  at  all  probable  that  vice  has  any  ad- 
vantage over  her  in  this  refpecl. 

2.  As  v/e  are  inquiring  which  is  the  proper  rule  that  man  ought 
to  go  by,  our  queflion  is  properly  reduced  to  this  point,  whether 
Jn  genera!,  and  every  thing  confidered,  the  obfervancc  of  natural 
laws  is  not  the  propcrcfl  and  furtfl  means  to  condudl  man  to  liis 
end,  and  to  procure  him  the  pnreft,  the  completeft,  and  the  molt 
"durable  happinefs  that  can  pofTibly  be  enjoyed  in  this  world  ;  and 
not  only  wiih  regard  to  feme  perfon?,  but  to  all  mankind  ;  not  only 
in  particular  ca'es,  but  likewife  through  the  whole  courfe  of  life. 

On  this  footing,  it  will  not  be  a  difficult  tafk  to  prove,  as  well 
by  reafon  as  by  experience,  thit  the  proper  and  ordinary  efFecl  of 
virtue  is  really  fuch  as  has  been  mentioned,  and  that  vice,  or  the 

irregularity 

t  ^^jcc  part  i.  di.->p.  ?.§!?• 


NaturalLaw.  165 

irregularity  of  paflions,  produces  a  quite  oppofite  efFetSl. 

IV.  We  have  already  (hewn,  in  difcourfing  of  the  nature  and  Proof  of 
ftate  of  humanity,  that  in  what  maiiner  and  light  foevcr  we  confid-  the  above 
er  the  Jyftem  of  humanity,  man   can  neither   anfwer  his  end,  nor  "^«^""""««l 
perfedt  his  talents  and  faculties,  nor  acquire  any  folid   happinefs,  or  jg^f^^^ 
reconcile  it  with  that  of  his  fellow-creatures,  but  by  the  help  of 

reafon  ;  that  it  ought  to  be  therefore  his  firft  care  to  improve  his 
reafon,  to  confult  if,  and  follow  the  counfi^ls  thereof;  that  it  in- 
forms him,  there  are  fome  things  which  are  fit  and  others  unfit  for 
him  ;  that  the  former  have  not  'ill  an  equal  fîtnef-,  nor  in  the  fame 
manner:  that  he  ought  therefore  to  make  a  proper  didincSlion  be- 
tween good  and  evil,  in  order  to  regulate  his  conduce  :  that  true 
happinefs  cannot  ronfift  in  things  incompatible  with  his  nature  and 
ftate  :  and,  in  fine,  th^t  fince  the  future  ought  to  be  equally  tha 
objeélof  his  views  as  the  prefent  and  paft,  it  is  not  fufîîcient,  in 
order  to  attain  certain  happintfs,  to  confidtr  merely  the  prefent 
good  or  evil  of  each  action  ;  but  we  fliould  likewife  recollect  what 
is  pafl,  and  extend  oiir  views  to  futurity,  in  order  to  combine  the 
whole,  and  fee  what  ought  to  be  the  rc-fult  thereof  in  the  intire 
duration  of  our  being.  Thefe  are  fo  many  evident  and  démon- 
trable truths.  Now  the  laws  of  nature  are  no  more  than  confe- 
quences  of  th:(ô  primitive  truths  ;  whence  it  appears  that  they 
have  necefTarily,  and  of  then)felves,  a  great  influence  on  our  hap- 
pinefs. And  how  is  it  pofllble  to  call  this  in  queflion,  after  having 
feen  in  the  courfe  of  this  work,  that  the  fole  method  to  difcover  the 
principles  of  thofe  laws,  is  to  fer  out  with  the  ftudy  of  the  nature 
and  flate  of  man,  and  10  inquire  afterwards  into  what  is  efTentially 
agreeable  to  his  perfe6lion  and  happinefs. 

V.  But  that  which  appears  fo  clear  and  fo  well  eflabliflied  by         t    i„ 
reafon,  is  rendered  inconteiiable  by  experience.     In  fi.<St,  we  gen-  tji^criencei 
erally  obferve,  that  virtue,  that  is,  the  obfervance  of  the  laws  of  na-  i.  Vinue 
ture,  is  of  itfelf  a  fource  of  internal  fatisf;.6lion,  and  that  it  is  infin-  is  of  itfeif 
itely  advantageous  in  its  efFecls,  whether  in  particular  to  individu-  t"^  pi^'nci- 
als,  or  to  human  focietyin  general,  whereas  vice  is  attended  with  ,>^J^i.d 
quite  difFerent  confequences.  fati^fac- 

Whatevcr  is  contrary   to  the  light  of  reafon  and  confcience,  tion  ;    and 
cannot  but  be  accompanied  with  a.(ecrct  difapprobation  of  mind,  v^ccaprm- 
and  afFord  us   vexation  and  ftiame.     The   heart  is   affliiUd   with    y,çt  ^^^ 
the  idea  of  the  crime,  and  the  remembrance  thereof  is  always  bitter  trouble, 
and  forrowful.     On  the  contrary,  evtrv  conformity  to  right  rea f<n 
is  3  ftate  of  order  and  perfeftionjwhich  the  mind  approves  ;  and  we  are 

framed 


ï 66  'ïlje  Principles  of 

framed  in  fuch  a  manner,  that  a  good  a(£lion  becomes  the  feed,  as 
it  were,  of  afecret  joy  ;  and  we  always  recollect  it  with  pleafiire. 
And  indeed,  what  can  be  fweeter  or  more  comfortable  than  to  be 
able  to  bear  an  inward  teltimony  to  ourfelves,  that  we  are  what  we 
ought  to  be,  and  that  we  perform  what  is  reafonably  our  duty, 
what  fits  us  bed,  and  is  moft  conformable  to  our  natural  dedina- 
tion  ?  Whatever  is  natural,  is  agreeable  ;  and  whatever  is  aci» 
cording  to  order,  is  afubjeél  offatisfadion  and  content. 

Of  external  ^^'  î^&fi'^es  this  internal  principle  of  joy,  which  attends  the 
goods  and  practice  of  natural  laws,  we  find  it  produces  externally  all  forts  of 
crils,  good  efFefls.     It  tends  to  preferve  our  health,  and  to  prolong  our 

tbe"^  QVil^  ^^y^  »  '^  exercifes  and  perfecSls  the  faculties  of  the  mind  ;  it  ren- 
quence  of  '^^''s  US  fit  for  labour,  and  for  allthe  fun6lions  of  domei'lic  and  civil 
virtue  and  life  ;  it  fecures  to  us  the  right  ufe  and  pofiTeflion  of  all  our  goods 
vjc*.  and  property  ;   it  prevents  a  great  number  of  evils,  and   foltens 

thofe  it  cannot  prevent  ;  it  procures  us  the  confidence,  eftecm, 
and  afFe£lion  of  other  men  ;  from  whence  refult  the  greatefl  com- 
forts of  fecial  life,  and  the  moft  efFedual  helps  for  the  fuccefs  of  our 
undertakings. 

Obferve  on  what  the  public  fecurity,  the  tranquillity  of  families» 
the  profperity  of  ftate?,  and  the  abfolute  welfare  of  every  individu- 
al are  founded.  Is  it  not  on  the  grand  principles  of  religion, 
temperance,  modefly,  beneficence,  juftice,  and  fincerity  ?  Wnence 
arife,  on  the  contrary',  the  greateft  part  of  the  diforders  and  evils 
that  trouble  fociety,  and  break  in  upon  the  happinefs  of  man  ? 
Whence,  but  from  the  neglect  of  thofe  very  principles?  Befides 
the  inquietude  and  infamy  that  generally  accompanies  irregularity 
and  debauch,  vice  is  likewife  attended  with  a  tnultitude  of  external 
evils,  fuch  as  the  enfeebling  of  the  body  and  mind,  diftempcrs  and 
untoward  accident?,  poverty  very  often  and  mifery,  violent  and 
^  dangerous  parties,  domeftic  jars,  enmities,  continual  fears,  diflion- 
ciir,  pimifhments,  contempt,  hatred,  and  a  thoufand  crofics  and 
difRculties  in  every  thing  we  undertake.  One  of  the  ancients  has 
very  elegantly  faid,  *  that  malice  drinks  one  half  of  her  own  poifon. 


VII.  But  iffuch  arc  the  natural  confequences  of  virtueand  vice 
ferent  ef-'  '"  rtrfpccl  to  the  generality  of  mankind,  thefe  effcds  are  flill  great- 
feds  ofvir-  er  among  thofe  who  by  their  condition  and  rank  have  a  particular 
tueandvice  influence  on  the  iiate  of  fociety,  and  determine  the  fate  cf  other 
"^  ^''^^  men.  What  calamities  might'not  the  fnbjecls  apprehend,  if  their 
mongthofe  Sovereigns  were  to  imagine  themîelves  fuperior  to  rule,  and  inde- 
pendent 

■  Seneca,  ep.  82.      ^tmadnoJum  At'.altu  tiojlcr dscerc/Qlebat,   maiitiaifja  ir.aM' 
i.vicm  partem  vencnffui  (liLlit 


Natural  Law.  «67 

pendent  of  all  law  ;  if  direding  every  thing  to  themfelves,  they  who    are 
were  to  liften  only  to  their  own  whims  and  caprice,  and  to  aban-  '^•'(h  power 
don  themfelves  to  injurtice,  ambition,  avarice,  and  cruelty  ?  What  3,^1  autho- 
good,  on  the  contrary,  niu(t  not  arife  from  the  government  of  a  rity. 
wife  and  virtuous  prince;  who  confidering  himfelf  under  a  partic- 
ular obligation  of  never  deviating  from  the  rules  of  piety,  juftice, 
moderation,  and  beneficence,  exercifes  his  power  with  no  other 
view,  but   to  maintain  order  within,  and  fecurity  without,  and 
places  his  glory  in  ruling  his  fubjedts  uprightly,  that  is,  in  making 
them  wife  and  happy  ?  We  need  only  have  recourfe  to  hiftory,  and 
confult  experience,  to  be  convinced  that  thefe  are  real  truths,  which 
no  reafonable  perfon  can  comeft. 

VIII.  This  is  a  truth  fo  generally  acknowledged,  that  all  the  Confirms- 
inflitutions  which  men  form  among  themfelves  for  their  common  t'on  of  this 
good  and  advantage,  are  founded  on  the  obfervance  of  the  laws  of  l^*' ^oufef, 
nature;  and  that  even  the  precautions  taken  tofccure  theefFe£t  of  ç^,;^  of  all 
thefe  inftitutions,  would  be  vain  and  ufelefs,  were  it  not  for  the  nutiom. 
authority  ofthofe  very  laws.     This  is  what  is  manifedly  fuppofed 

by  all  human  laws  in  general  ;  by  the  eftablifliments  for  the  edu- 
cation of  youth  ;  by  the  political  regulations  which  tend  to  pro- 
mote the  arts  and  commerce  ;  and  by  public  as  well  as  private 
treaties;.  For  of  what  ufe  would  allthofe  things  be,  or  what  benefit 
could  accrue  from  thence,  were  we  not  previoufly  to  eftablifh 
them  on  juftice,  probity,  fincerity,  and  the  facred  inviolability  of 
an  oath,  as  on  their  real  foundation  and  bafis  ? 

IX.  But  in  order  to  be  more  fenfibly  fatisfied  of  this  truth,  let  Confirma, 
any  one  try,  that  pleafes,  to  form  a  fyftem  of  morality  on  principles  '>on  of  the 
diredly  oppofite  to  thofe  we  have  now  eftabliflied.  Let  us  fup-  k^"'\'™*j|^ 
pof:  that  igniirance  and  prejudice  take  place  of  knowledge  and  furdicy  of 
reafon  ;  that  caprice  and  pafiion  are  fubftitutcd  inftead  of  prudence  the  contra- 
and  virtue  :   let  us  banifh  juftice  and   benevolence  from  fociety,  ""y. 

and  from  the  commerce  of  mankind,  to  make  room  for  unjufb 
felf-l.'ve,  which  calculating  every  thing  for  itfelf,  takes  no  notice 
of  other  people's  intereft,  or  of  the  public  advantage.  Let  us  ex- 
t:nd  and  apply  thefe  principles  to  the  particular  conditions  of  hu- 
man life,  and  welhil!  fee  what  muft  be  the  refult  of  a  fyftem  of 
this  kind,  were  it  ever  to  be  received  and  pafs  for  a  rule.  Can  we 
imagine  it  would  be  able  to  produce  the  happinefs  of  fociety,  the 
good  of  families,the  advantage  of  nation?,  and  the  welfare  of  man- 
kind ?  No  one  has  ever  yet  attempted  to  maintain  fuch  a  paradox  ; 
fo  evident  and  glaring  is  the  abfufdity  thereof. 

X.  I 


1 6 8  T^he  Principles   of 

Anfwer  to  X  I  am  not  ignorant,  that  injuflice  and  paffion  are  capable  in 
^^■^\.  ^^r  particular  cafes  of  procuring  feme  pleafurc  or  advantage.  But 
jcdions,  "^^  ^^  mention  that  virtue  produces  much  oftener  and  with  great- 
er certainty  the  fame  efFL(5ls  ;  reafon  and  experience  inform  us, 
that  tht;  good  procured  by  iiijullice  is  not  fo  real,  fo  durable,  nor  fo 
pure,  as  that  vA<hich  is  the  fruit  of  virtue.  This  is  becaufe  the 
lonner  beinii  unconformable  to  the  flate  of  a  rational  and  focial 
bemg,  IS  defective  in  its  principle,  and  has  only  a  deceitful  appear- 
ance, f  It  is  a  flower  which  having  no  root,  withers  and  falls 
almoll  as  foon  as  it  blofToms. 

With  regard  to  fiich  evils  and  misfortunes  as  are  annexed  to 
humanity,  iind  to  which  it  may  be  faid,  that  virtuous  people  arc 
expofed  as  well  as  others  ;  ccrtainiti^,that  virtue  has  herealfoagreat 
many  advantages.  In  the  firft  place,  it  is  very  proper  of  itfclf  to 
prevent  or  remove  feveral  of  thofe  evils  ;  and  thus  we  obftrvethat 
wife  and  fober  people  actually  efcape  a  great  many  precipices  and 
inares  into  which  the  vicious  and  inconfiderate  are  hurried.  2.  In 
cafes  wherein  wifdom  and  prudence  cannot  prevent  thofe  evils,  yet 
it  gives  the  foul  a  fufficicnt  vigour  to  fupport  them,  and  counter- 
balances them  with  fweets  and  confolations  which  contribute  ta 
abate  in  great  meafure  their  imprcffion.  Virtue  is  attended  with 
an  infeparable  contentment,  of  which  nothing  can  bereave  us  ; 
and  oureiTential  happinefs  is  very  little  impaired  by  the  tranfitory, 
and,  in  fome  meafure,  external  accidents  that  fometimes  difturb 
us. 

Surprifed  I  am  (fays  Ifocrates)  *  that  any  one  Jhould  imagine^ 
that  thofe  zvho  adhere  conjiantly  to  piety  andjujîice^  mufî  expeSï  to  be 
tnore  unhappy  than  the  unrighteous^  and  have  not  a  right  to  promife 
themfclves  greater  advantages  from  the  gods  and  men.  For  tny  part^ 
J  am  of  opinion^  that  the  virtuous  alone  abundantly  enjoy  whatever  is 
ivorthy  of  our  purfuit  ;  and  the  zvichd-,  on  the  contrary^  are  entirely 
ignorant  of  their  real  inter ejh.     He  that  prefers  injujlice   to  jnjiice-, 

and 

\  Fee  parti   chap,  vi    §  3. 

*  Qoi{jy.cc^u}  <r  «  TK   01  s\on  raç  rviv  vj  ç'ÂsiAV    K«i  tijv  <J't)tajo(rui/»)V 

■ârovvp^V  aAX'  è")/ v)ï^iMivs<T  y.a.i  zrapx  B'soTç  xa(  zrxpx  ku^^u  ttoiç  ttXiov 
t'icrKT^x,  Tuv  xXXuv.  lyu  ^Iv  yxp  o'ioy.xi  rmnq  juo'va^,  uv  $u 
TS'Xiovsitlsi'v,  T3Ç  J''</AAaç  ào£  yivucrxnv  û^tv  ^uu  (^£?\liov  tctv.  opu  yaft 
T-èç  fAv  ri'i'v  ccSmtxv  Tz-polifxavlxc  xxi  to  AaefU»  ri  ruv  aXholpiuv 
fAiyiçov  aTaôov  tojui'^&vîa.?.  o^j^oiu  •vrxa-'/Qvlxq  to~<t  $uXixC,o^ivoif 
rut    Cuuv,    xm  >C(»Vpp(,a\  IMV   ûCiïoXoiV ovlaç    uv    âv   Xsdt'iiinv^ 


Natural     Law.  169 

and  makes  his  /over eign  goodconftfi  in  depriving  another  man  of  his 
property^  is  like^  methinks.,  to  thofe  brute  creatures  that  are  caught  by 
the  bait  :  the  unjuji  acqnifition  flatters  his  fenfes  at  firfi^  but  he  focn 
finds  himfeif  involved  in  very  great  evils.  Thefe  on  the  contrary 
who  take  up  with  jujiice  and  piety  ^  are  not  only  fafe  for  the  prefenty 
but  have  likewije  reafon  to  conceive  good  hopes  for  the  remainder  of 
their  lives.  Ï own^  indeed^  that  this  does  not  always  happen  ;  yet  it 
is  generally  confirmed  by  experience.  Now  in  things  vjhofe  fuccefs 
cannot  be  infallibly  for  efe  en.,  it  is  the  bnfinefs  of  a  prudent  man  to  em- 
brace that  fide  which  mo[i  generally  turns  out  to  his  advantage.  But 
nothing  is  more  unreafonable  than  the  opinion  of  thofe.,  who  believing 
that  jujiice  has  fomething  in  it  more  beautiful  and  mne  agreeable  to  the 
gods  than  injuflice.,  imagine  neverthelefs  that  thofe  who  embrace  the  for- 
mer are  more  unhappy  than  fuch  as  abandon  themfelvcs  to  the  latter. 

XI.  Thus,  every  thing  duly  confidered,  the  advantage  is  with-  The  ad- 
out  comparifoii  on  the  (ide  of  virtue.     It  minit'cftly  appears,  that  vantage  al- 
the  fcherDC  of  the  divine  wifdom  was  to  eftablifh  a  natural  con-  ^^'Jjf  fn 
nexion  between  phyfical  and  moral  evil,  as  between  the  efFeit  and  the  fide  of 
the  caufe  ;  and,  on  the  contrary,  tointail  phyfical  good,  or  the  hap-  virtue;  and 
plnefs  of  man,  on  moral  good,  or  the  practice  of  virtue  :  infomuch,  ''^|?  '^     * 
that  generally  fpeaking,  and  purfuant  to  the  original  inftitution  of  ^j^^^  '^^  ^\^^ 
things,  the  obfervance  of  natural  laws  is    as  proper  and  necefTary  lawsofna» 
to  advance  both  the  public  and  particular  happinefs,  as  temperarice  uue* 
and  good  regimen  is  naturally  conducive  to  the  prefervation  of  health. 
And   as  thele  natural  rcv/ards  and  punifliments  of  virtue  and  vice, 
are  an  effect  of  the  divine  inftitutlon;  they  may  be  really  confider- 
ed, as  a  kind  of  fandtionof  the  laws  of  nature,  which  addsaconfid- 
crable  authority  to  the  maxims  of  right  reafon. 

X  XII.  And 

cKiyu  (J'  vçipov  £U  roTç  fj-syicoic  xxaoTc  ovlccç'  rèç  ê'ï  y.sr  îuVfoj»? 
Koci  ^ix.ocio(ru]/r]ç  Çco  j/raç,  iv  t£  to7ç  Trocftsa-i  ^o'voiç  àa-ÇxXui  ç  ê'iccy 
oînoiç ^  xo(,i  Tzifi  Ta  cv (attccuIoç  alcovoj  ■jn^isç  Toiq  iXiri^aç  ïyovjccç' 
XXI  roixJT  et  (avi    xxrot  rrdvloov  krçoç   h  ôtça*  <rvfji,Çoiiveiv,   ocXKoc!  ro     . 

y  W  ç  ÎTTJ  Tû  TSSQXX)  T8T0U  yiyVilOCl  TOI/  TOOTTOV.  yiri  aï  T8Ç  £U* 
Ç^QVtilxT^  tTTflJ"»)    TO  jtAfAAOl/  O-H   (TVVOKTHV   8  XCC^OpOù[/.EV,   TO  zyoXXciKiç 

u  ^iXan  THTO  (ponv£(r^xi  ■sr/)o«t/)8jM.6i/«ç.  ■arayjwv  ^^ dXoyo/rxlov  ttsttoÇ' 
6«<ni/,  ô(rot  iix,XÂiO]/jM.u  s7rilri^iv[ji.x  vofJuQt^iv  eïvxi,  xat  ^iopiXiçEcov 
mv  ^txxioa-'jvviv  tyiÇ  aSuttxq  X.^'p^i'  ^^  o'iovlxi  (SjwVftrôat  rèo"  TX'orn 
^^crJiAiuniy^rdiv  r^v  Txrovnptxv  srponprti/.ivuv^  Ifocra.  Orat.  dePirmutatione, 


t^o  The  Principles  of 

General  XII.   And  yet  we  muft  acknowledge,  that  this  firn  fsnflion  does 

difficulty  j^Qj  as  yet  leeai  fufficient  to  give  all  the  authority  ar,d  weight  of 
from"  the  ^^'^  livvs,  to  the  C"ur,(clf  of  rcafon.  For  if  we  confidtr  the  thing 
exceptions,  ftridlly,  We  fhall  find,  that  by  the  conftiiution  of  hunian  things, 
which  ren-  and  by  our  natural  dépendance  upon  one  another,  the  general  rule 
derthisfirft  ^fjQyg  mentioned  is  not  lo  fixt  and  invariable,  but  it  admits  of  divers 
iiifuiïi-  exception":,  by  which  the  force  and  eiFc6l  thereof  muft  certainly  be 
cicnt.         weakened. 

The  poods       ^'  Experience,  in  general,  (hews  u^,  that  the  degree  of  happinefs 
and  evils  of  or  mifery   which  every  cne   enjoys    in   this  worhi,  is  not  always 
nature  and  exadlly  proportioned  and  meafuied  to  the  degree  of  virtue  or  vice 
d°ft  "r^d*^  of  each  particular  perfon.     Thus  health,  the  goods  of  fortune,  edu- 
unequally,  cation,  fituation  of  life,  and  other  external  advantages,  generally 
and  not  ac-  depend  on  a  varietyofconjunftures,  which  render  their  diftribution 
cording  to  very  unequal  ;  and  thefe  advantages  are  frequently  k»(t  by  accidents, 
each  per-    to  which  all  men  are  equally  fubjefl.  l>ue  it  is,  thyt  the  diffr-rence 
of  rank  or  riches  does  not  abfolutely  dttermine  the  hnpplnefs   or 
mifery  of  life:  yet  agr^e  we  muft,  that  extreme  poverty,  the  priva- 
tion of  all  necefiary  means  of  inftruftion,  exceftive  labour,  afRic- 
tions  of  the  mind,  and  pains  of  the  body,  are  real  e\ils,  wh>ch  a 
variety  of  cafualti»;s  may  bring  as   well  upon  virtuous  as  other 
men. 
îhe  evils        2.  Befides  this  unequal  diftribution  of  natural  goods  and  evils, 
produced     ];joneft  men   are  no   more  fhtltered  than  others,  from  divtrs  evils 
fjil'aj^^gli  arifing  from  malice,  irjuftice,  violence,  and  ambition.     Such  «re 
upon  the     the  perfecutions  of  tyrants,  the  horrors  of  war,  and  fomany  ether 
innocent  aff  public  Of  private  calamities  to  which  the  good  and  the  bad  are  in- 
the  guiliy.  difcriminately  fubjeft.    It  even  frequentty  happens,  that  the  authors 
of  all  thofe  miferies  are  thofe  who  fee)  leaft  their  efFe£ls,  either 
becanfe  of  their  extraordinary  facet  fs  and  good  fortune,  or  becaufe 
their  infenfibility  is  arrived  to  ih;t  pitch,  as  to  let  them   enjoy,  al- 
moft  without  trouble  and  remorfe,  the  fruit  of  their  iniquities. 
Sometimes      3-   Again.  It  is  not  unufual  to  f;  e  innoc  nee  expofed  to  calumny, 
even  virtue  and  virtue  iifelf  becoiTie  tlie  ohjeâ  of  perfecution.     Now  in  thofe 
itfclf  is  the  particular  cafef,  in  which  the  honeft  man  fa'ls,  as  it  were,  a  vi6\im 
caufe  of      ^^  j^jg  ^^^^  virtue,  what  force  can  the  laws  ot  nature  be  faid  to  have, 
tion.  and  how   can   their  authority  be  fupported  ?    Is  the  internal  fitis- 

faélion  arifing  from  the  teftimony  of  a  good  conlcience,  capable 
alone  to  determine  man  to  f.crifice  his  property,  his  repofe,  his 
honour,  and  even  his  life  ^  And  yet  thofe  delicate  conjunélures 
frequently  happen  ;  and  the  refolution  then  taken,  may  have  very 
important  and  extenfive  confequences  in  relation  to  the  happinefs 
and  mifery  of  focicty, 

XIII.  Such 


N  A  T  U  R  A  L    L  A  W.  I71 

XIII.  Suc'n  is  indeed  the  a£lual  ftate  of  things.  On  the  one  The  means 
fide  wc  fee,  that  in  gentral  the  obfervance  of  natural  laws  is  alone  *'"^'^  ""* 
capable  of  eftabiiOiing  fonne  order  in  fociety,  and  of  conftituting  ^^"^^  \.^^, 
the  happincfs  of  man  ;  but  on  the  other  it  appear?,  that  virtue  and  ploy«  to  re- 
vice  are  not  always  fufficicitly  chanidterifed  by  their  e£Fe<5l:«,  and  medythofc 
by  their  common  and  natural  confequences,  to  make  this  order  on  •^'^"''^f^^^ 

/.  _  .,  n  '  are   hke- 

all  occaiions  prevail.  vvifc  in- 

Honce  arifes  a  confidcrable  difficulty  againft  the  moral  fyftera  fuffident. 
by  us  eftablifhed.  All  law^,  fome  will  fay,  ought  to  have  a  fufîi- 
cient  fandtion  to  determine  a  reafonable  creature  to  obey,  by  the 
profpe6l  of  its  own  good  and  intereft,  which  is  always  the  primum 
mobile  of  its  actions.  Now  though  the  moral  fyftcm  you  have 
fpolce  of,  gives  in  general  a  great  advantage  to  its  followers,  over 
thofe  who  neglefl  it  ;  yet  this  advantage  is  neither  (o  great,  nor 
fo  fure,  as  to  be  capable  to  indemnify  iis  fufficiently  in  each  partic- 
ular cafe  for  the  facrifices  we  are  obliged  to  make  in  the  difcharge 
of  our  duty.  This  fyfiem  is  not  therefore  as  yet  fupported 
with  all  the  authority  and  furce  neceffary  for  the  end  that  God 
propofes  ;  and  thecharafter  of  law,  efpecially  of  a  law  proceeding 
from  an  all-wife  being,  requires  ttill  a  more  diftindl,  furer,  and 
more  exttnfive  fanflion. 

That  legiflators  and  politicians  have  been  fenfible  of  this  defi- 
ciency, is  maaifeft,  by  their  endeavouring  to  fupply  it  in  the  bed 
manner  they  are  able.  They  have  publifhed  a  civil  law,  which, 
tends  to  ftrengthen  the  law  of  nature  ;  they  have  denounced  pun- 
iftiments  againft:  vice,  promifed  rewards  to  virtue,  and  ereâed 
tribunals.  This  is  undoubtedly  a  new  fupport  of  juftice,  and  the 
beft  human  method  that  could  be  contrived  to  prevented  the  fore- 
mentioned  inconveniencies.  And  yet  this  method  does  not  pro- 
vide againft  every  diforder,  but  leaves  ftill  a  great  vacuum  in  the 
moral  fyftem. 

For  I.  there  are  feveral  evils,  as  v^'eli  natural  as  arifing  from 
human  injuftice,  from  which  all  the  power  of  man  cannot  preferve 
even  the  moft  virtuous.  2.  Human  laws  are  not  always  drawn 
up  in  conformity  tojuftice  and  equity.  3.  Let  them  be  fuppofed 
never  fo  juft,  they  cannot  extend  to  every  cafe.  4.  The  execu- 
tion of  thofe  laws  is  fometimes  committed  to  weak,  ignorant,  or 
corrupt  men.  5.  How  great  foever  the  integrity  of  a  magiftrate 
may  be,  ftill  there  are  many  things  that  efcape  his  vigilance  :  he 
cannot  fee  and  redrefs  every  grievance.  6.  It  is  not  an  unexam- 
pled cafe,  that  virtue  inftead  of  finding  a  proteftor  in  its  judge, 
meets  with  an  implacable  enemy.  What  refource  fliall  be  left  to 
innocence  in  thai  cafe  ?  To  whom  fhall  fhe  fly  forfuccour,  if  the 

▼«7 


172  T.l:)e  Principles  of 

very  peiTon  that  ought  to  undertake  her  protedlion  and  defence,  is 
armed  againft  her  I 

The  ilifTi-  XIV.  Thus  the  difficulty  ftill  fubfifts  ;  a  difficulty  of  very  great 
culty  pro-  confequence,  becaufe  on  the  one  fide  it  makes  againft  the  plan  of 
pcfcd,  is  of  a  divine  providence,  and  on  the  other  it  may  contribute  to  invali- 
grcat  con-  date  what  we  have  faid  in   refpcd\  to  the  empire  of  virtue,  and  its 

1-qucncc.  rr  •  •  .^    ^\,     C  V    ■ ,        c 

*  neceiiary  connexion  witn  the  fencity  or  man. 

So  weighty  an  objection  that  has  been  Parted  in  al]  ages,  de- 
ferves  v/e  fliould  carefully  endeavour  to  remove  it.  But  the  great- 
er and  more  real  it  is,  the  more  probably  we  may  prefume  it  has  a 
proper  folution.  For  how  is  it  to  be  imagined,  that  the  Divine 
Wifdom  could  have  left  fuch  an  imperfedion,  fuch  an  enigma  in 
the  moral  order,  after  having  regulated  every  thing  fo  well  in  the 
phylical  world  \ 

Let  us  therefore  fee  whether  fome  new  refle(5lions  on  the  nature 
and  dellination  of  man,  will  not  dire£l  us  to  a  different  place 
from  the  prefent  life,  for  the  folution  we  are  here  inquiring.  What 
has  been  faid  concerning  the  natural  confequences  of  virtue  and 
vice  on  this  earth,  already  (hews  us  a  demi-fanclion  of  the  laws  of 
nature  :  let  us  try  whether  we  cannot  find  an  entire  and  proper 
one,  whofe  fpecies,  degree,  time,  and  manner,  depend  on  the  good  will 
of  the  legiflator,  and  are  fufficient  to  make  all  the  compenfations 
required  by  ftrid  juftice,  and  to  place  in  this,  as  in  every  other 
refpeft,  the  lyftcm  of  the  divine  laws  much  above  thofe  of  human 
inftitution. 


CHAP.     XÎII. 

Proofs  of  the  immortality  of  the  foul.     That  there  is  a  fan^ion^  prop- 
er Ij  fo  called^  in  refpeSî  to  natural  laiu. 

S<atc     of    Î-    T^ 

the   quef.  X   ^^^  diiEculty  we  have  been  fpeaking  of,  and  which    we 

tiun.  attempt  here  to  illullrate,  fuppofcs,  as  every  one  may  fee,  that  the 

human  fyftem  is  abfolutely  limited  to  the  prefent  life,  that  there  is 
no  fuch  thing  as  a  future  ftate,  and  confequtntly  that  there  is 
nothing  to  expeii  from  the  Divine  Wifdon;  in  favour  of  the  laws 
of  nature,  beyond  what  is  manifefted  in  this  life. 

Were  it  polTible,  on  ths  contraryj  to  prove  that  the  prrfent  ftate 

of 


Natural  Law.  173 

«fman  is  only  the  commencement  of  a  more  extenfive  fyftem  ;  and 
moreover,  that  the  fupreme  Being  has  really  been  pleafed  to  inveft 
the  rules  of  condudl  prefcribcd  to  us  by  reafon,  with  all  the  author- 
ity of  laws,  by  ftrengthening  them  with  a  fan£lion  properly  fo 
called  ;  we  might  in  fine  conclude,  that  there  is  nothing  wanting 
to  complete  the  moral  fyftem. 

II.  The  learned  are  divided  in  their  opinions  with  refpccEl  to  Divlfion  of 
thefe  important  queftions.  Some  there  arc  who  maintain,  that  °F'f"°P^-. 
reafon  alone  affords  clear  and  demonflrati  ve  proofs,  not  only  of  the  pofTible  to 
rewards  and  punifhments  of  a  future  life;  but  likewife  of  a  ftate  know  the 
of  immortality.  Others  on  the  contrary  pretend,  that  by  confult-  ^»"  «f  God 
ing  reafon  alone,  we  meet  with  nothing  but  obfcurity  and  uncer-  '"  /jf-^'^^ 
tainty,  and  that  fo  far  from  finding  any  demonftration  this  way,  we  point, 
have  not  even  a  probability  of  a  future  life. 

It  is  carrying  the  thing  too  far,  perhaps,  on  both  fides,  to  retfon 
nfter  this  manner.  Since  the  queftion  is  concerning  a  point  which, 
depends  intirely  on  the  will  of  the  Deity,  the  belt  way  undoubtedly 
to  Icnov/  this  will,  would  be  an  exprefs  declaration  on  his  fide. 
But  confining  ourfelves  within  the  circle  of  natural  knowledge,  let 
us  try  whether,  independently  c^  this  fii  (I  tnethod,  reafon  alone  can 
afFord  us  any  fure  light  in  relation  to  this  fubjeéf,  or  furnilh  us 
with  conjectures  and  prefumptions  fufficiently  ftrong,  to  infer  from 
thence  with  any  certainty  the  will  of  God.  With  this  view,  let 
us  inveftigate  a  little  clofer  the  nature  and  prefent  ftate  of  man,  let 
us  confult  the  ideas  v.'hich  right  reafon  gives  us  of  the  perfeâioa 
of  the  fupreme  Being,  and  of  the  plan  he  has  formed  with  refpe6t 
to  mankind  ;  in  order  to  know,  in  fine,  the  neceiTary  confequen- 
ccs  of  the  natural  laws  he  has  been  pleafed  to  prefcribe. 

III.  With  regard  to  the  nature  of   man,  we  arc  firft  of  all  to  M'hcther 
inquire  whether  death  be  really  the  laft  term  of  our  exigence,  and  the  foul  it 
thedifTolution  of  the  body  be  necefiarily  followed  with  the  annihila-  immortal, 
tion  of  the  foul  ;  or  v.'hether  the  fcml  is  immortal,  that  is,  whether 

it  fubfiils  after  the  death  of  the  body  ? 

Now  the  immortality  of  the  foul  is  fo  far  from  being  in  itfelf  Fi«  ft  proof, 

impoffible,  that  reafon  fupplies  us  with  the  ftrongeft  conjectures,  The  nature 

that  this  is  in  reality  the  Rate  for  which  it  was  defigned.  feems^  cn- 

The  obfervations  oftheableft  philofophersdiflinguifh  abfolutely  tirely    dif- 

the  foul  from  the  body,  as  a  being  in  its  nature  efTentially  different,  tind  from 

I.  in  fadl,  we  do  not  find  that  the  faculties  of  the  mind,  the  under-  ''^"^  °^  ^^^ 

(landing,  the  will,  liberty,  vnih.  all   the  operations  they  produce,  °'  ^  * 

have 


1 74  l^he  Principles  of 

have  any  relation  to  thofe  of  extenrion,  figure  and  motion,  which 
are  the  properties  of  matter.  2.  The  idea  we  have  of  an  exten- 
ded fubftence,  as  purely  pafllve,  ieems  to  be  abfo'utely  incompati- 
ble with  that  proper  and  internal  a£l:vity  which  dilfinguifhes  a 
thinking  being.  The  body  is  not  put  into  motion  of  itfelt,  buttha 
mind  finds  inwardly  the  principle  ofits  own  movements  ;  it  a£l?,it 
thinks,  it  wills,  it  moves  the  body  ;  it  turns  its  operations,  as  it 
'pleafes  ;  it  {tops,  proceed'^,  or  returns  the  way  it  went.  3.  We  ob- 
fcrve likewife,  that  our  thinking  part  is  a  fiinple,  fingle,  and  indi- 
vifible  being  ;  becaufe  it  colicîts  all  our  ideas  and  fenfations,  as  it 
werr,  into  jne  paint,  by  andc;r(tanding,  feeling,  and  comparing  them, 
^c.  which  cannot  be  done  by  a  being  compofed  of  various  parts. 

Dcatîi  <3o?»   jy  ^  'Y\\^  foul  feems  therefore  to  be  of  a  particular  nature,  to  have  no» 
f^    jjg^gf.  thing  in  common  with  grofs  and  matenal  bcing'^,  but  tobe  a  pure 
farilyimily  ^pirit, that  participators  infomemeafurc  ofthe  natnfof  the  fuprerie 
the  ani  ihi-  Being.     Tiiis  has  been  verv  elegantly  f xprefTd  by  Cicero  :    We 
hcion    of   cannot  find ^   fays  he,  *   a«  earth  the   leajl  trace  of  the  origin  of  the 
the  foul,     y^y/,     pgf  there  is  nothiig  m'lxt  or  compound  in  the  mind •■,   nothing 
that  feetns  to  proceed  from  the  earthy  water^  air^  or  fire.      Iheje  ele- 
ments have  nothing  productive  of  mejiniry^  under/ianding,,  rffieîîions  \ 
nothing  that   is  able  to  recal   the  paji^  to  forefee    the  future^  and  tf 
ernhrace  the  prefnt.       IVe  fl^ad  never  fi-td  the  jour  ce  from  whence 
man  has  derived  th  fj  divine  qualities,  hut  by  tracing  them  up  to  God. 
It  folloivs  therefore^  that  the  Joui  is  endowed  with  afsngular  nature^ 
which  has  n'lthing  in  it  common  zuith  thcfe  hioxun  and  familiar  ele~ 
m^ntf,      Hcnce^  let  the  nature   of  a  being  that  has  f-nfation^  under- 
Ji.inding^  tuill^  and  principle  of  life,  be   what  it   will,  this   being  if 
/urely  heavenly^  divine^  and  confequently  immortal. 

This  conclufion  is  very  ju(t.  For  if  the  foul  be  eflentially  dif- 
tîn£t  from  the  body,  the  dei'lru<^ion  of  the  one  is  not  neccffarily 
f.»llo.ved  with  the  annihilation  ofthe  other  ;  and  thus  far  nothing 
hinders  the  foul  from  fubfifting,  notwithftanding  the  deftruftioi^ 
of  its  ruinous  habitation. 

V.  Should 

•  Anjmorum  nulla  in  terris  oiigo  invcniri  porert  •■  n'.h'I  eri'm  in  animis  mix- 
-^  t'.iTi  atque  ccncretum,  aut  quod  ev  tei  râ  ratum  atque  fii^f  urn  cfTe  videatur  :  nihil 
nç  aut  humidum  qnidem  aut  ftabilf  aut  i^niiii.  His.  enim  in  naturis  nihil  Ja- 
e'*,qiiod  V  m  n->etrK>rix,  mentis,  c;  L  a'ionis  habeat  ;  quod  ct  praetcrita  teneae,  & 
futur.»  pnvideat  &  co'i  pleCti  piifTr  prjef'entia  :  qus:  Ibla  divina  funi  ;  nee  inve- 
T'ernr  ui>qu3m,  unde  ad  hominem  venire  prflint  nifi  a  Ddo.  Singularis  eft  ip;i- 
turquaeja'v.  ri'tura  atque  v'saninii,  fejunc^a  ab  his  ufitati;!  notifque  n  ruris.  Ita 
q-iMcquH  rft  il!ud,  quod  fL-ntit  qa-id  fi(>it,  quod  v^vir,  <juod  viget,  coelefte  et 
divinuin  ob  tamque  reaa  atcrnum  fit  nsccffc  eft.     Cic  'T>jfcul.  dijput,  l'A.  i,  «/. 


nRfnre 
annihila- 


Natural  Law*  175 

V.  Should   it  be  faid,  that  we  are  not  fufficientfy  acquainted  O^jcflJon. 
with  the  intrinfic  nature  of  (ubflances,  to  determine  that  God  could  ^^"^^'^'* 
not  communicate  thought  to  fome  portion  of  matter  ;  1  {hculdv.nf. 

v\  erj  that  we  cannot  hcuvcver  judge  of  things  but  according  tothcif 
appearance  and  our  ideas  ;  otherwife,  whatever  is  not  loundcd  on 
a  Itridl  demonftration,  muft  be  uncertain,and  this  would  terminate 
in  a  kind  of  pyrrhonifm.  All  that  reafon  requires  is,  that  wc  dif- 
tinguifb  properly  between  what  is  dubious,  probable,  or  certain  ; 
and  fince  all  wekfiow  in  relation  to  matter,  d  es  not  feem  to  have 
any  affinity  with  the  faculties  of  the  fuul  ;  and  as  we  even  find  in 
one  and  the  other,  qualities  that  fcem  incompatible  ;  it  is  not  prc- 
fcribing  limits  to  the  Divine  Power,  but  rather  following  the  no- 
tions that  reafon  has  furnifh.-d  u«;,  to  affirm  it  is  highly  probable, 
that  the  thinking  ^art  of  man  is  eiTcntially  dillinct  from  the  body* 

VI.  But  let  the  nature  of  the  foul  be  what  it  will,  and  be  it  even,  ^^^JJ^J^'^ 
though  contrary   to  all   appearance,   fuppofed  corporeal  ;    (till  it  preceding 
would  no  ways  lollow,  that  ihe  death  of  the  body  muft  necdTarily  truth, 
bring  on  the  annihilation  of  the  foul.     For  we  do  not  find  an  in-  Nothing;  îb 
ftance  of  any  annihilation   properly  fo    called.     The  body  itfeU,  "'"^", 
how  inferior  foever to  the  mind,  is  not  anniiiilatcd  by  death.     It  j^j^ 
receives,  indeed,  a  great  alteration  ;    but  its  fubilance  remains  al- 
ways effentially  the  fame,  and  admits  only  a  change  of  modification 

or  form.  Why  therefore  (hould  the  foul  be  annihilated  ?  It  will 
undergo,  if  you  pleafe,  a  great  mutatioTi  ;  it  will  be  detached  from 
the  bonds  that  unite  it  to  the  body,  and  will  be  incapable  of  opera- 
ting in  conjundtion  with  it  :  But  is  this  an  argument  that  it  can- 
not exift  feparatelv,  or  that  it  lofes  its  elTential  quality,  which  is  that 
of  underftanding  ?  This  does  not  at  all  appear  j  ior  one  does  not 
follow  from  the  other. 

Were  it  therefore  impoffible  for  us  to  determine  the  intrinfic 
nature  of  the  foul,  yet  it  would  be  carrying  the  thing  too  far,  and 
concluding  beyond  what  we  are  authorifed  by  fa£l  to  maintain,  - 
that  death  is  neceflarily  attended  with  a  total  deftruftion  of  the  foul. 
Thequeftion  is  therefore  reducible  to  this  point  :  Is  God  willing 
to  annihilate,  or  to  preferve  the  foul  ?  But  if  what  we  know  in 
refpedl  to  the  nature  of  the  foul,  does  not  incline  us  to  think  it  is 
deftined  toperi(h  by  death  ;  we  (hall  fee  likewife,  that  the  confid- 
eration  of  its  excellency  is  a  very  ttrong  prefumption  in  favour  of 
its  immortality. 

VII.  And  indeed  it  Is  not  at  all  probable,  that  an  intelligent  ^"^^f**.^, 
bein^,  capable  of  knowing  fach  a  muhitude  of  truths,  of  making  e^eliency  * 

fo  of  the  fouJ. 


176  I'he  Principles  of 

{o  many  difcoveries,  of  reafoningupoii  an  infinite  number  of  things, 
ofdifcerning  their  proportions,  fitnefs,  and  beauties  ;  of  contem- 
plating the  works  of  the  Creator,  of  tracing  them  up  to  him,  of 
obferving  his  deligns,  and  penetrating  into  their  caufes  ;  of  raifing 
himfelf  above  all  fenfible  things  to  the  knowledge  of  fpiritual  and 
divine  fubje(5ts  ;  that  has  a  power  to  a6t  with  liberty  and  difcern- 
mcnt,  and  to  array  himfelf  with  the  mod  beautiful  virtues,  it  is 
not,  I  fay,  at  all  probable,  that  a  being  adorned  with  qualities  of  fo 
excellent  a  nature,  and  fofupcrior  to  thofe  of  brut;;  animals,  fhould 
have  been  created  only  for  the  fhort  fpace  of  this  life.  Thefc 
confiderations  made  a  lively  imprefîion  upon  the  ancient  philofo- 
phers.  When  I  confidcr^  iays  Cicero,  *  the  furprlfing  a^ivity  of 
the  m'tndyfo  great  a  memory  of  what  is  pa/î^  and  fuch  an  v  fight  into 
futurity -y  when  I  behold  fuch  a  number  of  arts  and  fciences^  and  fuch 
a  multitude  of  difcoveries  frotn  thence  arifing  ;  I  believe^  and  am  firmly 
perfuaded^  that  a  naturt  which  contains  fo  many  things  within  itfelfy 
cannot  be  mortal, 

iTonfirma.       VIII.  Again  :  fuch  is  the  nature  of  the  human  mind,  that  it  is 

tion.  always  capable  of  improvement,   and  of  perfe6\ing  its   faculties. 

Our  facul-  Though  our  knowledge  is  acflually  confined  within  certain   limits, 

wT'^^fuf-*  y^f  ^^'s  ^^^  '"^^  bounds  to  that  which  we  are   capable  of  acquiring, 

ceptible  of  tt>  the  inventions  we  are  able  to  make,  to  the  progrefs  of  our  judg- 

a  greater    meot,  prudence,  and  virtue.     Man  is  in  this  rcfpe6l  always  fufcep- 

^^%'^%-^!  tible  of  feme  new  degree  of  perfection   and    maturity.     Death 

jer  c   10.1,  Qygj-{^j.gs  him  before  he  has  iinifhed,  as  it  were,  his  progrefs,  and 

when  he  was  capable  of  proceeding  a  great  deal   farther.     Hozu 

can  it  enter^  fays  a  celebrated  Eng'.ifh  writer,  f  into  the  thoughts  of 

man,  that  the  foul,  which  is  capable  of  fuch  immenfe  perfeSfions,  and  of 

7'eceiving  new    improvements  to   all  eternity^  Jhall  fall  away  into 

nothing  almofl  asfoon  as  it  is  created!*  Are  fuch  abilities  made  for  na 

purpofe?  A  brute  arrives  at  a  point  of  perfe6îion  that  he  can  never 

pafs  :  In  a  few  years  he  has    all  the   endowments  he  is  capable  of\ 

and  were  he  to  live  ten  thoufand  tnorc^  would  be  the  fa /ne  thing  he  is 

at  prefent.     Were  a  human  foul  thus  at  a  fl and  in  her  accomplijh- 

ments^  were  her  faculties  to  be  full  blnvn^  and  incapable  of  further 

enlargements.)  I  could  imagine  it  might  fall  away  infenfibly^  and  drop 

at  once  into  afîate  of  annihilation.     But  can  we  believe  a  thiyiking 

beingy 

*  Qiiid  muka  ?  Sic  mihi  perfuafi.  fie  feiitio,  cum  tanta  celeritas  animoruni 
fit,  tanta  mcmoria  prKteritorum  futurorumquc  prudentb,  tot  art«f,tantœ  fcien- 
tlx.  tot  inventa,  non  pofle  earn  nataram^  (jure  res  eas  coutincat»  effe  niortalcm. 

Cic.  de  Senec.  cap    1. 

f    SrECTATOR,   Vol.   II.  No   III, 


N  A  T  U  R  A  L    L  A  W.  177 

he'inr^  that  is  in  a  perpetual  progrefs  of  improvements',  ami  travelling 
on  from perjefiicn  to  pcrfeâîion.,  after  having  jujl  looked  abroad  i-ito 
the  works  of  its  Creator -^  and  made  a  feiv  difcovcries  of  bis  ivjinlte 
goodnejs,  wifdoni^  and  power.,  muji  periJJj  at  her  firjî  fetti.'ig  ou.\  and 
in  the  very  beginning  of  her  inquiries  f 

IX.  True  it  is,  that  m')fl  men  debafe  therafelves  in  fome  mca-  ONj-Aîon. 
furîstoan  animal  life,  and  have  very  little  concern  about  the  irn-  Aniwer. 
provemsnt  of  their  faculties.      But    ifthofe  people  voluntarily  de- 
grade tliemfdves,  this  ought  to  be  no  prejudice  to  fuch  as  chufe 

to  hipport  the  dignity  of  their  nature;  neither  does  it  invalidate 
what  wti  have  been  faying  in  regard  to  the  excellency  of  the  foul. 
For  to  judge  rightly  of  things,  they  ought  to  be  confidercd  in 
themfelves,  and  iti  their  moft  perfect  (late. 

X,  It  is  undoubtedly  in  confequence  of  the  natural  ferifo  of  the 
dignity  of  our  being,  and  of  the  grandeur  of  the  end  we  are  dcfign-       '"^^ 
ed  for,  that  we  naturally  extend  our  views  to  futurity  ;  that  we  con-  .ir^vvn 
cern  ourfelves  about  what  is  to  happen  after  our  death  ;  that  we  from  our 
feck  to  perpetuate  our  name  and  memory,  and  are  not  inllnhbleto  "'tural 
the  judgment  of  pofterity.Thelefentiments  are  far  from  being  the  iilu-  d:fporitir)ns 
fionoffelf-love  or  prejudice.  Thedefireandhopeofimmortality  isan  ^"    e  in.s. 
imprelîion  we  receive  from  nature,  x^nd  this  defire  is  Co  very  reafon- 

able  in  itfelf,  fo  ufeful,  and  fo  clofely  conneéled  with  the  fyflem  of 
humanity,  that  we  may  at  leaft  infer  from  thence  a  very  probable 
induélion  in  favour  of  a  future  (late.  How  great  foever  the  vivaci- 
ty of  this  defire  may  be  in  itfelf,  (lill  it  increafes  in  proportion  as 
we  take  more  care  to  cultivate  our  reafon,  and  as  we  advance  in 
the  knowledge  of  truth  and  the  practice  of  virtue.  This  fenri- 
ment  becomes  the  fured  principle  of  noble,  generous,  and  public- 
fpirited  a£lions  ;  and  we  may  affirm,  that  were  it  not  for  this  prin- 
ciple, all  human  views  would  be  low,  mean,  and  fordid. 

All  this  feems  to  point  out  to  us  clearly,  that  by  the  inftitution  of 
the  Creator,  there  is  a  kind  of  natural  proportion  and  relation  be- 
tween the  fold  and  immortality.  For  it  is  not  by  deceit  and  ilhi- 
fion  that  the  Supreme  Wifdom  condudls  us  to  his  propofed  end  I 
a  principle  foreafonableand  nece/Iary  ;  a  principle  that  cannot  bu: 
be  productive  of  good  effects,  that  raifes  man  above  himftlf,  and 
renders  him  not  only  capable  of  the  fublimefl  undertakings,  but 
fuperior  to  the  moft  delicate  temptations,  and  fuch  as  arc  inoft 
dangerous  to  virtue;  fuch  a  principle,  1  fay, cannot  be  chimerical.* 

Y  Thus 

*  Cicero  eives  an  admirable  pi^Hre  of  the  influence  which  the  dcCie  ana  hope 


1^8  T^he  Principles  of 

Thus  every  thing  concurs  to  perfuade  us  that  the  foul  mufi 
fubfill  after  death.  The  knowledge  we  have  of  the  nature  of  the 
mind;  its  excellence  and  faculties  ever  fufceptible  of  a  higher  de- 
gree of  perfection  ;  the  dirpofition  which  prompts  us  to  raife  our- 
Iclves  above  the  prefent  life,  and  to  dtiirc  imiiiortality  ;  are  all  fo 
many  natural  inclinations,  and  form  the  (trongeft  prefumplion,  that 
{uch  indeed  is  the  intention  of  the  Creator. 

The  fane-  ^^*  The  clearing  up  of  this  firft  point  is  of  great  importance  in 
tion  of  na-  regard  to  our  principal  queftion,  and  folves  already,  in  part,  the 
tarai  laws  difficulty  we  arc  examining.  P'or  when  once  the  foul  is  fuppofcd 
■'-'.'if  ^"  fublift  after  the  dilFolution  of  the  body,  nothing  can   hinder  us 

future  life  ^'^°'^  faying,  that  whatever  is  wantingin  the  prefent  Uate  to  complete 
the  fandtion  of  natural  law,  will  be  executed  hereafter,  if  fo  it  be 
agreeable  to  the  Divine  VVifdom. 

We  come  now  from  confidering  man  on  the  phyfical  fide,  which 
opens  us  already  a  pafTage  towards  finding  the  objcdfof  our  pref- 
ent purfuit.  Let  us  fee  now  whether  by  viewing  man  on  the 
moral  fide,  that  is,  as  a  being  capable  of  rule,  whoa6ls  with  know- 
ledge and  choice,  and  whether  railing  ou rfelves  afterwards  to  God, 
we  cannot  difcover  new  reafons  and  ftill  ftronger  prcfumptions  uf 
a  future  life,  of  a  (fate  of  rewards  and  punifhments. 

Here  we  cannot  avoid  repeating  part  of  thofe  things  which  have 
been  already  mentioned  in  this  work,  becaufe  we  are  upon  the 
point  of  confidering  their  intire  refuît  \  the  truth  we  intend  hereto 
eftablifh  being,  as  it  were,  the  conclufion  of  the  whole  fyftem. 
It  is  thus  a  painter,  after  having  worked  fmgly  upon  each  part  of 
his  piece,  thinks  it  neceffary  to  retouch  the  whole,  in  order  to  pro- 
dcce  what  is  called  the  total  effetl  and  harmony , 

XII.  Man,  we  have  feen,  is  a  rational  and  free  agent,  who 
Fm  ^prcc  ,  Jif|ipg^,i{}jcsjj,ffice  and  honefty,  who  finds  within  himftlf  the  prin- 
fr'.m  the  ciplcs  of  confciencc,  who  is  fenfible  of  his  dépendance  on  the  Cre- 
■ature  of  ator,  and  born  to  fulfil  certain  duties.  His  greateft  ornament  is 
man    con-  xtz{Qx\  and  virtue  ;  and" his  chief  talk  in  life  is  to  advance  in  that 

iiitred    on  . 

the    moral  P^'"' 


fiJc. 


of  immortality  has  had  in  all  agef,  to  excite  men  to  great  and  noble  a<Sions. 
•'  Nemo  unquam.yjjj'j-  he,  fine  magna  (pc  immortalitatis  fc  pro  patria  ofTerrct  ad 
'«  mortem.  Licuit  elTe  otiofo  Thcmiftocli  ;  licuit  Epaminonc'x  ;  licuit,  ne  et 
*'  Vetera  et  CNterna  quxram,  mihi  :  fed  nefcio  quo  modo  inhxret  in  mcntibns 
*'  quafi  ficulorum  qucddam  augurium  futurorum  ;  idque  in  maximis  ingeiiiis  al- 
"  tiflimifque  animisexiftit  maxime,  et  apparet  facillirrè.  Qu^quidem  dempto, 
«'  quis  tarn  eiTet  amcr.s,   qui  ftmpcr  ;ji  laboribus  et  periculis  viversc  f"    lujiul. 


Natural    La  w>  i  79 

path,  by  embracing  all  the  occafions  that  offer,  lo  improve,  to  re- 
flect, and  to  do  good.  The  more  he  praétifes  and  confirms  him- 
fclfinfiich  laudable  occupations,  the  more  he  accomplifties  the 
views  of  the  Creator,  and  proves  himfrlf  worthy  ot  the  cxidcnce 
he  has  received.  He  is  fenfible  he  can  be  reafonably  called  to  an 
account  for  his  condudl,  and  he  approves  or  condemns  himfelf  ac- 
cording to  hisdilFerent  manner  of  ailing. 

From  all  thefc  circumftances  it  evidently  appears,  that  man  is 
not  confined,  like  other  animals,  to  a  mere  phyfical  œconomy,  but 
that  he  is  included  in  amoral  one,  which  raifes  him  much  higher, 
and  is  attended  with  greater  confequences.  For  what  appearance 
or  probability  is  there,  that  a  foul  which  advances  daily  in  wifdom 
and  virtue,  (hnuld  tend  to  annihilation,  and  that  God  fhould  think 
proper  to  extingui(h  this  liglit  in  its  greatell  luftre  r  Is  it  not  more 
reafonable  to  think,  that  the  good  or  bad  ufc  of  our  faculties  will 
be  attended  with  future  confequences  ;  that  we  (hall  be  accounta- 
ble to  our  Creator,  and  finally  receive  the jatt  retribution  we  have 
merited  ?  Since  therefore  this  judgment  of  God  docs  not  difplay 
itfelf  fufficiently  in  this  world,  it  is  natural  to  prefume,  that  the 
plan  of  the  Divine  Wifdom,  with  regard  to  us,  embraces  a  dura- 
tion of  a  much  greater  extent. 

XIII.  Let  us  afcend  from  man  to   God,  and  we  (hall  be  ftilî  Second 
further  convinced,  that  fuch,  in  reality,  is  the  plan  he  formed.  proof. 

If  God  is  willing  (a  point  we  have  already  proved)  that  man  5,-0^,'   jf,ç 
(hould  obferve  the  rules  of  right  reafon,  in  proportion  to  his  fac-  perfedions 
ulties  and  the  circumftances  he  is  under  ;  this  mufi  be  a  ferions  of  God. 
and  pofitive  will.     It  is  the  will  of  the   Creator,  of  the  Governor 
of  the  world,  of  the  fovereign  Lord  of  all  things.     It  is  therefore 
a  real  command,    which  lays  us  under  an  obligation  of  obeying. 
It  is  moreover  the  will  of  a  Being  fupremely  powerful,  v^ife,  and 
good,  who  propofing  always,  both  with  refpeft  to  himfelf  ard  to 
bis  creatures,  the  moft  excellent  .ends,  cannot  fail  to  e{labl:(h  the 
mean?,  which  in  the  order  of  reafon,  and  purfuant  to  the  nature 
and  (late  of  thing»;,  are  nece(rary  for  the  execution  of  his  defign. 
No  one  can  reafonably  conteft  thefe  principles  ;  but  let  us  fee  what 
confequences  may  be  drawn  from  thence. 

I.  If  it  adïually  became  the  Divine  Wifdom  to  give  laws  to 
man,  this  fame  wifdom  requires  thefe  laws  (hould  be  accompanied 
with  neceiïary  motives  to  determine  rational  and  free  agents  to 
conform  thereto  in  all  cafes.  Ocherwife  we  ihould  be  obliged  to 
(ày^  either  that  God  does  not  really  and  (erioufly  ddVe  the  obfcr 

va;icQ 


1  où  The  Principles   of 

vsnce  of  the  laws  he  has  ena£led,  or  that  he  wants  power  or  vvif- 
dom  to  procure  ic, 

1.  If  through  an  effect  of  his  goodoeff,  he  has  not  thought 
proper  to  let  men  live  at  random,  or  to  abandon  the  m  to  the 
capricioulntfs  of  their  paflions  ;  if  he  has  given  them  a  light  to 
direct  them;  this  fame  goodnefsmuft,  undoubtedly,  induce  hirr»  to 
annex  a  perfect  and  durable  happlatfs  to  the  goud  ufe  that  every 
rem  makes  of  this  light. 

3.  Rcnfon  informs  us  afterwards,  that  an  all-powerful,  all-wife, 
and  ali-bouniiful  Being  is  inhnitely  fond  of  order;  that  the  fame 
perfections  make  him  dcfire  that  this  order  (hould  reign  among 
his  inelligentand  tree  creatures,  and  that  it  was  for  this  very  reaion 
he  fubjected  theai  to  laws.  The  fame  reafons  that  induced  him 
to  tftablifh  a  moral  order,  engage  him  likewife  to  procure  their  cb- 
fer  lice.  It  muft  be  therefore  his  fatisfattionar.d  glory,  to  render 
all  men  fenfible  of  the  difference  he  makes  between  thole  who  dif- 
turb,  and  thofe  who  conform  to  order.  He  cannot  be  indifferent 
in  this  rcfpeft  :  on  the  contrary,  he  is  determined,  by  the  love  he 
has  f.^r  hiaifelt  and  his  perfections,  to  inyeft  his  commands  with  all 
theefhcacy  neceffary  to  render  his  authority  refpcàted  :  this  imports 
an  eftabiiltiment  of  future  rewards  and  punifnments  ;  either  to  keep 
man  within  rule,  as  much  as  poffiblc,  in  the  prcfent  ftate,  by  the 
potent  motives  of  hope  and  fear;  or  to  give  afterwards  an  execu- 
tion worthy  of  his  juliice  and  wifdom  to  his  plan,  by  reducing  every 
thing  to  the  primitive  order  he  has  eilabliH'ied. 

4  The  fame  principle  carries  us  yet  further.  For  if  God  be 
infinitely  fond  of  the  order  he  hag  eftablifhed  in  the  moral  world,  he 
rannot  but  approve  of  thofe,  who  with  a  fmcerc  and  confiant  at- 
t  îchmenî  to  this  order,  endeavour  to  picafe  him  by  concuring  to 
the  accomplifhment  of  his  views;  and  he  cannot  but  difapprove  of 
luch  as  obftrve  an  oppofite  conduct:  *  for  the  former  are, 
as  it  were,  his  friends,  and  the  latter  declare  themfelves  his 
enemies.  But   the  approbation   of  the  Deity    imports  his 

pr<?tection,  benevolence,  and  love  ;  whereas  his  difapprobation  can- 
not but  be  attended  with  quite  contrary  effects.  If  fo,  how  can  any 
one  imagine,  that  God's  friends  and  ene-nies  will  be  confounded, 
and  no  difference  made  between  them  r  It  is  not  much  more  con- 
fonant  to  realup,  to  think,  that  the  Divine  Juftice  will  manifeft  at 
leivJth,  f.>me  way  or  other,  the  extreme  difference  he  places  he- 
t^ween  virtue  and  vice,  by  rendering  finally  and  perfectly  happy 
tbofe,  who  by  a  fubmiffion  to  his  will  are  become  the  objects  of 

his 


*   Set:  part  :i.  chap.  x.  §  7. 


NaturalLaw.  i8î 

his  bsne7olence  ;  and,  on  the  contrary,  by  making  the  wicked  feci 
his  jull  fiiverity  and  relcntinent  ? 

XIV.  This  is  whatourcleareft  notions  of  the  perfedion?;  of  the  fu- 
preme  Being  inJuce  us  to  judge  concerning  his  views,  and  the  plan  he 
fas  formed.  Were  not  virtue  to  meet  furely  and  inevitably  with  a 
final  recompence,  and  vice  with  a  final  punifliment,  and  this  in  a 
general  and  complete  manner,  exutflly  proportioned  to  the  degree 
of  insrit  or  demerit  of  each  perfon  ;  the  plan  of  natural  laws 
would  never  anfwer  our  expectation  from  a  fupreme  Ltgiflator, 
whofe  prefcience,  wifdom,  power,  and  goodneis,  are  without 
bounds.  This  would  be  leaving  the  laws  diverted  of  their  prin- 
cipal force,  and  reducing  them  to  the  quality  of  fimple  counfels  ; 
it  would  be  fubverting,  in  fine,  the  fundamental  part  of  the  fyflem 
of  intelligent  creatures^,  namely,  that  of  being  induced  to  make  a 
reafonablc  ui'e  cf  their  ficultie«,  with  a  view  and  expe£iation  of 
happinef;.  In  fiicri,  the  moral  fjftcm  would  fall  into  a  flate  cf 
impertedlion,  which  could  be  reconciled  neither  with  the  nature 
of  man,  nor  with  the  f^ate  of  fociety,  nor  with  the  m.oral  perfec- 
tions of  the  Deity.  It  is  otherwife,  when  we  acknowledr'^e  a  future 
life.  The  moral  fyftcm  is  thereby  fupported,  connected,  and  fin- 
iPiii^d,  fo  as  to  leave  nothing  wanting  to  render  it  complete  :  It  is 
then  a  plan  really  worthy  of  God,  and  ufeful  to  man.  The  fu- 
preme Being  does  ail  he  ought  to  do  with  free  and  rational  crea- 
tures, to  induce  th^'m  to  behave  as  they  fhould  ;  the  laws  of  na- 
ture are  thus  eftablithed  on  the  mo[i  folid  foundations  ;  and  noth- 
ing is  wanting  to  bind  man  by  fuch  motives  as  are  propcrelt  to 
make  an  impreiîîon. 

Hence  if  this  plan  be  without  comparifon  the  mod  beautiful  and 
the  bed;  if  it  be  iikewife  the  mod:  worthy  of  God,  and  the  moft 
conn-^ded  with  uh.atvveknow  of  the  n:;ture,  want?,  and  ftate  of 
man  ;  ho'.vcan  any  one  doubt  of  its  being  that  which  the  Divine 
WiiUom  has  adi;^dly  chofen  ? 

XV.  I  acknowledge,  indeed,  that  could  we  find  in  theprcfent 

life  a  fjfHcient  Gnflion  of  the  laws   of  nature,  in  the  meafure  and  T'*^  objec- 

i-.il  •         I  niii  •!  /-I-    f>o^  drawn 

pjenitude  i-bove  mentioned,  we  ihould  have  no  right  to  prefs   th'.s  {j,,^     j^c 

argument  ;  for  nothing  couldoblige  us  to  fcarch  into  ft;t:urity  for  prtfentftate 

an  iritire  unravelling  of  the  divine  plan.     But  we  have  fetn  in  the  "^    thinjjs 

preceditv:^  chapter,  that  thou2,h  by  the  nature  of  thincs,  and  even  ^^'^^^'^     \^ 

U       .U  ^  ■  rl     I   1-1  r      '  1  I  .       .  ,      prove      tllO 

by  the  vatinu.selt.ibninments  of  man,  virtue  has  already  its  reward,  fentimeiit 
aid  vice  iti  punifh  nent  ;    yet  this  excellent  and  jufl:  order  is  ac-  itoppofcs. 
cumniiilieJ  only  i;»  n-nt,  ami  that  v;e  find  a  great  number  of  excep- 
tions 


. 1 8 2  T^e  Principles  of 

tions  to  this  rule  in  hiflory,  and  the  experience  of  human  life. 
Hencearifesa  very  puzzling  objc£lion  againft  the  authority  of  nat- 
ural laws.  But  as  foon  as  mention  is  made  of  another  life,  the 
difficulty  difappears  ;  every  thing  is  cleared  up  and  fc-t  to  right  ;  the 
fyftem  appears  conneded,  finiflied,  and  fupported  ;  the  Divine 
Wifdom  is  juftified  :  we  find  all  the  neceffary  fupplements  and 
compenfations  to  redrefs  the  prefent  irregularities  ;  virtue  acquires 
a  firm  and  unlhak^n  prop,  by  furnifhing  the  virtuous  mm  with  a 
motive  capable  to  fuppoit  him  in  the  mofî  dangerous  difficulties, 
and  to  render  him  triumphant  owr  the  moft  delicate  temptations. 

Were  this  only  a  fimpleconieifure,  it  might  be  confidercd  ra- 
ther as  a  convenient  than  folid  fuppofstion.  But  we  have  feen  that 
it  is  founded  alfo  on  the  nature  and  excellence  of  the  foul  ;  on  the 
inflinct  that  inclines  us  to  raifeourfelvcs  .^bcvc  the  prefent  life  j 
and  on  the  nature  of  man  confidered  on  the  moral  fide,  as  a  crea- 
ture accountable  for  his  a£lion?,  and  obliged  to  confoim  to  a  cer- 
tain rule.  When  befides  all  this  we  behold  that  the  fame  opinion 
Tervcs  to  fupport,  and  perfectly  crowns  the  whole  fyftem  of  natural 
law,  it  muft  be  allowed  to  be  no  Icfs  probable  than  it  is  beautiful 
and  engaging. 

The  Micf      XVI.  Hence  this  fame  opinion  has  been  received  more  or  lefs 
o^f  a  future  at  all  time?,  and  by  all  nations,  according  as  reafonhas  been  more 
ftate     has  or  lefs  Cultivated,  or  a   people  have  inquired  defer  into  the  origin 
K'"      ^^  of  things.      It  would  be  an  eafy  tnatter  toalledge  divers  hifl-orical 
fcu'nutijns.  prcofs,  and  to  produce  aUu  fcveral  beautiful  paflagcs  from  the  an- 
cient philofophers,  in  order  to  fhew  that  the  reafuns  which   flrike 
us,  made  the  like  imprellions  on  the  vvifeft  of  the  Pagans.      But 
we  {hall  be  fatisfied  with  obferving,  that  thtfe  tcfiimonies,  which 
},ave  been  coileded  bv  other  writers,    are  not  indifferent  on  this 
fubjecl  ;  becaufc  this  fliewà,  either  the  veftiges  of  a  primitive  tra- 
dition, or  the  voice  of  reafon  and  nature,  or  both  ;  which  adds  9 
eonfiderable  weight  to  our  argument. 


CHAP.     XIV. 

That  the  proofs  vje  have  alledged  have  fuch  a  prohahiUly  ondfitnefs^  as 
renders  thcmj'ufficient  to  fix  our  belief  and  to  determine  our  condu^. 


^"hr  e        VV  E  have  fcen  how  far  our  reafon  is  capable  of  conducH;- 


The 


Natural  Law.  183 

ing  us  with  regard  to  the  important  queftion  of  the  immortality  of  8'^'"^"      ^^ 
the  foul,  and  a  future  fbte  of  rewards  and  puuifhmcnts.     Each  of  ^.^  ^^  oïi^m- 
the  proofs  we  have  alledged,  has  without  doubt  its  particular  force  ;  mai     law» 
but  joining  to  the  afTjlhuice  of  one  another,  and  acquiring  a  great-  are     fuS*- 
er  ftrength  by  their  union,  they  are  certainly  capable  of  making  an  '^"^'^*« 
impreffton  on  every  attentive  and  unprejudiced  mind,   and  ought 
to  appear  fufHcicnt  to  cflablifh  the  authority  and  fandion  of  nat- 
ural law  in  as  full  an  extent  as  we  defire. 

II.  If  any  one  (hoiild  fay,  that  all  our  reafonings  on  this  fubjedl  objcaio». 

are  only  probability  and  conjeiSture,  and  prcperly  reducible  to  a  Thcfe 

plaufible  reafon  or  fitnefs,  which  leaves  the  thing  flill  at  a  great  proofs  con- 

diilance  from  dcmonfîration  ;   I  (hall  agree,  if  he  pleafes,  that  we  ^^^^^^  ^^^^ 

have  not  here  a  complete  evidence  ;  yet  the  probability,  methink?,  a    fit     or 

is  fo  very  ftrong,  and  the  fitnefs  fo  great  and  fo  well  eftabllfhed,  fuitabic 

that  this  is  fufficicnt  to  make  it  prevail  over  the  contrary  opinion,  reafon. 

J  r  ►!    *    J   .         •  J      \r  }  General 

and  conlequently  to  determuae  us.  anfwef. 

For  we  (hould  be  ftrangcly  embarrafTed,  if  in  every  queftion  that 
arifcs,  we  fliould  refufe  to  be  determined  by  any  thing  but  a  de- 
monft'rative  argument.  Moft  commonly  we  are  obliged  to  be  fat- 
isfied  with  an  affemblage  of  probabilities,  which,  in  a  conjundt 
confideration,  very  leldom  deceive  us,  and  ought  to  fupply  the 
place  of  evidence  in  fubjefls  unfufceptible  of  demonftration.  It 
is  thus  that  in  natural  philofophy,  in  phyfic,  criticifm,  hiftory,  pol- 
itics, commerce,  and  generally  in  all  the  affairs  of  life,  a  prudent 
man  is  determined  by  a  concurrence  of  reafons,  which,  every  thing 
confidered,  he  judges  fuperior  to  the  oppofite  arguments. 

III.  In  order  to  render  the  force  of  this  kind  of  proof  more  ob-         '      " 

•11  I  T  1-1  r-nt  1       meant     by 

vious,  It  Will  not  beamits  to  explain  here  at  hrlt  what  we  mean  by  a  fuitabic 
a  plûu/ible  reafon  ox  fitnefs  ;  to  inquire  afterwards  into  the  general  reafon. 
principle  on  which  this  fort  of  reafoning  is  founded  ;  and  to  fee  in 
particular  what  conftitutes  its  force  when  applied  to  the  law  of 
nature.  This  will  be  the  right  way  to  know  the  juft  value  ©f  our 
arguments,  and  what  weight  they  ought  to  have  in  our  determina- 
tions. 

J  plaufible  reafi)n  or  fitnefs  is  that  which  is  drawn  from  the  ne- 
ceffity  of  admitting  a  point  ascertain,  for  the  perfedlion  of  a  fyftem 
in  other  refpe£tsfo]id,  ufefu!,  and  well  conne6led,  but  which  would 
bedefeâive  without  this  point  ;  whenthere  is  no  reafon  to  fup- 
pofe  that  it  has  any  eflential  defcdt.*  For  example  :  upon  be- 
holding 

•  See  chap,  viii,  J  ». 


1 84  7'ie  Principles  of 

holding  a  great  and  magnificent  palace-,  we  remark  an  admirable 
fymni'ciry  a;id  proportion  j  where  all  the  rules  of  art,  \\hich  form 
the  folidity,  convenience,  ar,d  beauty  of  a  building,  are  flrldtly  ob- 
ferved.  In  fhort,  all  that  we  fee  of  the  building  denotes  an  able 
architefl.  May  it  not  therefore  be  reafonably  fuppofcd,  that  the 
foundation  which  we  do  not  fee  is  equally  folid  and  proportion'jd 
to  the  great  mafs  it  bears  ?  Can  it  be  imagined  that  the  architect's 
ability  and  knowledge  fliould  have  forfaken  him  in  fo  important  a 
point?  In  order  to  form  fuch  afuppafition,  we  (hould  have  certain 
proofs  ot  this  deficiency,  or  havefeen  that  in  faél  the  foundation  is 
imperft:£l  ;  oiherwife  we  could  not  prefume  fo  improbable  a 
thing.  Who  is  it,  that  on  a  rricre  metaphyfical  poflibility  of  the 
architeft's  having  neglected  to  lay  the  foundation,  would  venture 
to  wager  that  the  thing  is  really  fo  ? 

General  jy^  Such  is  the  nature  of  fitnefs.     The  general  foundation  of 

of  this  *      *^^^  manner  of  reafoning  is,  that  we  mull  not  confider  only  what 

manner  of  is  poflible,  but  v/hat  is  probable  ;  and  that  a  truth   ot   itfelf  very 

reafoning,    little  known,  acquires  a  probability  by  its  natural  connexion  with 

other  truths  more   obvious.     Thus  natural  philofophers   do  not 

queftion  but  they  have  difcovered    the  truth,    when  an  hypothefis 

happily  explains  all    the    phenomena  ;  and   an   event   very  little 

known  in  hiftory,  appears  no  longer  doubtful,  when  we  fee  it  ferves 

for  a  key  and  bafis  to  many  other  indubitable  events.     It  is  on  this 

principle  in  great  meafure  that  moral  certainty  is  founded,*  which 

is  fo  much  ufed  in  moft  fciencesj  as  well  as  in  the  condudt  of  life, 

and  in  things  of  the  greateft  importance  to  individuals,  families, 

and  to  the  whole  focicty. 

This  kind       V.  But  if  this  manner  cfjuJging  and  reafoning  takes  place  fo 

»f  fitnefs  is  frequently  in  humm  affairs,  aiid  is  in  general  founded  on  fo  folid  a 

yeryftronff  prji^cipje  j    it  jj  (till  much   furer  when  we  are  to  rerifon  on   the 

to   natural  works  of  God,  to  difcover  his  plan,  and  to  judge  of  his  views  and 

law.  defigns.     For  the  whole  untverf.*,   with  the  feveral  fyftems  that 

compofe  it,  and  particularly  the  fyftem  of  man  and  fociety,  are  the 

work  of  a  fupreme  uiiderftanding.     Nothing   has  been  done  by 

chance  ;  nothing  depends  on  a  blind,  capricious,  or  impotent  caufe  ; 

every  thing    has  been  calculated  and  meafured   with  a  profound 

wifdom.     Here  therefore,  more  than  any  where  elfe,  we  have  a 

right  to  judge,  that  fo  powerful  and  fo  wife  an  author,  has  omitted 

nothing 

*  See  M.  Boul'ifr's  philofnphical  cffay  on  the  fouls  of  brutes.  &c.  fcconJ 
edition  ;  to  which  has  heen  joined  a  treatife  of  the  true  principles  that  fcrve  a» 
a  foundation  to  moral  certainty,     AmJ.  1 73  7. 


Natural  Law.  185 

nothing  neccfTary  for  the  perfedion  of  his  plan;  and  that  confia- 
em  with  himfclf  he  has  fitted  ic  with  all  the  eflential  parts,  for  the 
(Jefigii  he  propofed.  If  we  ought  to  prcfume  reafonabiy  fuch  a 
care  in  an  able  architeiSl,  who  is  nothing  more  than  a  nnan  fubjcé^ 
to  error  ;  hovv  much  more  ought  we  to  prefume  it  in  a  being  of 
infinite  wifdom  ? 

VI.  What  we  have  been  now  faying,  (hews  that  this  fitnefs  is  Thisfifncfs 
not  always  of  the  fame  weight,  but  may  be  more  or  lefs  ftrong,  in  "*■  '  *''" 
proportion  to  the  greater  or  lefler  neccfTuy  on  which  it  is  eflabhfh-  principles* 
ed.      And  to  lay  down  rules  on  thisfubjeiSl,  we  may  fay  in  general,  to  judge  of 

1.  That  the  more  we  know  the  views  and  defign  of  the  author  ;  *'• 

2.  The  more  we  are  aflured  of  his  wifdom  and  power  j  3.  The 
more  this  power  and  wifdom  are  perfe(St  ;  4.  The  more  confid- 
erable  are  the  inconveniences  that  refait  from  the  oppofite  fyftem  ; 
the  more  they  border  upon  the  abfurd  ;  and  the  more  prefïing  we 
find  the  confequences  drawn  from  this  fort  of  confideration-\  For  - 
then  we  have  nothing  to  fet  in  oppofitionto  them  by  way  of  coun- 
terbalance ;  and  confequently  it  is  on  that  fide  we  are  determined 
by  right  reafon. 

VII.  Thefe  principles  are  of  themfelves  applicable  to  our  fubjefl,  -^pplîca- 
and  this  in  fo  juft  and  complete  a  manner,  that  the  reafon  drawn  ''°"       .°^ 
from  probability  or  fitnefs  cannot  be  carried  any  farther.       After  cipl!«^'^'to 
what  has  beenfaid  in  the  preceding  chapters,  it  would  be  entering  ourfubjefl, 
into  ufelefs  repetitions,  to  attempt  to  prove  here  all  the  particulars  : 

the  thing  fufficiently  proves  itfelf.  Let  us  be  fatisfied  with  obfer- 
ving,  that  the  fitnefs  in  favour  of  the  fantlion  of  natural  laws,  is 
(b  much  the  flronger  and  more  prefling,  as  the  contrary  opinion 
throws  into  the  fyftem  of  humanity  an  obfcurity  and  confufion, 
which  borders  very  much  upon  the  abfurd,  if  it  does  not  come 
quite  up  to  it.  The  plan  of  the  Divine  Wifdom  becomes  in  refpc^t 
to  us  an  infoluble  enigma  ;  we  are  no  longer  able  to  account  for 
any  thing  ;  and  we  cannot  tell  why  fo  nectflary  a  thing  fhould  be 
wanting  in  a  plan  fo  beautiful  in  other  refpedls,  fo  ufeful,  and  fo 
perfectly  conne£led. 

VIII.  Let  us  draw  a  comparison  between  the  two  fyftems,  to  Compari- 
fee  which  is  mofl  conformable  to  order,  moft  fuitjble  to  the  nature  f»"  of  the 
and  rtate  of  man,  and,  in  fhort,  moft  reafonable  and  worthy  of  God.  1^*^  °PP°" 

Suppofe,  on  one  fide,  that  the  Creator  propofed  the  perfection  tems, 
and  telicity  of  his  creatures,  and  in  particular  the  gvjod  of  man  and 
(bciety.    That  for  this  purpofê,  having  inveftcd  man  with  under- 
X  Handing 


1 86  lihe  Principles  of 

landing  and  liberty,  and  rendering  him  capable  of  knowing  his 
end,  of  difcovering  and  tollowing  the  road  that  can  alone  condiiâ: 
him  to  it,  he  lays  him  under  a  ftrict  obligation,  of  walkmg  con- 
flaiuly  in  this  road,  and  of  ever  foUovving  the  light  of  reafon,  which 
ought  always  to  dire6l  his  ilcps.  That  in  order  to  guide  him  the 
,  better,  he  has  given  him  all  the  principles  necefl'ary  to  ferve  him 

as  a  rule.  ThJitthis  direction,  and  th^ife  principles,  coming  from 
a  powerful,  wife,  and  good  fuperior,  have  all  the  charadteriftics  of 
a  real  law.  That  this  law  carries  already  along  with  it,  even  in 
this  life,  its  reward  and  punifhment  ;  but  that  this  firft  fanftion 
biing  infjfficicnt,  God,  in  order  to  give  to  a  plan  fa  worthy  of  his 
wifdom  andgoodnefs,  its  full  perfeiEtion,  and  to  fu.nllh  mankind  in 
all  poffible  cafes  with  neceffiry  motives  and  helps,  has  moreover 
cftabliihed  a  proper  fandlion  in  refpedl  to  natural  law,  which  will 
be  mr.nifefled  in  a  future  life  :  and  that  attentive  to  the  conduct  of 
man,  hepropofts  to  make  him  give  an  account  of  his  actions,  to 
vccompence  virtue,  and  to  punifh  vice,  by  a  retribution  exadllr 
proportioned  to  themerii  or  demerit  of  each  perfon. 

Let  us  fet  now  iti  oppofition  to  this  firfl  fyftem  the  other,  which 
fuppofes  that  every  thing  is  limited,  in  refptc^  to  man, to  the  pref- 
ent  life,  and  that  he  has  nothing  to  hope  or  fear  beyond  this  term  : 
that  God,  after  having  created  man  and  inftituted  fociety,  concerns 
himfelf  no  more  about  them  :  that  after  giving  us  a  power  of  dif- 
cerning  good  :yid  evil  by  the  help  of  reafon,  he  takes  no  manner  of 
notice  of  the  nfc  we  make  thereof,  but  leaves  us  in  fuch  a  manner 
to  ourfclves,  that  we  are  abfolutely  at  liberty  to  do  as  we  plcafe  : 
that  we  fhall  have  no  account  to  give  to  our  Creator,  and  that 
notwithftanding  the  unequal  and  irregular  diftribution  of  the 
goods  and  evils  of  this  life,  notwithftanding  the  diforders  caufed 
by  the  malice  or  injufticeof  mankind,  we  have  no  redrefs  or  com- 
penfation  ever  to  expert  fi'om  Gud. 

,j„    -  -  ÎX.  Can  any  one  fay  that  this  laft  fyftem  is  comparable  to  the 

ilfThe^fanc-  ^^^^^^  ^  Does  it  fft  the  divine  perfedions  in  fo  great  a  light  ?   Is  itfo 

tion  of  nat-  worthy  of  the  divine  wifdom,  bounty,  and  juitice  r  Is  it  fo  proper 

cral     laws  xo  ftem  the  torrent  of  vice  and  to  ftipport  virtue,  in  delicate  and 

!:>  ar   ?«■<:- (jgpjT.jj-Q^ijçopjun^lures  ?  Does  it  render  the  flru6tnre  of  fociety  as 
fsrable  to     ,   , .  =>         .  •       •'n     i      i  r  •  i     r     i  i       -  "^  l 

the  oppo-    'olui,  and  invelt  the  laws  ot  nature  with  loch  an  authority  as  the 

lite  fyitem,  gl'irv  of  the  fiipreme  LegiHator  and  the  good  of  humanity  requires  ? 

Were  we  to  chufe  betr/een  two  focieties,  one  of  which  admitted 

the  former  fyf^cm,  while  the  other  acknowledge  only  the  latter,  is 

there  a  prudent  man  but  w'ould  highly  prefer  to  live  in  the  firft  of 

thofe  focieties  \ 

There 


Natural  Law.  187 

There  is,  certainly,  no  comparifon  between  thofe  two  fyftems, 
in  refpe6l  to  beauty  and  fitntfs  :  the  firft  is  a  work  of  the  mo(t 
perfecl  reafon  ;  the  fécond  is  defeétive,  and  provides  no  mannerof 
remedy  againft  a  great  many  diforders.  Now  even  this  alona 
points  out  fuffiriently  on  which  fide  the  truth  lies  ;  becaufe  the 
bufmefs  is  to  judge  and  reafon  of  the  d.^figns  and  worics  of  the 
Deity,  who  does  every  thing  with  infinite  wildom. 

X.  Let  no  one  fay,  that  limited  as  we  are,  it  is  temerity  to  objcdion. 
decide  after  this  manner  ;  and  that  we  have  too  imperfeét  ideas  of  Aufucr. 
the  divine  nature  and  perfeflions,  to  be  able  to  judge  of  his  plan 
and  (lefigns  with  any  certainty.  This  reflection,  which  is  in  fome 
meafure  true,  and  in  fome  cafes  juft,  proves  too  much,  if  applied 
to  our  fubjeil,  and  confequcntly  has  no  weight.  Let  us  but  re- 
fle£l  a  little,  and  we  fhall  Hnd  that  this  thouglit  leads  us  iufenfibly  to 
a  kind  of  pyrrhunifm,  which  would  be  the  fubverlion  of  all  order 
and  focial  œconomy.  For  in  fine  there  is  no  medium  ;  we  muffc- 
chufe  one  of  the  two  fyftems  above  explained.  To  reject  the  firft, 
is  admitting  the  fécond  with  all  its  inconveniences.  This  remark 
is  of  fome  importance,  and  alone  is  almoft  fiifficient  to  fhew  us 
the  force  of  fitnefs  in  this  cafe  ;  becaufe  not  to  acknowledge  the 
folidity  of  this  reafon,  is  to  lay  one's  fclf  under  a  neccfiity  of  re- 
ceiving a  dtfe6live  fyftem  ;  a  fyflera  lor^ded  with  inconveniences, 
and  whofe  confequences  are  very  far  from  being  reafonablc. 

XL  Such  are  the  nature  and  force  of  the  fitnefs,  on  wliich  the  Of  the  jn. 
proofs  of  the  fandlion  of  natural  laws  are  eftablifhed.  All  that  ^'!^."^^ 
remains  now,  is  to  fee  what  i  m  predion  thefe  proofs  unitexl,  ought  thof^.pj-oof 
to  make  on  our  minds,  and  what  influence  they  fhould  have  over  ouglu  to 
our  conduct.  This  is  the  capital  point  in  which  the  whole  ought  I'iive  over 
to  terminate.  Jl"^     <=o"- 

I.  Li  the  firft  place  I  obferve,  that  though  all  that  can  be  faid  -^^'e  (hould 
in  favour  of  the  fanclion  of  natural  laws,   were  dill  to  leave  the  ad  in  this 
queftion  undecided  ;  yet  it  would  be  reafonable  even  in  this  very  world     on 
uncertainty  to  a6l,  as  if  it  had  been  determined  in  the  affirmative.   ^,''^.   f'»""" 
For  it  is  evidently  the  fafefl  fide,  namely,  that  in  which  there  is  Itfs  at  the  ""belief 
all  events  to  lofe,  and  more  to  gain.     Let  us  Itate  the  thing  as  of  a  future 
dubious.     If  there  be  a  future  ftate,  it  is  not  only  an  error  not  to  flats., 
believe  it,  but  likev^ife  a  dangerous  irregularity  to  a£t  as  if  there 
were  no  fuch  thing  :  an  error  of  this  kind  is  attended   with  perni- 
cious confequences  ;  whereas  if  there  is  no  fuch  thing,  the  miftake 
in  believing  it,  produces  in  general  none  but  good  effects]  it  is 

not 


iB8  ^he  Principles  of 

not  fubjci^  to  any  inconveniences  hereafter,  nor  does  it,  generally 
fpcaking,  expofe  us  to  any  great  difficultits  for  the  time  prefcnt. 
Be  it  therefore  as  it  may,  and  let  the  cafe  be  ever  fo  unfavourable  to 
natural  laws,  a  prudent  man  will  never  hefitate  which  fide  he  is- to 
embrace,  whether  the  obfcrvance,  or  the  violation  ofthofelaws: 
virtue  will  certainly  have  the  preference  of  vice. 

2.  But  if  this  fiJc  of  the  quertion  is  the  mod  prudent  and  eligible^ 
even  under  a  fuppofiti(m  of  doubt  and  uncertainty,  how  much 
more  will  it  be  fo.,  if  we  acknowledge,  as  we  cannot  avoid,  that 
this  opinion  is  at  lead  more  probable  than  the  other  ?  A  firft 
degree  of  vcrifmiilitude,  or  a  fimple  though  flight  probability, 
becomes  a  reafonable  motive  of  determination,  in  refpe£l  to  every 
man  that  calculates  and  rtflcfls.  And  if  it  be  prudent  to  conduce 
ourfjlves  by  this  principle  in  the  ordinary  affairs  of  life,  docs  pru- 
G.-iiCe  permit  us  to  deviate  from  this  very  road  in  the  moit  impor- 
tant affairs,  fuch  as  cflentially  interefl  our  felicity  ? 

3.  But,  in  fine,  if  proceeding  ftill  further,  and  reducing  the 
thing  to  its  true  point,  it  is  agreed  that  we  have  aclually,  if  not  a 
flriif^demonflration  of  a  future  life,  at  lead  a  probability  founded 
on  many  reafonable  prefumptions,  and  fo  great  a  fitnef^  as  borders 
very  near  upon  certainty  j  it  is  ftill  more  evident,  that  in  the  prcf- 
ent  ftate  of  things,  we  ought  to  aft  on  this  footing,  and  are  not 
reafonably  allowed  to  form  any  other  rule  cf  condud.* 


fj- 


It  IS  a  nc-      XII.  Nothing,  indeed,  is  more  worthy  of  a  rational  being,  than 
'^\^^cZ        to  feek  for  evidence  on  every  fubje£t,  and  to  be  determined  only 
oMi.nce    of  hy  clear  and  certain   principles.       But  fince  all  fubjc6ls  are  not 
cur  nature  fufcfptible  thereof,  and  yet  we  are  obliged   to  determine  ;  what 
and  ilate.     would  become  of  us,  if  we  were  always  to  v/ait  for  a  perfect  de- 
mondration  ?  In  failure  of  the  higheft  degree  of  certainty,  we  muft 
take  up  with  the   next  to  it;   and  a  great   probability  becomes  a 
fufficicnt  reafon  of  acting,  when  there  is  none  of  equal  weight  to 
cppofe  it.     If  this  fide  of  the  queHion  be  not  in  itfelf  evidently  cer- 
tain, it  is  at  leaft  an  evident  and  certain  rule,  that  in  the  prefent 
itate  of  things,  it  ought  to  have  the  preference. 

This  is  a  necclTary  condquence  of  our  nature  and  condition. 
As  we  have  only  a  Hmited  knov.'Iedge,  and  yet  are  under  a  necef- 
fify  of  deterrnining  and  atSling  ;  were  it  rtquifite  for  this  purpofe 
to  have  a  perfect  certainty,  and  were  we  to  refufe  to  accept  of 
probability  as  a  principle  of  determination  ;  we  fnould  be  cither 
obliged  to  determine  in  favour  of  the  leaf!  probable  fide,  and  con- 

trary 

*  See  part  i.  chap  vi  ^  6. 


Natural  Law.  t^^ 

Wary  to  verlfimilitude,  (which  noboi)',  methinks,  will  attempt  to 
maintain)  or  we  (hould  be  forced  to  I'pend  our  days  in  dubioufnefs 
and  unceitaintyj  to  fluduate  continually  in  a  ftatc  of  irrefolution, 
and  to  remain  ever  in  fufpence,  without  adling,  without  refolving 
upon  any  thing,  or  without  having  any  fixt  rule  of  condudl  ; 
which  would  be  a  total  fubverfion  of  the  fyftem  of  humanity. 

XIII.  But  if  it  be  reafonable  in  general  to  admit  of  fitnefs  and  Reafo" 
probability  as  the  rule  of  condu£l,  for  want  of  evidence  ;   this  rule  ^^^^^^  ^I 
becomes  ftill  more  necefl'ary  andjuft,  in  particular  cafes,  in  which,  ligation  of 
as  hath  been  already  obferved,  a  perfon  runs  no  rifle  in  following  it.  fo  doing. 
When  there  is  nothing  to  lofe,  if  we  are  miftaken  ;  and  a  great 

<3eal  to  win,  if  we  are  not  ;  what  can  we  defire  more  for  a  rational 
motive  ofafting  ?  Efpecially  when  the  oppofite  fideexpofcs  us  to 
very  great  danger,  in  cafe  of  error  ;  and  affords  us  no  manner  of 
advantage,  fuppofing  we  arc  in  the  right.  Under  fuch  circumftan- 
ces  there  is  no  room  for  hefitating  ;  reafon  obliges  us  to  embrace 
the  fafeft  fide  ;  and  this  obligation  is  fo  much  the  {Wronger,  as  it 
arifes  from  a  concurrence  of  motives  of  the  greatefl  weight  and 
foivJity. 

In  fhort,  if  it  be  reafonable  to  embrace  this  fide,  even  in  cafe  of 
an  intire  uncertainty,  it  is  dill  more  fo  when  there  is  fome  proba- 
bility in  its  favour;  it  becomes  neceflaryif  thefe  probabilities  arc 
cogent  and  numerous  ;  and,  in  fine,  the  necefîîty  (till  increafes,  if, 
at  all  eveiitf,  this  is  the  fafeft  and  moft  advantageous  party.  What 
can  any  one  defire  more,  in  order  to  produce  a  real  obligation,  * 
according  to  the  principles  wehaveeftabliflied  in  regard  to  the  in- 
ternal obligation  impofed  by  reafon. 

XIV.  Again.     This  internal  and  primitive  obligation  is  con-  -  .      , 
firmed  by  the  Divine  Will  itfelf,    and  confequently  rendered   as  tf,at  qI^ 
ftrong  as   poffible.     In  fa£l,    this  manner  of  judging  and  a6ling  himfelf  im- 
being,  as  we  have  /een,  the  refult  of  our  conftitution,  fuch  as  the  pofesonus. 
Creator  has  formed  it  ;   this  alone  is  a  certain  proof,  that  it  is  the 

will  of  God  we  fhould  be  diredted  by  thofe  principles,  and  con- 
fider  it  as  a  point  of  duty.  For  whatever,  as  we  have  already  ob- 
ferved, f  is  inherent  in  the  nature  of  man,  whatever  is  a  confe- 
quence  of  his  original  conftitution  and  ftate,  acquaints  us  clearly 
and  diftin(flly  with  the  will  of  the  Creator,  with  the  iite  he  cxpeds 
we  fhould  make  of  our  faculties,  and  the  obligations  to  which  he 

has 

*  See  part  i.  chap.  vi.  §    9.  and  13, 


•  t>ee  part  1.  chap.  vi.  § 
f  See  part  ii.  chap  iv.  ■§  j. 


îgO  77)e  Principles  of 

has  thought  proper  to  fubjc6t  us.  This  is  a  point  that  merits 
great  attention,  f'or  if  we  may  affirm,  without  fear  of  inifbke, 
that  the  Deity  is  atSlually  willing  that  man  fhoiild  condudt  himfelf 
in  this  life  on  the  foundation  of  the  belief  of  a  future  rtate,  and  as 
having  every  thing  to  hope  or  to  fear  on  his  fide,  according  as  he 
has  aded  juftly  or  unjuftly  ;  does  there  not  arife  from  thence  a 
more  than  probable  proof  of  the  reality  of  this  ftate,  and  of  the 
certainty  of  rewards  and  puniftiments  ?  Oiherwife  we  ftiould  be 
obliged  to  fay,  that  God  himfelf  deceives  us,  becaufe  this  error  was 
necedary  for  the  execution  of  his  defigns,  as  a  principle  effential 
to  the  plan  he  has  formed  in  refpeft  to  humanity.  But  to  fpealc 
after  this  manner  of  the  moft  perfedl  Being,  of  a  Being,  whofe 
power,  wifdom,  and  goodnefs,  are  infinite,  would  be  ii/ing  a  lan- 
guage equally  abfurd  and  indecent.  For  this  very  reafon,  that  as 
the  abovementioned  article  of  belief  is  neceflafy  to  mankind,  and 
enters  into  the  views  of  the  Creator,  it  cannot  be  falfe.  What- 
ever the  Deity  fets  before  us  as  a  duty,  or  as  a  reafonablc  princi- 
ple of  conduce,  muft  be  certainly  true. 

XV.  Thus  every  thing  concurs  to  enablifn  the  authority  of 
Ccinclu-      natural  laws.       i.  The   approbation   they  receive  from  reafon. 

2.  The  cxprefs  command  of  God.  3.  The  real  advantages 
which  their  obfervance  procures  us  in  this  world  j  and,  in  fine, 
thegreathopes  and  ju  I  fears  we  ought  to  have  in  re{pe£l  to  futu- 
rity, according  as  we  have  obfervcd  ordcfpifed  thofelaws.  Thus 
it  is  that  God  binds  us  to  the  pradlice  of  virtue  by  fuch  fcrong  and 
fo numerous  connexions,  that  every  man  who  confults  and  liflens 
to  reafon,  finds  himfelf  under  an  indifpenlible  obligation  of  render- 
ing them  the  unvariable  rule  of  his  conduct. 

XVI.  Some  perhaps  will  obje<5^,  that  we  have  been  too  diflufive 
which  is  *"  refpe£l  to  the  fandlion  of  natural  laws.  True  it  is,  that  moffc 
already  of  thofe  who  have  written  concerning  the  law  ()f  nature,  are  more 
probableby  concife  on  this  article,  and  Puffendorf  himfelf  does  not  fay  much 
reafon  aboutit.*  This  author,  without  abfolutely  excluding  the  confid- 
?"|^j  "g^^j^  eration  of  a  future  life  from  this  fcience,  feems  neverthelefs  to 
dencc  by  Confine  the  law  of  nature  within  the  bounds  of  the  prefent  life,  as 
revelation.  tending 

*  The  reader  may  fee  in  a  fmall  treatife,  intitlcd  'Judg7nenlof  an  anonymous,  &c. 
and  inferred  in  the  5th  edition  of  fhe  Duties  o/man  and  a  citizen,  the  remarks  that 
Mr.  Leibnitz,  author  of  that  treatifî,  makes  againft  Puffendorf  upon  this  fcore. 
Barbeyrac  who  has  joined  his  own  remarks  to  Mr  Leibnitz's  work,  juflifies 
I'ufiendorf  pretty  well.  And  yet  an  attentive  obferver  will  find  there  is  fliil 
fomething  wanting  to  the  entire  juflification  of  this  author's  fyftem. 


Natural  Law.  igt 


tending  only  to  render  us  fociable.  f  And  yet  he  acknowledges 
that  man  is  naturally  defirous  of  immortality,  and  that  this  has 
induced  heathens  to  believe  the  foul  immortal  ;  that  this  belief  is 
likewife  authorifed  by  an  ancient  tradition  concerning  the  goddefs 
of  revenge  ;  to  which  he  adds,  that  in  h6\  it  is  very  probable  God 
will  puiiifh  the  violation  of  the  laws  of  nature  J  but  that  there  is 
ftill  a  great  obfcurity  in  this  refpecl,  and  nothing  but  revelation  can 
put  the  thing  out  of  doubt  J 

But  were  it  even  true,  that  reafon  affords  us  nothing  but  proba- 
bilities in  regard  to  this  quedion,  yet  we  muft  not  exclude  from  the 
law  of  nature  all  coniiderationsof  a  future  ftatei  efpecially  if  thefe 
probabilities  are  fo  very  great,  as  to  border  upon  certainty.  The 
above  article  enters  necefTarily  into  the  fyftem  of  this  fcience,  and 
forms  a  part  thereof  fo  much  the  more  eirential,  that  were  it  not 
for  this,  the  authority  of  natural  law  would  be  weakened,  as  we 
have  already  dcmonftrated  ;  and  it  would  be  difficult  (to  fay  no- 
thing more)  to  eftablifh  on  any  folid  grounds  feveral  important 
duties,  which  oblige  us  to  facrifice  our  greateft  advantages  to  the 
good  of  fociety,  or  to  the  fupport  of  equity  and  juftice.  Neceflary 
therefore  it  was,  to  examine  with  fome  care,  how  far  our  natural 
light  may  lead  us  in  refpe(5l  to  this  qucftion,  and  to  fhew  the  force 
of  the  proofs  that  our  reafon  affords  us,  and  the  influence  thofe 
proofs  ought  to  have  over  our  conduce. 

True  It  is,  as  we  have  already  obferved,  that  the  beft  way  to 
know  the  will  of  God  in  this  refpedl,  would  be  an  ex prcfs  declara- 
tion on  his  part.  But  if  reafoning,  as  rnere  philofophers,  we  have 
not  been  able  to  make  ufe  of  fo  decifive  a  proof,  nothing  can  hinder 
us,  as  chriflian  philofophers,  to  avail  ourfelves  of  the  advantage  we 
have  from  revelation,  in  order  to  ftrengthen  our  conjedures. 
Nothing,  indeed,  can  be  a  better  argument  that  we  have  reafoned 
and  conjectured  right,  than  the  pofitive  declaration  of  the  Deity  on 
this  important  point.  For  fince  it  appears  in  fafl  that  God  is 
willing  to  recompenfe  virtue,  andtopunifh  vice  in  another  life,  it' 
is  no  longer  pofTible  to  doubt  of  what  we  have  advanced,  namely, 
that  this  is  extremely  conformable  to  his  wifdom,  goodnefs,  and 
juftice.  The  proofs  we  have  drawn  from  the  nature  of  man, 
from  God's  defigns  in  his  favour,  from  the  wifdom  and  equity 
with  which  he  governs  the  world,  and  from  the  prefent  ftate  of 
things,  are  not  a  work  of  the  imagination,  or  an  illufion  offelf-Iove  ; 
no,  they  are  refledions  di dated  by  right  reafon  :  and  when  reve- 

•  lation 

f  See  Puffendorf's  Preface  on  the  Duties  of  Man  and  a  Citizen,  §  6,  7, 
\  See  the  Law  of  Nature  and  Nations;  book  ii,  chip,  iii  §  zi. 


tgz  77je  Principles,  &^c. 

lation  comes  up  to  their  afîîftance,  it  fets  then  in  full  evidence 
what  already  had  been  rendered  probable  by  the  fuie  li^ht  of  nature. 
But  the  refle£tion  we  have  here  made,  regards  not  only  the 
fan6lion  of  natural  laws,  it  may  be  equally  extended  to  the  other 
parts  of  this  work.  It  is  to  us  a  great  pleafure  to  fee  that  the 
principles  we  have  laid  down,  are  exadtly  thofe  that  the  chrtftian 
religion  adopts  for  its  bafis,  and  on  which  the  whole  (trudure  of 
religion  and  morality  is  raifed.  If  on  one  fide  this  remark  ferves 
to  confirm  us  in  thefe  principles,  by  afTuring  us  that  we  have  hit 
upon  the  true  fyflem  of  nature  ;  on  the  other,  it  ought  to  difpofe  us 
to  have  an  infinite  efteemfor  a  revelation  which  perfectly  confirms 
the  law  of  nature,  and  converts  moral  philoiophy  into  a  religious 
and  popular  dodtrine  ;  a  do(Elrine  founded  on  tadl?,  and  in  which 
the  authority  and  promifes  of  the  Deity  manifeftly  intervene  in  the 
fitteft  manner  to  make  an  imprefïion  upon  man.  This  happy 
agreement  hetvv'een  natural  and  revealed  light,  is  equally  honoura- 
ble to  both. 


£ND   OF   THE   FIRST  VOLUME. 


1'  H  E 


PRINCIPLES 


O  F 


POLITIC     LAW; 

BEING    A    SEQUEL    TO    THE 

Principles  of  the  Law  of  Nature, 


Vol.  II. 


— itJ^TTi 

PART    I. 

If^'hich  treats  of  the  origin  and  nature  of  civil  fociety ,  offovereignty  in 
general^  of  its  peculiar  charaSIeri/lic,  limitations^  and  ejfential  parts, 
^iJ^rt% 

CHAP.    I. 

Containing  a  feiv  general  and  preliminary  refieRion:^   which  ferve 
as  an  introduSïion  to  this  and  the  following  parts. 

I.  IT  TT  T'HATEVER  has  been  hitherto  explained  concern- 
ing the  rights  and  duties  oi  man,  relates  to  the 
naturaland  primitive  fociety,  eftabhftied  by  God 
himfclf,  independent  of  human  inftitution  :  we 
muft  now  treat  of  civil  fociety,  or  the  body  politic, 
which  is  defervedly  efteemed  the  completed  of  focieties,  and  to 
which  the  name  of  State  has  been  given  by  way  of  preference. 


Aa 


11.  For 


ï 94  The  Principles  of 

II.  For  this  purpofe  we  fliall  repeat  here  the  fubOance  of  fom^ 
principles  eliablilhed  in  the  precediiig  volume,  and  we  iliaii  give  a- 
further  explication  of  others  relative  to  this  fubjcft. 

i'^.  Human  I'ocicty  is  originally  and  in  itftlfa  ftate  of  equality 
and  independence. 

2**.  The  inftitiition  of  fove re ignty  deflroys  this  independence. 

3^^.  This  inftitution  does  ni)t  fubvcrt  natural  fucicty. 

4*^.  On  the  contrary,  it  contributes  to  ftrengthen  and  cement  it. 

III.  To  form  therefore  a  jufl  idea  of  civil  fociety,  wc  nuift  call  it 
lutural  fociety  itfelf,  modified  in  fuch  a  manner,  that  there  is  a  fove- 
rcign  prefiding  over  it,  on  whofe  will  whatever  relates  to  the  wel- 
fare of  the  fociety  ultimately  depends  ;  to  the  end  that,  by  thefe 
means,  inankind  may  attain,  with  greater  certainty,  that  happinefs 
to  which  they  all  do  naturally  afpire. 

IV.  The  inftitution  of  civil  focieiies  produces  fome  new  rela- 
tions amongft  mankind;  I  Hican  fuch  as  fubfift  between  thofe  dif- 
ferent bodies  or  communities,  which  are  called  fiâtes  or  nations^ 
from  whence  the  law  of  nations  and  civil  polity  are  derived. 

V.  In  fa^^,  fo  foon  as  ftates  are  form.ed,  they  acquire,  in  fome 
fncafurc,  perfom-îl  pr.>pcrties  ;  and  conlequently  we  may  attribute 
the  fame  rights  and  obligations  to  them,  as  are  attributed  to  individ- 
ual?, confidered  as  members  of  fociety.  Aiîd  indeed  it  is  evident, 
that  if  rcafon  impofes  certain  duties  on  individuals  towards  each 
ether,  it  prcfcribes  likewifi  thofe  very  fame  rules  of  condu£l  to  na- 
tions, (which  are  rompofed  only  of  men)  in  the  intercourfe  which 
they  may  have  with  each  other. 

VI.  V/emay  therefore  apply  to  kingdoms  and  nation*;  the  fév-* 
eral  maxims  of  natural  law  hitherto  explained  ;  and  the  fame  law, 
which  is  called  natural,  when  fpeaking  of  individuals,  is  diftinguifh- 
ed  by  the  name  of  the  law  of  nations,  when  applied  to  men,  conhd- 
ered  as  mem.bcrs  forming  thcfs  different  bodies,  known  by  ths 
name  of  dales  or  nations. 

VH.  To  enter  into  this  fubjt£V,  we  mud  obferve,  that  the  nat- 
ural ftate  of  nations,  with  rcTpc(5l  to  each  other,  is  that  of  fociety 
and  peace.  This  fociety  is  likewife  a  liate  of  equality  and  inde- 
pendence, which  eRabliflies  between  them  a  right  of  equality,  by 
which  they  are  obliged  to  have  the  fame  regard  for  each  other. 
The  general  principle  therefore  of  the  law  of  nations,  is  nothing 

more 


P  O  L  I  T  I  C      L  A  W.  195 

more  than  the  general  law  of  fociability,  which  obligf  s  nations  to 
the  fame  duties  as  are  prefcribed  to  individuels. 

VIII.  Thus  the  law  of  natural  equality,  that  which  prohibits 
our  injuring  any  perfon,  and  commands  the  reparation  of  damage 
dune,  tlie  law  lilcewiie  of  beneficence,  of  hJelity  to  our  engage- 
ments, Sec.  are  fo  many  laws  in  regard  to  nation?,  which  iirpofc 
both  on  the  people  and  on  their  rtfpetStive  fovereigns  the  fame 
duties  as  arc  prefcribed  to  individuals. 

IX.  It  is  a  point  of  fome  importance  to  attend  to  the  nature  and 
origin  of  the  law  of  nations,  fuchas  hsith  been  here  explained  ;  fur 
it  follows  from  thence,  that  the  Liw  of  nations  is  of  equal  authori- 
ty with  the  law  of  nature  itfelf,  of  which  it  conflitutes  a  part,  and 
that  they  are  equally  facred  and  venerable,  fince  both  have  the  Dei- 
ty  for  their  author. 

X.  There  cannot  even  be  any  other  law  of  nations  really  obli- 
gatory, and  intrinfically  inveftcd  with  the  force  of  a  law.  For 
ftnce  all  nations  are  in  refpe£l  to  each  other  in  a  flate  of  perfect 
equality,  it  is  beyond  contradidlion,  that  if  there  be  any  common 
\&w  betwixt  them,  it  muft  necefl'arily  have  God,  their  common 
fovereign,  for  its  author. 

XI.  As  to  what  concerns  the  tacit  confent  or  cufloms  ofnation^, 
on  which  fome  do<5lors  eftablifli  a  law  of  nations,  they  cannot  of 
theinfclves  produce  a  real  obligation.  For  from  this  only,  that 
fciveral  nations  have  behaved  towards  each  other  for  fome  time 
after  a  certain  manner,  it  docs  not  follow  that  they  have  laid  them- 
felvcs  under  a  necefljty  of  ading  conftantly  fo  for  the  fjture,  and 
much  lefs  that  every  oth-^r  nation  is  obliged  to  conform  to  this 
cuftom. 

XII.  All  that  can  be  faid  is,  that  when  once  a  particular  ufage 
or  cuftom  is  introduced  between  nations  that  have  a  frequent  in- 
tercourfe  with  each  other,  thefe  nations  are,  and  may  reafonably  be 
fiippofed  to  fubmit  to  this  ufage,  unlefs  they  have,  in  exprefs  terms, 
declaredthatthey  will  not  conform  toitany  longer  ;  and  this  isall  the 
effccSl  that  can  be  attributed  to  the  received  ufages  between  nations. 

XIII.  This  being  premifed,  wc  may  didinguifli  two  forts  of 
laws  of  nations,  one  necefTary,  which  is  obligatory  of  itfelf,  and  no 
way  diiTcrs  from  the  law  of  nature  j  the  other  arbitrary  and  free, 

foundc»! 


1 96  I'he  Principles  of 


founvJcd  only  on  a  kind  of  tacit  convention,  and  deriving  all  its 
force  from  the  law  of  nature,  which  commands  us  to  be  faithful  to 
our  engagements. 

XIV.  What  has  been  faid  concerning  the  law  of  nations,  fur- 
rifhiiS  princes  with  feveral  important  reflciStions  ;  amr.ng  others, 
that  fince  the  law  of  nations  is,  in  reality,  nothing  elfe  but  the  law 
of  nature  itf.-lf,  there  is  but  one  and  the  fame  rule  cf  juftice  for  all 
mankind,  infomuch  that  thofe  princes  who  violate  them  are  as  giiil- 
ty  of  as  great  a  crime  as  private  people,  efpecially  as  their  wicked 
allions  are  generally  attended  with  more  unhappy  confequcnces 
than  thofe  of  private  people. 

XV.  Another  confequence  that  may  be  drawn  from  the  prin- 
ciples v/e  have  ertab!i{h<.d  relating  to  the  law  of  nature  and  nations, 
is  to  form  a  jiift  idea  of  that  fciencc  fo  neceflary  to  the  dirtcftors  of 
nations,  which  is  called  Policy:  by  policy  therefore  is  meant  that 
knowledge  or  ability  by  which  a  lovereign  provides  for  the  prtf- 
ervation,  (ecurity,  i)rofperity,  and  glory  of  the  nation  he  govern?, 
without  doing  any  prejudice  to  other  people,  but  rather  coufulting 
their  advantage  as  much  as  poflible. 

XVI.  In  fliort,  thst  which  is  called  prudence,  in  rcfpe£l  to 
private  perfons,  is  dilVmguilhed  by  the  name  of  policy  when  applied 
to  fovereigns  ;  and  as  that  inirchievou<i  abi'ity,  by  which  a  pcrfon 
feeks  his  own  advantage  to  the  detriment  of  others,  and  which  is 
called  artifice  or  cunning,  is  dirferving  of  cenfure  in  individual?,  it  is 
equally  foin  thofe  princes,  whofs  policy  aims  at  procuring  the  ad- 
vantage of  their  own  nation,  to  the  prejudice  of  what  they  owe  to 
ether  people,  in  virtue  of  the  laws  of  humanity  and  juftice. 

XVII.  From  what  has  been  faid  of  the  nati:re  of  civil  fociety 
in  general,  it  is  eafy  to  comprehend  that,  among  all  human  inftitu- 
tions,  there  is  none  more  confiderable  than  this  ;  and  that,  as  it 
embraces  whatever  is  intercfting  to  the  h?.ppinefs  of  fociety,  it  is  a 
very  extenfive  uibjedt,  and  confcquently  that  it  is  important  alike 
both  to  princes  and  people  to  have  proper  inflrudtions  upon  this 
head. 

XVIII.  That  we  may  reduce  the  feveral  articles  relative  to  this 
matter  into  fon.c  order,  we  (hall  divide  our  uork  into  four  parts. 

The  firft  will  treat  of  the  origin  and  nature  of  civil  focieties,  of 
ibe  manner  in  which  liâtes  are  formed,  of  foverei^rity  in  general,  its 

proper 


Politic    La  ^v, 

proper  charaâ:cri{lic«,  its  lîmitationr,  and  eiTential  parts. 

In  the  fécond  we  (hill  explain  the  different  forms  of  government, 
the  various  ways  of  acquiring  or  lofing  fovereignty,  and  the  recip- 
rocal dutiesof  fovereigns  and  fubjeits. 

The  third  will  contain  a  more  particniar  inquiry  into  thofe 
effential  parts  of  fovereignty  which  are  relative  to  the  internal  ad- 
miniftration  of  the  ftate,  (iich  as  the  legillative  power,  the  fupremc 
power  in  refpefl  to  religion,  the  right  of  infliding  puniflinaenis, 
that  which  the  fovereign  has  over  theeftates  and  efiecls  contained 
in  his  dominions,  &c. 

In  the  fourth,  in  fine,  v/efhall  explain  the  rights  of  fovereigns 
with  regard  to  foreigners,  where  v/efha!l  treat  of  the  right  of  war, 
and  of  whatever  is  relative  to  that  fubje^t,  of  alliances,  and  other 
public  treaties,  and  likevvife  of  the  rights  of  ambafladors. 


97 


'G 


CHAP.     II. 

Of  the  real  srigin  cf  civil jocidies. 

,,^^IVIL  fociety  is  nothing  more  than  the  union  of  a  multi- 
tude of  people,  who  agree  to  live  in  fubjeilion  to  a  fovereign,  in 
order  to  find,  through  his  protection  and  care,  the  happinefs  to 
which  they  naturally  afpire. 

II.  Whenever  the  qnefiion  concerning  the  origin  of  civil  fo- 
ciety is  ftarted,  it  may  be  con  Gdered  two  different  ways  ;  for  either 
I  am  afked  my  opinion  concerning  the  origin  of  governments  in 
reality  and  in  ïà^  ;  or  elfe  in  regard  to  the  right  of  congruity  and 
fitncfs  ;  that  is,  what  are  the  reafons  which  fliould  induce  mankind 
to  renoimce  their  natural  liberty,  and  to  prefer  a  civil  ftate  to  that 
of  nature  r  Let  us  fee  firft  what  can  be  fiid  in  regard  to  the  fatfl. 

III.  As  the  eftablifhment  of  fociety  and  civil  government  is 
almolt  coeval  with  the  world,  and  there  are  but  very  h\w  records 
extant  of  thofe  firft  ages  ;  nothing  can  be  advanced  with  certaintv 
concerning  the  real  origin  of  civil  focieties.  All  that  political 
writers  fay  upon  this  fubjed  is  reduced  to  conjectures  that  have 
more  or  lei's  probability. 

IV.  Some  attribute  the  origin  of  civil  focieties  to  paternal  au- 
thority.    Thefs  obfervc  that  all  the  anci^^nt  traditions  inform  uj^, 

lb  at, 


1  g8  The  Principles   of 

that  the  firft  men  lived  a  long  time  ;  by  this  lont;evity,  joined  \.q 
the  multiplicity  of  wives,  which  was  then  permittcil,  a  great  num- 
ber of  faniilies  faw  themfelves  united  vinder  the  authority  of  one 
grandfather  ;  and  as  it  is  difficult  that  a  fociety,  any  thing  numer- 
ous, can  maintain  itfelf  without  afupreme  authoriry,  it  is  natural 
to  imagine  that  their  children,  accuftomcd  Irom  their  infmcy  to 
refpedl  and  obey  their  fathers,  voluntarily  refigned  the  fupreme 
command  into  their  hands,  io  foon  as  they  arrived  to  a  full  matu- 
rity of  reafon. 

V.  Others  fuppofethat  the  fear  and  diffidence  wlvch  mankind 
had  of  one  another,  was  their  inducement  to  unite  together  under 
a  chief,  inorder  to  fhelter  themfelves  from  thofe  mifchiefs  which 
they  apprehended.  From  the  iniquity  of  the  firfl  men,  fay  they, 
proceed  war,  as  alfo  the  necefhty  to  which  they  v/ere  reduced  of 
fubmitting  to  mafters,  by  whom  their  rig,hts  and  privileges  might 
be  determined. 

VI.  Some  there  arc,  in  fm?,  who  pretend  that  the  fiift  bcgin^ 
nings  of  civil  focieties  are  to  be  attributed  to  ambition  fupported 
by  force  or  abilities.  The  moft  dexterour,  the  ftrongefl,  and  the 
rnofl  ambitious  reduced  at  firft  the  Hmplelt  and  vveaktit  into  fub^ 
jc<Slion  ;  thofe  growing  ftates  were  afterwards  infenfibly  (Irength- 
ened  by  conquers,  ar.d  by  the  concurrence  of  fuch  as  became 
voluntary  members  of  thoie  focieties. 

VII.  Sjch  are  the  principal  conjectures  of  political  writers  in 
regard  to  the  origin  of  focieties  ;  to  which  let  us  add  a  few  reflec- 
tions. 

The  firfl  is,  that  in  the  inftitution  of  focieties,  mankind  in  all 
probability  thought  rather  of  redreffing  the  evils  which  they  had 
experienced,  than  cf  procuring:  the  foveral  advantages  rtfulting 
from  laws,  from  commerce,  from  the  arts  and  fciences,  and  from 
all  thofe  other  improvements  io  frequently  mentioned  in  hiftory. 

1^ .  The  natural  difpofition  of  mankind,  and  their  general  man- 
ner of  aéling,  do  not  by  any  means  permit  ns  to  refer  the  inftitu- 
tion of  all  governments  to  a  general  and  uniform  principle.  More 
natural  it  is  to  think  that  different  circumftances  gave  rife  to  differ-- 
cnt  fiâtes. 

3°.  We  behold  without  doubt  the  firft  image  of  government  in 
democratic  fociety,  or  in  families  ;  but  there  is  all  the  probability 
in  the  world,  that  it  was  ambition,  fupported  by  force  or  abilities, 

which 


Politic    Law.  tç^ 

^lïlch  firft  fabjc£ledth2  feveral  fathers  of  families  under  the  do- 
minion of  a  chief.  This  appears  very  agreeable  to  the  natural 
difp  ifition  of  mankind,  and  feems  further  fupported  by  the  manner 
in  which  the  fcripture  fpealcs  ofNimrod,  *  the  firft  king  mention- 
ed in  hiftory. 

4*^.  When  fuch  a  body  politic  was  once  framed,  feveral  others 
joined  the.nfelves  to  it  afterwards,  through  different  motives  ;  and 
other  fathers  of  families  being  afraid  of  infults  or  opprcffion  from 
thofc  growing  ftates,  determined  to  form  themfelves  into  the  like 
focieties,  and  to  chufe  to  themfelves  a  chief. 

5*^.  Bi  this  as  it  may,  we    mud  not  imagine   that  thofe  firft 

fiâtes  were  fuch  as  exid  in  our  days.     Human  inflitutions  are  ever 

weak  and  imperfect  in  their  beginnings, there  is  nothing  but  timeand 

experience  that  can  gradually  bring  them  to  perfection. 

The   iîrft   ftates  were  in  all  probability    very  fmall  :    kings  in 

thofe  days  were  only  a  kind  of  chieftains,  or  particular  magiftrates,    - 

appointed    for  deciding  difputes,  or  for  the   command  of  armies. 

Hence  we  find  by  the  molt  ancient  hiftories,  that  there  were  fome- 

times  feveral  kings  in  one  and  the  fame  nation. 

VIII.  But  to  conclude,  whatever  can  be  faid  in  regard  to  the 
original  of  the  firft  governments,  confifts,  according  to  what  w6 
have  already  obferved,  in  mere  conjectures,  that  have  only  more 
or  lefs  probability.  Befides,  this  is  a  queftion  rather-curious  than 
ufcful  or  necefTary  ;  the  point  of  importance,  and  that  particularly 
interefting  to  mankind,  is  to  know  whether  the  eftablifhment  of 
government,  and  of  a  fupreme  authority,  was  really  necefTary,  and 
v/hether  mankind  derive  from  thence  any  confidcrable  advantages  : 
this  is  what  we  call  the  right  of  congruhy  or  fitnefs,  and  what  wc 
are  going  now  to  examine. 


CHAP.      HI. 

Ofihe  right  of  congrutty  or  fitnefs  with  regard  ta  the  infîitution  of 
civil  focictyy  and  the  necejjtty  of  a  fupreme  authority  :  of  civilliber- 
iy  ;  that  it  is  far  preferable  to  natural  liberty,  and  that  the  fi  ate  is 
of  all  human  conditions  the  mofl  per  feet  y  the  mojl  rtafonable^  and 
confequently  the  naturaljiate  of?nan. 

WE  are  here  to  inquire,  whether  the  eftablifhmcnt  of  civil 

fociety, 

•  See  Genefi»,  c,  x,  vcr.  8,  &  fcij. 


lOO  The  Principles    of 

fociety,  and  of  a  fupremc  authority,  was  abfolutcly  VicccfT.ry  to 
mankind,  or  whether  they  could  not  live  happy  without  it?  And 
whether  lbvereignty,v.'hofi;  orii^inal  is  owing  perhaps,  to  ufijrpation, 
ambition,  and  violence,  does  tiot  include  an  attempt  agairift  the 
uatiiral  L-quality  and  independency  of  man?  Thefe  are  without 
doubt  qucllions  of  importance,  and  which  merit  the  utrnoft  at- 
tention. 

II.  I  grant,  at  firfl:  fetting  out,  that  the  primitive  and  original 
focicty  which  nature  has  eftablifiied  aniongft  maiikir.d,  is  a  ftate  of 
equality  and  independence  ;  it  is  likewilc  true,  that  the  law  of 
nature  is  that  to  which  all  men  are  obliged  to  conform  their 
aélions  -,  and  in  fine  it  is  certain,  that  this  law  is  in  itf-lf  moft  per- 
fe£t,  and  the  beft  adapted  for  the  prefervation  and  happinefs  of 
mankind. 

III.  It  muft  likewife  be  granted,  that  if  mankind,  during  the 
time  they  lived  in  j-iatural  focicty,  had  exactly  conformed  to  nature's 
la\vs,nothing  would  have  been  wanting  to  complete  their  happineff, 
nor  would  there  have  been  any  occafion  to  eflablifli  a  fupremc 
authority  upon  earth.  They  would  have  lived  in  a  mutual  inter- 
courfe  of  love  and  beneficence,  in  a  funplicity  without  ftate  or 
pomp,  in  an  equality  without  jealoufy,  ftrangers  to  all  fuperiority 
but  that  of  virtue,  and  to  every  other  ambition  than  that  of  being 
difinterefted  and  generous. 

W .  But  mankind  were  not  long  directed  by  {o  pcrfecl  a  rule  ; 
the  vivacity  of  their  pafTions  foon  weakened  the  force  of  nature's 
law,  which  ceafcd  now  to  be  a  bridle  fufficient  for  them,  fo  that 
they  could  no  lon2,er  be  left  to  themfelves  thus  weakened  and 
blinded  by  their  pafiions.  Let  us  explain  this  a  little  more  par- 
ticularly. 

V.  Laws  are  incapable  of  contributing  to  the  happinefs  of  foci- 
cty, unlefs  they  be  fufficisntly  known.  The  laws  of  nature  cannot 
be  known  otherwifc  to  man,  than  as  he  makes  a  right  ufe  of  his 
rcafon  ;  but  as  thegreateft  part  of  mankind,  abandoned  to  them- 
felves, liften  rather  to  the  prejudices  of  pafllon  than  to  reafon  and 
truth,  it  thence  follows,  that  in  the  ftate  of  natural  fociety,  the  faws 
of  nature  were  known  but  very  imperfe<5lly,  and  confequcntly  that 
in  this  condition  of  things  man  could  not  lead  an  happy  life. 

VI.  Befides,  the  (late  of  nature  wanted  another  thing  ncceflary 
for  thehappinsfsand  tranq'iilHty  of  fociety,  I  mean  a  common  judge, 

acknowledged 


Politic    Law.  Sox 

acknowledged  as  fiich,  whofe  bufitiefs  it  is  to  decide  the  differences 
that  every  dayarife  betwixt  individuals. 

VII.  In  this  date,  as  every  one  would  be  fupreme arbiter  of 
his  own  aiflions,  and  would  have  a  right  of  being  judge  himfelf, 
both  of  the  laws  of  nature  and  ot  the  manner  in  which  he  ought  to 
apply  them,  this  independence  and  exceffive  liberty  could  not  but 
be  productive  of  diforder  and  confufion,  cfpecially  in  cafes  where 
th°re  happened  to  be  any  clafhing  of  intercfts  or  pafîions. 

VIII.  In  fine,  as  in  the  (late  of  nature  no  one  had  a  power  of  en- 
forcing the  execution  of  the  laws,  nor  an  authority  to  punifh  the  ' 
violation  of  them,  this  was  a  third  inconveniency  of  the  (tate  of 
primitive  fociety,  by  which  the  efficacy  of  natural  laws  vvasalmoft 
intirely  deftroyed.  For  as  men  are  framed,  the  laws  derive  their 
greated  force  from  the  coercive  power,  which,  by  exemplary  pun- 
ifhment.«,  intimidates  the  wicked,  and  balances  the  fuperior  force 
of  pleafure  and  pafTion. 

IX.  Such  were  the  inconveniences  that  attended  the  ftate  of 
nature.  By  the  exceffive  liberty  and  independence  which  mankind 
enjoyed,  they  were  hurried  into  perpetual  troubles  ;  for  which  rea- 
fon  they  were  under  an  abfolute  neceflity  of  quitting  this  fl:ate  of 
independence,  and  of  feeking  a  remedy  againft  the  evils  of  which 
it  was  produ6live  ;  and  this  remedy  they  found  in  the  eflablifliment 
of  civil  fociety  and  a  fovereign  authority. 

X.  But  this  could  not  be  obtained  without  efFe(Sting  two  things 
equally  necelTary  ;  the  firft  was  to  unite  together  by  means  of  a 
more  particular  fociety;  the  fécond  to  form  this  fociety  under  the 
dependence  of  a  perfon  inveftsd  with  an  uncontrolable  power,  to 
the  end  that  he  might  maintain  order  and  peace. 

XI.  By  thefo  means  they  remedied  the  inconveniences  above- 
mentioned.  The  fovereign,  by  promulgating  his  laws,  acquaints 
hisfubjefts  with  the  rules  which  they  ought  to  follow.  Wethenceafe 
to  be  judges  in  our  own  caufe,  our  whims  and  partions  are  checked, 
antl  we  are  obi igeil  to  contain  ourfelves  within  the  limits  of  that 
regard  and  refpedl  which  we  owe  to  each  other. 

XII.  This  might  be  fufficient  to  prove  the  neceflity  of  govern- 
ment, and  of  a  fupreme  authority  in  fociety,  and  to  eftablifh  the 
right  of  congruity  or  htnefs  in  this  refped  ;  but  as  it  is  a  queftion 

Bb  of 


202  'The  Principles  of 

of  ihe  iitmoft  importance  ;  as  mankind  haven  particular  interefl 
in  being  well  acquainted  with  their  ilate  ;  as  they  have  a  natural 
pafîion  tor  indepcndencc,and  generally  frame  falfe  notions  of  liberty  ; 
it  will  not  be  improper  to  continue  our  reflc(^ions  on  this  fubjedt. 

XIII.  Let  us  therefore  examine  into  natural  and  civil  liberty  j 
let  us  afterwards  endeavour  to  ftiew,  that  civil  liberty  is  far  prefera- 
ble to  that  of  nature,  and  confequently,  that  the  ftate  which  it  pro- 
duce?, is  of  all  hunian  conditions  the  moH:  perft^,  and,  to  fpcak 
with  exadlnels,  the  true  natural  ftate  of  man. 

XIV.  The  reflexions  we  have  to  make  upon  this  fubjecl-  are 
of  the  laft  importance,  affording  ufeful  leflons  both  to  princes  and 
fubjeâs.  The  greatcft  part  of  mankind  are  ftrangers  to  the  ad- 
vantages of  civil  fociety,  or  at  lea  ft  they  live  in  fuch  a  manner  as 
to  give  no  attention  to  the  beauty  or  excellence  of  this  falutary  in- 
flitution.  On  the  other  hand,  princes  often  lofe  fight  of  the  end 
for  which  they  were  appointed,  and  inftead  of  thinking  that  the 
fupreme  authority  was  eftablifhed  for  no  other  purpofe  than  for 
the  maintenance  and  fecurity  of  the  liberty  of  mankind,  that  is,  to 
make  them  enjoy  a  folid  happinefs,  they  frequently  diredl  it  to  a 
different  end,  and  to  their  own  private  advantage.  Nothing  there- 
fore is  more  neceffary  than  to  remove  the  prejudices  both  cf  fove- 
fcignsand  fubje£ts  in  regard  to  this  article. 

XV.  Natural  liberty  is  the  right  which  nature  gives  to  all  man- 
kind, of  difpofmg  of  their  perfons  and  property,  after  the  manner 
they  judge  moft  convenient  to  their  happinefs,  on  condition  of  their 
acting  within  the  limits  of  the  law  of  nature,  and  of  their  not  abu- 
jfing  it  to  the  prejudice  of  othermcn.     To  this  right  of  liberty  there 

''  is  a  reciprocal  obligation  correfponding,  by  which  the  law  of  na- 
ture binds  all  mankind  to  refpeft  the  liberty  of  other  men,  and  not 
to  difturb  them  in  the  ufe  they  make  of  it,  fo  long  as  they  do  not 
abufe  it. 

XVI,  The  laws  of  nature  are  therefore  the  rule  and  meafureof 
liberty  ;  and  in  the  primitive  and  natural  ftate,  mankind  have  no 
liberty  but  what  the  laws  of  nature  give  them;  for  which  reafori 
it  is  proper  to  obferve  here,  that  the  ftate  of  natural  liberty  is  lîot 
that  of  an  intire  independence.  In  this  ftate,  men  are  indeed  in- 
dependent with  regard  to  one  another,  but  they  are  all  in  a  ftate  of 
dependence  on  God  and  his  laws.    Independence^ generally  fpeak- 


Politic    Law.  203 

ing,  is  a  Rate  unfui table  to  man,  becaufe  by  his  very  nature  he 
holds  it  of  a  fuperior. 

XV^II.  Liberty  and  independence  of  any  fu  peri  or,  are  two  very 
dl[h'ii6l  things,  which  mu(t  not  be  confounded.  The  fird  belongs 
efL-ntialiy  to  man,  the  other  cannot  Cuit  him.  And  fo  far  is  it 
from  being  true,  that  human  liberty  is  of  itfelf  inconfiftent  with 
dependence  on  a  fovcreign  and  fubmifîion  to  his  laws,  that,  on 
the  contrary^  it  is  this  power  of  the  fovereign,  and  the  protection 
which  men  derive  from  thence,  that  forms  the  greatelt  fecurity  of 
(heir  liberty.  * 

XV^IIL  This  will  be  ftiU  better  undcrftood  by  recolleding 
what  we  have  already  fettled,  when  (peaking  of  natural  liberty. 
We  have  Ihewn  that  the  reilridions  which  the  law  of  nature 
makes  to  the  liberty  of  man,  far  from  diminifhing  or  fubverting  it, 
on  the  contrary  conlHtutes  its  perfedtion  and  fecurity.  The  end 
of  natural  laws  is  not  fo  much  to  reftrain  the  liberty  of  man,  as  to  i' 
make  him  a£t  agreeably  to  his  real  interefts  ;  and  moreover,  as 
thefe  very  laws  are  a  check  to  human  liberty,  in  whatever  rnay  be 
of  pernicious  conf;.'quence  toothers,  it  fecures,  by  thefe  means,  to 
all  mankind,  the  higheft,  and  the  moft  advantageous  degree  of  lib- . 
erty  they  can  reafonably  defire. 

XIX.  We  may  therefore  conclude,  that  in  the  ftate  of  nature 
man  could  not  enjoy  all  the  advantages  of  liberty,  but  inafmuch  as 
this  liberty  was  made  fuhje^St  to  reafon,  and  the  laws  of  nature 
were  the  rule  and  meafure  of  the  exercife  pf  it.  But  if  it  be  true 
in  fa(5l,  that  the  ftate  of  nature  was  attended  with  the  feveral  incon- 
veniences already  mentioned,  inconveniences  which  almoft  effaced 
the  imprelfion  and  force  of  natural  laws,  it  is  a  plain  confequence, 
that  natural  liberty  muft  have  greatly  fufFered  thereby,  and  that  by  not 
being  reftrained  within  the  limits  of  the  law  of  nature,  it  could  not 
but  degenerate  into  licentioufnefs,  and  reduce  mankind  to  the  mo(t 
frightful  and  the  moft  melancholy  of  fituations. 

XX.  As  they  were  perpetually  divided  by  contentions,  the 
ftrongctl  oppreflcd  the  weakelf  ;  they  pofTeiled  nothing  v/ith  tran- 
quillity ;  they  enjoyed  no  repofe  :  and  what  we  ought  particularly 
to  obferve  is,  that  all  thefe  evils  were  owing  chiefly  to  that  very 
independence  which  mankind  were  poflTelTed  of  in  regard  to  each 
other,  and  which  deprived  them  of  all  fecurity  of  the  exercife  of 
th;ir  iibeity  ;  infomuch  that  by  being  too  free,  they  enjoyed  no 

freedon) 


04  'The  Principles   of 

frcfdom  at  all  ;    for  freedom  there  can    be  none,  when  il  is   i)ot 
fubjedt  to  thedire£lion  of  laws. 

XXI.  If  it  be  therefore  true,  that  the  civil  flate  gives  a  nevvr 
force  to  the  laws  of  nature,  if  it  b«  (ruealfo,  that  the  cftablifttVnent 
of  fovereignty  fecures,  in  a  more  effe(^lual  rnanner,  the  obfervance 
of  thofe  laws,  wemurt  conclude,  that  the  liberty,  vv-hich  man  en- 
joys in  this  ftatc,  is  far  more  perfedf,  more  feciirc,  and  better  adap- 
ted to  procure  his  happineff,  than  that  which  he  was  pofltffed  of 
in  the  Hate  of  nature. 

XXII.  True  it  is  that  the  inflitution  of  government  and  fove- 
reignty is  a  confiderable  limitation  to  natural  liberty,  for  man  muft 
renounce  that  power  of  difpofmg  of  his  own  perfon  and  aftions,  in 
a  word,  his  independence.  But  what  better  ufe  coi;ld  mankind 
make  of  their  liberty,  than  to  renoimce  every  dangerous  tendency 
it  had  in  regard  to  themfelves,  and  to  preferve  no  more  of  it  than 
was  neccflary  to  procure  their  own  real  and  folid  happinefs  ? 

XX III.  Civil  liberty  is  therefore,  in  the  main,  nothing  more 
than  natural  liberty,  diveded  of  that  part  of  it  which  formed  the 
independence  of  individuals,  by  the  authority  cf  which  tlicy  have 
conferred  on  their  fovereign. 

XXIV.  7'hts  liberty  is  flill  attended  with  two  confiderable  adr 
vantages,  which  natural  liberty  had  not.  The  fuft  is,  the  right  of 
infiftinp;  that  their  fovei;eign  fhall  make  a  good  ufe  of  his  authority, 
Hgreeably  to  the  pu r|)ores  for  which  he  was  intrufted  with  it.  Ti;e 
ll'Coml  is  the  Iccurity  which  prudence  requires  that  the  fubjttSls 
iliould  rcferve  to  themfelves  fo^r  the  execution  of  their  formir 
tight,  a  fccurity  abiolutely  neccfl'ary,  and  without  which  the  people 
tan  never  enjoy  any  folid  liberty. 

XXV.  Lotus  therefore  conclude,  that  to  give  an  adequate  de- 
finition of  civil  liberty,  we  muft  fay,  that  it  is  natural  liberty  itfe'f, 
diverted  of  that  part,  which  conftituted  the  independence  of  indi- 
viduals, by  the  authority  which  it  confers  on  fovereigns,  and  at- 
tended with  a  right  ofinfifting  on  his  making  a  good  ufe  of  his 
authority,  and  with  a  moral  fecurity  that  this  right  v»'ill  have  its 
cftca.  .  - 

XXVI.  Since  civil  liberty  therefore  is  far  preferable  to  that  of 
nature,  we  may  fafely  co.ncluJe,  that  the  civil  Ilate,  which  procures 

•this 


Politic    Law.  205 

this  liberty  to  mankind,  is  of  all  human  ftates  the  moft  perfe£>, 
the  moft  reafonable,  and  of  courfe  the  true  natural  ftate  of  man. 

XXVII.  And  indeed,  fince  man,  by  his  nature,  is  a  free  and 
intelligent  being,  capable  of  difcovering  his  ftate  by  himfelf,  as 
well  as  its  ultimate  end,  and  of  taking  the  necefTary  meafures  to 
attain  it,  it  is  properly  in  this  point  of  view  that  we  muft  confider 
his  natural  ftate  ;  that  is,  the  natural  ftate  of  man  muft  be  that, 
which  is  moft  agreeable  to  his  nature,  to  his  conOitution,  to  rea- 
fon,  to  the  good  ufe  of  his  faculties,  and  to  his  ultimate  end;  all 
which  circumftarrces  perfcclly  agree  with  the  civil  ftate.  In 
lîiort,  as  the  inftitution  of  government  and  fupreme  authority  brings 
men  back  to  the  obfervance  of  the  laws  of  nature,  and  confequent- 
ly  to  the  road  of  hsppinefs,  it  makes  them  return  to  their  natural 
ftate,  from  whence  they  had  ftrayed  by  the  bad  ufe  which  they 
made  of  their  liberty. 

XXVIII.  The  refÏGfftions  we  have  here  made  on  the  advan- 
tages which  men  derive  from  government,  deferve  very  great  at- 
tention. 

i^.  They  are  extremely  proper  for  removing  the  falfe  notions 
which  moft  peon'c  have  upon  this  fubjeil  ;  as  if  the  civil  ftate 
could  not  be  cftablifti'^d  but  in  prejudice  to  their  natural  liberty, 
and  as  if  government  had  been  invented  only  to  fatisfy  the  ambi- 
tion of  defigning  men,  contrary  to  the  intereft  of  the  reft  of  the 
community. 

2^.  They  infpire  mankind  with  a  love  and  refpeâ  for  fo  falu- 
taryaninftitutionjdifpofingthem  thus  to  fubmit  voluntarily  to  what- 
ever the  civil  fociety  requires  of  thera,  from  a  convidlion  that 
the  advantages  fronri  liience  derived  are  very  confiderable. 

3°.  They  may  likewife  contribute  greatly  to  the  increafe  of  the 
love  of  one's  country,  the  firft  feeds  o(  v/hich  nature  herfelf  has 
implanted,  as  it  were,  in  the  hearts  of  all  mankind,  in  order  to  pro- 
mote, as  it  moft  eftstSlually  does,  the  happinefs  of  fociety.  Sextus 
Empiricus  relates,  "  that  it  was  a  cuflom  among  the  ancient 
*'  Perfian?,  upon  the  death  of  a  king,  to  pnfs  five  days  in  a  ftate  of 
"  anarchy,  as  an  inducement  to  be  more  faithful  to  his  fticceftbr, 
"  from  the  experience  they  acquired  of  the  inconveniences  of  an- 
*^  archy,  of  the  many  murders,  robberies,  and  every  other  mifchief, 
"  with  which  it  is  pregnant."  ^ 

XXIX.  As 

*  Advcrf.  Mathcmat.  lib.  z.  §  3j.       Vid.  Heiodot.  lib.  i,  cap.  96,  &:  k^j. 


2o6  7^6'  Principles  of 

XXIX.  As  thefe  refle6tions  are  proper  for  removing  the  pre- 
judices of  private  people,  (o  theylikcwife  contain  molt  excellent 
infliuclions  çvcn  far  fovereigns.  For  is  there  any  thing  better 
adapted  for  making  princes  fenfible  of  the  full  extent  of  their  duty, 
than  to  refleft  fcrioufly  on  the  ends  which  the  people  propofed  to 
thenafelves  in  intruding  them  with  tlieir  liberty,  that  i?,  with 
whatever  is  nio(t  valuable  to  them  \  and  on  the  engagements  into 
which  they  entered,  by  charging themlelves  with  fo  (acred  adepofit  ? 
When  mankind  renounced  their  independence  and  natural  liberty, 
by  giving  mafters  to  thcmfelves,  it  was  in  order  to  be  fheltercd  from 
the  evils  with  which  they  were  aiflidted,  and  *în*opes,  that  under 
the  proteélion  and  care  of  their  fovereign,  they  (hould  meet  with 
(olid  happinefs.  Thus  have  we  feen,  that  by  civil  liberty  man- 
kind acquired  a  right  of  infifting  upon  their  fovercign's  ufing  his 
authority  agreeably  to  the  defiçn  with  which  he  was  entrufted 
with  ir,  which  was  to  render  their  fuLjeits  wife  and  virtuous,  ai^d 
thereby  to  promote  their  rep-1  felicity.  la  a  word,  v/hatever  has 
been  faid  concerning  the  advantages  of  the  civil  ftate  preferably  to 
that  of  nature,  fuppofes  this  flate  in  its  due  perfeflion  ;  and  that 
both  fubjecls  nnd   fovereign  difcharge  their  duties   towaidseach 


ether. 


C  H  A  P.     IV. 


Of  the  ejjcnt'ial  conjl'itution  of  fiâtes^  and  of  the  manner  in  ivhich 
they  are  formed. 

I.  A 

XJ^FTER  treating  of  the  original  of  civil  focieties,  the  nat- 
ural order  of  our  fubjcdl  leads  us  to  examine  into  the  cllential  con- 
(litution  of  (lat^'s-,  thac  is,  into  the  manner  in  which  they  are  form- 
ed, and  the  internal  frame  of  thofe  furprifing  ftru5turcs. 

II.  From  what  has  been  faid  in  the  preceding  chapter  it  follows, 
that  the  only  efFeitual  method  which  mankind  could  employ  ia 
order  to  fkreen  themfelves  from  the  evils  with  which  they  were 
affliclcdin  the  ffate  ofnature,  and  to  procure  to  theadclves  all  the 
advantages  v^antiug  to  their  fecurity  and  happin:ls,  mult  be  drawn 
from  m  in  himfclf,  and  from  the  afliftance  of  fociety. 

III.  For  this  purpofe  it  was  neceflary  that  a  multitude  of  peo- 
ple Ihould  unite  in  fo  particular  a  man,i£r,  that  their  prefervation 

niufl: 


Politic    Law.  toj 

muft  depend  on  each  other,  to  the  end  that  they  remain 
under  a  neceflity  of  mutual  alîiltance,  and  by  this  jundlioii 
of  Itrength  and  intereft?,  be  able  nox.  only  to  repel  the  iniults 
a'^^ainit  which  each  iiulividual  could  not  guard  fo  eaiily,  butalfo  to 
contain  thofe  who  ihould  attempt  to  deviate  from  their  duty,  and 
to  promote,  more  efFe£lually,  their  common  advantage.  Let  us 
explain  more  particularly  how  this  could  be  efixcSled. 

IV.  Two  things  were  neceflary  for  this  purpofe. 

1**.  It  was  necedary  to  unite  forever  the  wills  of  all  the  mem- 
bers of  the  fociety,  in  fuch  a  manner,  that  from  that  time  forward 
they  (hould  never  defire  but  one  and  the  "fame  thing  in  whatever 
relates  to  the  end  and  purpofe  of  fociety.  2°.  It  was  requifite 
afterwards  to  eftablifh  a  fupreme  power  fuppcKted  by  the  ftrength 
of  the  whole  body  (by  which  means  they  might  over-awe  thofe 
wno  (h  luld  be  inclinable  to  difturb  the  peace)  and  to  infliél  a  pref- 
ent  and  fenfible  evil  on  fuch  as  fhould  attempt  to  a6l  contrary  to 
the  public  good. 

V.  It  is  from  this  union  of  wills  and  of  ftrength,  that  the  body 
politic  or  ftate  refults,  and  without  it  we  could  never  conceive  a 
civil  fociety.  For  let  the  number  of  confederates  be  ever  fo  great, 
if  each  man  was  to  follow  his  own  private  judgment  in  things 
relating  to  the  public  good,  they  would  only  embarrafs  one  another, 
and  the  diverfity  of  inclinations  and  judgments,  arifing  from  the 
levity  and  natural  inconftancy  of  man,  would  foon  demolifh  all 
concord,  and  mankind  would  thus  relapfe  into  the  inconveniences 
of  the  {late  of  nature.  Befides,  a  fociety  of  that  kind  could  never 
aft  long  in  concert,  and  for  the  fame  end,  nor  maintain  itfelf  ia 
that  harmony  which  conftitutes  its  whole  ftrength,  without  a  fupe- 
rior  power,  whofe  bufmefs  it  is  to  ferve  as  a  check  to  the  incon- 
ftancy and  malice  of  man,  and  to  oblige  each  individual  to  diredl 
all  his  allions  to  the  public  utility. 

VI.  All  this  is  performed  by  means  of  covenants  ;  for  this 
union  of  wills  in  one  and  the  fame  perfon  could  never  be  fo  effec- 
ted, as  to  aftually  deftroy  the  natural  diverfity  of  inclinations  and 
fentiments  ;  but  it  is  done  by  an  engagement  which  every  man 
enters  into,  of  fubmitting  his  private  will  to  that  of  a  fingle  perfon, 
or  of  an  aflembly  ;  infomuch  that  every  refohition  of  this  perfon  or 
aft*emb!y,  concerning  things  relative  to  the  public  fecurity  or  advan- 
tage, muft  be  conftdered  as  the  pofitive  will  of  all  in  general,  and 
of  each  in  particular, 

VII.  With 


2 c5  "the  Principles   of 

VII.  With  regard  to  the  union  of  ftrength,  which  produces  the 
fovereign  power^  it  is  not  formed  by  each  man's  cotnmunicaring 
phyfically  his  ftrcngth  to  a  fingle  perfon,  fo  as  to  remain  utterly 
weak  and  impotent  ;  but  by  a  covenant  or  engagement,  whereby 
all  in  general,  and  each  in  particular,  oblige  themfelves  to  make 
110  ufc  of  their  ftrength,  but  in  fuch  a  manner  as  fhall  be  prefcri- 
bed  to  them  by  the  perfon  on  whom  they  have,  with  one  common 
accord,  conferred  the  fupreme  authority. 

VIII.  By  this  union  of  the  body  politic  under  one  and  the  fame 
chief,  each  individual  acquires,  in  fome  meafure^as  much  ftrer.gth 
as  the  whole  fociety  united.  Sappofe,  for  inftance,  there  are  a 
million  of  men  in  the  commonwealth,  each  man  is  able  to  refift 
this  million,  by  means  of  their  fubjedlion  to  the  fovereign,  who 
keeps  them  all  in  awe,  anJ  hinders  them  from  hurting  one  another. 
This  multiplication  of  ftrength  in  the  body  puliiic  refembles  that 
of  each  member  in  the  human  body  ;  take  them  afunder,  and  their 
vigor  is  no  more  ;  but  by  their  mutual  union  the  ftrength  of  each 
increafes,  and  they  form,  all  together,  a  robuft  and  animated  body. 

IX.  The  date  maybe  defined,  a  fociety  by  which  a  multitude 
of  people  jjnite  together,  under  the  dependence  of  a  fovereign,  in 
order  to  find,  through  his  protection  and  care,  the  happinefs  to 
which  they  naturally  afpire.  The  definition  which  TuIIy  gives, 
amounts  pretty  near  to  the  fame.  Multitudo  juris  confenfu^  ^ 
idUltath  commiinione  focidta.  A  multitude  of  people  united  toge- 
ther by  a  common  intereft,  and  by  common  laws,  to  which  they 
fubmit  with  one  accord. 

X.  The  ftate  is  therefore  confidered  as  a  body,  or  as  a  moral 
perfon,  of  which  the  fovereign  is  the  chief  or  head,  and  the  fubjecfts 
are  the  members  ;  in  confequence  of  which  we  attribute  to  this 
perfon  certain  acîlions  peculiar  to  him,  certain  rights,  privileges, 
and  poflelTion'5,  dirtinéUrom  thofe  of  each  citizen,  and  to  which 
neither  each  citizen,  nor  many,  nor  even  all  together,  can  pretend, 
but  only  the  fovereign. 

XI.  It  is  moreover  this  union  of  fcveral  pcrfons  in  one  body, 
produced  by  the  concurrence  of  the  wills  and  the  ftrength  of  every 
individual  in  oneantl  the  fame  perfon,  that  diftinguifhes  the  ftate 
from  a  multitude.  For  a  multitude  is  only  an  aflemblage  of  fcv- 
eral perfons,  each  of  whom  has  his  own  private  will,  with  the  lib- 
erty of  jvidging  according     to   his   own   notions  of  whatever  is 

propofed 


Politic    Law.  209 

propofed  to  him,  and  of  determining  as  he  jjleafes  :  for  which  rea- 
I'on  they  cannot  be  faid  to  have  only  one  will.  Whereas  theftate 
is  a  body,  or  a  fociety,  animated  by  one  only  foul,  which  directs  all 
iis  motions,  and  makes  all  its  members  a<ft  after  a  conftaiu  and 
uniform  manner,  with  a  view  to  one  and  the  fame  end,  namely, 
the  public  utility. 

XII.  But  it  will  be  here  obje^fled,  that  if  the  union  of  the  will 
and  of  the  ftrength  of  each  member  of  the  fociety,  in  the  perfon  of 
the  fovereign,  dudroys  neither  the  will  nor  the  natural  force  cf 
each  individual  ;  if  they  always  continue  in  pofîeiîion  of  it  ;  and  if 
they  are  able,  in  fadl,  to  employ  it  againfl  tlie  fovereign  himfelf, 
what  does  the  force  of  the  fbate  conflit  in,  and  what  is  it  thatcon- 
ftitutes  the  f^curity  of  this  fociety  ?  I  anfw^ r,  that  two  things  con- 
tribute chiefly  to  maintain  the  (late,  and  the  fovereign,  who  is  the 
foul  of  it. 

The  firft  is  the  engagement  itfelf,  by  which  individuals  have 
fijbje61:ed  themfelves  to  the  command  of  a  fovereign,  an  engage- 
ment which  derives  a  confiderable  force  both  from  divine  author- 
ity, and  from  the  fanftion  of  an  oath.  Butas  to  vicious  and  ilU 
difpofed  minds,  on  whom  thefe  motives  make  no  imprefllon,  the 
ftrength  of  the  government  confifts  chieHy  in  the  fear  of  Oiofs 
punilhments  which  the  fovereign  may  inflidt  upon  them,  by  virtue 
of  the  power  with  which  he  is  inverted. 

XIII.  Now  fince  the  means,  by  which  tjie  fovereign  is  enabled 
to  compel  rebellious  and  refractory  perfons  to  their  duty,  conflits 
in  this,  that  the  reft  of  the  fubjeâs  join  their  ftrength  with  him 
for  this  end  (for,  were  it  not  for  this,  he  would  have  no  more 
{)ower  than  the  loweft  of  his  fubjecStî)  it  follows  from  thence,  that 
it  is  the  ready  fubmifTion  of  good  fubjedts  that  furniflies  the  fove- 
reign with  the  means  of  repreffing  the  iafolent,  and  of  maintaining 
his  authority. 

XIV.  But  provided  a  fovereign  fhews  never  fo  fmall  an  attach- 
ment to  his  duty,  he  will  always  find  it  eafy  to  fix  the  better  part 
of  his  fubjefts  in  his  intereft,  and  of  courfe  to  have  the  greateft 
part  of  the  ftrength  of  the  ftate  in  his  hands,  and  to  maintain  the 
authorityof  the  government.  Experience  has  always  fhewn  that 
princes  only  need  a  common  fhare  of  virtue  to  be  adored  by  their 
fubjects.  We  ma^'  therefore  affirm,  that  the  fovereign  is  capable 
of  deriving  from  himfelf  the  means  necefTary  for  the  fupport  of  his 
authority,  and  that  a  prudent  exercifeof  the  fovereigntv,  purfuant 

Co  '  :o 


I o  Ihc  Principles  of 

to  the  end  for  which  it  was  defigned,  conftitutes  at  the  fame  time 
the  happinefs  of  the  p^'ople,  and,  by  a  neciffary  confcquence,  the 
greaieft  fecurity  of  the  government  in  the  perfon  of  the  fovereign. 

XV.  Tracing  the  principles  here  eflablifhed  in  regard  to  the 
formation  of  ftates,  6cc.  were  we  to  fuppofe  that  a  muliitude  of 
people,  who  had  lived  hitherto  independent  of  each  other,  wanted 
to  eftabllfli  a  civil  fociety,  we  {hall  find  a  neceflity  for  different 
covenants,  and  for  a  general  decree. 

1°.  The  firft  covenant  is  that  by  which  each  individual  enga- 
ges with  all  the  re(t  to  join  for  ever  in  one  body,  and  to  regulate, 
with  one  common  confent,  whatever  regards  their  prtfervation  and 
their  common  fecurity.  Thofe  who  do  not  enter  into  this  firft 
engagement,  remain  excluded  from  the  new  fociety. 

7.^ .  There  muft  afterwards  be  a  decree  made  for  fettling  the 
form  of  government  ;  oiherwife  they  could  never  take  any  fixt 
meafures  for  promoting,  cffe6lually  and  in  concert,  the  public 
fecurity  and  welfare. 

3^.  In  fine,  when  once  the  form  of  government  is  fettled,  there 
mud  be  another  covenant,  whereby,  after  having  pitched  upon 
oneor  more  perfons  to  be  invefled  with  the  power  of  governing, 
thofe  on  whom  this  fupreme  authority  is  conferred,  engage  to 
confult  moft  carefully  the  common  fecurity  and  advantage,  and 
the  others  promife  fidelity  and  allegiance  to  the  fovereign.  This 
laft  covenant  includes  a  fubmiflion  of  the  flrength  and  will  of  each 
individual  to  the  will  o/the  head  of  the  fociety,  as  far  as  the  public 
good  requires  ;  and  thus  it  is  that  a  regular  ftate  and  perfect  gov- 
ernment are  formed. 

XVL  What  we  have  hitherto  delivered  may  be  further  illuftrated 
by  the  account  we  have  in  hiftory  concerning  the  foundation  of 
the  Roman  ftate.  At  firft  \v'e  behold  a  multitude  of  people,  who 
flock  together  with  a  view  of  ftttling  on  the  banks  of  the  Tiber  ; 
afterwards  they  confiilt  about  what  form  of  government  they  (hall 
eftablifii,  and  the  party  for  monarchy  prevailing,  they  confef  the 
fupreme  authority  on  Romulus.  * 

XVII.  And  thoïigh  we  are   ftrangers  to  the  original  of  moft 
fiâtes,  yet  we  muft  not  imagine  that  what  has  been  herefaid,  con- 
cerning the  manner  in  which  civil  fucieties  are  formed,  is  a  mere 
ficlion.   ■  For  fince  it  is  certain,  that  all  civil  focietics  had  a  begin- 
ning, 

■*  See  Dionyfius  Halicarn.  lib.  %.  in  thebegiouing. 


P  O  L  I  T  I  C      L  A  W.  211 

ning,  it  is  impoffible  to   conceive,  how  the  members,  of  which 
they  are  compofod,  could   agree  to  hve  together,  dependent  on  a 
fupreme  authority,  without   I'uppofing  the  covenants  above-men-  , 
tioncd. 

XVIir.  And  yet«ll  political  writers  do  not  explain  the  origin 
of  (tates  after  our  manner.  Some  there  are  f  who  pretend,  that 
ftates  are  formed  merely  by  the  covenant  of  the  fubjecls  with  one 
another,  by  which  each  man  enters  into  an  engagement  with  all 
the  reft  not  to  refill  the  will  of  the  fovereign,  upon  condition  thnt 
the  reft  on  their  fide  fubmit  to  the  fame  engagement  j  but  thev 
pretend  that  there  is  no  original  compa£l  between  the  fovereign 
and  the  fubjedts. 

XIX.  The  reafon  why  thefe  writers  give  this  explication  of 
the  matter,  is  obvious.  Their  defign  is  to  give  an  arbitrary  and 
unlimited  authority  to  fovereigns,  and  to  deprive  the  fubjedts  of 
every  means  of  withdrawing  their  allegiance  upon  any  pretext 
whatever,  notwithftanding  the  bad  ufe  the  fovereign  may  make  of 
his  authority.  For  this  purpofe  it  was  abfolutely  necefiary  to  free 
kings  from  all  reftraintof  compact  or  covenant  between  them  and 
their  fubjedl?,  which,  without  doubt,  is  the  chief  inftrument  of 
limiting  their  power. 

XX.  But  notwithftanding  it  is  of  the  utmofl  importance  to 
mankind,  tofupport  the  authority  of  kings,  and  to  defetid  itagainlt 
the  attempts  of  refllefs  and  mutinous  fpirits,  yet  we  mud  not  deny 
evident  truths,  or  refuft;  to  acknowledge  a  covenant,  in  which  ther.^ 
is  manifeftly  a  mutual  promife,  of  performing  things  to  which  they 
were  not  before  obliged. 

XXI.  When  I  fubmit  voluntarily  to  a  prince,  I  pron-iife  him 
allegiance,  on  condition  that  he  will  protect  me  ;  the  prince  on  his 
fide  promifes  me  his  protetflion,  on  condition  that  i  will  obay 
him.  Before  this  promife,  I  was  not  obliged  to  obey  him, 
nor  was  he  obliged  toprotcd  me,  at  leaft  by  any /)t'r/I't?  obligation  ; 
it  is  therefore  evident,  that  there  muft  be  a  mutual  enfra^ement. 

DO 

XXII.  But  there  is  ftill  fomething  more  ;  for  fo  fur  is  the  fyftem 
we  are  here  refuting,  from  ftrengtht^ning  the  fupreme  authority, 
and  from  fcreening  it  from  the  capricious  invafions  of  the  fnbjedt, 

that, 

___—>»_ .——._^— •.________ _____«._ ■  } ' *  '  '.  — --' 

+  A.  Hobbes,  de  Give,  cap.  v,  §  7, 


I  2  The  Principles  of 

that,  on, the  contrary,  nothing  is  of  a  more  dangerous  confequence 
to  fovereign?,  than  lo  nx  their  right  on  fuch  a  foundation.  For  if 
the  obligation  of  the  fubjeéts  towards  their  princes  is  founded 
merely  on  the  mutual  covenant  between  the  fiibjeéls,  by  v.hich 
each  man  engages  for  the  fake  of  the  reft  to  obey  the  fovereign,  on 
ccndition  that  the  reft  do  the  fame  for  his  fake  \  it  is  evident,  that 
at  this  rate  every  fubjecl  makes  the  force  of  bis  engagement  depend 
on  the  execution  of  that  of  every  other  fellow-fubje(5t  ;  and  confe- 
qiiently  if  any  one  refufes  toobey  the  fovereign,  all  the  rtft  ftand 
rtleafed  frcn)  their  allegiance.  Thus  by  endeavouring  to  extend 
the  rights  of  fovereigns  beyond  their  juft  limits,  inftead  of  flrength- 
en^ng,  they  rather  inadvertently  weaken  them.  ^ 

CHAP.     V. 

Of  the  fovereign^  Joverc'igJiiy^  and  the  fuhjeSls, 

I.  rp 

j_   HE  fovereign  in  a  ftatc,  is  that  perfon  who  has  a  right  of 
commanding  in  the  laftrefort. 

U.  As  to  the  fovereignty  vvp  muft  define  it,  the  right  of  com- 
matiding  civil  focicty  in  the  laft  refort,  which  right  the  members 
cf  this  focicty  have  conferred  on  one  and  the  fame  perfon,  with  a 
view  to  pi'cfervc  order  and  (ecurity  in  the  commonwealth,  and,  in 
general,  to  procure,  under  his  protection  and  through  his  care, 
their  own  real  happinefs,  and  cfpecially  the  fare  exercifc  of  their 
liberty. 

III.  I  fay,  inthefirft  place,  that  fovereignty  is  the  right  of  com- 
manding civil  focieiy  in  the  laft  refort,  to  fhew  that  the  nature  of 
fovereignty  confifts  chiefly  in  two  things. 

The  firft  is,  the  rit^ht  of  commanding  the  members  of  the  focie- 
tv,  that  is,  of  direéiing  their  a(Stions  with  authority,  or  with  a 
power  of  compelling. 

The  fécond  is,  that  this  right  ought  to  be  that  cf  commanding 
in  the  laft  refort  in  fuch  a  manner,  that  every  private  perfon  be 
obliged  to  fuhmit,  without  a  power  left  to  any  man  of  refifting. 
Otherwifc,  if  this  authority  was  not  fuperior  to  every  other  upon 
earth,  it  could  eftablifh  no  order  or  fecurity  in  the  commonwealth,, 
though  thefeare  the  ends  for  which  it  was  eftabliftitd. 

IVs  In 


P  O  L  I  T  I  C      L  A  W.  213 

IV.  In  the  fécond  place,  I  fay,  that  it  is  a  right  conferred  upon 
a  perfon,  and  not  upon  a  man,  to  denote  that  this  perfon  may  be, 
rot  only  a  fingle  man,  but  likewife  a  multitude  of  men,  united  in 
conncil,  and  forming  only  one  will,  by  means  of  a  plurality  of  fuf- 
frages,  as  we  (hall  more  particularly  explain  hereafter, 

V.  Thirdly,  I  Hiy,  to  one  and  the  fame  petfon,  to  fiiew  that 
fovereignty  can  admjt  of  no  ftiare  or  partition,  that  there  is  no 
fovereign  at  all  when  there  are  many,  becaufe  there  is  no  one  who 
commands  then  in  the  lafl:  refort,  and  none  of  them  being  obliged 
to  give  way  to  the  other,  their  competitica  muft  necefTarily  throw 
every  thing  into  diforder  and  confufion, 

VI.  I  add,  in  fine,  to  procure  their  own  happinefs.  Sec.  in  order 
to  point  out  the  end  of  fovereignty,  that  is,  the  welfare  of  the  peo- 
ple. When  fovcreigns  once  lofe  Hghtof  this  end,  when  they  per-  - 
vert  it  to  their  private  interefts,  or  caprices,  fovereignty  then  degen- 
erates into  tyranny,  and  ceafes  to  be  a  legitimate  authority.  Such 
is  the  idsa  we  ought  to  form  of  a  fovereign  and  of  fovereignty. 

VII.  All  the  other  m.embers  of  the  (late  arc  called  fubjecls,  that 
is,  they  are  under  an  obligation  of  obeying  the  fovereign. 

VIII.  Now  a  perfon  becomes  a  member  or  fubje£l  of  a  ftate 
tvfo  ways,  either  by  an  exprefs  or  by  a  tacit  covenant. 

IX.  If  by  an  exprefs  covenant,  the  thing  admits  of  no  difficulty. 
But,  with  regard  to  a  tacit  covenant,  wemuft  obfervc  that  the  firft 
founders  of  fbtes,  and  all  thofe  who  afterwards  became  members 
thereof,  are  fuppofed  to  have  ftipulated,  that  their  children  and  dc 
fcendants  fnould,  at  their  coming  into  the  v/orld,  have  the  right  of 
enjoying  thofe  advantages  which  are  common  to  all  the  members 
of  the  ftate,  provided  ni.verthelefs  that  thcfe  defcendants,  when  they 
attain  to  the  ufe  of  rcafon,  be  on  their  part  willing  to  fubmit  to  the 
government,  and  to  acknowledge  the  authority  of  the  fovereign. 

X.  I  faid,  provided  the  defcendants  acknowledged  the  authority  • 
of  the  fovereign  j   for  the  ftipulation  of  the  parents  cannot,  in  its 

own  nature,  have  the  force  of  fubjefting  the  children  againft  their 
will  to  an  authority,  to  which  they  would  not  of  thcmfelves  chufe 
to  fubmit  :  hence  the  authority  of  the  fovereign  over  the  children 
of  the  members  of  the  ftate,  and  the  right,  on  the  other  hand, 
which  thcfs  children  have  to  the  protcdion  of  the  fovereign,  and 

to 


214  ^^  Principles  of 

to  the  ad  vantages  of  the  government,  are  founded  on  mutual  ccn- 
fent. 

XI.  Now  if  the  childrenof  members  of  the  ftate,  upon  attain- 
ing to  the  years  of  difcretion,  are  willing  to  live  in  the  place  of 
their  parentage,  or  in  their  native  country,  they  are  by  this  very 
aâ  fuppofed  to  fubmlt  themfclves  to  the  power  that  governs  the 
ftate,  and  confequently  they  ought  to  enjoy,  as  members  of  that 
(late,  the  advantages  naturally  arifing  from  it.  This  is  the  reafon 
likewife,  that  when  once  the  foyereign  is  acknowledged,  he  has 
«o  occafion  to  tender  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  children,  who 
are  afterwards  born  in  his  dominions. 

XII.  Befides,  it  is  a  maxim  which  nas  been  ever  confidered  as 
agenerallaw  of  governmenr,  that  whofoever  merely  enters  upon 
the  territories  of  a  date,  and  by  a  much  ftronger  reafon,  thofe  who 
are  defirous  of  enjoying  the  advantages  which  are  x.o  be  found 
there,  are  fuppofed  to  renounce  their  natural  liberty,  and  to  fubmit 
to  theeftablifhed  laws  and  government,  fo  far  as  the  public  and 
private  fafety  requires.  And  if  they  refufe  to  do  this,  they  may  be 
confidered  as  enemies,  in  this  fenfe  at  leaft,  that  the  government 
has  a  right  to  expel  them  the  country  ;  and  this  is  likewifea  tacit 
covenant,  by  whic  \  they  make  a  temporary  fubmiffion  to  the 
government, 

XIII.  Subje(^s  are  fometimes  called  c'lves^  or  members  of  the 
civil  ftate  j  fome  indeed  make  no  diftinftion  between  thefe  tv.'O 
terms,  but  I  think  it  is  better  to  diftinguifh  them.  The  appella- 
tion of  f?m  ought  to  be  underftood  only  of  thofe  who  (hare  in  all 
the  advantages  and  privileges  of  the  afTociation,  and  who  are  prop- 
erly members  of  the  ftate,  either  by  birth,  or  in  fome  other  manner. 
All  the  reft  are  rather  inmate?,  ftrangers,  or  temporary  inhabitants, 
than  members.  As  to  women  and  fervants,  the  title  of  member 
is  applicable  to  them  only,  inafmuch  as  they  enjoy  certain  rights, 
in  virtue  of  their  dependence  on  their  domeftic  governor,  who  is 
properly  a  member  of  the  ftate  ;  and  all  this  depends  on  the  laws 

*  and  particular  cuftoms  of  each  governmtnt, 

XIV.  To  proceed  ;  members,  befides  the  general  relation  of 
being  united  in  the  fame  civil  fociety,  have  iikewife  many  other 
particular  relations,  which  are  reducible  to  t\vo  principal  ones. 

The  firft  is,  when  private  people  compofe  particular  bodies  or 
corporations. 

The 


Politic     L  a  w^  215 

The  fécond  is,  when  fovereigns  intruft  particular  perfons  with 
fome  (hare  of  the  adminiftration. 

XV.  Thofe  particular  bodies  are  called  Companies,  Chambers, 
Colleges.^  Societies^  Communities,  But  it  is  to  be  obferved,  that  all 
thefc  particular  focieties  are  finally  fubordinate  to  thefovereign. 

XVI.  Bcfides^  we  may  confider  fome  as  more  ancient  than  the 
eftablifliment  of  civil  dates,  and  others  as  formed  fincc. 

XVII.  The  latter  are  likewife  either  public,  fuch  as  are  eftab- 
lifliied  by  the  authority  of  the  fovereign,  and  then  they  generally 
enjoy  fome  particular  privileges,  agreeably  to  their  parents  :  or 
private,  fuch  as  are  formed  by  private  people. 

XVIII.  In  fine,  thefe  private  bodies  are  either  lawful  or  unlaw- 
ful. The  former  are  thofe,  which,  having  nothing  in  their  na- 
ture contrary  to  good  order,  good  manners,  or  the  authority  of  the 
fovereign,  are  fuppofed  to  be  approved  of  by  the  ftate,  though  they 
have  not  received  any  formal  fanâion.  With  refpecl  to  unlawful 
bodies,  we  mean  not  only  thofe  whofe  members  unite  for  the  open 
commiflion  of  any  crime,  fuch  as  gangs  of  robbers,  thieves,  pirates^ 
banditti,  but  likewife  all  other  kinds  of  confederacy,  which  the  fub- 
je£ls  enter  into,  without  the  confent  of  the  fovereign,  and  contrary 
to  the  end  of  civil  fociety.  Thefe  engagements  are  called  cabals, 
fadlions,  confpiracies. 

XIX.  Thofe  members  whom  the  fovereign  intrufts  with  fome 
fiiare  of  the  adminiftration,  which  they  exercife  in  his  name  and 
by  his  authority,  have  in  confequence  thereof  particular  relations  to 
the  reft  of  the  members,  and  are  under  ftronger  engagements  to 
the  fovereign  ;  thefe  are  called  minifters,  public  officers,  or  magif- 
trates. 

XX.  Such  are  the  regents  of  a  kingdom,  during  a  minority,  the 
governors  of  provinces  and  towns,  the  commanders  of  armies,  the 
dire(5lors  of  the  treafury,  the  prefidents  of  courts  of  juftice,  ambaf- 
fadors,  or  envoys  to  foreign  powers,  &c.  As  all  thefe  perfons  are 
intrufted  with  a  fhare  of  the  adminiftration,  they  rcprefent  the 
fovereign,  and  it  is  they  that  have  properly  the  name  of  public  min- 
ifters. 

XXI.  Othsrs  there  are,  who  aiïift  merely  in  the  execution  of 

public 


2 1 6  7^^  Principles  of 

public  biifinefs,  fuch  as  counfcllors,  who  only  give  their  opinion, 
Iccretaries,  receivers  of  tiïe  public  revenue,  foldiers,  fubaltern  ofli- 
cers,  &c. 

CHAP.     VI. 
Of  the  immediate  Jourccy  and  foundation  of fovere'tgntj» 

1.  rjy 

X  HOUGH  what  has  been  faid  in  the  fourth  chapter  con- 
cerning the  ftruclure  of  ftates,  is  fufficient  to  (hew  the  original  and 
fourcc  of  fovereignty,  as  well  as  its  real  foundation  j  yet  as  this  is 
one  of  thofe  queftions  on  which  political  writers  are  greatly  divi- 
ded, it  will  nut  beamifs  to  examine  it  foniewhat  more  particular- 
ly J  and  what  remains  ftill  to  be  faid  upon  this  fubjecS^  will  help  to 
give  us  a  more  complete  idea  of  the  nature  and  end  of  fovereignty. 

II.  When  we  inquire  here  into  the  fource  of  fovcreigntyj  our 
intent  is  to  know  the  neareft  and  immediate  fource  of  it;  now  it 
is  certain,  that  the  fupreme  authority,  as  well  as  the  title  en  which 
this  power  is  edabliditd,  rsnd  which  conflitutes  its  right,  is  derived 
immediately  from  the  very  covenants  which  conftitute  civil  fociety, 
and  give  birth  to  government. 

III.  And  indeed,  upon  confulering  the  primitive  ftate  of  man, 
it  appears  molt  certain,  that  the  appellations  of  fovereigns  and 
fubjeâis,  mafters  and  flaves,  are  unknown  to  nature.  Nature  has 
made  us  all  of  the  fume  fpecies,  all  equal,  all  free  and  independent 
of  each  other  j  in  fhoi  t,  (he  was  willing  that  thofe,  on  whom  flie 
has  beftowed  the  fame  faculties,  fhould  have  all  the  fame  rights. 
It  is  therefore  beyond  all  doubt,  that,  in  this  primitive  ftate  of 
nature,  no  man  has  of  himfelf  an  original  right  of  commanding 
others,  or  any  title  to  fovereignty. 

IV.  There  is  none  but  God  alone  that  has,  in  confequence  of 
'                his  nature  and  pcrfcvSticns,  a  natural,  efiential,  and  inherent  right  of 

giving  laws  to  mankind,  and  of  exercifingan  abfoluce  fovereignty 
over  them.  The  cafe  is  otherwife  between  man  and  man  ;  they 
arcin  their  ownnatureas  independent  of  one  another,  as  theyarc 
dependent  on  (rod.  This  liberty  and  independence  is  therefore  a 
right  naturally  belonging  to  man,  of  which  it  v.'0uld  be  unjuft  to 
deprive  him  a';!;ainft  his  wi!!. 

V.  But 


Politic    Law.  21.^/ 

y.  But  if  this  be  the  cafe,  and  there  is  yet  a  (upreme  authority 
fubfiftitig  amongft  mankind,  whence  can  this  authority  arife,  unlets 
it  be  from  the  compadts  or  covenants,  which  men  have  made 
amongft  themfelves  upon  this  fubje<ft  ?  For  as  we  have  a  right  of 
transferring  our  property  to  another  by  a  covenant  ;  io^  by  a  vol- 
untary fubmiflion,  a  perfon  may  convey  to  another,  v^ho  accepts 
of  the  renunciation,  the  natural  right  he  had  of  difpofmg  of  his 
liberty  and  natural  ftrength. 

VI.  It  muft  therefore  be  agreed,  that  fovereignty  refides  origin- 
ally in  the  people,  and  in  each  individual  with  regard  to  himlelf  ; 
and  that  it  is  the  transferring  and  uniting  the  feveral  rights  of  indi- 
viduals in  the  perfon  of  the  fovereign,  that  conftitutes  him  fuch,  and 
rcaliy  produces  fovereignty.  It  is  beyond  all  dlfpute,  fi)r  example, 
that  when  the  Romans  chofe  Romulus  and  Numafor  their  kingsj 
they  muft  have  conferred  upon  them,  by  this  very  ad,  the  fove- 
reignty, which  thofe  princes  were  not  poflliled  of  before,  and  to 
which  they  had  certainly  no  other  right  than  what  was  derived  from 
the  eledion  of  the  people, 

VII.  Neverthelefs,  though  it  be  evident,  that  the  immediate 
original  of  fovereignty  is  owing  to  human  covenants,  yet  nothing 
can  hinder  us  from  affirming,  with  good  ground,  that  it  is  of  divine 
as  well  as  human  right. 

VIII.  And  indeed,  right  reafon  having  made  it  plainly  appear^ 
after  multiplication  of  mankind,  that  the  eftabliihment  of  civil  fo- 
cieties  and  of  a  fupreme  authority,  was  abfolutely  necelfary  for 
the  order,  tranquillity,  and  prefervation  of  the  fpecies,  it  is  as 
convincing  a  proof  that  this  inftitution  is  agreeable  to  the  defigns 
of  Providence,  as  if  God  himfelf  had  declared  it  to  mankind  by  a 
pofilive  revelation.  And  fmcc  God  is  eflentially  fond  of  order, 
he  is  doubtlefs  willing  that  there  fhould  be  a  fupreme  authority 
upon  earth,  which  alone  is  capable  of  procuring  and  fupporting 
that  order  amongft  mankind,  by  enforcing  the  obfçrvance  of  the 
laws  of  nature. 

IX.  There  is  a  beautiful  paflage  of  Cicero's  to  this  purpofe.  * 

D  d  Nothing 


*  Nihil  ell illi principi  Deo  qui  omnem  btmc  mundum  regit,  quod  qttidem  in  tirritfi^t 
acceptius,  quam  çonjîlia  («luj'aut  bominum  jure  fociati^  qua  etvitatu  apptllautur,  Sotn, 
Sip  cap,  3, 


2 1 8  l^he  Principles   of 

Ncthutg  is  7nore  agreeable  to  the  fupreme  De'tty^  that  governs  this 
univerfe^  than  civil focieties  lawfully  efiabli/ljcd. 

X.  When  therefore  we  give  to  fovercigns  the  title  of  God's 
vicegerents  upon  earth,  tliis  does  not  imply  that  they  derive  their 
authority  immediately  from  God  ;  but  it  fignifies  only,  that  by 
means  of  the  power  lodged  in  their  hands,  and  with  which  the  peo- 
ple have  invefted  them,  they  maintain,  agreeably  to  the  views  of 
the  Deity,  boih  order  and  peace,  and  thus  procure  the  felicity  of 
mankind, 

XI.  But  if  thefe  magnificent  titles  add  a  confiderable  lufire  to 
fovereignty,  and  render  it  more  refpectable,  they  aff.ird  likewife,  at 
the  fame  time,  an  excellent  leflbn  to  princes.  For  tliey  cannot 
deferve  the  title  of  God's  vicegerents  upon  earth,  but  inafmuch  as 
they  make  ufe  of  their  authority,  purfuant  to  the  views  and  purpo- 
fes  for  which  they  were  intruded  with  it,  and  agreeably  to  the  in- 
tention of  the  Deity,  that  is,  for  the  happinefs  of  the  people,  by 
ufmg  all  their  endeavours  to  infpire  them  with  virtuous  principles. 

XII.  This,  without  doubt,  is  fufRcient  to  make  us  lock  upon 
the  original  of  government  as  facred,  and  to  induce  fubjedls  to 
fliew  fubmiflion  and  refpec^  to  the  perfon  of  the  fovereign.  But 
there  are  political  writers  who  carry  the  thing  further,  and  main- 
tain that  it  is  God  who  confers  immediately  the  fupreme  power 
on  princes,  without  any  intervention  or  concurrence  of  man. 

Xni.  For  this  purpofe,  they  make  a  diftindtion  betwixt  the 
caufe  of  the  (tate,  and  the  caufe  of  the  fovereignty.  They  confcfs 
indeed  that  fiâtes  are  fonned  by  covenants,  but  they  infi'l  that  God 
himfclf  is  the  immediate  caufe  of  the  fovereignty.  According  to 
their  notions,  the  people,  who  chufe  to  themfelves  a  king,  do  not, 
by  this  a6t,  confer  the  fupreme  authority  upon  him,  they  only  point 
out  the  perfon  whom  heaven  is  to  intrufl  with  it.  Thus  the  con- 
fcnt  of  the  people  to  the  dominion  of  one  or  more  perfons,  may  be 
confidered  as  a  channel,  through  which  the  fupreme  authority  flows, 
but  is  not  its  real  fource. 

XIV.  The  principal  argument  which  thefe  writers  adopt,  is, 
that  as  neither  each  individual  amongft  a  number  of  free  and  inde- 
pendent people,  nor  the  whole  colle6tive  multitude,  are  in  any  wife 
pofl'effed  of  the  fupreme  authority,  they  cannot  confer  it  on  the 
pri.-ace.     But  this  argument  proves  nothing  :  it  is  true  that  neither 

each 


Politic    Law.  219 

each  member  of  the  foclety,  nor  the  whole  multitude  collected, 
are  fûr.nally  invefled  with  the  (upreme  authority,  fuch  as  we  be- 
hold it  in  the  fovereign,  but  it  is  fuffilcient  that  ihcy  pofTds  it  vir- 
tually, that  is,  that  they  have  within  themfclvcs  all  that  is  ncceira- 
ry  to  enable  them,  by  the  concurrence  of  their  free  will  and  confent, 
to  produce  it  in  the  fovereign. 

XV.  Since  every  individual  has  a  natural  right  ofdifpofmgof 
bis  natural  freedom  according  as  bethinks  proper,  whyfhouldhe 
not  have  a  power  of  transferring  to  another  that  right  which  he 
has  of  direifting  himfdf  ?  Now  is  it  not  manifeft,  that  if  all  the 
members  of  this  fociety  agree  to  transfer  this  right  to  one  of  their 
fel!ow-;iiembcrs,  this  cefTion  will  be  the  neareft  and  immediate 
caufe  of  fovereignty  ?  It  is  therefore  evident,  that  there  are,  in  each 
individual,  the  feeds,  as  it  were,  of  the  fupreme  power.  The  cafe 
is  hsre  very  near  the  fime  as  in  that  of  feveral  voices,  colIe6led 
together,  which,  by  their  union,  produce  a  harmony,  that  was  not' 
to  be  found  feparately  in  each. 

XVI.  But  it  will  he  here  objeded,  that  the  fcripture  itfelf  fays, 
that  every  m.an  ought  to  be  fubjeil  to  the  fupreme  powers,  be- 
caufe  they  are  eftabhflied  by  God.  *  I  anfwer,  with  Grotius,  that 
men  have  eftablifhed  civil  focieties,  not  in  confequence  of  a  divine 
ordinance,  but  of  their  voluntary  motion,  induced  by  the  expe- 
rience they  had  had  of  the  incapacity  which  feparate  families  were 
under,  of  defending  therafelves  ag^iinfl  the  infults  and  attacks  of 
human  violence.  From  thence  (he  zdis)  arifes  the  civil  power, 
which  St.  Peter,  for  this  reafon,  calls  a  human  power,  §  though  in 
other  parts  of  fcripture  it  bears  the  name  of  a  divine  inftitution,  f 
becaufeGod  has  approved  of  it  as  an  eflablifiiment  ufeful  to  man- 
kiod.J 

XVII.  The  other  arguments,  in  favour  of  the  opinion  we  have 
been  here  refuting,  do  not  even  deferve  our  notice.  In  general, 
it  may  be  obferved,  that  never  were  more  wretched  reafons  pro- 
duced upon  this  fubje6l,  as  the  reader  may  be  eafily  convinced  by 
reading  Puffendorf  on  the  law  of  nature  and  nations,  who,  in  the 
chapter  correfponding  to  this,  gives  thefe  arg*jments  at  length,  and 
fully  refutes  them.  || 

XVIII.  Let 


*  Rom.  jlii,  §  Ep.   i.   chap.  ii.  ver.   13.         +  Rom.  xiii.  i. 

^  Grotiusof  the  right  of  war  and  peace,  book  i.  chap.  iv.  §  7,  iz.No.  3.    Sec 
above.  No.  7,  and  following. 

Jj  See  the  Lav/  of  nature  and  nations,  book  vii.  chap,  iii- 


2  20  'The  Principles  of 

XVIII.  Let  us  therefore  conclude,  that  the  opinion  of  thole, 
who  pretend  that  God  is  the  immtdiate  caufe  of  fovereigntVj  has 
no  other  foundation  than  that  of  adulation  and  flattery,  by  which, 
in  order  to  render  the  authority  ot  fovereigns  more  abfolute,  they 
have  attempted  to  render  it  independent  of  all  human  coir)pa<5t, 
and  dependent  only  on  God.  But  were  we  even  to  grant,  that 
princes  hold  their  authority  iin mediately  of  God,  yet  the  confe- 
quences,  which  fome  political  writers  want  to  infer,  could  not  be 
drawn  froni  this  principle. 

XIX.  For  fince  it  is  mofl  certain,  that  God  could  never  intruft 
princes  with  this  fupreme  authority,  but  for  the  good  of  fociety  in 
general,  as  well  as  of  individuals,  the  extrcife  of  this  power  muil 
ncccflari  y  be  limited  by  the  very  intention  which  the  Deity  had  in 
confer rng  it  on  the  fovereign  ;  infomuch  that  the  people  would 
flill  have  the  fame  right  of  refuting  to  obey  a  prince,  who,  inftead 
of  conciirririo- with  the  views  of  the  Deity,  would,  on  the  contrary, 
endeavour  to  crofs  and  defeat  them,  by  rendering  his  people  nruU 
erable,  as  we  fhall  prove  more  particularly  hereatter. 


CHAP      VII. 

Of  the  ejjenttal  chara^evs  of  /vjerelgnty^  its  modifications,    extent^ 

and  limits. 

1°.   Of  ike  choranerifics  of fovercignty. 

'  SOVEREIGNTY  wc  liave  defined  to  be  a  right  of  com- 
manding in  the  laft  refort  in  civil  fociety,  which  right  the  members 
of  this  fociety  have  conferred  upon  fome  perfon,  with  a  viev/  of 
maintaining  order  and  fecurity  in  the  commonwealth.  This 
definition  fliews  us  the  principal  charadcriftics  of  the  power  that 
governs  the  (late,  and  this  is  what  it  will  be  proper  to  explain 
here  in  a  more  particular  manner. 

II.  The  firft  charaderiftlc,  and  that  from  which  all  the  others 
flow,  is  its  being  a  fupreme  and  independent  power,  that  is,  a  power 
that  iudges  in  the  lart  refort  of  whatever  is  fufccptible  of  human 
direâion,  and  relates  to  the  welfare  and  advantage  of  fociety  ; 
infomuch  that  this  power  acknowledges  no  otlier  fuperior  power 

on  earth.  ,    , 

IIL  It 


Politic    Law.  -    221 

HI.  It  muft  be  obferred  however,  that  when  we  fay  the  civil 
power  is  of  its  own  nature,  fupreme  and  independent,  we  do  not 
mean  thereby,  that  it  does  not  depend,  in  regard  to  its  original,  on 
ihe  human  will  :  *  all  that  we  would  have  underftood  is,  that, 
when  once  this  power  is  eftablifhed,  it  acknowledges  no  other 
upon  earth,  fuperior  or  equal  to  it,  and  confequently  that  whatever 
it  ordains  in  the  plenitude  of  its  power,  cannot  be  reverfed  by  any 
other  human  will,  as  fuperior  to  it. 

IV.  That  in  every  government  there  fhould  be  fuch  a  fupreme 
power,  is  a  point  abfolutely  neceflary  ;  the  very  nature  of  the  thing 
requires  it,  othcrwife  it  is  impoiTiblc  for  it  to  fubfift.  For  fmce 
powers  cannot  be  multiplied  to  infinity,  we  muft  neceflarily  flop 
at  fome  degree  of  authority  fuperior  to  all  other  :  and  let  the  form 
of  government  be  what  it  will,  monarchical,  ariftocratical,  demo- 
cratical,or  mixt,we  mufl  always  fubmit  to  a  fupreme  decifion  ;  fince 
it  implies  a  contradiftion  to  fay,  that  there  is  any  perfon  above 
him,  who  holds  the  higheit  rank  in  the  lame  order  of  beings. 

V.  A  fécond  charaSeriftic,  which  is  a  confequence  of  the 
former,  is  that  the  fovereign,  as  fuch,  is  not  accountable  to  any 
perfon  upon  earth  for  his  conduit,  nor  liable  to  any  punifhment 
from  man  ;  for  both  fuppofe  a  fuperior. 

VI.  There  are  two  v^'ays  of  being  accountable. 

One  as  to  a  fuperior,  who  has  a  right  of  reverfing  what  has  been 
done,  if  he  does  not  find  it  to  his  liking,  and  even  of  infliding  fome 
punifhment,  and  this  is  inconfiftent  with  the  idea  of  a  fovereign. 

The  other  as  to  an  equal,  whofe  approbation  we  are  defirous  of 
having  ;  and  in  this  fenÇe  a  fovereign  may  be  accountable,  without 
any  abfurdity.  And  even  ihey  who  have  a  right  idea  of  honour, 
endeavour  by  fuch  means  to  acquire  the  approbation  and  efteem 
of  mankind,  by  letting  all  the  world  fee,  that  they  ad  with  prudence 
and  integrity  :  but  this  does  not  imply  any  dependence. 

VII.  I  faid  that  the  fovereign,  as  fuch,  was  neither  accountable 
nor  punifhable;  that  is,  fo  long  as  he  continues  really  a  fovereign, 
and  has  not  forfeited  his  right.  For  it  is  paft  all  doubt,  that  if 
the  fovereign,  utterly  forgetful  of  the  er.d  for  v/hich  he  was  intruflcd 
with  the  fovereignty,  applied  it  to  a  quite  contrary  purpofe,  and 
thus  became  an  enemy  to  the  ftate  ;  the  fovereignty  returns  (ipfa 
fu^oj  to  the  nation,  who,  in  that  cafe,  can  act  towards  the  perfon, 
who  was  their  fovereign,  in  the  manner  they  think  mofl  agreeable 

fo 

*  See  abcvc,  chap.  iv.  &c.  where  wc  have  proved  the  contrary. 


2  2  2  7/^t?  Principles  of 

to  thcjlr  fecurity  ami  intercfts.  For,  whatever  notion  we  may  en- 
tertain of  Ibvereigiity,  no  man,  in  his  fcufe?,  will  pretend  to  fay, 
that  it  is  an  undoubted  title  to  follow  the  impulfe  of  our  irregular 
paflions  withimpunity,  and  thus  to  become  an  enemy  to  focicty. 

VIII.  A  third  characEleriftic  efTontial  to  fovereignty,  confidered 
in  itfclf,  is,  that  the  fovereign,  as  fuch,  be  above  all  human  or  civil 
law.  I  fay,  all  human  hw  j  for  there  is  no  doubt  but  the  fovc- 
rejgn  is  fubjc6l  to  the  divine  laws,  whether  natural  or  pofitivc. 

Regum  t'tmendorum  in  proprios  gregcSy 
fieges  in  ipfos  imperium  eji  "Jovis. 

HoR.  lib.  3.  Od.  I. 

IX.  But  with  regard  to  laws  merely  human,  as  their  whole 
force  and  obligatioii  ultimately  cl-'pends  on  the  will  of  the  fove- 
reign, they  cannot,  with  any  propriety  of  fpeech,  be  fiui  to  be 
obligatory  in  refpcd^  to  him  :  for  obligation  neceiTarily  fuppofeth 
two  perfons,  a  fuperior  and  an  inferior. 

X.  xAnd  yet  natural  equity  requires  fcmetimes,  that  the  prince 
fhould  conf:)rni  to  his  ov^'n  iaws,  to  the  end  that  his  fubje£ls  may 
be  more?  effectually  induce!  co  obferve  them.  This  is  extremely 
well  exprefi'v^d  in  thefe  verfes  of  Glaudian.*' 

In  cojnmune  juhesfi  quid^  cenjcjve  tenendum^ 
Primus  jnjja  juhi  ;  tunc  oh[t:rvantior  aqni 
Fit  popttlus^  ncc  ferre  negct^  cum  vider  it  ipfum 
AuÙorem  parère  ftbi  :  componitor  or  bis 
R/^gis  ad  exemplum  ;  ncc Jic  infiei'^erefcnfus 
Humanos  ediéia  valent,  ut  vita  regenlis. 

Would  you  your  public  laws  fhould  facred  ftand, 
Lead  firft  the  way,  and  ziH  wliat  you  command. 
The  crowd  grow  iTiildand  tradlable  to  fee 
The  author  governed  by  his  own  decree. 
The  world  turns  round,  as  its  great  matter  draws, 
And  princes  lives  bind  flronger  than  their  laws. 

XI.  To  proceed  ;  in  treating  here  of  foverc!gnt\',  we  fuppofe 
that  it  is  really  and  abfoluteiy  fuch  in  its  own  nature,  and  that  the 

cdablifhment 

*  Dc  IV,  Ccuful.  Honor,  ver.  196;  &  fcij. 


V 

Politic    Law,  223 

eflablifhment  of  civil  laws  ultimately  depends  on  the  fole  will  of 
the  perfcn  who  enjoys  the  honours  and  title  of  fovercign,  info- 
much  that  his  authority,  in  this  refpcèt,  cannot  be  limited  :  other- 
wife  this  fuperiority  of  the  prince  above  the  laws  is  not  applicable 
to  him  in  the  full  txicnt  in  which  we  havegiven  it  him. 

XII.  This  fovcreignty,  fuch  as  we  have  novv  reprefentcd  if, 
refided  originally  in  the  people.  But  when  once  the  people  have 
transferred  their  right  to  a  fovereign,  they  cannot,  without  ccntra- 
dié^ion,  be  fuppofed  to  continue  ftill  mafters  of  it. 

XIII.  Hence  the  diftiniflion  which  fome  political  writers  make 
between  real  foVereignty^  which  always  refides  in  the  people,  and 
(lot ual f over eignt)\  which  belongs  to  the  king,  is  equally  abfurd  and 
dangerous.  For  it  is  ridiculous  to  pretciid,  that  after  the  people 
have  conferred  the  fupreme  authority  on  the  king,  they  fhould 
flill  continue  in  pofleffion  of  that  very  authority,  fuperior  to  the 
king  himfelf. 

XIV.  We  mijft  therefore  obferve  hsfe  a  juft  medium,  and 
eftablifh  principles  that  neither  favour  tyranny,  nor  the  fpiiit  of 
mutiny  and  rebellion. 

4^.  It  is  certain,  that  fo  foon  as  a  people  fubmit  to  a  king, 
really  fuch,  they  have  no  longer  the  fupreme  power. 

2°.  But  it  does  not  follow,  from  the  people's  having  conferred 
the  fupreme  power  in  fuch  a  manner,  that  they  have  referved  to 
themfelves  in  no  cafe  the  right  of  refuming  it. 

3*^.  This  refervation  is  fometinics  explicit;  but  there  is  always 
a  tacit  one,  the  efFeil  of  which  difclofes  iifelf,  when  the  pcrfon,  in- 
trijfted  with  the  fupreme  authority,  perverts  it  to  an  ufe  direflly 
contrary  to  the  end  for  which  it  was  conferred  upon  him,  as  will 
better  appear  hereafter. 

XV.  But  though  it  beabfclutely  neceffary,  that  there  fhould  be 
a  fupreme  and  independent  authority  in  the  ftate,  there  isneverthe- 
lefs  fomedifference,  cfpecially  in  monarchies  and  ariftocracies,  with 
regard  to'  the  manner  in  which  thofe  who  are  intrufted  with  this 
power,  exercife  it.  In  fome  ftates  the  prince  governs  a?  he  thinks 
proper  ;  in  others,  he  is  obliged  to  follow  fome  fixt  and  confiant 
rules,  from  which  he  is  not  allowed  to  deviate  ;  this  is  what  I  call 
the  modifications  of  fovereignty,  and  from  ihence  arifesthe  diftinc- 
tion  of  abfolute  and  limited  fovcreignty. 

XVI.  Abfolute 


i224  W^  Principles  of 

2^.  Of  abfolutefoveretgnty, 

XVI.  Abfolute  lovereignty  is  therefore  nothing  elfe  but  the 
right  of  governing  theflate  as  the  prince  thinks  proper,  accord- 
ing as  the  prefent  fi|uation  of  affairs  feems  to  require,  and  without 
being  obliged  to  coh(ult  any  perfon  whatever,  or  to  follow  any  fixt 
and  perpetual  rules. 

XVII.  Upon  this  head  we  have  feveral  important  refledions  to 
make. 

1°.  The  word  abfolute  power  is  generally  very  odious  to  repub- 
licans ;  and  I  muft  confefs,  that  when  it  is  mifunderftood,  iti$  apt 
to  make  the  mofl  dangerous  impreffion  on  the  minds  of  princes, 
\  efpecially  in  the  mouths  of  flatterers. 

2°.  In  order  to  form  a  juft  idea  of  it,  we  muft  trace  it  to  its 
principle.  In  the  ftate  of  nature,  every  man  has  an  abfolute  right 
to  a£l  after  what  manner  he  thinks  moft  conducive  to  his  happinefs, 
gnd  without  being  obliged  to  confult  any  perfon  whatever,  provi- 
ded however  that  he  does  nothing  contrary  to  the  laws  of  nature  : 
confequently  v/hen  a  multitude  of  men  unite  together,  in  order  to 
form  a  flate,  this  body  hath  the  fime  liberty  in  regard  to  matters  in 
which  the  public  good  is  concerned. 

3^.  When  therefore  the  whole  body  of  the  people  confer  the 
fovereignty  upon  a  prince,  with  this  extent  and  abfolute  power, 
which  originally  reilded  in  themfelves,  and  without  adding  any 
particular  limitation  to  it,  we  call  that  fovereignty  abfolute. 

4**.  Things  being  thus  conftituted,  we  muft  not  confound  an 
abfolute  power  with  an  arbitrary,  defpotic,  and  unlimited  authority. 
For,  from  what  w^e  have  here  advanced  concerning  the  original  and 
nature  of  abfolute  fovereignty,  it  manifeftly  follows,  that  it  is  lim- 
ited, from  its  very  nature,  by  the  intention  of  thofe  who  conferred 
it  on  the  fovereign,  and  by  the  very  laws  of  God.  This  is  what 
we  muft  explain  more  at  large. 

XVIII.  The  end  which  mankind  propofed  to  themfelves  in  re- 
nouncing their  natural  independence,  and  eftablifhing  government 
and  fovereignty, was  doubtlefs  to  redrefs  the  evils  which  they  laboured 
under,  and  to  fecure  their  happinefs.  If  fo,  how  is  it  poflible  to 
conceive,  that  thofe,  who,  with  this  view,  granted  an  abfolute 
power  to  the  fovereign,  ihould  have  intended  to  give  him  an 
arbitrary  and  unlimited  authority,  foas  to  intitle  him  to  gratify  his 
caprice  and  paflion?,  to  the  prejudice  of  the  life,  property,  and  lib- 
erty 


Politic    Law.  225 

erly  of  the  fubjefl  ?  On  the  contrary,  we  have  fhewn  above,  that 
the  civil  flats  muft  necefTarily  empower  the  fiibjedls  to  infirt  upon 
the  fovereign's  ufing  his  authority  for  their  advantage,  and  accord- 
ing to  the  purpofes  for  which  he  was  intrufted  with  it. 

XIX.  It  muft  therefore  be  acknowledged,  that  it  never  vv'as  the 
intention  of  the  people  to  confer  abfolute  fovereignty  upon  a  prince, 
but  with  this  exprefs  condition,  that  the  public  good  (hould  be  the 
fupreme  law  to  diredl  him  ;  confequently  fo  long  as  the  prince  ads 
with  this  view,  he  is  authorized  by  the  people  ;  but,  on  the  contrary, 
if  he  makes  ufe  of  his  power  merely  to  ruin  and  deftroy  his  fubjedls, 
he  adls  intirely  of  his  own  head,  and  not  in  virtue  of  the  power 
with  which  he  was  intruded  by  the  people. 

XX.  Still  further,  the  very  nature  of  the  thing  does  not  allow  ' 
abfolute  power  to  be  extended  beyond  the  bounds  of  public  utility  ; 
for  abfolute  fovereignty  connot  confer  a  right  upon  the  fovereign, 
which  the  people  had  not  originally  in  themfelves.  Now  before 
the  eftablifhment  of  civil  fociety,  furely  no  man  had  a  power  of 
injuring  either  himfelf  or  others  ;  confequently  abfolute  power 
caniiot  give  the  fovereign  a  right  to  hurt  and  abufe  his  fubjedls. 

XXI.  In  the  ftate  of  nalure  every  man  was  abfolute  mafter  of 
his  own  perfon  and  a(5lions,  provided  he  confined  himfelf  within 
the  limits  of  the  law  of  nature.  Abfolute  power  is  formed  only 
by  the  union  of  all  the  rights  of  individuals  in  the  perfon  of  the 
fovereign  ;  of  courfe  the  abfolute  power  of  the  fovereign  is  con- 
fined within  the  fame  bounds,  as  thofe  by  which  the  abfolute 
power  of  individuals  was  originally  limited. 

XXII.  But  I  go  ftill  further,  and  affirm  that,  fuppofing  even  a 
nation  had  been  really  willing  to  grant  their  fovereign  an  arbitrary 
and  unlimited  power,  this  conceflion  would  of  itfelf  be  void  and  of 
no  efFeft. 

XXIII.  No  man  can  divert  himfelf  fo  far  of  his  liberty  as  to 
fubmit  to  an  arbitrary  prince,  who  is  to  treat  him  abfolutely  ac- 
cording to  his  fancy.  This  would  be  renouncing  his  own  life, 
which  he  is  not  mafter  of  ;  it  would  be  renouncing  his  duty,  which 
is  never  permitted  :  and  if  thus  it  be  with  regard  to  an  individual 
who  (hould  make  himlelfa  flave,  much  lefs  hath  an  intire  nation 
that  power,  which  is  not  to  be  found  in  any  of  its  members. 

Ee  XXIV.  By 


2  26  The  Principles  of 

XXIV.  By  this  it  appears  moft  evident,  that  all  fovereignty, 
how  abfolijtc  foever  we  fuppcfe  it,  hath  its  limits  ;  and  that  it  can 
never  imply  an  arbitrary  power  in  the  prince  of  doing  whatever 
he  pleafes,  without  any  other  rule  or  rcafon  than  his  ownde(potic 
will. 

XXV.  For  how  indeed  fliould  we  attribute  any  fuch  power  to 
the  creature,  v.'heii  it  is  not  to  be  found  in  the  fuprcme  Being  him- 
feif?  His  ablolute  dominion  is  not  founded  on  a  blind  will  j  his 
fovereign  will  is  always  determined  by  the  immutable  rules  of 
vvifdom,  juftice,  and  beneficence. 

XXVI.  In  fliort,  the  right  of  commanding,  or  fovereignty, 
ought  always  to  be  tliabliflied  ultimately  on  a  power  of  doing  good, 
cthei  wife  it  cannot  be  productive  of  a  real  obligation  ;  for  reafon 
cannot  approve  or  fubmit  to  it  ;  and  this  is  what  difiinguilhes 
empire  and  fovereignty  from  violence  and  tyranny.  Such  arc  the 
ideas  we  ought  to  form  of  ubfolute  fovereignty. 

3*^.     Oflwntcà  fovereignty. 

XXVII.  But  although  abfolute  power,  confidered  in  itfelf,  and 
fuch  as  we  have  now  reprefented  it,  in:plies  nothing  odious  or  un- 
lawful, and,  in  that  fenfc,  people  may  confer  it  upon  the  fovereign  ; 
yet  we  mult  allow,  that  the  experience  of  all  ages  has  informed 
mankind,  that  this  is  not  the  form  of  government  which  fuits 
them  beff,  nor  the  fitteft  for  procuring  them  a  ftate  of  tranquillity 
and  happiaefs. 

XXVIII.  Whatever  diftance  there  may  be  between  the  fub- 

jectsand  the  fovereign,  in  whatfoever  degree  of  elevation  the  lat- 
ter may  be  placed  above  the  reft,  ftill  he  is  a  human  creature  like 
themfelves  ;  their  fouls  are  all  caft,  as  it  were,  in  the  fiime  mould, 
they^^sall  fubjeil  to  the  fame  prejudices,  and  fufceptible  of  the 
fame  pafllcns. 

XXIX.  Again,  the  very  Ration,  which  fovereigns  occupy,  cx- 
pofes  them  to  temptations,  unknown  to  private  people.  The 
generality  of  princes  have  neither  virtue  nor  courage  fufficient  to 
moderate  their  paflions,  w  hen  they  find  they  may  do  whatever  they 
lift.  The  people  have  therefore  great  reafon  to  fear,  that  an  unlim- 
ited authority  will  turn  out  to  their  prejudice,  and  that  if  they  do 
«ot  rcferve  fome  fccurity  to  ihcmfcîves,  ogainft  the  Sovereign's 

abufinir 


Politic    Law.  22 

abuHng  it,  he  will  fomc  rime  or  other  abufe  it. 

XXX.  It  is  thefe  refle£lions,  juftilied  by  experience,  that  have 
iiiduced  moft,  and  thofe  the  wifcft,  nations,  to  fct  bounds  to  tho 
power  of  their  fovereigns,  and  to  prcfcribc  the  manner  in  which  the 
latter  are  to  govern  ;  and  this  has  produced  what  is  calitd  hmited 
fovcreignty. 

XXXI.  But  though  this  limitation  of  the  fuprcme  power  be 
advantageous  to  the  people,  it  does  no  injury  to  the  princes  them- 
felves  ;  nay  it  niiy  rather  be  faid,  that  it  turns  out  to  their  advantage, 
and  forms  thegrcateft  fecurity  to  their  authority. 

XXX[[.  It  does  no  injury  to  princes  ;  for  if  they  could  not  be 
fatisfied  with  a  limited  authority,  th.eir  btifmefs  was  to  refufe  the 
Ciown  ;  and  when  once  they  have  accepted  of  it  upon  thefe  con- 
ditions, they  are  no  longer  at  liberty  to  endeavour  afterwards  to 
break  through  them,  or  to  ftrive  to  render  themfelves  abfolute. 

XXXIII.  It  is  rather  advantageous  to  prince?,  bccaufe  thofc 
who  are  inverted  with  abfolute  power,  and  are  deilrons  ofdifchar- 
ging  their  duty,  are  obliged  to  a  far  greater  vigilance  and  circum- 
fpedion,  and  expofcd  to  more  fatigu»,  than  thofe  who  have  their 
tafk,  as  it  were,  marked  outtothem,  and  are  not  allowed  to  deviate 
from  certain  rules. 

XXXIV.  In  fine,  this  limitation  of  fovereignty  forms  the 
greateft  fecurity  to  the  authority  of  princes  ;  for,  as  they  are  I efs 
CKpofed  hereby  to  temptation,  they  avoid  that  popular  fury,  which 
is  (ometimes  difcharged  on  thofe,  who,  having  been  inverted  with 
ablulute  authority,  abufe  it  to  the  public  prejudice.  Abfolute 
power  eafily  degenerates  into  defpotifm,  and  defpotifm  paves  the 
v/ay  for  the  greatell  and  mofl  fatal  revolutions  that  can  happen  to 
fovereigns.  This  is  what  the  experience  of  all  ages  has  verified  : 
it  is  therefore  a  happy  incapacity  in  Icings  not  to  be  able  to  adt 
contrary  to  the  laws  of  their  country. 

XXXV.  Let  us  therefore  conclude,  that  it  entirely  depends 
upon  a  free  people,  to  inveft  the  fovereigîis,  whom  they  place  over 
their  heads,  with  an  authority  either  abfolute,  or  limited  by  certain 
laws,  provided  thefe  laws  contain  nothing  conjtrary  to  juftice,  nor 
to  the  end  of  government,     Thefe  regulations,  by  which  the  fu- 

preaiç 


2  2  8  The  Principled  of 

preme  authority  is  kept  within  bounds,  are  called,  The  fundamentûl 
laws  of  thejiate. 

é^ .     Of  fundamental  laws, 

XXXVI.  The  fundamental  laws  of  a  ftate,  taken  in  their  full 
extent,  are  not  only  the  decrees  by  which  the  entire  body  of  the 
nation  determine  the  form  of  government,  and  the  manner  of  fuc- 
ceeding  to  the  crown  ;  but  are  likewife  the  covenants  betwixt  the 
people  and  the  peifon  on  whom  they  confer  the  fovereignty,  which 
regulate  the  manner  of  governing,  and  by  which  the  fupreme  au- 
thority is  limited, 

XXXVn.  Thefe  regulations  are  called  fundamental  laws, 
becaufe  they  are  th^  bads,  as  it  were,  and  foundation  of  the  fVate, 
on  which  the  flrudlure  of  the  government  is  raifed,  and  becaufe 
th?  people  look  upon  thofe  regulations  as  their  principal  ftiength 
and  fupport. 

XXXVIII.  Tha  name  of  laws  however  has  been  given  to 
thefe  regulations  in  an  improper  and  figurative  fenfe  ;  for,  prop- 
erly fpeaking,  they  are  real  covenants.  But  as  thofe  covenants  are 
obligatory  between  the  contra6ling  parties,  they  have  the  force  of 
laws  themfelves.     I.^t  us  explain  this  more  at  large. 

XXXIX.  1°.  I  obferve  in  the  firft  place,  that  there  is  a  kind 
of  fundamental  law,  efTential  to  all  governments,  even  in  thofe  dates 
>vhere  the  moft  abfolute  fovereignty  prevails.  This  law  is  that  of 
the  public  good,  from  which  the  fovereign  can  never  depart,  with- 
out being  wanting  in  his  duty  j  .but  this  alone  is  not  fuiRcient  to 
limit  the  fovereignty. 

XL.  Hence  thofe  promifes,  either  tacit  or  exprefs,  by  which 
princes  bind  themfelves  even  by  oath,  when  they  come  to  the 
crown,  of  governing  according  to  the  laws  of  juftice  and  equity, 
of  confulting  the  public  good,  of  opprefTing  no  man,  of  protecting 
the  virtdou?,  and  of  punifliing  evil  doers,  and  the  like,  do  not  imply 
any  limitation  to  their  authority,  nor  any  diminution  of  their  ab- 
folute power.  It  is  fufficient  that  the  choice  of  the  means  for  pro- 
curing the  advantag;e  of  the  ftp.te,  and  the  method  of  putting  them 
in  pravEtice,  be  left  to  the  judgment  and  dif^jufal  of  the  fovereign  j 
otherwife  the  diftinClion  of  abfolute  and  limited  power  would  be 
utterly  abolifhed. 

XLI.  2*». 


Politic    Law.  229 

XLl,  a^.  But  with  regard  to  fundamental  laws,  properly  fo 
called,  they  are  only  more  particular  precautions  taken  by  ihe  peo- 
ple, to  oblige  fovereigns  more  ftrorigly  to  employ  their  authority, 
agreeably  to  the  general  rule  of  the  public  good.  This  may  be 
done  feveral  ways  ;  but  ftill  thefe  limitations  of  the  fovereignty 
have  more  or  lefs  force,  according  as  the  nation  has  taken  more 
or  lefs  precautions,  that  they  fhall  have  their  dueefFed. 

XLII.  Hence,  i^.  a  nation  may  require  of  a  fovereign,  that 
he  will  engage,  by  a  particular  promife,  not  to  make  any  new  laws, 
nor  to  levy  new  impofts,  to  tax  only  fome  particular  things,  to 
give  places  and  employments  only  to  a  certain  let  of  people,  and 
not  to  take  any  foreign  troops  into  his  pay,  &c.  Then  indeed  the 
fupremc  authority  is  limited  in  thofe  different  refpe£ls,  infomuch 
that  whatever  the  king  attempts  afterwards,  contrary  to  the  formal 
engagement  he  entered  into,  fhall  be  void  and  of  no  cfFecTc.  But 
if  there  fliould  happen  to  be  an  extraordinary  cafe,  in  which  the 
fovereign  thought  it  conducive  to  the  public  good  to  deviate  from 
the  fundamental  laws,  he  is  not  allowed  to  do  it  of  his  cwn  head,  in 
contempt  of  his  folemn  engagement,  but  in  that  cafe  he  ought 
to  confult  the  people  themfelves,  or  their  reprefentatives.  Other- 
wife,  under  pretence  of  fome  neceffity  or  utility,  the  fovereiga 
might  eafily  break  his  word,  and  fruftrate  the  efFe£t  of  the  precau- 
tions taken  by  the  nation  to  limit  his  power.  And  yet  Puffendorf 
thinks  othcrwife.*  But,  for  a  ftill  greater  fecurity  of  the  perform- 
ance of  the  engagements  into  which  the  fovereign  entered,  and 
which  limit  his  power,  it  is  proper  to  require  explicitly  of  him, 
that  he  fliall  convene  a  general  aflembly  of  the  people,  or  of  their 
seprefentative?,  or  of  the  nobility  of  the  country,  when  any  matters 
happen  to  fall  under  debate,  which  it  was  thought  improper  to 
leave  to  his  decifion.  Or  e!fc  the  nation  may  previoufly  eftablifh  a 
cotmcil,  a  fenate,  or  parliament,  without  whofe  confent  the  prince 
fhall  be  rendered  incapable  of  afting  in  regard  to  things  which  the 
nation  did  not  think  fit  to  fubmit  to  his  will. 

XLIII.  2^.  Hi ftory  informs  us,  that  fome  nations  have  carried 
their  precautions  ftill  further,  by  inferting,  in  plain  term?,  in  their 
fundamental  laws,  a  condition  or  claufe,  by  which  the  king  was 
declared  to  have  forfeited  his  crown,  if  he  broke  through  thofe 
laws.  PufFendorf  gives  an  example  of  this,  taken  from  the  oath  of 
allegiance  which  the  people  of  Aragon  formerly  made  to   their 

kings, 

*  Se«  the  Law  of  nature  and  Rations^  book  vli,  chap,  vi  §  lo. 


230  T'he  Principles  of 


kings.  IVe^t  who  have  as  much  power  as  you^  make  you  our  king^ 
upon  condition  that  you  mainta'vt  ir.vidably  our  rights  and  liberties^ 
and  not  otherivije. 

XLIV.  It  is  by  fuch  precautions  as  tlief?,  that  a  nation  really 
limits  the  authority  flic  confers  on  the  (overeigii,  and  fccurcs  her 
liberty.  P'or,  as  we  have  already  obfcrved,  civil  liberty  ought  to 
bo  accon:ipanicd  not  only  with  a  right  of  infifling  on  the  fovercign's 
making  a  due  ufe  of  his  authority,  but  moreover  with  a  moral  cer- 
tainty that  this  right  fhall  have  its  eftl'61.  And  the  only  way  to 
reader  the  people  thus  certain,  is  to  ufe  proper  precautions  againil 
thsabufe  of  the  fovcreign  power,  in  fjch  a  manner  as  thefe  pre- 
cautions fiiallnotbe  ealily  eluded. 

XLV.  Befides,  wc  miift  obfcrvc,  that  ihefe  limitations  of  the 
fovereign  power  do  not  render  it  defeélive,  nrr  make  any  diminu- 
tion in  the  fupreme  authority  ;  for  a  prince,  or  a  fcnate,  v  ho  has 
been  invefted  v/ilh  the  fuprcme  power  upon  this  f(;oting,  may  tx- 
crcife  every  adl  of  it  as  well  as  iji  an  abfolute  monarchy.  All  the 
difterence  i?,  that  in  tlie  latter  the  prince  aione  determines  ultimate- 
ly according  to  his  private  judgment;  but  in  a  limited  monarchy, 
there  is  a  certain  afl'embly,  who,  in  conjunction  wiih  the  king, 
take  cognizance  of  particular  affairs,  and  whole  confent  is  a  necef - 
fary  condition,  witho  ;t  which  the  king  can  determine  nothing. 
But  the  wifdom  and  virtue  of  good  fovereigns,  are  ftrengthened  by 
the  concurring  a/îiilance  of  thofe  who  have  a  fharc  in  the  authority. 
Princes  always  àci  what  they  incline  to,  when  they  incline  to  noth- 
ing but  what  is  juft  and  good  ;  and  they  ought  to  eftcem  them- 
felves  happy  in  having  it  put  out  of  their  power  to  acl  otherwife. 

XLVI.  3°.  In  a  word,  as  the  fundamental  law?,  which  limit 
the  fovereign  authority,  are  nothing  elfe  but  the  means  which  the 
people  ufe  to  alfure  themfelves  that  the  prince  will  not  recede  from 
the  general  law  of  the  public  good  in  the  moft  important  con- 
junflurer,  it  cannot  be  faid  that  they  render  the  fovereignty  imper-. 
fe£l  or  dcfedive.  For  if  we  fuppofe  a  -prince  invefted  with  abfo- 
lute authorii}',  but  at  the  fame  time  bltfled  with  fo  much  wifdom 
and  virtue,  that  be  will  never,  even  in  the  moft  trifling  cafei  deviate 
from  the  laws  which  the  public  good  requires,  arid  that  all  his  de- 
terminations fnall  be  fubjeéled  to  t!.«  fuperior  rule,  can  we,  for 
that  rçaf<n,  fay,  that  his  power  is  in  the  Icalt  weakened  or 
diminifhcd?    No,    ccrtainlv  ;  for  the  precautions,  which    the 

people 


Politic    Law.  531 

people  take  agninfi:  the  weakncfs  or  the  wickednefs  infeparable 
from  iuiinan  iKjture,  in  limiting  the  power  of  their  fovereigns  to 
hinder  them  from  abuling  it, do  not  in  the  leaft  weaken  or  dimin- 
ifli  the  fovcrL-ignty  j  but,  on  the  contrary,  they  render  it  more  per- 
fe6l,  by  reducing  the  fovcreign  to  a  ncceflity  of  doing  good,  and 
confcquently  by  putting  hiai,  as  it  were,  out  of  acapacity  of  niifbe- 
having. 

XLVII.  Neither  are  we  to  believe  that  there  are  two  diftin6: 
^ills  in  a  rtatc,  whofe  fovereignty  islirrtited  in  the  manner  wc  have 
explained  ;  for  the  (bate  wills  or  determines  nothing  but  by  the 
will  of  the  king.  Only  it  is  to  be  obferved,  that  when  a  condition 
ftipulated  happens  to  be  broken,  the  king  cantiot  decree  at  all,  or 
at  leaft  he  muft  do  fo  in  vain  in  certain  points  ;  but  he  is  not,  for 
thisreafon,  Icfs  a  foverci^^n  than  he  was  before.  Becaufe  a  prince 
cannot  do  every  thing  according  to  his  humour,  it  does  not  follow/ 
from  this,  that  he  is  not  the  fovereign.  Sovereign  and  abfolute 
power  ought  not  to  be  confounded  ;  and,  from  what  has  been 
laid,  it  is  evident,  that  the  one  may  fubfill  without  the  other. 

XLVIII.  4^.  Laftly,  there  i^  ftill  another  manner  of  limit- 
ing the  authority  of  thofe  to  whom  the  fovereignty  is  com- 
mitted ;  which  is  not  to  truft  all  the  different  rights  included  in  the 
fovereignty  to  one  fingle  perfon,  but  to  lodge  them  in  feparate 
hands,  or  in  different  bodies,  that  they  may  modify  or  reftrain  the 
fovereignty. 

XLIX.  For  example,  if  we  fiippofe  that  the  body  of  the  nation 
referves  to  itfelf  the  legiflative  power,  and  that  of  creating  the  prin- 
cipal magiftrates  ;  that  it  gives  the  king  the  military  and  executive 
powers,  &c.  and  that  it  truftsto  a  fenate  compofed  of  the  principal 
men,  the  judiciary  power,  that  of  laying  taxes,  &c.  it  is  eafily 
conceived,  that  this  may  be  executed  in  different  manners,  in  the 
choice  of  which  prudence  muft  determine  us. 

L.  If  the  government  is  eftabliflied  on  this  footing,  then,  by  the 
original  compa(5t  of  allbciation,  there  is  a  kind  of  partition  in  the;, 
rights  of  the  fovereignty,  by  a  reciprocal  contraéï  or  ftipulatioq 
between  the  dift'erent  bodies  of  the  ftate.  This  partition  produ- 
ces a  balance  of  power,  which  places  the  different  bodies  of  the 
flate  in  fuch  a  mutual  dépendance,  as  retains  every  one,  who  has  a 
fliare  in  the  fovereign  authority,  v/iihin  the  bounds  which  the  law 
prefcribes  to  them  -,  by  which  means  the  public  liberty  iï  fccured. 

For 


^32  ^^  Principles  of 

For  example,  the  regal  authority  is  balanced  by  the  power  of  the 
people,  and  a  third  order  ferves  as  a  counterbalance  to  the  two 
former,  to  keep  them  always  in  an  rquilibrium,  and  hinder  the 
one  from  fubverting  the  other.  And  this  is  fufficient,  concerning 
the  diilindion  between  abfolute  and  limited  fovertignty. 

*  5**.     Of  patrimonial^  and  iifîifruâîuary  kingdomt. 

LI.  In  order  to  finifh  this  chapter,  let  us  obferve,  that  there  it 
ftill  another  accidental  difFercnce  in  the  manner  of  pofTeffing  the 
fovcreignty,  efpecially  with  refpeil  to  kings.  Some  are  mafters 
of  their  crown  in  the  way  of  patrimony,  which  they  are  permitted 
to  finre,  transfer,  or  alienate  to  whom  they  have  a  mind  ;  in  a 
word,  of  which  they  can  difpofe  as  they  think  proper  \  others  hold 
the  fovereignty  in  the  way  of  ufe  only,  not  ol  property  j  and  this 
either  for  themfelves  only,  or  with  the  power  of  tranfmitting  it  to 
thtlrdefcendants  according  to  the  laws  eftablifhed  for  the  fuccef- 
fion.  It  is  upon  this  foundation  that  the  learned  diftinguifh  king- 
doms into  patrimonial,  and  ufufrudluary  or  not  patrimonial. 

LII.  We  (hall  here  add,  that  thofe  kings  pofTefs  the  crown  in 
full  property,  who  have  acquired  the  fovereignty  by  right  of  con- 
qaeft  ;  or  thofe  to  whom  a  pi^ople  have  delivered  themfelves  up 
without  referVe,  in  order  to  avoid  a  greater  evil  ;  but  that,  on 
the  contrary,  thofe  kings  who  have  been  efiabliflied  by  a  free  con- 
fent  of  the  people^  pofTefs  the  crown  in  the  way  of  ufe  only.  This 
is  the  manner  in  which  Grotius  explains  thisdiftindion,  in  which 
he  has  been  followed  by  Puffondorf,  and  by  mod  of  the  other 
commentators  or  writers.* 

LIII.  On  this  vve  may  make  the  following  remarks. 

1°.  There  is  no  reafon  to  hinder  the  fo vereign  power,  as  well 
as  every  other  right,  from  being  alienated  or  transferred.  In  this 
there  is  nothing  contrary  to  the  nature  of  the  thing  ;  and  if  the 
agreement  between  the  prince  and  the  people  bears  that  the 
prince  fhall  have  full  right  to  difpof^  of  the  crown  as  he  (hall  think 
proper,  this  will  be  what  we  call  a  patrimonial  kingdom. 

2^.  But  examples  of  fuch  agreements  are  very  rare  ;  and  we 
hardly  find  any  other  except  that  of  the  Egyptians  with  their  king, 
mentioned  in  Gcnefis.  f 
3^-  The 

*   See  Grotius  on  the  right  of  war  and    peace,  lib.  i.   chap.  iîl.  §  1 1  and  I»» 
&c.     PufTendorf  on  iheluw.of  natwre  and  nation»,  lib.  vii.  chap,  vi,  §  14,  15 • 
t  Chap,  xlvii.  ver.  18,  5;c. 


Politic    Law.  .23 

3°.  The  fovereign  power,  however  abfolute,  is  not,  of  itfelf, 
invefted  with  the  right  of  property,  nor  confequently  with  the 
power  of  alienation.  Thefe  two  ideas  are  intirely  diftindl,  and 
have  no  necelTary  connexion  with  each  other. 

4^*.  It  is  true,  fome  alledge  a  great  many  examples  of  alienations 
made  in  all  ages  by  fovereigns  :  but  either  thofe  alienations  had  no  »i 

efFe6l  ;  or  they  were  made  with  an  exprefs  or  tacit  confent  of  the         ^ 
people  J    or,  laftly,  they  were  founded  on  no  other  title  but  that  of 
force. 

5**.  Let  us  therefore  take  it  for  an  inconteftable  principle,  that, 
iti  dubious  cafes,  every  kingdom  ought  to  be  judged  not 
patrimn;;ial,  fo  long  as  it  cannot  be  proved,  that  a  people  fubmitted 
themfw'Ives  on  that  footing  to  a  fovereign. 


CHAP.      Vllf . 

Of  the  parts  offoveretgnty^  or  of  the  different  ejfential  rights  which 
it  includes. 

^  T 

J|[_N  order  to  finifh  this  firft  part,  nothing  remains  but  to  treat 
of  the  different  parts  of  fjvereignty.  We  may  confider  fovereign- 
ty  as  an  r^fT^mblage  of  various  rights  and  different  powers,  which, 
though  diftinfl,  are  neverthelefs  conferred  for  the  fame  end  ;  that 
is  to  fay,  for  the  good  of  the  fociety,  and  which  are  all  effentially 
neceflary  for  this  fame  end  :  thefe  different  rights  and  powers  are 
called  the  elTential  parts  of  fovereignty. 

II.  To  be  convinced  that  thefe  arc  the  parts  of  fovereignty,  we 
need  only  attend  to  its  nature  and  end. 

The  end  of  fovereignty  is  the  prefervation,  the  tranquillity,  and 
the  happinefs  oftheftate,  as  well  within  itfelf,  as  with  refpeel  to 
its  interefts  abroad  ;  fo  that  fovereignty  mult  include  every  thing 
that  is  effintially  neceiTary  for  procuring  this  twofold  end. 

III.  i^.  As  this  is  the  cafe,  the  firft  part  of  fovereignty,  and 
that  which  is,  as  it  were,  the  founJation  of  all  the  reft,  is  the  legif- 
lative  power,  bv  virtue  of  which  tha  fovereign  eftabllflies  general 
and  perpetual  rules,  which  are  called  laws.  By  thefe  means  every 
one  knows  how  he  ought  to  conduct  himfelf  for  the  prefervation 
of  peace  and  good  order,  whatfhare  he  retains  of  his  natural  lib- 

F  f  crty, 


-1 


234  '^^  Principles  of 

erty,  and  how  he  ought  to  excrl  his  rights,  fo  as  not  to  diflurb  the 
public  tranquillity. 

It  is  by  means  of  laws  that  wc  contrive  fo  nobly  to  unite  the 
prodigious  diverilty  of  fentimcnts  and  inclinations  obfervabic 
among  men,  and  elfablilli  that  concert  and  harmony  .  fo  efibnt'ral  to 
fociety,  fmce  they  dire£t  the  different  adlions  of  individuals  to  the 
general  good  and  advantage.  But  it  murt  be  fuppofed  that  the 
laws  of  toe  fovereign  coniain  nothing  oppofite  to  the  divine  laws, 
whether  natural  or  revealed. 

IV.  2^.  To  the  Ifglflativc  v/e  muil  join  the  coercive  power, 
that  is  to  fay,  the  right  of  ordaining  punifhments  agaiuft  thofe 
who  moled  the  community  by  their  irregularities,  and  the  power 
cf  adlually  infliding  them.  Without  this  power,  the  eftablifti- 
meut  of  civil  fociety  and  of  laws,  v/ould  be  abfoluiely  ufelefs,  and 
we  could  not  propofe  to  live  in  peace  and  fafety.  But  that  the 
dread  of  punilliments  may  make  a  fufficient  impreflion  on  the 
minds  of  the  people,  the  right  cf  punilning  mud  extend  to  the 
pow.rof  infliifling  the  greaielt  of  natural  evils,  which  is  d.'ath  ; 
othervvife  the  dread  of  puniftimeut  would  not  be  always  capable  of 
counter-balancing  the  force  of  pleafure,  and  theimpulfe  of  pafTion. 
la  a  word,  the  fubjeds  mud  have  a  llronger  intereft  to  obferve, 
than  to  violate  the  law.  Thus  the  vindicative  power  is  certainly 
the  higheft  degree  of  authority  which  one  man  can  hold  over 
another. 

V.  3"-  Further,  it  is  neceffary  for  the  prefervation  of  peace,  that 
the  fovereign  fliould  have  a  right  to  take  cogniîîance  of  the  differ- 
ent quarrels  between  the  fubjecfts,  and  to  decide  them  in  the  laft 
refort  ;  as  alfo  to  examine  the  accufations  laid  againft  any  perfon, 
in  order  to  abfolve  or  punilh  him  by  his  fentencc,  conformably  to 
the  laws  :  this  is  what  we  czW  jurifdi^iori^  or  the  judiciary  power. 
To  this  we  mud  alfo  refer  the  right  of  pardoning  criminals  when 
the  public  utility  requires  it. 

VI.  4^.  Befides,  as  the  ways  of  thinking,  or  opinions  embra- 
ced by  the  fubjedt,  may  have  a  very  great  influence  on  the  welfare 
of  the  comaionvi'ealth,-  it  is  necelTary  that  fovereignty  fhould  in- 
clude a  right  of  examining  the  doctrines  taught  in  the  date,  fo  that 
nothing  may  be  publicly  advanced  but  what  is  conformable  to  truth, 
and  conducive  to  the  advantage  of  fociety.  Hence  it  is,  that  it 
belongs  to  the  fovereigti  to  citablifli  protefîors,  académie?, 
and  public  fchools  j  and  the  fupFeme  power,  in  matters  of  religion, 

is 


Politic    Law.       ^  235 

is  as  much  his  right,  as  the  nature  of  the  thing  will  permit.  After 
having  fecured  the  public  repofe  at  home,  it  is  necefl'ary  to  guard 
the  people  againft  ftranger?,  and  to  procure  to  them,  by  leagues 
with  foreian  ftates,  all  the  neccfTary  aids  and  advantages  whether  in 
the  feafjns  of  peace  or  war. 

VÎT.  5°.  In  confequence  of  thi?,  the  iovcreign  ought  to  be 
invefted  with  the  power  of  allembling  and  arming  his  rubjt£ls,  or  of 
raifing  other  troops  in  as  great  a  number  as  13  neceflary  for  the 
fafety  and  defence  of  the  flato,  and  of  making  peace  when  he  ihall 
judge  proper. 

VIII.  6°.  Hence  alfo  arifes  the  right  of  contrafling  pubKc 
engagements,  of  making  treaties  and  alliances  with  foreign  ftates, 
and  of  obliging  all  the  fubjecls  to  obferve  them. 

IX.  7".  Butas  the  public  affairs,  both  at  home  end  abroad, 
cannot  be  condu(5ted  by  a  fingle  perfon,  and  as  the  fovereign  is  in- 
capable of  difcharging  all  thefe  duties,  he  mu(l  certainly  have  a 
power  to  create  miniftersand  fubordinatemagiftrates,  whofe  bufi- 
liefs  it  is  to  take  care  of  the  public  welfare,  and  tranfaft  the  affairs 
of  the  flate  in  his  name,  and  under  his  authority.  The  fovereign, 
who  has  intruded  them  with  thofe  employments,  may,  and  ought 
to  compel  them  to  difcharge  them,  and  oblige  them  to  give  an 
exa£t  account  of  their  adminillration. 

X.  8".  Laftly,  the  affairs  of  the  Rate  necefTarily  demand,  both 
in  times  of  peace  and  war,  confiderable  expences  which  the  fove- 
reign himfelf  neither  can,  nor  ought  to  furnifh.  He  mnft  there- 
fore have  a  right  of  referving  to  himfelf  a  part  of  the  goods  or  pro- 
duits of  the  country,  or  of  obliging  the  fubjeds  to  contribute  either 
by  their  purfe,  or  b)  their  labour  and  perfonal  fervice,  as  much  as 
the  public  necefHiies  demand,  and  this  is  called  the  right  offiihfidies 
or  taxes. 

To  this  part  of  the  fovcrci;î;nty  we  may  refer  the  prerogative  of 
coining  money,  the  right  of  hunting,  with  that  of  fifhing,  &c, 
Thefe  are  the  principal  parts  cfTential  to  fovereignty. 


THE  END  OF  THE  FIRST  PART, 


THE 


PRINCIPLES 


O    F 


POLITIC     LAW. 


>^^^- 


P  A  R  T      II. 

In  which  are  explained  the  different  forrns  of  government^  the  zvays 
of  ocqn'iring  or  lofing  fovereignty^  and  the  reciprocal  duties  of 
fovereigns  and  fuhjeSis. 


T 


CHAP.     I. 

Of  the  various  forms  of  government. 

NATIONS  have  been  fenfible,  that  it  was  cflential  to 
their  happinefs  and  fafety,  to  eflablifli  fome  form  of 
government.  They  have  all  agreed  in  this  point,  that  it 
was  neceff^ry  to  inftitute  a  rupreme  power,  to  whofe 
will  every  thing  fiiould  be  ultimately  fubmitted. 

II.  But,  the  more  the  eftablilkrnent  of  a  fupreme  power  is  ne- 
ceflary,  the  more  important  is  the  choice  of  the  perfoii  inverted 
v/ith  that  high  dignity.  Hence  it  is  that,  in  regard  to  this  article, 
nations  are  extremely  dividedj  having  intrufted  the  fupreme  power 
in  different  hands,  according  as  they  judged  it  moft  conducive  to 
their  fafety  and  happiiîcfs  ;  neither  have  they  taken  this  ftep  with- 
out maicing  (evcral  fyllenis  and  reflri^l ions,  which  may  vary  great- 
ly.    T'his  is  the  origiii  of  the  diflereni  forms  of  government. 

III.  There 


P  o  L  I  r  i  c    L  A  w.  237 

III.  There  are  therefore  various  forms  of  government,  accord- 
ing to  the  different  fubjefts  in  v/hom  the  fovereignty  immediately 
relides,  and  according  as  it  is  inherent  cither  in  a  fingle  perfon,  or 
in  a  fingle  afTembly,  more  or  lefs  compounded  :  and  this  is  what 
forms  the  conftitution  of  the  {[ate. 

IV.  Thefe  different  forms  of  government  may  be  reduced  to 
two  general  clafles,  namely,  to  the  fimple'  forms,  or  to  thofe  which 
are  compounded  or  mixed. 

V.  There  are  three  fimpie  forms  of  government  ;  Democracy, 
Ariftocracy,  and  Monarchy. 

VI.  Some  nations,  more  diffident  than  others,  have  placed  the 
fovereign  power  in  the  multitude  itfclf,  that  is  to  fay,  in  the  heads 
of  families  affembled  and  met  in  council,  and  fuch  governments  are 
called  Popular  or  Democratic. 

VII.  Other  nations  of  a  bolder  turn,  pafling  to  the  oppofite 
extreme,  have  e.ftabliflied  Monarchy,  or  the  government  of  a  fingle 
man.  Thus  Monarchy  is  a  ftate  in  which  the  fupreme  power, 
and  all  the  rights  effential  to  it,  refide  in  a  fingle  perfon,  who  is 
called  Ki-jg^  Monarchy  or  Emperor. 

VIII.  Others  have  kept  a  due  medium  between  thofe  two 
extremes,  and  lodged  the  whole  fovereign  authority  in  a  council 
compofed  of  fcledl  member?,  and  this  is  termed  an  Ariftocracy,  or 
the  government  of  the  Nobles. 

IX.  Laftly,  other  nations  have  been  perfuaded,  that  it  was 
ncceffary,  by  a  mixture  of  the  fimpie  forms,  to  eftablifli  a  com- 
pound government,  and,  mnking  a  divifion  of  the  fovereignty,  to 
intruftthe  different  parts  of  it  into  different  hands  ;  to  temper,  for 
example.  Monarchy  v/ith  Ariftocracy  ;  and  at  the  fame  time  to 
give  the  people  a  ftiare  in  the  fovereignty  :  this  may  be  executed 
different  ways. 

X.  In  order  to  have  a  more  particular  knowledge  of  the  nature 
of  thefe  different  forms  of  government,  we  mult  obferve,  that  as  in 
Democracies  the  fovereign  is  a  moral  perfon,  formed  by  the  re- 
union of  all  the  heads  of  families  into  a  fingle  will,  there  are  three 
things  abfolutcly  necefùry  for  the  conllitution  of  this  form  of 
government. 

i^'.  That 


238  7^^    P  R  I  N  C  IP  L  E  s    Ç/* 


i'*.  That  there  be  a  certain  place,  and  regulateil  times  for  delib., 
crating  in  common  on  the  public  arTairs  ;  the  members  of  the 
fovcreign  council  might  afiemble  at  different  times,  or  places, 
whence  fadlions  would  arifc,  which  would  intc:rrupt  the  union 
efTcntial  to  the  {late. 

2**.  ItmuŒ  be  eftabliflied  for  a  rule,  that  the  plurality  cf  fuf- 
frages  fhall  pafs  for  the  will  of  the  whole  ;  oiherwife  no  affair 
could  be  determined,  it  being  impofiible  that  a  great  number  cf 
people  flîaukl  be  always  of  the  fame  opinion.  V/emuft  therefore 
efeem  it  the  ciiential  quality  of  a  moral  body,  that  the  refolution 
of  the  majority  (hall  pafs  for  the  v^ill  of  the  whole. 

3^.  Laftly,  it  is  efTential  that  magiftrates  fhoi^ld  be  appointed 
to  convene  the  people  in  extraordinary  cafes,  to  difpatch  ordinary 
affairs,  in  their  name,  and  to  fee  that  the  decrees  of  the  aflembljr 
be  executed  ;  for  fi nee  the  fovereign  council  cannot  always  fit,  it 
is  evident  that  it  cannot  take  the  dirtdion  of  every  thing  itfelf. 

XI.  With  regard  to  Ariflocracies,  fince  the  fovereignty  refides 
in  a  coancilor  fenate,  compofed  of  the  principal  men  of  the  nation, 
itisabfolutely  nectfTary  that  the  conditions  eifential  to  the  confti- 
tution  of  a  Democracy,  and  which  we  have  above  mentioned, 
fhould  alfo  concur  to  ultablifli  an  Ariflocracy. 

XII.  Further,  Ariilocracy  may  be  of  two  kinds,  cither  by 
birth  and  hereditary,  or  eleâive.  The  Ariûocracy  by  birth,  and 
hereditar)*,  is  that  which  is  confined  to  a  certain  nunîber  of  fami- 
lies, to  which  birth  alone  gives  right,  and  which  paffes  from 
parents  to  their  children,  without  any  choice,  and  to  the  exclufton 
of  all  others.  On  the  contrary,  the  elective  Ariftocracy  is  that  in 
which  a  perfon  arrives  at  the  government  by  eledlion  only,  and 
without  receiving  any  right  from  birth. 

XIII.  In  a  word,  it  may  be  equally  obferved  of  Ariftocracies 
and  Democracies,  that,  whether  in  a  popular  (late,  or  in  a  govern- 
ment of  the  nobles,  every  citiz-en,  or  every  member  of  the  fupremc 
council,  has  not  the  fupreme  power,  nor  even  a  part  of  it  i  but  this 
power  refid::s  cither  in  the  general  afTetiihly  of  the  people, 
co.'ivened  according  to  the  laws,  or  in  the  council  of  the  nobles  ; 
for  it  is  one  thing  to  have  afhare  in  the  fovereignty,  and  another 
to  have  the  right  o(  fuffrag^  in  an  alTembly  inverted  with  the  fove- 
reign  power. 

XIV.  As 


Politic    Law.  239 

XIV.  As  to  Monarchy,  it  iseftabliftied  when  the  whole  body 
of  the  people  confer  the  fovereign  power  on  a  fingle  perfon,  which 
is  done  by  an  agreement  betwixt  the  king  and  his  fubjctls,  as  we 
have  before  explained. 

XV.  There  is  therefore  this  eflential  difFerence  betv/een  Mon- 
archy and  the  two  other  forms  of  government,  that,  in  Democra- 
cies and  Ariftocracies,  the  adtual  exercife  of  the  fovereign  authori- 
ty depends  on  the  concurrence  of  certain  circumftances  of  time 
and  place  J  whereas  in  a  Monarchy,  at  leaft  when  it  is  fimple  anil 
abfolute,  the  prince  can  give  his  orders  at  all  times,  and  in  all  pla- 
ces :  it  is  Rome  wherever  the  Emperor  rejides. 

X   XVl.  Another  remark,  which   very  naturally  occurs  on  thi? 

;occalion,  is,  that  in  a  Monarchy,  when  the  king  orders  any  thing 
contrary  tojuftice  and  equity,  he  is  certainly  to  blame,  becaufe  i« 
him  the  civil  and  natural  wills  are  the  fame  thing.  But  when  the 
afTemblyof  the  people,  or  a  fenate,  form  an  unjult  refolution,  only 
thofe  citizens  or  fcnators,  who  carried  ihe  point,  render  themfelves 

-really  accountable,  and  not  thofe  who  were  of  the  oppofite  fenti- 
inent.     Let  this  fuiEce  for  the  fimple  forms  of  government. 

XVI [.  As  to  mixed  or  compound  governments,  they  are 
eftablifhed,  as  we  have  obferved,  by  the  concurrence  of  the  three 
fimple  forms,  or  only  of  two  j  when,  for  example,  the  king,  the 
nobles,  and  the  people,  or  only  the  two  latter,  Ihare  the  different 
parts  of  the  fovereignty  between  them,  fo  that  one  "adminilters 
fome  parts  of  it,  and  the  others  the  remainder.  This  mixture 
may  be  made  various  ways,  as  we  obferve  in  mod  republics. 

XVIII.  It  is  true,  to  confider  fovereignty  in  itfclf,  and  in  the 
height  of  plenitude  and  perfedion,  all  the  rights,  which  it  includes, 
ought  to  belong  to  a  fingle  perfon,  or  to  one  bod)',  without  any 
partition  j  fo  that  there  be  but  one  fuprcme  will  to  govern  the 
fubje£t.  There  cannot,  properly  fpeaking,  be  feveral  fovereigns 
in  a  ftate,  who  fhall  act  as  they  pleafe,  independently  of  each  other. 
This  is  morally  impoflîble,  and  befides  would  manifeftly  tend  to 
the  ruin  and  deftru(5^ion  of  fociety. 

XIX.  But  this  union  of  the  fuprcme  power  does  not  hinder  the 
whole  body  of  the  nation,  in  whom  this  power  originally  refidcs, 
from  regulating  the  government  by  a  fundamental  law,  in  fuch  a 
manner  as  to  commit  the  exsrcifçofthc  different  parts  of  the  fupreme 

power 


240  ^he.  Principles  of 

power  to  different  pcrfons  or  bodie?,  who  may  ad\  independ- 
ently of  each  other,  in  regard  to  the  rights  committed  to  them,  but 

ftill  fubordinate  to  the  laws  from  which  thofe  rights  are  derived. 

o 

XX.  And  provided  the  fundamental  laws,  which  eftablifh  this 
fpecies  of  partition  in  the  fovereignty,  regulate  the  refpe<Slive  limits 
of  the  different  branches  of  the  legiflature,  fo  that  we  may  eafily 
fee  the  extent  of  their  jurifdiclion  ;  thispaitition  produces  neither 
a  plurality  of  fovereigns,  nor  an  oppofition  between  them,  nor  any 
irregularity  in  the  government. 

XXr.  In  a  word,  in  this  cafe  there  is,  properly  fpeaking,  but  one 
fovereign,  who  in  himfclf  is  pofTdfled  of  the  fulnefs  of  power. 
There  is  but  one  fupreme  will.  This  fovereign  is  the  body  of  the 
people,  fora.ed  by  the  union  of  all  the  orders  of  the  f^ate  ;  and  this 
fupreme  will  is  the  very  law,  by  which  the  whole  body  of  the  na- 
tion makes  its  refolutions  known. 

XXII.  The}',  who  thus  fhare  the  fovereignty  among  them, 
are  properly  no  more  than  the  executors  of  the  law,  fincc  it  is  from 
the  law  itfclf  that  they  hold  their  power.     And  as  thefe  fundamen- 

■  tal  laws  are  real  covenants,  or  what  the  civilians  call  fatia  convenia^ 

between  the  different  orders  of  the  republic,  *  by  which  they  mu- 
tually ftipulate,  that  each  fliall  Inve  fuch  a  particular  part  of  the 
fovereignty,  and  that  this  fhall  eftablidi  the  form  of  government, 
it  is  evident  that,  by  thefe  means,  each  of  the  contracting  parties 
acquires  a  right  not  only  of  exercifing  the  power  granted  to  it, 
butalfo  ofprclerving  that  original  right. 

XXIII.  Such  party  cannot  even  be  divefted  of  its  right  in  fpite 
ofitfdf,  and  by  the  will  of  the  reft,  fo  long  at  leaft  as  ic  conducts 
itfelfin  a  manner  conformable  to  the  laws,  and  not  manifeitly 
oppofite  to  the  public  welfare. 

XXIV.  In  a  word,  the  conftituiionof  thofe  governments  can 
be  changed  only  in  the  f^me  manner,  and  by  the  fame  methods, 
by  which  it    was   eftabliflied,  that  is  to  fay,  by  the  unanimous 

\       concurrence  of  all  the  contraâing  parties  who  have  fixed  the  form 
/       of  government  by  the  original  contra6l. 

XXV.  This  conffitution  of  the  flate  by  no  means  deftroys  the 

union 


*  Sfc  part  i.  chajt.  vii.  No.  35,  ^c. 


Politic    Law.  24t 

union  of  a  moral  body  compofecl  of  fcveral  perfon?,  or  of  feveral 
bodies,  really  diftindl  in  themfelves,  but  joined  by  a  fundamental 
law  in  a  mutual  engagement. 

XXVI.  From  what  has  been  faid  on  the  nature  of  mixed  or 
compound  governments  it  follows,  that  in  all  fuch  ftaies,  the 
fovereignty  is  limited  j  for  as  the  different  branches  are  not  com- 
mitted to  a  ftngle  perlon,  but  lodged  in  different  hands,  the  power 
of  thofe,  who  have  a  fharein  the  government,  is  thereby  retrain- 
ed ;  and  as  they  are  thus  a  check  to  each  other,  this  produces 
fuch  a  balance  of  authority,  as  fecures  the  public  weal,  and  the 
liberty  of  individuals. 

XXVII.  But  with  refpedl  to  fimple  governments  ;  in  thefe  the 
fovereignty  may  be  either  abfolute  or  limited.  Thofe  who  are 
poildlcJ  of  the  fovereignty,  exercife  it  fometimes  in  an  abfolute,  ' 
and  fometimes  in  a  limited  manner,  by  fundamental  laws,  which 
prefcribe  bounds  to  the  fovereign,  with  regard  to  the  manner  in 
which  he  ought  to  govern. 

XX VIII.  On  this  occafion  it  is  expedient  to  obferye,  that  all 
the  accidental  circumftances,  which  can  modify  fimple  Monarchies 
or  Ariftocracies,  and  which,  in  fome  meafure,  may  be  faid  to  limit 
fovereignty,  do  not,  for  that  reafon,  change  the  form  of  govern- 
ment, which  ftill  continues  the  fame.  One  government  may 
partake  fomewhat  of  another,  when  the  manner,  in  which  the  fove- 
reign governs,  feems  to  be  borrowed  from  the  form  of  the  latter  ; 
but  it  does  not,  for  that  reafon,  change  its  nature. 

XXIX.  For  example,  in  a  Democratic  ftate,  the  people  may 
intruft  the  care  of  feveral  affairs  cither  to  a  principal  member,  or 
to  afenate.  In  an  Ariftocracy,  there  may  be  a  chief  magi ftrate 
inverted  with  a  particular  authority,  or  an  aflembly  of  the  people  to  ,t 
be  confulted  on  fome  occafions.  Or  laftly,  in  a  Monarchic  ffate,  <„ 
important  affairs  may  be  laid  before  a  fenate,  &c.  But  thefe  acci- 
dental circumftances  do  by  no  means  change  the  form  of  the  gov- 
ernment ;  neither  is  there  a  partition  of  the  fovereignty  on  this 
account;  the  flate  fHU  continues  purely  either  Democratic,  Arif- 
tocratic,  or  Monarchic. 

XXX.  In  a  word  there  is  a  wide  difference  between  exercifing 
a  proper  power,  and  afting  by  a  foreign  and  precarious 
authority,   vv hich  may  every  minute  be  taken  away  by  him  who 

G  g    '  conferred 


) 


Ê42  'ïha    PRIxNCiPLES    of 

conferred  if.  Thus  what  conftitutes  the  chara<Sleiifilc  of  mixed 
or  compound  commonwealth?,  and  diltinguiflics  thcnri  from  fimple 
governments,  is,  that  the  different  ortlcrs  of  the  ftatc,  who  have  a 
Ihare  in  the  fovcreignty,  poflefs  the  rights  which  they  exercife  by 
an  equal  title,  that  is  to  fay,  in  virtue  of  tlie  fundamer>tal  law,  and 
not  under  the  title  of  commillion,  as  if  the  one  was  only  the  minifter 
or  executor  of  the  other's  will.  We  mutt  therefore  be  fare  ta 
diftinguifh  between  the  form  of  governiiient,  and  the  manner  of 
governing. 

XXXI.  Thefe  are  the  principal  obfervaiions  with  refpedl  to  the 
various  forms  of  government.  Puffendorf  explains  himfelf  in  a 
fomewhat  different  manner,  and  calls  thole  governments  irregular, 
which  we  have  fliled  mixed  j  and  he  gives  the  name  of  regular  to 

the  fimple  governments.  * 

XXXIÏ.  But  this  regularity  is  only  in  idea  ;  the  true  rule  of 
practice  ought  to  be  that  v/hich  is  mort  conformable  to  the  end  of 
civil  fociety,  fuppofing  men  lobe  in  their  ufual  ftate,  and  taking 
the  general  cuurfe  of  things  into  the  account,  according  to  the  ex- 
perience of  all  countries  and  ages.  Now  on  this  footing,  the 
liâtes,  in  which  the  whole  depends  on  a  fingle  will,  are  fo  far  from 
being  happy,  that  it  is  certain  their  fuhje6\s  have  the  moft  frequent 
reafon  to  lament  the  lofs  of  their  natural  independency. 

XXXIII.  Befides,  it  is  with  the  body  politic,  as  with  the  hu- 
man body  i  there  is  a  difTtrence  between  a  found  and  cachedtic 
nate. 

XXXIV.  Thefe  di.^rders  arife  either  from  the  abufe  of  the 
fovcreign  power,  or  from  the  bad  conlHtution  of  the  ihite  ;  and  the 
taufes  thereof  are  to  be  fought  for  either  in  the  defects  of  the  gov- 
ernors, or  in  thofe  of  the  government  itfclf. 

XXXV.  In  Monarchies,  the  defe£ls  of  the  perfon  are,  when 
the  king  has  not  the  qualifications  neceffary  for  reigning,  when 
be  has  little  or  no  attachment  to  the  public  good,  ana  when  he 
delivers  his  fubjedls  up  as  a  prey,  cither  to  the  avarice  or  ambition 
of  his  minifter.^,  &c. 

XXX V^I.  With  regard  to  Ariftocracies,  the  defeds  of  the  per- 

fons 

"  Sec  Law  of  jiatare  and  nations,  book  v?i.  chap.  v. 


Politic    L 


A  W. 


243 


funs  are,whcn,  by  intrigue  and  other  finifter  melhoJ>,  they  intro- 
duce into  the  council,  either  ^vicIceJ  men,  or  fuch  as  are  incapable 
of  bufuief?,  while  pcrfons  of  merit  are  excluded  ;  when  factions 
and  cabals  are  formed  ;  and  when  the  nobles  treat  the  populace  as 
ilavcs,  &c. 

XXXVII.  In  fine,  we  fometimes  fee  alfo  in  Democracies, 
that  their  alTcmblies  are  didurbcd  with  inteftine  broils,  and  merit 
is  opprefTed  by  envy,  &c. 

XXXVIII.  In  regard  to  the  defeats  of  government,  they  are 
of  various  kinds.  For  example,  if  the  laws  of  the  rtate  be  not 
conformable  to  the  natural  genius  of  the  people,  tending  to  engage 
in  a  war  a  nation,  that  is  net  naturally  warlike,  but  inclined  to  the 
peaceful  arts  ;  or  if  not,  they  fiiould  be  agreeable  to  the  fituation 
and  the  natural  products  of  the  country  ;  thus  it  is  bad  conduit-, 
not  to  promote  coiflmerce  and  manufaéturts,  in  a  province  well 
fituated  for  that  purpofc,  and  abounding  with  the  materials  of  trade. 
It  is  alf)  a  def^d:  of  government,  if  the  conflitution  of  the  (late 
renders  the  difpatch  of  affairs  very, flow  or  difficult,  as  in  Poland, 
where  the  oppofition  of  a  fingle  tnembtr  diflblves  the  diet. 

XXXIX.  It  is  cuflomary  to  give  particular  names  to  thefe 
defedts  in  governmenr.  Thus  the  corruption  of  Monarchy  is 
called  Tyranny.  Oligarchy  is  the  abufe  of  Arirtocracy  ;  and  the 
abufc  of  Democracy  is  called  Ochlocracy.  But  it  often  happens 
that  thefe  words  denote  lefs  a  dcfo;5t  or  diforder  in  the  ftate,  than 
fome  particular  paiHon  or  difgufl  in  thofe  who  ufe  them. 

XL.  To  conclude  this  chapter,  we  have  only  to  take  fome  no- 
tice of  thofe  coTipoiind  forms  of  government  v/hich  are  formed  by 
the  union  of  feveral  particular  ftates.  Thefe  may  be  defined  an 
aflemblage  of  pcrfc6l  governments  flriiSily  united  by  fome  partic- 
ular bond,  fo  that  they  fcem  to  make  but  a  fingle  body  with  refpe6l 
to  the  affairs  which  intcrcft  them  in  common,  though  each  pre- 
ferves  its  fovereignty  full  and  intire,  independently  of  the  others. 

XfvT.  This  affemblage  is  formed  either  by  the  union  of  two  or 
more  diftin£l  ftates,  under  one  and  the  fame  king  ;  as  for  inflance, 
England,  Scotland, and  Ireland,  before  the  union  lately  made  be- 
tween England  and  Scotland  ;  or  when  fevcral  independent  ftates 
agree  am?ng  themfrlves  to  form  but  a  fmgle  body  :  fuch  are  the 
united  provinces  of  the  Netheilands,  and  the  Swifs  cantons. 

^LII.  The 


y 
^ 


244  ^^  Principles   of 

XLII.  The  fir  ft  kind  of  union  may  happen,  either  bymarriagr, 
or  by  fucceflion,  or  when  a  people  cl^ufe  for  their  king  the  fove- 
reign  of  another  country  ;  fo  that  thofe  different  ftates  come  to  be 
united  under  a  prirxe  who  governs  each  in  particular  by  its  fun- 
damental la^s. 

XLIIL  As  to  the  compound  governments,  formed  by  the 
perpetual  coniederacy  of  feveral  ftates,  it  is  to  be  obferved,  that 
this  is  the  only  method  by  which  feveral  fmall  governments,  too 
weak  to  maintain  themfelves  feparately  againft  their  enemies,  arc 
enabled  to  preferve  their  liberties. 

XLIV.  Thefe  confederate  ftates  engage  to  each  other  only  to 
exercile,  with  common  confenf,  certain  parts  of  the  fovereignty, 
efpecially  thofe  which  relate  to  their  mutual  defence  againft  foreign 
enemies.  But  each  of  the  confederates  retains  an  intire  liberty  of 
exercifing,  as  it  thinks  proper,  thofe  parts  pf  the  fovereignty, 
which  are  not  mentioned  in  the  treaty  of  union,  as  parts  that  ought 
to  be  cxcrcifed  in  common. 

XLV.  Laftly,  it  is  abfolutely  neccflary,  in  confederate  ftates,  to 
gfcertain  a  time  and  place  for  affembling  when  occafion  requires, 
and  to  inveft  fopie  member  with  a  power  of  convening  the  aflcn^- 
bly  for  extraordinary  affairs,  and  fuch  as  will  not  admit  of  delay. 
Or  they  may  eftablifh  a  perpetual  alTembly,  compcfed  of  the  depu- 
ties of  each  ftate,  for  dilpatching  common  affairs  according  to  thç 
orders  of  their  fupcricrs. 


C  H  A  P.      II. 

An  ejjuy  on  this  q-ue/àouy  Which  is  the  beft  form  of  government  ? 

I.  T  , 

Jl  r  is  certainly  one  of  the  moft  important  queftions  in  poli- 
tics, and  has  moit  cxercifed  the  men  of  genius  to  determine  the  hejl 
form  cf  government. 

ÎI.  Every  form  of  government  has  its  advantages  and  inconve- 
niences infcparably  from  it.  It  would  be  in  vain  to  ftek  for  a 
government  abfolutely  perfect  ;  and  however  perfect  it  miglit 
appear  in  fpcculation,  ytt  it  is  certain,  that  in  piaiStice,  and  under 

the 


Politic    Law.  245 

the  admininratlon  of  men,  it  will  ever  be  attended  with  fome 
particular  defcdls. 

III.  But  though  we  cannot  arrive  at  the  fummit  of  perfeflion 
in  this  refpe£^,  it  is  neverthelcfs  certain,  that  there  are  différent 
degree?,  which  prudence  mutt  determine.  That  government 
ought  to  be  accounted  the  moft  complete,  which  beft  anfwers  the 
end  of  its  inftitution,  and  is  attended  with  feweft  inconvenien- 
ces. Be  this  as  it  may,  the  examination  of  this  queftion  furnifhcs 
very  ufeful  inftiudlions  both  to  fubjeâs  and  fovereigns. 

IV.  Difputes  on  this  fubjefl  are  of  a  very  ancient  date  ;  and 
there  is  nothing  more  intcrefting  upon  the  topic,  than  what  we 
read  in  the  father  of  hiftory,  Herodotu?,  who  relates  what  pafled 
in  the  council  of  the  feven  chiefs  of  Perfia,  when  the  government 
was  to  be  re— eftablifhed  after  the  death  of  Cambyfes,  and  the  pun- 
ifhment  of  the  Magus,,  who  had  ufurped  the  throne  under  the  pre- 
text of  being  Smcrdis  the  fon  of  Cyrus. 

V.  Otaries  was  of  opinion,  that  Perfia  fliould  be  formed  into 

a  republic,  and  fpoke  nearly  in  the  following  (train.     *'  I  am  not 

*'  of  opinion  that  we  ihould  ledge  the  government  in  the  hands  of 

**  a  fingle  perfon.     You  know  to  \shat  excefs  Cambyfes  proceed- 

*'  ed,  and  to  what  degree  of  infolence  the  Magus  arrived  :    how 

*'  can  the  flatebe  well  governed  in  a  monarchy,  W'here  a  fmgle 

"  perfon  is  permitted  to  a£l  according  to  his  plcafure  ?    An  au- 

"  thority  uncontroled  corrupts  the  mcft  virtuous  man,  and  defeats 

*'  his  beft  qualities.     Envy  and  infolence  flow  from  riches  and 

**  profperity  ;  and  all  other  vices  are  derived  from  thofe  twofonrces. 

*'  Kings   hate*virtiious   men  who  oppofe   their  unjuft  defigns, 

"  but  caref?  the    wicked    who  favour  them.      A  fmgle  perfon 

*'  cannot  fee  every  thing  with  his  own   eyes  ;   he  often  lends  a 

"  favourable  ear  to  falfc  accufations  ;   he  fubverts   the  laws  and 

"  culloms  of  the  country  ;  he  attacks  the  chaftity  of  women,  'and 

"  wantonly  puts  the  innocent  to  death.     When  the  people  have 

"  the  government  in  their  own  hands,  the  equality  among  the 

"  members  prevents  all  thofe  evils.     The  magiflrates  are,  in  this 

*'  cafe,  chofen  by  lot  ;  they  render  an  account  of  their  adminiilra- 

*'  tion,  and  they  form  all  their  refolutions  in  common  with  the 

"  people.     I  am   therefore  of  opinion,  that  we   ought  to  reje£l 

"  Monarchy  and  introduce  a  popular  government,    becaufe  we 

"  rather  find  thefe  advantages  in  a  multitude  than  in  a  fingle  per- 


*'  fon/'     Such  was  the  harangue  of  Otanes. 


VI.  But 


246  "The  Principles  of 


VI.  But  MegabyTes  fpoke  in  favour  of  Ariflocracy.  "  I  approve 
(faid  he)  *'  of  the  opinion  ofOtancs  with  ref'peci  to  exterminating 
*'  Monarchy,  but  I  beheve  he  is  wrong  in  endeavouring  to  perfijade 
"  us  totruft  the  government  to  the  difcrv-^tion  of  the  people  ;  for 
*'•  furely  nothing  can  b^  imagined  more  ftupid  and  infolcm  than 
•' the  giddy  multitude.  Why  fliould  we  reje£l  the  power  of  a 
*'  fingic  man,  to  deliver  up  ouiTtlves  to  the  tyranny  of  a  blind 
*•  and  diforderly  populace  ?  If  akingfets  about  an  entcrprize,  he 
"  is  at  leafl  capable  of  liftening  t^  advice  ;  but  the  people  are  4 
*'  blind  mohflcr,  devoid  of  reafôn  and  capacity.  They  are  ftran- 
**  gers  to  decency,  virtue,  and  their  own  interefts.  They  do  every 
"  thing  precipitately,  without  judgment,  and  without  order,  re- 
*'  rambling  a  rapid  torrent,  which  cannot  be  flemmed.  If  tliere- 
*'  fore  yen  deflre  the  ruin  of  ihe  Pv^rfians,  eilablilh  a  popular  gov- 
*'  ernraent.  As  to  rnyfeîf,  I  am  of  opinion,  that  we  fliould  make 
'*  choice,  of  virtuous  men,  and  lodge  the  government  in  their 
'*<  bands.'     Such  was  the  fentiiiient  of  Me^abyfcs. 

VIJ.  h^i^^  \\\m,  Dariys,  fpoke  in  the  following  terms, 
"  I  am  of  opinion,  thjt  there  is  a  great  deal  of  good  fcnfe  in  the 
*'  fpeccii  which  Magabyfes  has  made  againfl  a  popular  ftate  j  biif 
*'  I  alfo  think,  that  he  is  not  intirely  in  the  right,  when  he  prcr 
"^  fers  tbegoverntnent  ofafmall  number  to  Monarchy.  It  is  cer- 
*'  tain,  that  nothing  can  be  imagined  better,  or  more  perfc<£t,  than 
*' the  ad.niniPtration  of  a  virtuous  man.  BefiJes,  when  a  fingl? 
"  man  is  mafler,  if  is  more  difficult  for  the  enemy  to  difcover  his 
*' fecritcounfels  and  refolution;.  When  the  government  is  in 
**  the  hands  of  inaiiy,  it  is  impofllble  but  enmity  and  hatred  muft 
*•  arife  among  theni  ;  for  as  every  one  dcTires  his  opini(jn  to  be 
"  follovvtd,  they  gradu^illy  become  mutual  enemies.  Emulation 
"  andjealoufy  divide  them,  2nd  then  their  -averfions  inn  to  exccfg. 
*'  From  hence  arifc  feditlons;  from  feditions,  murders;  and  from 
"  murders,  a  monarch  infendbly  becomes  necefTiry.  Thus  the  gov- 
*'  ernment  at  length  isfurefofaUintothehandsofafingleperfon.  In.a 
*'  popular  ftate,  there  mufl  needs  bs  a  great  flore  of  malice  and 
"  corruption.  It  is  true,  equality  does  not  generate  hatred  ;  hi^t 
"  it  foments  friendlliip  among  the  wicked,  who  fupport  er.c,h 
*'  other,  till  fome  perfon  or  other,  who  by  his  behaviour  his  ac- 
*•  quired  an  authority  over  the  multitude,  difcovers  the  frauds, 
*' and  expofes  the  perfidy  of  thofe  villains.  Such  a  man  fhews 
«'  himfelf  really  a  mon:;rch  ;  and  hence  we  kno-.v  that  Monarchy 
"  is  the  moft  natural  govcrnm.cnt,  fince  the  feditions  of  Ariffoç- 
"  facy,  and  the  corruption  of  Democracy,  are  equal  Indu'ements 

"  for 


Politic    La  \r.  24^ 

"/or  our  uniting  the  fupreme  power  iathc  hands  of  a  fingle  perfon.'* 
The  opinion  oj  Darius  v/as  approved,  and  the   government  of 
Pcrfia  continued  monarchic.     Wc  thought  this  p.-dFai^c  of  hiftory 
fufficieiiily  interelting  to  be  related  on  this  ocçafion. 

i-^VIII.  To  determine  this  quenion,  we  mufl  trace  matters  to 
their  very  fource.  Liberty,  under  which  we  mufl  comprehend 
nil  the  mod  valuable  enjoymentSj  has  tv/o  enemies  in  civil  (bciety. 
The  firil  is  liceniioufncrs,  and  confufion  i  and  the  fécond  is  op- 
prefïîon  arifing  from  tyranny. 

IX.  The  firfl:  of  thofe  evils  arifes  from  liberty  itfe If,  when  it  Is 
not  kept  within  due  bounds. 

The  fécond  is  owing  to  the  remedy  which  mankind  have  con- 
trived againft  the  former  evil,  that  is,   to  fovereignty. 

X.  Tiie  height  of  human  felicity  and  prudence  is  to  know  how  to 
guard  againft  thofe  two  enemies:  theonly  method  is  to  have  a  well- 
conflituted  government,  formed  with  fuch  precautions,  as  to  ban- 
ifh  licentioufnefs,  and  yet  be  noway  introdu£tiveto  tyranny. 

XL  'Iif^s  this  happy  temperament  that  alone  can  give  us  the 
idea  of  a  good  government.  It  is  evident,  that  the  political  con- 
flitution  which  avoids  thofe  extremes,  is  fo  juflly  adapted  for  the 
prefervation  of  order,  and  for  providing  againft  the  necefTitles  of 
the.  people,  that  it  leaves  them  a  fnfficienr  fecurity,  that  this  end 
fhall  be  perpetually  held  in  view. 

XII.  But  here  we  fhall  be  afked,  Which  government  is  it  that 
approaches  neareft  to  this  perfection  ?  Before  we  anfwer  this  quef- 
tion,  it  is  proper  to  obferve,  that  it  is  very  different  from  our  being 
afked,  Which  is  the  moft  legitimate  government  ? 

XIII.  As  for  the  latter  queffion,  it  is  certain,  that  governments 
of  every  kind,  which  are  founded  on  the  free  acqniefcence  of  the 
people,  whether  exprefs  or  juftified  by  a  long  and  peaceable  pofTef- 
fion,  are  all  equally  legitimate,  fo  long  at  lealfas,  by  theiiitention  of 
the  lovereign,  they  tend  to  promote  the  h.ippinefs  of  îhe  people  : 
thus  no  other  caufe  can  fubvert  a  government,  but  an  open  and 
actual  violence,  either  in  its  eftablifhment,  or  in  its  txcrcife  ;  I 
mean  ufurpation,  or  tyranny. 

XIV.  To  return  to  the  principal  qujflion,  I  affirm,  that  tlie 

beft 


248  T^&  Principles  of 

bcfl  government  is  neither  abfolutc  Monarchy,  nor  that  which  is 
intirely  popular  :  the  former  is  too  violent,  encroaches  on  liberty, 
and  inclines  too  much  to  tyranny  ;  the  latter  is  too  v/eak,  leaves  the 
people  too  much  to  themfclves,  and  tends  to  confafion  and  licen- 
tioufnefs. 

XV.  It  were  to  be  v^'ifhcd,  for  the  glory  of  fovereigns  and  for 
the  happinefs  of  the  people,  that  we  could  conteft  the  fa£l  above 
aflferted  with  refpefl^to  abfolute  governments.  We  may  venture, 
to  ajffirm,  that  nothing  can  be  compared  to  an  abfolute  government 
in  the  hands  of  a  wife  and  virtuous  prince.  Order,  diligence, 
fecrecy,  expedition,  the  greateft  enterprizes,  and  the  mod  happy 
execution,  are  .the  certain  efFedls  of  it.  Dignities,  honours, 
rewards  and  punilhments,  are  all  difpenfed  under  it  with  juftice 
and  difcernmcnt.  So  glorious  a  reign  is  the  era  of  the  golden 
age. 

XVI.  But  to  govern  in  this  manner,  a  fuperior  genius,  perfect 
virtue,  great  experience,  and  uninterrupted  application,  are  neccf- 
fary.  Man,  in  fo  high  an  elevation,  is  rarely  capable  of  fo  many 
accomplifliments.  The  multitude  of  ob]c£ls  diverts  his  attention  ; 
pride  feduces  him,  pleafure  tempts  him,  and  flattery,  the  bane  of  the 
great,  does  him  more  injury  than  all  the  reft.  It  is  difficult  to 
cfcape  fo  many  fnares  ;  and  it  generally  happens,  that  an  abfolute 
prince  becomes  an  eafy  prey  to  his  paffions,  and  confequently  ren- 
ders his  fubjeds  miferable. 

XVII.  Hence  proceeds  the  difguflof  people  to  abfolute  gov- 
ernments, and  this  difgufl  fometimes  is  worked  up  to  averfion  and 
hatred.  This  has  alfo  given  occafion  to  politicians  to  make  two 
important  refîedlions. 

The  firfl  is,  that,  in  an  abfolute  government,  it  is  rare  to  fee  the 
people  intereft  themfclves  in  its  pxefervation.  Oppreifcd  with 
their  burdens,  they  long  for  a  revolution,  which  cannot  render 
their  fituation  more  uncomfortable. 

The  fécond  is,  that  it  is  the  intereft  of  princes  to  engage  the 
people  in  the  fupport  of  their  government,  and  to  give  them  a 
(hare  therein,  by  privileges  tending  to  fccure  their  liberty.  This 
is  the  beft  expedient  to  promote  the  fafety  of  princes  at  home, 
together  with  their  power  abroad,  and  their  glory  in  every  refpedt. 

XVIII.-  It  has  been  faid  of  the  Romans,  that,  fo  long  as  tliey 
fought  for  their  own  interefts,  they  were  invincible  3  but,  as  foon 

as 


Politic    Law.  '  249 

as  they  became  (laves  under  abn:>lute  maflers,  th^ir  courage  failed, 
and  they  afked  for  no  more  than  bread  and  public  diverf;on3,p<3«fOT 
i^  cinenfei. 

XIX.  Oi\  the  contrary,  in  Hates  where  the  people  have  fume 
fhare  in  the  government,  every  individual  interefts  himfelf  in  th(i 
public  good,  becaufe  each,  according  to  his  quality  or  merit,  par- 
takes of  the  general  fuccefs,  or  feels  the  lofs  fuftained  by  the  Itate. 
This  is  what  renders  jneii  adKveand  generous,  what  infpires  them 
with  an  ardent  love  of  their  country,  and  with  an  invincible  cour- 
age, fo  as  to  be  proof  againft  the  greateft  misfortunes. 

XX.  When  Hannibal  had  gained  four  viélories  over  the  Ro- 
man?, and  killed  more  than  two  hundred  thoufand  of  that  flatiori, 
when,  much  about  the  fame  time,  the  two  brave  Scipios  periflied 
in  Spain,  nor  tc  mention  feveral  Conllderable  lofTcs  at  fea,  and  in 
Sicily,  who  could  have  thought  that  Rome  could  have  withftood 
her  enemies?  Yet  the  virtue  of  her  citizens,  the  love  they  bore 
their  country,and  the  intereft  they  had  in  the  government,  augment- 
ed  the  ftrength  of  that  republic  in  the  midft  of  her  calamities,  and 
at  laft  (he  furmounted  every  difficulty.  Among  the  Lacedaemoni' 
ans  and  Athenians  we  find  feveral  examples  to  the  fame  point. 

XXI.  Thefe  advantages  are  not  found  in  abiblute  governments. 
We  may  juftly  affirm,  that  it  is  an  efTential  defect  in  them  not  vo 
intereft  the  people  in  their  prefervation,  that  they  are  too  violent, 
tending  too  much  toopprelfioD,  and  very  little  to  the  good  of  the 
fubjeét. 

XXII.  Such  are  abfolute  governments:  thofe  of  the  popular 
kind  are  no  better,  and  we  may  fay  they  have  no  advantage  but 
liberty,  and  their  leaving  the  people  at  their  option  to  choofe  a 
better. 

XXIII.  Abfolute  governments  have  at  leaft  two  advantages  : 
the  firft  is,  that  they  have  happy  intervals  when  in  the  hands  of 
good  princes  :  the  fécond  is,  that  they  have  a  greater  degree  of 
force,  a£livity,  and  expedition. 

XXIV.  But  a  popular  government  has  none  of  thofc  advanta- 
ges j  formed  by  the  multitude,  it  bears  a  (Irong  refemblance  to 
that  many-headed  monfter.  The  multitude  is  a  mixture  of  all 
kinds  of  people  j  it  contains  a  few  msn  of  pares,  feme  of  whom 

H  h  may 


250  I'hc   V  R  I  N  C  I  P  L  K  s   of 


may  have  honeft  intentions;  but  far  the  greater  number  <?annot 
he  depended  on,  as  they  have  nothing  toh)fe,  and  confequcnt'.y  can 
hardly  be  trailed.  Bsfides,  a  multitude  alv^ays  afls  u'itli  llownefs 
and  ccntufion.  Secrecy  and  precaution  are  advantages  unknown 
to  them. 

XXV.  Liberty  is  not  v/anting  in  popular  flatss  ;  nay,  they 
have  rather  too  much  of  it,  fince  it  degenerates  into  licentioufnefs. 
Heiice  it  is  that  they  are  ever  tottering  and  weak.  Inteftlne  com- 
motions, or  foreign  attacks,  often  throw  them  into  conllcrnation  ; 
it  is  their  ordinary  fate  to  fall  a  prey  to  the  ambition  of  their  fellow- 
citizens,  or  to  foreign  ufurpation,  and  thus  to  pafs  from  the  high- 
çft  liberty  to  the  loweft  llavery. 

XXVI.  This  is  proved  by  the  experience  of  different  nations, 
liven  at  prefent,  Poland  ia  a  ftriking  example  of  the  defed\s  of 
popular  government,  from  the  anarchy  and  diforder  which  reigns 
in  that  republic.  It  is  the  fport  of  its  own  inhabitants  and  of 
foreign  nation?,  and  is  frequently  the  feat  of  inteftine  war  ;  becaufe, 
under  the  appearance  of  Monarchy,  it  isuideed  toopopulara  gov- 
ernment. 

XX VH.  V/e  netd  o!i1y  read  the  hiflories  cf  Florence  and  Ge- 
noa, to  b(  hold  a  lively  exhibition  of  the  misfortunes  which  repub- 
lics futfer  from  the  multitude,  when  the  latter  attempt  to  govern. 
The  ancient  republics,  efpecially  Athens,  the  moft  confiderable 
in  Greece,  are  cap.^ble  of  fetting  this  truth  in  a  (Ironger  light. 

XXVIII.  In  a  word,  Rome  perifhed  in  the  hands  of  the  peo- 
ple ;  and  monarchy  gave  birth  toit.  The  patriciens,  who  com- 
pofed  the  fen  air,  by  freeing  it  from  the  regal  dignity,  had  rendered 
it  midrcfs  of  Italy.  The  people,  by  the  encroachment  of  the 
tribunes,  gradually  ufurped  the  authority  of  the  fenate.  From 
that  time  d  ifci  pli  ne  v.'as  relaxed,  and  gave  place  to  licentioufnefs. 
At  length  the  republic  was  reduced,  by  the  people  themfelves,  to 
the  nioft  abject  flavery. 

XXIX.  It  is  not  therefore  to  be  doubted,  but  popular  govcrn- 
nvruts  arc  the  weakeii:  and  worft  of  all  others.  If  we  confider 
the  education  of  the  vulgar,  their  laborious  employment?,  their 
ignorance  and  brutalitj',  we  muiJ  quickly  perceive,  that  they  are 
made  to  be  governed  ;  and  that  good  order,  and  their  own  advan- 
t.if2;e,  forbid  thtm  to  interfere  with  that  province. 

"  XXX.   If 


Politic    Law.  251 

XXX.  If  therefore  neiiher  the  jjovernrnent:  of  the  rrailtlttulc, 
nor  the  abfolute  will  of  a  finglt:  perfon,  are  fit  to  procuie  ihî  hap- 
pinels  of  a  nation,  it  foHowF,  that  the  bed  governments  arc  th*.le 
which  a:-e  fo  tempered,  as  to  fee u re  the  hippin-'fs  of  the  fubjcds, 
by  avoiding  tyranny  and  licentioufnefs. 

XXXI.  There  are  two  ways  of  iintiing  this  temperament. 
The  firfl  coniifts  in  lodging  the  fovereigiity  in  a  council  (ocom- 

pnfed,  both  as  to  the  numh.-r  and  choice  of  perfons,  that  there 
fhajl  be  a  moral  certainty  of  their  having  no  other  interefts  ihin 
thofe  of  thecomiTiunity,  and  of  their  being  always  ready  to  give  a 
faithful  account  of  their  condudl.  This  is  what  v.'e  fee  iuppily 
pracflifed  in  rr.oft  republics. 

XXXII.  The  fécond  is,  to  limit  the  fovereignty  of  the  princo 
in  monarchic  liâtes,  by  fundamental  laws,  or  to  inveft  the  perfon, 
who  cninys  the  honours  and  title  of  fovereignty,  with  only  a  part  . 
of  the  fupreme  authority,  and  to  lodge  the  other  in  different  hands, 
for  example,  in  a  council  or  p:arliament.  This  is  what  gives  birth 
to  limited  monarchies.  * 

XXXIII.  With  regard  to  Monarchie?,  it  is  proper,  for  exam- 
ple, that  the.  military  and  legiflative  powers,  together  with  thit  of 
railing  taxes,  fhould  be  lodged  in  dilFerent  hands,  to  the  end  that 
they  may  not  hi  eafiiy  abufed.  It  is  eafy  to  conceive,  that  thefe 
reftri£lions  may  be  made  different  ways.  Tiie  general  rule,  which 
prudence  directs,  is  to  limit  the  power  of  the  prince,  fo  that  no 
danger  may  be  apprehended  fro;7i  it  ;  but  at  the  fame  time  not  to 
carry  things  to  excefj,  for  fear  of  weakening  the  governmrnf. 

XXXIV.  By  following  thisjuft  medium,  the  people  will  enjoy 
the  inoll  perfefl  liberty,  fince  they  have  all  the  moral  fccurities 
that  the  prince  v.'ill  not  abufe  his  power.  Tlie  prince,  on  the 
other  hand,  being,  as  it  were,  undjr  a  neceffity  of  doing  his  duty, 
confidersbly  ftrengihens  his  authority,  and  enjoys  a  high  d'c-gree  of 
happinefs  and  {olid  glory  ;  for  as  the  felicity  of  the  people  is  the 
end  of  government,  it  is  alfo  the  fureft  foundation  of  the  throne. 
3"e  whit  lus  been  already  faid  on  this  fubject. 

XXXV.  This  fpecics  of  Monarchy,  limited  by  a  mixed  gov- 
ernment, unites  the  principal  advantages  of  abfolute  IMoiiarchy, 
and  of  the  Ariftocratic  and  popular  governments  ;  at  the  fame 
time  it  avoids  the  dangers  and  inconveniences  peculiar  to  each. 
'This 

*    bee  part  i.  chap.  vii.  €  a6,  ike. 


252  The  Principles  of 

This  is  the  happy  temperament  which  we  have  been  endeavouring 
to  find, 

XXXVI.  The  truth  of  this  remark  has  been  proved  by  the 
experience  of  paft  ages.  Such  was  the  government  of  Sparta: 
Lycurgu?,  knowing  that  each  ot  the  three  forts  of  fimple  govern- 
jTicnts  had  very  great  inconveniences  ;  that  Monarchy  eafily  fell 
into  arbitrary  power  and  tyranny  ;  that  Ariftocracv  degenerated 
into  the  oppreHlve  government  of  a  few  individuals  ;  and  Democ- 
racy into  a  wild  and  lawlefs  dominion,  thought  it  expedient  to 
combine  thcfe  three  governments  in  that  of  Spatta,  and  mix  them, 
as  it  were,  into  one,  fo  that  they  m.ight  ferve  as  a  remedy  and 
counterpoife  to  each  other.  This  wife  legiflatur  was  not  deceiv- 
ed, and  no  republic  preferved  its  laws,  cuftoms,  and  liberty,  longer 
than  tîiat  of  Sparta, 

XXX  VII.  It  may  be  faid,  that  the  government  of  the  Ronaans, 
under  the  republic,  united  in  fome  mcafure,  as  that  of  Sparta,  the 
three  fpecies  of  authority.  The  confuls  held  the  place  of  kingr, 
the  fenate  form.ed  the  public  council,  and  the  people  had  alfo  fome 
(hare  in  the  adminiftration, 

XXXVIIT.  If  modern  examples  arc  wanted,  is  not  England  at 
prefent  a  proof  of  the  excellency  of  mixed  governments  ?  Is  there 
a  nation,  every  thing  confidered,  that  enjoys  a  higher  degree  of 
profpcrity  or  reputation  ? 

XXXIX.  The  northern  nations,  which  fubverted  the  Roman 
empire,  introduced  into  the  conquered  provinces  that  fpecies  of 
-  government,  v/hich  was  then  called  Gothic.  They  had  kings, 
lords,  and  commons  ;  and  experience  fhcws,  that  the  liâtes,  which 
have  retained  thiit  fpecies  of  government,  have  flourifntd  more 
than  thofe  which  have  devolved  the  whole  government  into  the 
hands  of  a  fmgle  perfon. 

XL.  As  to  Ariflocratic  governments,  we  mufl  firft  dirtingui{h 
Ariflpcracy  by  birth,  from  that  which  is  eleflive.  The  former 
has  feveral  advantages,  but  is  alf  j  attended  v/ith  very  great  incon- 
veniences. It  infpires  the  nobility  with  pride,  and  entertain?, 
between  the  grandees  and  the  people,  divifion,  contempt,  and  jea- 
loufy,  which  are  productive  cf  confidcVablc  evils. 

XLI.  Eut 


Politic    Law.  25;^ 

XLI.  Bat  the  latter  has  all  the  advantages  of  the  former,  with- 
out its  dcfcfls.  As  there  is  no  privilege  of  exclufion,  and  as  the 
door  to  prefennent  is  open  to  all  i\\c  citizens,  we  find  neither 
pride  nor  divifion  among  them.  On  the  contrary,  a  general  erriu- 
jaiiorj  glows  in  the  breads  of  all  the  members,  converting  every 
Ihing  to  the  public  good,  and  contrit)uting  infinitely  to  the  prefer- 
vation  of  liberty. 

XLII.  Thus  ifwefuppofe  an  elective  Ariftocracy,  in  which 
the  fovereignty  is  in  the  hands  of  a  council  fo  nunicroii<;,  as  to 
comprehend  the  chief  property  of  the  republic,  and  never  to  hrwii 
any  intereft  oppofite  to  that  of  the  ilatr.  If  befide»:,  this  council 
be  fo  fmrdl,  as  to  m^intcin  order,  harmony  and  fecrecy  ;  if  it  bs 
chofen  from  among  the  wifert,  and  nnoiï  virtuous  citizens  ;  ani 
ladly,  if  it»  authority  be  limited  and  Icept  within  rule,  there  can  be 
no  doubt  but  fach  a  government  is  very  well  adapted  to  promote 
the  happincfs  of  a  nation. 

XLÏII.  The  moft  difficult  point  in  thefe  governments,  is  to 
temper  them  in  fuch  a  manner,  that,  while  the  people  are  afllired 
of  their  liberty,  by  giving  them  fome  (hare  in  the  government, 
thefe  aflurances  fhall  not  be  carried  too  far,  fo  as  to  make  the 
government  approach  too  near  to  Democracy  :  for  the  preceding 
reflections  fiifEcientiy  evince  the  inconveniences  which  would 
rcfult  from  this  ftep. 

XLIV.  Let  us  therefore  conclude,  from  this  inquiry  into  the 
different  forms  of  government,  that  the  heft  are  either  a  limited 
Pvlonarchy,  or  an  Ariftocracy  tempered  with  Democracy,  by  fome 
privileges  in  favour  of  the  body  of  the  people. 

XLV.  It  is  true  there  are  always  fome  dedu£lions  to  be  made 
from  the  advantages  which  we  have  afcribed  to  thofe  governments  ; 
but  this  is  owing  to  the  infirmity  of  human  nature,  and  not  to  the 
cftablifliments.  The  conftitution  above  defcribed  is  the  mod 
perfect  that  can  be  imagined,  and  if  we  adulterate  it  by  our  vices 
and  follies,  this  is  the  fate  of  all  fublunary  affairs  ;  and  fince  a 
choice  muft  be  made,  the  belt  is  that  attended  with  the  feweft  in- 
conveniences. 

XLVI.  In  a  word,  fliould  it  flill  be  afked,  which  government 
is  bell  ?  I  would  anfwer,  that  every  fpecies  of  government  is  not 
equally  proper  for  every  nation,  and  that,  in  this  point,  we  muft 

have 


5554  ^^  Principles   of 

have  a  regard  to  the  humour  and  chara£ler  of  the  people,  and  to 
the  extent  of  the  country. 

XLVII.  Great  ftates  can  hardly  admit  of  republican  govern- 
ments ;  hence  a  monarchy,  wifely  limited,  fuits  them  better. 
Butas  to  ftates,  of  an  ordinary  extent,  the  moft  advantageous  gov- 
ernment for  them,  is  an  elective  ariftocracy,  tempered  v  ith  fomo 
privileges  in  favour  of  the  body  of  the  people. 


CHAP.      III. 

Of  the  different  zvays  of  acquiring  fovcreignty. 

X  HEonly  juft  foundationof  all  acquifition  of  fovereignty, 
is  the  confent,  or  will  of  the  people.*  But  as  this  confent  may  be 
given  different  wayr,  according  to  the  difFerent  circumftances 
attending  it  \  hence  we  diftinguilh  the  fevcral  ways  of  acquiring 
fovereignty. 

II.  Sometimes  a  people  are  conftrained,  by  force  of  nrmr,  to 
fubmit  to  the  do-ninion  of  a  conqueror  ;  at  other  time^rthe  people, 
of  their  own  accord,  confer  the  fupreme  authority  on  fome  par- 
ticular perfon.  Sovereignty  may  therefore  be  acquired  either  by 
force  and  violence,  or  in  a  free  and  voluntary  manner. 

III.  Thefe  different  acquifitions  of  fovereignty  may  agree  in 
fome  meafure  to  all  forts  of  governments  ;  but  as  they  are  molt 
remarkable  in  monarchies,  it  fhall  be  principally  with  refpecx  to 
the  latter,  that  we  Ihall  examine  this  queftion. 

1°.      Ofconqucjl. 

IV.  Sovereignty  is  fometimes  acquired  by  force,  or  rather  is 
feized  by  conqueli  or  ufurpation. 

V.  Conqueft  is  the  acquifition  of  fovereignty,  by  the  fupenority 
of  a  foreign  prince's  arms,  who  reduces  the  vanquillied  to  fubmit 
to  his  government.     Ufurpation  is  properly    made  by  a  perfon 

naturally 


*  0:i  this  fubijefl:,  fee  part  i.  chap-  vi. 


Politic    Law,  25^ 

naturally  fubmitted  to  him  from  whom  he  wrefts  the  fupremtf 
power  i  but  cudom  often  confounds  thefc  two  terms. 

VI.  There  are  feveral  remarks  to  be  made  on  conqucft,  con- 
fidered  as  a  method  of  acquiring  the  fovereignty. 

1^.  Conquelt,  in  itfelf,  is  rather  the  cccafion  of  acquiring  the 
fovereignty,  than  the  immediate  caufe  of  this  acquifition.  The 
immediate  caufe  is  the  confent  of  the  people,  either  tacit  or  ex- 
prefled.  Without  this  confent  the  ftate  of  war  always  fubfifts 
between  two  enemies,  and  one  is  not  obliged  to  obey  the  other. 
AH  that  can  be  faid  i?,  that  the  confent  of  the  vanquifhed  is  ex- 
torted by  the  luperiorify  of  the  conqiicror. 

VII.  2^.  Lav/ful  conqueft  fuppofes,  that  the  conqueror  has 
had  juft  reafon  to  wage  war  againft  the  vanquifhed.  Without 
this,  conqueft  is  by  no  means,  of  itfelf,  ajuft  title  ;  for  aman  can- 
not acquire  a  fovereignty  over  a  nation,  by  bare  feizure,  as  over 
a  thing  which  belongs  to  no  proprietor.  Thus  when  Alexander 
waged  war  againft  diflant  nations,  who  had  never  heard  of  his 
name,  certainly  fuch  a  conqueft  was  no  more  a  lawful  title  to  the 
fovereignty  over  thofe  people,  than  robbery  is  a  lawful  manner  of 
becoming  rich.  The  quality  and  number  of  the  perfons  do  not 
change  the  nature  of  the  adion,  the  injury  is  the  fame,  and  the 
crime  equal. 

VIII.  But  if  the  war  bejuft,  the  conqueft  is  alfo  the  fame  :  for, 
in  the  firft  place,  it  is  a  natural  confequence  of  the  victory  j  and 
the  vanquifhed,  who  deliver  themfelves  to  the  conqueror,  only  pur- 
chafe  their  lives  by  the  lofs  of  their  liberties.  Befides,  the  van- 
quifhed having,  through  their  own  fault,  engaged  in  an  unjuft 
war,  rather  than  grant  the  faiisfadlion  they  owed,  are  fuppofed  to 
have  tacitly  confented  to  the  conditions  which  the  conqueror  fhould 
impofe  on  them,  provided  they  were  neither  unjuft  nor  inhuman.   . 

IX.  3°,  But  what  muft  we  think  of  unjuft  conquefts^  and  of 
fubmifTion  extorted  by  mere  violence  ?  Can  it  give  a  lawful  right  ? 
I  anfwer,  we  fhould  diftinguilh  whether  the  ufurper  has  changed 
the  government  from  a  republic  into  a  monarchy,  or  difpoffefled 
the  lawful  monarch.  In  the  latter  cafe,  he  is  obliged  to  reftore 
the  crown  to  the  right  owner,  or  to  his  heirs,  till  it  can  be  prcfu- 
med  that  they  have  renounced  their  pretenfion  ;  and  this  is  always 
prefumed,  when  a  confiderable  time  is  elapfcd  without  their  being 
willing  or  able  tqmake  any  effort  to  recover  the  crown  ? 

X.  The 


12 5 6  V^e  Principles  of 

X.  The  law  of  nations  therefore  admits  of  a  kind  of  prcfcrip- 
tion  with  refpedl  to  fnvereignty.  This  is  reqiiiilte  for  the  intercft 
and  tranquillity  of  focicties  ;  a  long  and  quiet  pofieflion  of  the 
fup.emn;  power,  lîîurt:  ef^ablifli  the  legality  of  it,  othervvile  thcrs 
Avould  never  be  an  end  of  difputes  in  regard  to  kingdoms  and  their 
limits  ;  this  would  be  a  fource  of  perpetual  qujirrels,  and  there 
would  hardly  be  any  fuch  thing  as  a  fovereign  lawfully  pcfl'efl'ed 
oi"  the  fupreme  autii^rity. 

XL  It  is,  indeed,  the  duty  of  the  people,  in  the  beginning,  to 
relift  tl)t  ufurper  with  all  their  might,  and  to  continue  faithful  to 
their  pnnce  ;  but  if,  in  fpite  of  their  utmort  efforts,  their  fovereign 
is  deîcated,  and  is  no  longer  able  tsj  alTert  his  right,  ihey  are  obliged 
to  wo  more,  but  may  lawfully  take  care  of  their  ownprefervation. 

XII.  The  people  cannot  live  in  a  ftate  of  anarchy,  and  as  they  are 
not  obliged  to  txpofe  thcmfelves  to  perpetual  wars,  in  defence  of 
the  rights  of  their  former  fovereign,  their  confent  may  render  the 
right  of  the  ufurper  lawful;  and  in  this  cafe  the  fovereign  dethro- 
ned ought  to  reft  contented  with  the  lofs  of  his  dominions,  arid 
confider  it  as  a  misfortune. 

XIII.  With  regard  to  the  former  cafe,  when  the  ufurper  has 
chan^ied  the  republic  into  a  monarchy  ;  if  he  governs  with  mod- 
eration and  equity,  it  is  fufficient  that  he  has  reigned  peaceably  for 
fome  time,  to  afford  reafon  to  believe,  that  the  people  confent  to 
his  dominion,  and  to  efface  what  was  defe(5live  in  the  manner  of 
his  acquiring  it.  This  may  be  very  well  applied  to  the  reign  of 
Auijuftus.  But  if,  on  the  contrary,  the  prince,  who  has  made 
himfelf  mafler  of  the  republic,  exercifes  his  pov/er  in  a  tyrannical 
manner,  and  opprefles  his  fubjeds,  they  are  not  then  obliged  to  obey 
him.  In  thefe  circumftances  the  longeft  polfcfîîon  imports  no 
more  than  a  long  continuation  of  injuftice. 

2**.     0/  the  eîeâlîon  of  fovereign;, 

XIV.  But  the  moft  legitimate  way  of  acquiring  fovereignty,  is 
foundei  on  the  free  confent  of  the  people.  This  is  effeé^ed  either 
by  the  way  of  election,  or  by  the  right  of  fucceffion  ;  for  which 
reafon  kingdoms  are  dittinguifhed  into  elective  and  hereditary. 

XV.  Elcdion  is  that  3(51,  by  which  the  people  defign  or  nomi- 

nate 


Politic    Law.  ^57 

nate  a  certain  perfon,  whom  they  judge  capable  of  fucceeding  the 
dcceafed  king,  to  govern  the  ftate  ;  and  fo  foon  as  this  psrfon  has 
accepted  the  offer  of  the  people,  he  is  invefted  with  the  fovereignty. 

XVI.  We  may  diftingui(h  two  forts  of  elections,  one  intirely 
free,  and  the  other  limited  in  certain  refpe£ls  ;  the  former  when 
the  people  can  chufe  whom  thev  th-nJc  proper,  and  the  latter 
when  they  are  obliged,  for  example,  to  chufe  a  perf  in  of  a  certain 
nation,  a  particular  family,  religion,  &c.  A^non^  the  ancient 
Perfun";,  no  man  could  be  king  unlefs  he  had  been  inftruvSled  by 
the  Magi.** 

XVII.  The  time  between  the  death  of  the  king  and  the  eleiSllon* 
of  his  fucceffor,  is  called  an  InUrregnum.  > 

XVIII.  During  the  Interregnum  the  ftate  is,  as  it  were,  an  im- 
perfetSl  body  without  a  head  ;  yet  the  civil  fociety  is  not  difTulved. 
The  fovereignty  then  returns  to  the  people,  who,  till  they  chufe 
a  new  king  to  exercife  it,  have  it  even  in  their  power  to  change 
the  form  of  government. 

XIX.  But  it  is  a  wife  precaution,  to  prevent  the  troubles  of  aa 
Interregnum^  to  nominate  beforehand  thofe,  who,  during  that  time, 
are  to  hold  the  reins  of  government.  Thus  in  Poland  thcarch- 
bidiop  of  Gneina,  with  the  deputies  of  great  and  little  Poland, 
are  appointed  for  that  purpofe. 

XX.  The  perfons,  invefted  with  this  employment,  are  called 
Regents  of  the  kingdom  \  and  the  Romans  ftiled  them /«/^rr^^^i. 
They  are  temporary,  and,  as  it  were,  provifional  magiftrates,  who, 
in  the  name,  and  by  the  authority  of  the  people,  exercife  the  a£ts 
of  fovereignty,  fo  that  they  are  obliged  to  give  an  account  of  their 
adminiftration.     This  may  fuffice  for  the  way  of  eledlion. 

3**.  Of  fuccejjton  to  the  crown. 

XXI.  The  other  manner  of  acquiring  fovereignty,  is  the  right 
of  luccefTion,  by  which  princes,  who  have  once  acquired  the  crown, 
tranfmit  it  to  their  fucceftbrs. 

XXII.  It  may  feem  at  firft  that  eledive  kingdoms  have  the 
advantage  over  thofe  which  arc  hereditary,  becaufe,  in  the  former, 

I  i  the 

•  Sec  Ciç.  de  Divin,  lib.  i,  csp.  iv. 


258  7]i5^    Pr  î  N  C  I  P  LE  s    of 

the  fi)bje£ls  may  always  chufe  a  j/rince  of  merit,  and  capable  of 
govtri.ing.  Howtvtr,  experience  (hews^  that,  taking  all  things 
into  the  account,  the  way  of  fuccefîîon  is  more  conducive  to  the 
welfare  of  the  Hate. 

XXIII.  For,  I*',  by  this  method  we  avoid  the  vaft  inconve- 
nience?, both  foreign  and  domellic,  which  arifi  from  fréquent 
elections.  2^.  1  here  is  lefs  contention  and  unceitainty,  with 
refpecfl  to  the  title  of  the  fucccflbr.  '^.  A  prince,  whole  crown 
is  hereditary,  all  other  circuniftanccs  bung  equal,  will  take  great- 
er care  of  his  kingdom,  and  fpare  his  fubjcdls  more,  in  hi -pes  to 
leave  the  crown  to  his  children,  than  if  he  only  pofiUr.d  it  for  life. 
4^.  A  kingdom,  where  the  fuccefîîon  is  regulated,  has  greater 
^lability  and  force.  It  can  form  mightier  proj-dl?,  and  piirfue 
them  more  vigoroufly,  than  if  it  were  ele£live.  5^.  In  a  word, 
the  perfon  of  the  prince  (Irikes  the  people  with  greater  reverence, 
and  they  hive  reafon  to  hope,  that  the  \\  1-nJor  of  his  defctnt^  and 
the  imprtflionsof  his  education,  will  infpire  him  with  the  nectlfar* 
ry  qualities  for  holding  the  reins  of  government. 

XXIV.  The  order  of  fuccefTion  is  regulated  cither  by  the  will 
ofihelaft  king,  or  by  that  of  the  people. 

XXV.  In  kingdoms,  truly  patrimonial,  every  king  has  a  right 
to  regulate  the  fucceffion,  and  to  dilpofe  of  the  crown  as  he  has  a 
mind  ;  provid.'d  the  choice  he  makes  of  his  fucctfTor,  and  the  man- 
ner in  which  he  fettles  the  (late,  be  not  manifcRly  oppofite  to  the 
public  good,  which,  even  in  patrimonial  kingdoms,  is  ever  the 
fupreme  lav^. 

.  XXVI.  But  if  the  king,  prevented  prerhaps  by  death,  has  net 

named  his  fucceffbr,  it  fcems  natural  to  toUowthe  laws  or  cuftoms 
eftabhfhed  in  that  country,  concerning  private  inheritances,  fo  far 
at  leaft  as  the  fafety  of  the  flate  will  admit.*  But  it  is  certain 
:har^  in  thofe  cafes,  the  moft  approved  and  powerful  candidate 
will  always  carry  it. 

XXVri.  In  kingdoms,  which  are  not  patrimonial,  the  people 
regulate  the  order  of  fucceflion  :  and  although  they  mayeftablifh 
the  fucceflion  as  they  plcafe,  yet  prudence  requires  they  (hould 
follow  the  method  mcft  advantageous  to  the  ftate,  bert  adapted  to 


A 


maintain 


Sec  the  Law  of  nature  and  nations>  bcok  vii,  chap.  Tfii.  §  XX 1 


Politic    Law.  259 

maintain  order  and  peace,  and  mofl  expedient  to  promote  the  pub- 
lic fccunty. 

XXVIII.  The  ufual  methods  are,  a  fucceîîîon,  (imply  heredit- 
ary, which  folio  AS  nearly  the  rules  of  common  inheritances  ;  and 
the  lineal  fucceffion,  which  receives  mere  particular  limitations. 

XXIX.  The  good  of  the  Hate  therefore  requires  that  a  fuccef- 
fion,  fimply  hereditary,  Ihould  vary  in  feveral  thing?  from  private 
inheritances. 

i^.  The  kinsdom  ought  to  remain  indivifible,  and  not  hs 
llvircd  aaiong  fc:veral  heir?,  in  the  fame  degree  ;  for,  in  the  firfl 
place,  this  would  confideiably  weaken  the  ftate,  and  render  it  lefs 
proper  to  relîil  the  attacks  of  a  foreign  enemy.  Befides,  the  fub- 
ied?,  hiving  diflfeient  mafters,  would  no  longer  be  fo  clofcly  uni- 
ted among  themfclves  :  and  Lft'y,  this  might  lay  a  foundation  for 
inteftinc  wars,  as  experience  has  too  often  evinced.    . 

XXX.  2^.  The  crown  ought  to  remain  in  the  poRerrty  of  (he 
frft  polfefTor,  and  not  to  pafs  to  his  rd-tions  in  a  collatéral  line, 
and  much  lefstothnfe  who  haveonly  connexions  of  aa'Hnily  with 
him-  Thas  is,  no  doubt,  the  intention  o(  a  people  who  have 
rendered  the  crown  hereditary  in  any  one  family.  Thus,  unkfs  it 
is  othsrwife  determined,  in  dtfault  of  the  defcendants  of  the  firft 
pofT  {Fm',  the  right  of  difpoling  of  the  kingdom  returns  to  the 
nation. 

XXXI.  3°.  Thofe  only  ought  to  be  admitted  to  the  fuccefîion, 
who  are  born  of  a  marriage  conformable  to  the  laws  of  the  nation. 
For  this  there  are  feveral  reafons.  i^.  This  was,  no  doubt,  the 
intention  of  the  people,  when  they  fettled  the  crown  on  the 
defcendants  of  the  king.  2^.  The  people  have  not  the  fr.me 
refpedl  for  the  king's  natural  or  bafe  C^n?,  as  for  his  lawful  chil- 
dren. 3°.  Thï  father  of  natural  children  is  not  known  for  cer- 
tain, there  being  no  fure  method  of  afcertaining  the  father  of  a 
child  born  out  of  wedlock  ;  and  yet  it  is  of  the  laft  importance 
that  there  fhould  be  no  doubt  about  the  birth  of  thofe  who  are  to 
reign,  in  order  to  avoid  the  difputes  which  might  embroil  the  king- 
dom. Hence  it  is,  that,  in  feveral  countries,  the  queen  is  deliver» 
cd  in  public,  or  in  the  prefence  of  feveral  perfons, 

XXXII.  4**.  Adopted  children,  not  being  of  the  royal  blood, 
are  alfo  excluded  from  the  crown,  which  ou?ht  to  revert  to  the 
people  fo  foon  as  the  royal  line  f<iils, 


200  The  Principles  of 

XXXIII.  5®.  Among  thofe  whoareinthe  fame  degree,  whe- 
ther really  or  by  reprefentation,  the  males  arc  to  be  preferred  to  the 
females,  becaufe  they  are  prefumed  more  proper  for  the  corrimand 
ofarmieSj  and  for  exsrcifing  the  other  fundlions  of  government. 

XXXIV.  6°.  Among  feveral  males,  or  feveral  females  in  the 
fame  degree,  the  elded  oiight  to  fucceed.  It  is  birth  which  gives 
this  right  ;  for  the  crown  being  at  the  fame  time  indivifible  and 
hereditary,  the  eldeft",  in  confequence  of  his  birth,  has  a  preference, 
of  which  the  younger  cannot  deprive  him.  But  it  is  juQ  that  the 
cldc-ft  (hould  give  his  brothers  a  fufficiency  to  fupport  themfelves 
decently,  and  in  a  manner  fuitable  to  their  rank.  What  is  allotted 
them  for  this  purpofe  isdiftinguifhed  by  the  x\z'a\ç,o{  Appmncge. 

XXXV.  7°.  Laflly,  we  mufl  cbferve,  that  the  crown  does  not 
pafs  to  thcfucceffor  in  confequence  of  the  pleafure  of  the  deceafed 
king,  but  by  the  will  of  the  people,  who  have  fettled  it  on  the  royal 
family-  Hence  it  follows,  that  the  inheritance  of  the  particular 
cRate  of  the  king,  and  that  of  the  crown,  are  of  a  quite  different 
nature,  and  have  no  connexion  with  each  other  ;  fo  that,  fîri£tly 
fpeaking,  the  fucceiîor  may  accept  of  the  crown,  and  refufe  the 
private  inheritance  ;  and,  in  this  cafe,  he  is  not  obliged  to  pay  the 
debts  due  upon  this  particular  eftate, 

XXXVI.  But  it  is  certain,  that  honour  and  equity  hardly  per- 
.                 mit  a  prince,  who  afcends  the  throne,  to  ufe  this  right,  and  that, 

if  he  has  the  glory  of  his  royal  houfe  at  heart,  he  will,  by  œcono- 
my  and  frugality,  be  enabled  to  pay  the  debts  of  his  predecefibr. 
But  this  ought  not  to  be  done  at  the  expence  of  the  public. 
Thefe  are  the  rules  of  fuccefTion  fimply  hereditary. 

XXXVII.  But  fince  in  this  hereditary  fuccefTion,  where  the 
next  heir  to  the  deceafed  king  is  called  to  the  crown,  terrible  dif- 
putes  may  happen  concerning  the  degree  of  proximity,  when  thofe 
who  remain  are  a  little  diftant  from  the  common  ftem  ;  feveral 
nations  have  eftabliftied  the  lineal  fucceffion  from  branch  to  branch, 
the  rules  of  which  are  thefe  following. 

I*'.  All  thofe  defcended  from  the  royal  founder  are  accounted 
fo  many  lines  or  branches,  each  of  which  has  a  right  to  the  crown 
according  to  the  degree  of  its  proximity. 

2°.  Among  thofe  cf  this  line,  who  are  in  the   fame  degree,  in 
the  fiift  place  fex,  and  then  age,  gives  the  preference- 
s''- We 


Politic    Law. 


26t 


3°.  We  muft  not  pafs  from  one  line  to  another,  fo  long  as 
there  remains  one  of  the  preceding,  even  though  there  (hould  be 
another  line  of  relations  nearer  to  the  deceafed  king.   For  exanjple  : 


r" 


r' ^ 

j  Lewis   I 
V ) 


.^ 


( ^ 

Charles  I 


L'; 


r~"i 


V ; 

A  king  leaves  three  fons,  Leuri?,  Charles,  and  Henry.  The 
fon  of  Lewis,  who  fucceeds  him,  dies  without  children  ;  Charles 
leaves  a  grandfon  ;  Henry  is  ftill  living,  and  is  the  uncle  of  the 
deceafed  king  ;  the  grand  child  of  Charles  is  only  his  ccufu:-gcr- 
man  :  and  vct  this  grand-child  will  have  the  crown,  as  being  iranf- 
mitted  to  him  by  his  grand-father,  whofe  line  has  excluded  Henry 
and  his  defcendants,  till  it  be  quite  extinft. 

4"'.  Every  one  has  therefore  a  right  to  fucceed  in  his  rank,  and 
tranfmits  thi^  right  to  his  defcendants,  with  the  fame  order  of  fuc- 
cefïxon,  thouqh  he  has  never  reigned  himfelf  ;  that  is  to  fay,  the 
right  of  the  deceafed  pafTes  to  the  living,  and  that  of  the  living  to 
the  deci;afed. 

5°.  If  the  laftking  has  died  without  IfTue,  we  make  choice  of 
the  neareft  line  to  his,  and  fo  on. 

XXXVni.  There  are  two  principal  kinds  of  lineal  fnccefîîon, 
namely,  Cognctic  and   Jgnatic.       Thefe  names  come  from  the 

Latin 


262  ^ïhe  Principles  of 

L'îtin  words  Cjgnnti  and  yfgnati,  the  former  of  which,  in  the 
R  rmn  law,  fi^nities  the  rchtions  on  the  mother's  fide,  and  the 
Ltitr  ihufe  on  the  father's  fide. 

XXXIX.  The  Cognatk  lineal  fiicce/Tmn  is  that  which  does 
not  exclude  wom?n  tro^rj  the  fucceflion,  but  only  calls  them  after 
tile  miles  in  the  fame  line;  fo  that,  when  on^y  women  remain, 
tliere  is  no  tranficion  m:de  to  another  lin^,  but  the  fucceflion  runs 
baeii  to  the  f-.-mile  again,  in  cafe  'he  male"^,  who  were  fuperior  or 
equal  to  th-m  in  other  rcfpefis,  fliill  happen  tf)  fail  with  all  their 
ddcendantà.  This  fucceflion  is  alfo  called  Cajîilian.  Hence  it 
follows,  that  the  daughter  of  ihe  r)n  of  the  laltking,  is  preferred 
to  the  fon  of  the  daughter  t>f  the  fame  prince,  ;ind  the  daughter  of 
one  ot  his  brothers  to  the  fon  of  one  cf  his  filkrs. 

XL.  The  agnatic  lineal  fucceflion  is  that  in  vl-hich  only  the 
tnalc  liîue  of  males  fucceeds,  fo  that  women,  arul  all  thofe  dtfcend- 
\\\%  from  them,  are  perpetually  excluded.  It  is  alfo  called  the 
French  {ncctïï^o•^.  This  exclufion  of  worhen  and  their  defcend- 
aiits  IS  principally  cflablilhed  to  hinder  the  crown  from  devolvmg 
to  a  fo.eign  race,  by  the  marriage  of  princefl!es  of  the  blood  royal. 

XLI.  Thefe  îire  the  principal  kinds  of  fucceflion  in  ufe,  and 
may  be  tempered  in  difF.-rent  manners  by  the  people  ;  but  prudence 
dircdts  u^  to  prefer  thofe  which  are  fubje<fl  to  the  leaft  difficulty  ; 
and  in  this  refpeft  the  lineal  fucceflion  has  the  advantage  ovv.r  that 
which  is  limply  hereditary. 

XLII.  Several  queflions,  cquallv  curious  and  important,  may 
be  (farted  with  regard  to  the  fucceflion  of  kingdoms.  On  this 
fubjefl  the  reader  may  conf  It  Grotiu^.  *  We  Ihall  only  examine, 
who  has  a  right  to  decide  the  difputes  that  may  arife  between  two 
or  more  prtteulcrs  to  a  crown  ? 

1°.  If  the  kingdom  be  patrimonial,  and  difputes  arife  after  the 
dtath  of  the  king,  the  beft  method  is  to  refer  the  caufe  to  arbitra- 
tors of  the  royal  family.  The  welfare  and  peace  of  the  kingdom 
recommend  this  conduâ:. 

2?.  But  if  in  kingdoms  eflablifhed  by  the  voluntary  a£l  of  the 

people,  the  difpute   arifes  even  in  the  king's  life  time,  he  is  not  a 

competent  judge  of  it  ;  for  then  the  people  mufl  have  invefled  him 

with  the  power  of  regulating  the  fucceflion  according  to  his  own 

.    .  1',  plcafure, 

♦  The  Right  gf  war  &n4  peace»  bock  ii.  c.hap.vii.  §  25,  <Scç. 


Politic    Law,  26^ 


pî^afiire,  whîcb  is  not  to  be  fuppofed.  It  therefore  belongs  to  the 
people  to  decide  thedifpute,  either  by  themlelve»  or  by  tbtir  rcpre- 
feiuativcs. 

3*.  The  fame  holds  true,  if  the  difpute  does  not  arife  till  after 
the  death  of  the  king  :  in  tiiis  cale  it  ii  either  nsce.iary  n  determine 
which  of  the  pretenders  is  n:-areft  to  the  deceafcd  fovereign  j  and 
this  is  a  matter  of  fa£l  which  the  people  only  ought  to  determine, 
becaufi  they  are  principally  incerelled  in  it. 

4''.  Or  the  point  is  to  knQw,  what  degree,  or  line,  ought  to 
have  the  preference  according  to  the  order  of"  fucceffion  eftabliihed 
by  the  people  ;  and  then  it  is  a  matter  of  right.  Now  who  can 
determine  better  this  point  than  the  people  themfelves,  who  have 
eftablifli-'d  the  order  of  fucceflion  ?  Otherwife  there  would  be  no 
method  of  deciding  the  difpute  but  by  force  of  armSj  which  would 
be  entirely  oppofite  to  the  good  of  the  fociety. 

XLin.  But  to  avoid  every  perplexity  of  this  kind,  it  would  be 
proper  that  the  people  fhould,  by  a  fundamental  law,  expref  ly  re- 
ferve  to  themfelves  the  right  of  judging  in  the  above  cafes.  What 
has  been  faid  is  fufficient  on  the  different  ways  of  acquiring  fove* 
reignty. 


CHAP.      IV. 

0/the  different  ways  ofhfmgfoveretgnty, 

I'  T 

\  >ET  us  now  inquire  how  fovereignty  may  be  lofl  ;  and  in 
this  there  is  no  great  difficulty,  after  the  principles  we  have 
Cf!ablilhed  on  the  ways  of  acquiring  it. 

II.  Sovereignty  may  be  loft  by  abdication,  that  is,  when  the 
reio;ning  prince  renounces  the  fovereignty,  fo  far  as  it  regards  him- 
felf.  Of  this  the  hiftory  even  of  latter  ages  furniihes  us  with 
remarkable  examples. 

III.  As  fovereignty  derives  its  original  from  a  covenant  between 
the  king  and  his  fubjcfls  ;  if,  for  plaufible  reafons,  the  king  thinks 
proper  to  renounce  the  fupreme  dignity,  the  people  have  not  prop- 
erly a  right  to  conflrain  him  to  keep  it. 

ÎV.  But  fuch  an  abdication  muft  not  be  made  at  an  unfeafona- 
ije  juncture  ;  as  for  inftance,  when  the  kingdomi  is  like  to  fink 

into 


564  ^he  Principles  0/" 

into  a  minority,  efpecially  if  it  be  threatened  with  a  war  ■■,  or  whei. 
the  prince,  by  his  bad  condudl,  has  thrown  the  date  into  a  dan-t 
gtrous  convulfion,  in  which  he  cannot  abandon  it  without  betray- 
ing his  truft,  and  ruining  his  country. 

V.  But  we  may  fafely  fay,  that  a  prince  very  rarely  finds  himfelf 
in  fuch  circumftances,  as  fliould  engage  him  to  renounce  the 
crown.  However  his  affairs  may  be  fituated,  he  may  cafe  him- 
felf of  the  drudgery  of  government,  and  {till  retain  the  fuperior 
command.  A  king  ought  to  die  upon  the  throne  ;  and  it  is  a 
wealcnefs  unworthy  ot  him,  to  divcft  himfelf  of  his  authority. 
Befides,  experience  has  fliewn,  that  abdication  is  too  frequently 
attended  with  unhappy  catuftrophies. 

VI.  It  is  therefore  certain,  that  a  prince  may,  for  himf.'lf, 
renounce  the  crown,  or  the  right  of  fucceflion.  But  there  is 
great  difficulty  whether  he  can  do  it  for  his  children. 

VII.  To  judge  rightly  of  this  point,  v/hich  has  embarralTed  fo 
many  politicians,  we  muft  cllabliih  the  following  principles. 

I**.  Every  acquifition  (^fright  or  power  over  another,  and  con- 
fequently  of  fuvereignty,  luppofes  the  confent  of  him  over  whom 
this  right  is  to  be  acquired,  and  the  acceptance  of  him  who  is  to 
acquire  it.  Till  this  acceptance  is  fettled,  the  intention  of  the 
f)rmer  does  not  produce,  in  favour  of  the  latter,  an  ablolute  and 
irrevocable  right  :  it  is  only  a  fimple  defignaiion,  which  he  is  at 
liberty  to  accept  of  or  not. 

VIII.  2°.  Let  us  apply  thefe  principles.  The  princes  of  the 
blood  royal,  who  have  accepted  the  will  of  the  people,  by  which 
the  crown  has  been  conferred  on  them,  have  certainly  thereby 
acquired  an  abfolute  and  irrevocable  right,  of  which  they  cannot 
be  ftripped  without  their  own  confent. 

IX.  3°.  With  regard  to  thofc  who  are  not  yet  born,  as  they 
have  not  accepted  of  thedelignation  of  the  peoj)!e,  they  have  not 
as  yet  acquired  any  richt.  Hence  it  iollovvs,  that,  in  relation  to 
them,  this  defignation  is  only  an  imperfeit  adï,  a  kind  of  expectan- 
cy, the  completion  of  which  intirely  depends  on  the  will  of  the 
people. 

X.  4°.  But  it  may  be  faid,  the  anceftors  of  thofe,  uho  are  not 

vet 


Politic    Law.  265 

yst  bom,  hive  confcnted  and  ftipulated  for  them,  and  confcquently 
received  the  engagement  of  the  people  in  their  behalf.  But  this 
is  rather  an  argument  in  favour  of  renunciation,  which  it  elte£lu- 
ally  eftablifties  ;  for  as  the  right  of  thofe,  who  are  not  yet  born,  has 
no  other  foundation  than  the  concurrence  of  the  will  of  the  peupla 
and  of  their  anceftors,  it  is  eviJent  that  this  right  may  be  taken 
from  them,  without  injaflice,  by  thofe  very  peifons,  from  the 
fingle  will  of  whom  they  hold  it. 

Xr.  5^.  The  nngle  will  of  a  prince,  without  the  confentof  the 
nation,  cannot  efFeélually  exclude  his  children  from  the  crown  to 
which  the  people  have  called  them.  In  like  manner,  the  fingle 
will  of  the  people,  without  the  confent  of  the  prince,  cannot  de- 
prive his  children  of  an  expe£lancy  which  their  father  has  ftipu- 
lated with  the  people  in  their  favour.  But  if  thefe  two  wills  unite, 
they  may,  without  doubt,  alter  what  they  have  eftabliflied. 

XII.  6°.  It  is  true,  this  renunciation  ought  not  to  be  made 
without  a  caufe,  and  through  inconftancy  and  levity.  Under 
thsfe  circumftances  it  cannot  be  juftified,  and  the  good  of  the  ftate 
does  not  permit,  that,  without  neceflîty,  an  alteration  (hould  bs 
made  in  the  order  of  the  fucceflion. 

XIII.  7°.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  nation  be  fo  fituated,  that 
the  renunciation  of  a  prince,  or  a  princefs,  is  abfolutely  neceffary 
to  its  tranquillity  and  happinefs,  then  the  fupreme  law  of  the  public 
good,  which  has  eflablifhed  the  order  of  the  fucceflion,  requires 
it  (hould  be  fet  afide. 

XIV.  8°.  Let  U3  add,  that  it  is  for  the  general  good  of  nations, 
fuch  renunciations  be  valid,  and  the  parties  interelted  fliould  not 
attempt  to  difannul  them.  For  there  are  times  and  conjundtures 
in  which  they  are  necefTary  for  the  welfare  of  the  ftate  ;  and  if 
thofe  with  whom  we  are  treating,  ftiould  come  to  think  that  the 
renunciation  would  afterwards  be  fet  afide,  they  certainly  would 
have  nothing  to  do  with  us.  Now  this  muft  be  productive  of 
bloody  and  cruel  wars.  Grotius  decides  this  queftion  nearly  ia 
the  fame  manner.     The  reader  may  fee  what  he  fays  of  it.  * 

XV.  9*^.  Since  war  or  conqueft  is  a  method  of  acquiring  fove- 
reignty,  as  we  have  feen  in  the  preceding  chapter,  it  is  evidently 
alfo  a  means  of  lofing  it. 

Kk  XLVr.  With 

• 

"  Qi)\  u,  chip,  v'li.  §  a5,   and  bo»k  ii.  chap.  iv.  §  10, 


266  "The   P  R  I  x\  c  I  ?  L  E  s   of 


XVI.  With  regard  to  tyranny  and  the  dcpofing  cf  foVereigns^ 
both  which  are  alfo  ways  of  lofiiig  the  fupreme  power,  as  thefc 
two  articles  bear  feme  relation  to  the  duties  of  fubicdls  towards 
îheir  fovcreigns,  we  Ihall  treat  of  them  in  the  next  chapter  more 
particularly, after  wc  have  confidered  thofe  duties. 


C  H  A  P.      V. 

Of  the  dutlei  offnbjeSh  in  general. 

_/\^CCORDING  to  the  plan  we  have  laid  down,  we  mnft 
here  treat  of  the  duties  oflubj  j6ts.  Fuflendort  has  given  us  a  cltar 
and  diftindl  idea  of  them,  in  the  laft  chapter  of  his  Duties  of  a  Matt 
ando  Citizen.     We  (hall  follow  him  fkp  by  ftep. 

II.  The  duties  of  fubje£ls  are  either  general  or  particular  j  and 
fcoth  flow  from  their  ftale  and  condition, 

III.  All  fubje(5\s  have  this  in  comtron,  that  they  live  under  the 

fame  fovereign  and  the  fame  government  and  tfat  they  are  mem- 
bers of  the  fame  itate.  From  thcfe  relations  the  general  duties 
arifs, 

IV.  Butas  they  have  different  empIoymentFy  enjoy  differen^t 
poRs  in  the  ftate,  and  follov^  different  proîeflîonsj  hence  alfoarife 
their  particular  duties. 

V.  It  is  alfo  to  be  obferved,  that  the  duties  of  fubjefls  fuppofe 
and  include  thofe  of  man,  conlidercd  fimply  as  fuch,  and  as  a  mem- 
ber of  human  fociety  in  general.   ■ 

VI.  The  general  duties  of  fubjcdh  have,  for  their  cbjedl:,  either 
the  governors  of  the  il:aLe,  or  the  whole  body  of  the  people,  viz. 
their  country,  or  the  individuals  among  their  fellow- fubjcéts. 

VII.  As  to  fovereigns  and  governors  of  the  ftate,  every  fubjecS: 
owes  them  that  refpeft,  fidelity,  znd  obedience,  which  their  cha- 
racter demands.  Hence  it  follows,  that  we  ought  to  be  contented 
with  the  prefent  government,  and  to  form  no  cabals  nor  feditions, 
bat  to  be  attached  to  the  iatered  of  the  reigning  princcj.more  than 

to 


Politic    Law.  267 

to  that  of  any  other  perfon,  to  pay  him  honour,  to  think  favoura- 
bly of  him,  and  to  fpeak  with  refpeél  of  him  and  his  adtions.  We 
ought  even  to  have  a  veneration  for  t[:e  memory  of  gooil  princes,  &c. 

VIII.  With  refpeiSl  to  the  whole  body  of  the  ftat^,  a  good  fub- 
jedl  makes  it  his  rule  to  prêter  the  pnblic  vi'clf.-.rc  to  every  thin^ 
elle,  bravely  to  facrifice  his  fortune,  and  his  private  intcrelts,  and 
even  his  life,  for  the  preicrvation  of  the  ftate  j  and  to  employ  all 
bis  abilities  and  his  induftry  to  advance  the  honour,  and  to  procure 
the  advantage  ot  his  native  country. 

IX.  Laftly,  theduty  of  afubjed  to  hisfellovv-fubjeiSls  confifls 
in  living  with  them,  as  much  as  he  poffibly  can,  in  peace  and  flrici 
union,  in  b.;ing  mild,  complaifant,  affable,  and  obliging  to  each  of 
ihcm,  in  creatuig  no  trouble  by  a  rude  or  litigious  behaviour,  and 
feeariiig  no  envy  or  preju<hce  againft  the  happinefs  of  others,  &c. 

X.  xAs  to  the  particular  duties  of  nibje<fl:s,  they  are  connedled 
with  the  particular  employments  which  they  follow  in  fociety. 
We  ihall  here  lay  down  fome  general  rules  in  regard  to  this  matter. 

i^.  A  fubj.'ét  ought  not  to  al'pire  after  any  public  employment, 
nor  even  to  accept  of  it,  when  he  is  fenfible  that  he  is  not  duly 
qualified  for  it.  2*^.  He  ought  not  to  accept  of  more  employments 
than  he  can  difcharge.  3^.  He  lliould  not  ufe  unlawful  means  to  ' 
obtain  pnblic  offices.  4°.  It  is  even  fonietimes  a  kind  ofjuftice 
not  to  feck  after  certain  employments,  which  are  not  neccfl'ary  to 
us,  and  which  may  be  as  well  filled  by  others,  for  whom  they  arj 
perhaps  more  adapted.  5*^.  He  ought  to  difcharge  the  feveral 
functions  of  the  employments  he  has  obtained,  with  the  utmoU 
application,  exadlnefs,  and  fidelity. 

XI.  Nothing  is  more  cafy  than  to  apply  thefe  general  maxims 
to  the  particular  employmeiits  of  fociety,  and  to  draw  inferences 
proper  to  each  of  theai  ;  as  for  inltance,  with  refpedl  to  mini  tiers 
and  counlellors  of  ffate,  minifters  of  religion,  public  profellbrs, 
magiftrates  and  judges,  ofîicersin  the  army  and  foldiers,  receivers 
of  taxes,  ambafTadors,  ècc. 

XII-  The  particular  duties  of  fubjedls  ceafe  with  the  public 
charges  from  whence  they  arife.  Bat  as  to  the  general  duties,  they 
fubfilt  fo  long  as  a  perfon  remains  fubjedl  to  the  ftate.  Now  a 
man  ceafes  to  be  a  fubjeft,  principally  three  ways.  i**.  When 
he  goes  to  fettle  elfewhl-re.     2^.  XVhen  he  is  banifhed  from  a 

coui'.try 


268  I'he  Principles  of 

country  for  fome  crime,  and  deprived  cf  the  rights  of  a  fubject. 
3^.  And  laftly,  when  he  is  reduced  to  a  ncctflity  of  fubmitting  to 
the  dominion  of  a  conqueror. 

XIII.  It  is  a  right  inherent  in  a'l  free  people,  that  every  men 
fhould  have  the  liberty  of  removing  out  of  the  commonwealth,  if 
be  thinks  proper.  In  a  word,  when  a  ptrfon  becomes  member  of 
a  ^ate,  he  does  not  thereby  renounce  the  care  cf  himfelf  and  his 
own  private  affairs.  On  the  contrary,  he  feeks  a  powtrful  pro- 
tedion,  undt-r  the  flieltcr  of  which  he  may  procure  to  himfelf  both 
the  necefiaries  and  conveniences  of  life.  Thus  the  fubji<5ls  of  a 
Hate  cannot  be  denied  the  liberty  of  fettling  elfeuhere,  in  order  to 
procure  thofe  advantages  which  they  do  net  enjoy  in  their  native 
country. 

XIV.  On  this  occafion  there  are  however  certain  maxims  of 
duty  and  decency,  which  cannot  be  difpenfed  with. 

1°.  In  general,  a  man  ought  not  to  quit  his  native  country 
without  the  permiff.on  of  his  fovereign  :  but  his  fovercign  ought 
not  to  refufeit  him,  without  very  important  reafons. 
'  1°.  It  would  be  contrary  to  the  duty  of  a  good  fubjefl  to  aban- 
don his  native  country  at  an  unfeafonable  jundlure,  and  when  the 
ftate  has  a  particular  intereft  that  he  fliould  iUy  at  home*. 

3^.  If  the  laws  of  the  country  have  determined  any  thing  in 
this  point,  we  muft  be  determined  by  them  ;  for  we  have  confentcd 
to  thofelaws  in  becoming  members  of  the  ftate. 

XV.  The  Romans  forced  no  perfon  to  continue  under  their 
government,  and  Cicero  f  highly  commends  this  maxim,  calling 
it  the  furert  foundation  of  liberty,  *'  which  confifts  in  being  able 
*'  to  preferve  or  renounce  our  right  as  we  think  proper." 

XVI.  Some  propofe  a  question,  whether  fuhjedls  can  go  out 
of  the  flate  in  great  companies  ?  In  this  point  Grotius  and  PufFcn- 
dorf  are  of  oppofite  fentiments.  \     As  for  my  own  part,  I  am  ot 

opinion 

•  .''ee  Grolius  of  the  Right  of  war  and  peace,  book  ii   chap.  iv.  §'24. 

f  O  cxceller.r  and  divine  laws,   enacSled  by  our  anceftors  in  the  begimiing  of 

the  Roman  empire Let  no  rnan  change  his  city  againft  his  will,  nor  kt  hini 

bs  compelled  to  ftay  in  it.  Thtfc  are  the  furcd  foundations  of  our  liheity,  that 
every  one  fhnuld  have  it  in  his  power  either  to  preferve  or  relinquiftx  hi'*  right. 
Oral. pro  L.  Corn.  £,ji&.  tap.  13.  adée  Leg,  12.  §  9.  JDigiJi,  de  cap.  diminut.  tS* 
pcJIUm.  iib-  49    ///.  15. 

\  See  Grocius,  ubifuprs^  ar.d  PufTendorf  of  the  Law  of  nature  and  ratlonSj 
'pook  viji.  chap.  si.  §  4. 


Politic    Law.  269 

opinion  that  it  can  hardly  happen,  that  fubjefls  ftiouM  go  out  of 
the  ftate  in  large  companies,  except  in  one  or  other  of  thefc  two 
cafes  ;  either  when  the  government  is  tyrannical,  or  when  a  ntul- 
tiruJc  of  people  cannot  fubfill  in  the  country  ;  as  when  manufac- 
turers, for  example,  or  other  tradefmen,  cannot  find  the  means  of 
making  or  diltributing  tlicir  commodities.  Under  thefe  circum- 
fbnces,  the  fubjecfls  may  retire  if  they  will,  and  they  are  authori- 
aed  fo  to  do  by  virtue  of  a  tacit  ex.ception.  If  the  government  be 
tyrannical,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  fovereign  to  change  his  condu(5l  ; 
for  no  fubjedl  is  obliged  to  live  under  tyranny.  If  mifery  forces 
them  to  remove,  this  is  alfo  a  rcafonable  exception  againfl  the 
mod  exprefs  engagements,  unlefs  the  fovereign  furnifhes  them 
with  the  means  of  fubfiftence.  But,  except  in  thofe  cafe?,  were 
the  fubjedls  to  remove  in  great  companies,  without  a  caufe,  and 
by  a  kind  of  general  defertion,  the  fovereign  may  certainly  oppofu 
their  removal,  if  he  finds  that  the  Itate  fuffers  great  prejudice  by  it- 

XVII.  A  man  ceafes  to  be  a  fubjtcfl  of  the  ftate  when  he  is  for 
ever  bani (lied,  in  punilhment  for  fome  crime:  for  the  moment 
that  the  llate  will  not  acknowledge  a  man  to  be  one  of  its  members, 
bat  drives  him  from  its  territories,  he  is  releafed  from  his  engage- 
ments as  a  fubjecf.  The  civilians  call  this  punifhrnent  a  civil 
death.  Bat  it  is  evident  that  the  Hate,  or  fovereign,  cannot 
expel  a  fubjecl  from  their  territories  whenever  they  pleafe,  unlefs 
he  has  dsfsrvcd  it  by  the  commillion  of  fomc  crime. 

XVIII.  Laftly,  aman  may  ceafjtobea  fubjedl  by  the  fuperi- 
or  force  of  an  enemy,  by  which  he  is  reduced  to  a  neceflity  of  fub- 
mitting  to  his  dominion  :  and  this  neceffity  is  founded  on  the  right 
which  every  man  has  to  lake  care  of  his  own  prefervation. 


C  H  A  P.      VI. 

Of  the  inviolable  rights  ofjovereignty^  of  the  depojlng  cf Jovcreigns, 
of  the  abufe  of  the  fupreme  power ,  and  of  tyranny. 

V V  HAT  wchave  faid  in  the  preceding  chapter,  concern- 
ing the  duties  of  fubjefts  to  their  fjvereigns,  admits  of  no  difficul- 
ty. We  are  agreed  in  general  upon  the  rule,  that  the  perfon  pf 
the  fovereign  ftiould  be  facrcd  and  inviolable.     But  the  qucHion  is, 

whether 


270  The  Principles  <9/ 

whether  this  prerogative  of  the  lovereign  be  fuch,  that  it  is  never 
la-.vful  for  ihc  people  to  rife  againft  him,  to  caft  him  from  the  throne, 
oi  to  cha.12;:  the  form  of  government  ? 

II.  In  ar.fwer  to  this  queftion,  I  obferve  in  the  firft  place,  that 
the  nature  and  end  of  government  lay  an  indifpenfiblc  obligation  on 
a!"  fubjeils  not  to  refut  their  fovcreign,  but  to  refpedt  and  obey 
him,  folong  as  he  utes  his  power  with  equity  and  nioderation,  and 
does  not  exceed  the  limits  of  his  authority. 

III.  It  is  this  obligation  to  obedience  in  the  fubje£ls,  that  coj^ 
ftitutes  the  whole  force  of  civil  fociety  and  government,  and  con- 
fequïiitly  the  intire  felicity  of  the  flate.  Whoever  therelore  rifes 
againd  tne  fovereign,  or  makes  an  attack  upon  his  perfon  or  author- 
it),  renders  hirafelf  manifeftly  guilty  of  the  greatelt  crime  which  a 
man  can  commit,  fiace  he  endeavours  to  fubvèrt  the  firft  founda- 
tions of  the  public  felicity,  in  which  that  of  every  individual  is  in- 
cluded. 

"  IV.  But  if  this  maxim  be  true  with  rcfpc6l  to  individuals,  may 
we  alfo  apply  it  to  the  whole  body  of  the  nation,  of  whom  the  (ovCt. 
reign  originailv  hoUs  his  authority  ?  If  the  people  thinic  fit  to  re- 
funif,  ov  to  chan  :■  the  form  of  govemmen',  why  fliould  they  not 
be  at  liberty  to  do  it  ?  Cannot  they  who  make  a  king,  alfo  depofc 
him  ? 

V.  Let  us  endeavour  to  folve  this  difïîciilty.  I  therefore 
affirm,  that  the  people  themfelves,  that  is,  the  whole  body  of  the 
nation,  have  not  a  right  to  depofe  the  fovereign,  or  to  change  the 
form  of  government,  without  any  other  reafon  than  thtir  own 
pleafure,  and  purely  from  inconflancy  or  levity. 

VI.  In  general,  the  fame  reafons  which  eflablilh  the  necelTity  of 
government  and  fupreme  authority  in  fociety,  alfo  prove  that  the 
government  ought  to  be  It^bie,  and  that  the  people  Ihould  not 
have  the  power  of  depofing  their  fovereigns,  whenever,  through 
c-'priceor  levity,  they  are  inclined  fo  to  act,  anil  when  they  have 
n..  iound  reafon  to  change  the  forixi  of  government. 

VII.  Indeed,  it  would  be  fubverting  all  government,  to  malce 
it  depend  on  the  caprice  or  inconftancy  bf  the  pe^>ple.  It  would 
be  impoiiibie  for  the  ftate  to  ^e  ever  fettled  amiuH  ihofe  revolutions, 

which 


Politic    Law.  271 

tv'hkh  would  expofe  it  (o  often  todcftru6Vion  ;  for  we  rauft  either 
grant  that  the  pco,jle  cannot  difpofTefs  their  ibvereign,  and  change 
the  torm  of  government  ;  or  we  muft  give  them,  in  this  refpedij 
a  liberty  without  control. 

VIII.  An  opinion  which  fap5  the  foundation  of  all  authority, 
which  deftroys  all  power,  and  confequently  all  fociety,  cannot  be 
admitted  as  a  principle  of  reafoning,  or  of  conduit  in  politics. 

IX.  The  law  of  congruity  or  fitnefs  is  in  this  cafe  of  the  utmofî 
force.  What  (hould  we  fay  of  a  minor,  who,  without  any  other 
reafon  than  his  caprice,  fhould  withdraw  from  his  guardian,  or 
change  him  at  pleafure  ?  The  prefent  cafe  is  in  point  the  fame.    It 

is  with  reafon  that  politicians  compare  the  people  to  minors  j  neither  '~ 

being  capable  of  governing  themfelvcs.  Theymuft  be  fubjedl  to 
tuition,  and  this  forbids  them  to  withdraw  from  their  authority,  or 
to  alter  the  form  of  government,  without  very  fubftantial  reafons. 

X.  Not  only  the  lav/ of  congruity  forbids  the  people  wantonly 
to  rife  againft  their  fovereigiT  or  the  governmenti  but  juftice  alio 
makes  the  fame  prohibition. 

XI.  Government  and  fovereignty  are  eftablifhed  by  mutual 
agreement  betwixt  the  governor  and  the  governed  ;  and  juftice 
requires  that  people  fhould  be  faithful  to  their  engagements.  It 
is  therefore  the  duty  of  the  fubjefls  to  keep  their  wnrd,  and  religi- 
oufly  to  obferve  their  contrail  with  their  ibvereign,  fo  long  as  the 
latter  performs  his  engagements, 

XII.  Otherwffe  the  people  would  do  a  manifeft  injuflice  to  the 
fovercign,  in  depriving  him  of  a  right  which  he  has  lawfully 
acquired,  which  he  has  not  ufed  to  their  prejudice,  and  for  the 
lofs  of  which  they  cannot  indemnify  him. 

XIII.  But  what  mud  we  think  of  a  fovereign,  who,  inflead  of 
making  a  good  ufe  of  his  authority,  injures  his  fubjecls,  negleâs 
theintereft  of  the  ftate,  fubverts  the  fundamental  laws,  drains  the 
people  by  exceffive  taxe=,  which  he  fquanders  away  in  foolifh  and 
ufelefs  expences,  &c  r  Ought  the  perfon  of  fuch  a  king  to  be  fa- 
cred  to  the  fubjedls  ?  Ought  they  patiently  to  fubmit  to  all  his  ex- 
tortions ?  Or,  can  they  withdraw  from  his  authority  ? 

XIV.  To 


2jt  Tïje  Principles  of 

XIV.  To  anfwer  this  queOion,  which  is  one  cf  the  mod  delicate? 
in  politics,  I  obferve,  thatdifaflrefted,  mutinou?,  orfeditiousfubjeds, 
often  make  things,  highly  innocent,  pafs  for  acts  of  injiifticc  in  the 
fovereign.  The  people  are  apt  to  murmur  at  the  naod  neceflary 
taxes  J  others  feek  to  deftroy  the  government,  becaufe  they  have 
not  a  (hare  in  the  adminiftration.  In  a  word,  the  complaints  of 
fubjcfl^  oftener  denote  the  bad  humovir  and  feditious  fpirit  of 
thofe  who  make  them,  than  real  diforders  in  the  government,  or 
injufticc  in  thofe  who  govern. 

XV.  It  wereindeeJtobewiflied,  for  the  glory  of  fovereigns,  that 
the  complaints  of  fubjeéts  never  had  jufter  foundations.  Bin  hiftory 
and  experience  teach  us  that  they  are  too  often  well  founded. 
Under  thcfc  circumftance?,  what  is  the  duty  of  fubjecls  ?  Ought 
they  patiently  to  fuffer  ?  Or,  may  they  refift  their  (overeigni 

XVI.  We  muft  diflinguiflt  between  the  extreme  abufe  of  fovc- 
reignty,  which  degenerates  manifeftly  into  tyranny,  and  tends  to 
the  intire  ruin  of  the  fubjeiSls  ;  and  a  moderate  abufe  of  it,  which 
may  be  attributed  to  human  weaknefe,  rather  than  to  an  intention 
of  fubverting  the  liberty  andhappinefs  of  the  people. 

XVII.  In  the  fermer  cafe,  I  think  the  people  have  a  right  to 
refift  their  fovereign,  and  even  to  refume  the  fovereignty  which  they 
have  given  him,  and  which  he  has  abufed  to  excels.  But  if  the 
abufe  be  only  moderate,  it  is  their  duty  to  fuffer  fomething,  rather 
than  to  rife  in  arms  againft  their  fovereign. 

XVIII.  This  difl^inftion  Is  founded  on  the  nature  of  man,  and  the  na- 
ture and  end  of  government. The  people  rault  patiently  bear  the  flight 
injuftices  of  their  fovereign,  or  the  moderate  abufe  of  his  power,  be- 
caufe this  is  no  more  than  a  tribute  due  to  humanity.  It  is  on  this 
condition  they  have  invefted  him  with  the  fupreme  authority. 
Kings  are  men  as  well  as  others,  that  is  to  fay,  liable  to  be  mifta- 
ken,  and,  in  fome  inftances,  to  fail  in  point  of  duty.  Of  this  the 
people  cannot  be  ignorant,  and  on  this  footing  they  have  treated 
with  their  fovereign. 

XIX.  If,  for  the  fmalleft  faults,  the  people  had  a  right  to  refift 
or  depofe  their  fovereign,  no  prince  could  maintain  his  authority, 
and  the  community  would  be  continually  diftra6led  ;  fuch  a  fitua- 
tion  would  be  direilly  contrary  both  to  the  end  and  inftitution  of 
government,  and  of  fovereignty. 


Politic    Law.  273 


XX.  It  is  therefore  right  to  overlook  the  lefler  faults  of  fove- 
reigns,  and  to  have  a  regard  to  the  laborious  and  exalted  office  with 
which  they  are  inverted  for  our  prefervation.  Tacitus  beautifully 
fays:  "  We  muft  endure  the  luxury  and  avarice  of  fovereigns,  as 
"  we  endure  the  barrennefs  of  a  foil,  Itorms,  and  other  inconve- 
*'  niences  of  nature.  There  will  be  vices  as  long  as  there  are 
•*  men;  but  thefeare  not  continual,  and  are  recompenftd  by  the 
*'  intermixture  of  better  qualities.'"* 

XXI.  But  if  the  fovçreign  fhould  pufli  things  to  the  lafl  ex- 
tremity, fo  that  his  tyranny  becomes  inlupportable,  and  it  appears 
evident  that  he  has  formed  a  defigti  to  deftroy  the  liberty  of  his 
fubjects,  then  they  have  a  right  to  rife  againft  him,  and  even  to 
deprive  him  of  the  fupreme  power. 

XXir.  This  I  prove,  i^.  by  the  nature  of  tyranny,  which 
of  itielf  degrades  the  fovereign  of  his  dignity.  Sovereignty  always 
fuppofes  a  beneficent  power  :  we  muft  indeed  make  fome  allow- 
ance for  the  weaknefs  infeparable  from  humanity  ;  but  beyond 
that,  and  when  the  people  are  reduced  to  the  laft  extremity,  there 
is  no  difference  between  tyranny  and  robbery.  The  one  gives  no 
more  right  than  the  other,  and  vve  may  lawfully  oppofe  force  to 
violence. 

XXI n.  2'°.  Men  have  eftablifhed  civil  fociety  and  govern- 
ment for  their  own  good,  to  extricate  themfelves  from  troubles, 
and  to  be  refcued  from  the  evils  of  a  ftate  of  nature.  But  it  is 
highly  evident,  that  if  the  people  were  obliged  to  fuffer  every  op- 
preffion  from  their  fovereigns,  and  never  to  refift  their  encroach- 
ments, this  would  be  reducing  them  to  a  far  more  deplorable  ftate, 
than  that  frorn  which  they  wanted  to  avoid,  by  the  inftitution  of 
fovereignty.  It  can  never  furely  be  prefumed,  that  this  was  the 
intention  of  mankind. 

XXIV.  3*^.  Even  a  people,  who  have  fubmiitedto  an  abfolute 
government,  have  not  thereby  forfeited  the  right  of  afierting  their 
liberty,  and  taking  care  of  their  prefervation,  when  they  find  them- 
felves reduced  to  the  utmoft  mifery.  Abfolute  fovereignty,  in 
itfelf,  is  no  more  than  the  higheft  power  of  doing  good  ; 
now  the  higheft  power  of  procuring  the  good  of  a  perfon, 
L  1  and 

*  Quomodo  fterilitatem,  aut  nimlos  imbres,  et  csetera  naturse  mala,  ita  lut* 
uni  vel  avaritiam  doniinantium  tolerate.  Vitia  erunt,  donee  homines  ;  fed  neque 
kœc  continua,  et  meliçrum  intervcate  penfantur.   Hifi,  lib.  iv.   cap,lxx.iY.  N.  4> 


2  74  ^^  Principles  of 

and  the  abfolute  power  of  deftroyiiig  him  at  pleafure,  have 
jio  connexion  with  each  other.  Let  us  therefore  conclude,  that 
never  any  nation  had  an  intention  to  fubmit  their  liberties  to  a 
fovercign  in  fuch  a  manner,  as  never  to  have  It  in  their  power  to 
refift  hun,  not  even  lor  their  own  prefervation. 

XXV.  *'  Suppofe,  fays  Grotius,  ^  onehadafked  thofe  whofirft 
"  formed  the  civil  laws,  whether  they  intended  to  impofe  on  all 
"  the  fiibje£ts  th'j  fatal  necefTity  of  dying,  rather  than  taking  up 
*'  arms  to  defend  themfelves  againft  the  unjuft  violence  of  their 
"  fovereign  ?  I  know  not  whether  they  would  have  anfwered  in  the 
*•  affirmative.  It  is  rather  reafonable  to  believe  tlicy  would  have 
"  declared,  that  the  people  ought  not  to  endure  all  manner  of  in- 
"  juries,  except  perhaps  when  matters  are  fo  fituated,  that  refiil- 
*'  ance  would  infallibly  produce  very  great  troubles  in  theftate,  or 
**  tend  to  the  ruin  of  many  innocent  people." 

XXVL  We  have  already  proved  f ,  that  no  perfon  can  renounce 
his  liberty  to  fuch  a  degree  as  that  here  mentioned.  This  would 
befelling  his  own  life,  that  of  his  children,  his  religion,  in  a  word, 
every  advantage  he  enjoys,  which  it  is  not  certainly  in  any  man's 
power  to  do.  This  may  bs  illuftrated  by  the  comparifon  of  a 
patient  and  his  phyfician. 

XXVII.  If  therefore  the  fubje£ls  have  a  right  to  refift  the  man- 
ifeft  tyranny  even  of  an  abfolute  prince,  they  muf^,  for  a  fironger 
reafon,  have  the  fame  power  with  refpeil  to  a  prince  who  has  only 
a  limited  fovereignty,  fliould  he  attempt  to  invade  the  rights  and 
properties  of  his  people.  % 

XXVIII.  We  muft  indeed  patiently  fufTer  the  caprice  and 
anfterity  of  our  matters,  as  well  as  the  bad  humour  of  our  fathers 
and  mothers  ;  but,  as  Seneca  fays,  •*  Though  a  perfon  ought  to 
"  obey  a  father  in  all  things,  yet  he  is  not  obliged  to  obey  .him 
"  v/hen  his  commands  are  of  fuch  a  nature,  that  he  ceafes  thereby 
"  to  be  a  father." 

XXIX.  But  it  is  here  to  be  obferved,  that  when  we  fay  the 
people  have  a  right  to  refift  a  tyrant,  or  even  to  depofe  him,  wc 

ought 

•  Book  i.  chap.  iv.   §  7.  N.  2.  • 

f  Part  i.  chap.  vii.  N.  22,  &c. 

\  Grotlus  ou  the  right  of  v/ai  and  peacc^  book  i.  chap.  iv.  §  %* 


Politic    Law.  275 

ought  not,  by  the  word  people,  to  underhand  the  vile  populace  or 
dregs  of  accJuntry,  nor  the  cabal  of  a  fmall  number  of  f.-ditious 
perfons,  but  thegreateft  and  moftjudicious  part  of  the  fubjedts  of 
airorder  s  in  the  kingdom.  The  tyranny,  as  we  have  alfo  obferved, 
muft  be  notorious,  and  accompanied  with  the  higheft  evidence. 

XXX.  We  may  like  wife  affirm,  that,  ftriflly  fpealcing,  the  fub- 
je6ls  are  not  obliged  to  wait  till  the  prince  has  entirely  rivetted 
their  chains,  and  till  he  has  put  it  out  of  their  power  to  refift  him. 
It  is  high  tim3  to  think  of  their  fafety,  and  to  tiike  proper  meafures 
againlT:  tjieir  fovereign,  when  they  ft;)d  that  all  his  aitions  mjui- 
{c(\]y  tend  to  opprefs  them,  and  that  he  is  marching  boldly  on  to 
the  ruin  of  the  (tate. 

XXXI.  Thcfe  are  truths  of  the  lafl  importance.  It  is  highly 
proper  they  fhould  be  known,  not  only  for  the  fafety  and  happi- 
iiefs  of  nations,  but  alfo  for  the  advantiige  of  good  and  wife  kings, 

XXXII.  They,  who  are  well  acquainted  with  the  frailty  of 
human  nature,  are  always  diffident  of  themielves  ;  and  wifhing 
only  to  difcharge  their  duty,  are  contented  to  have  bounds  fet  to 
their  authority,  and  by  fuch  means  to  be  hindered  from  doing 
what  thsy  ought  to  avoid.  Taught  by  reafon  and  experience, 
that  the  people  love  peace  and  good  government,  they  will  never 
be  afraid  of  a  general  infurreftion,  fo  long  as  they  take  care  to 
govern  with  moderation,  and  hinder  their  officers  from  commit- 
ting injuftice. 

XXXin.  However,  the  abettors  of  defpotic  power  and  paffive 
obedience,  ftart  feveral  difficulties  on  this  fubjeft. 

Flrji  Objeâïlon.  A  revolt  againft  the  fupreme  power  includes  a 
contradi6tion  ;  for  if  this  power  is  fupreme,  there  is  nonefuperior 
to  it.  By  whom  then  fliall  it  be  judged  ?  If  the  fovereignty  ftill 
inheres  in  the  people,  they  havetiot  transferred  their  right  ;  and  if 
they  have  transferred  it,  they  are  no  longer  maftersof  it. 

Anfwer.  This  difficulty  fuppofes  the  point  in  queftion,  namely, 
that  the  people  have  divefted  themfelves  fo  far  of  their  liberty,  that 
they  have  given  fulF  power  to  the  fovereign  to  treat  them  as  he 
pleafes,  without  having  in  any  cafe  referved  to  themfelves  the 
power  of  refifting  him.  This  is  what  no  people  ever  did,  nor 
ever  could  do.  There  is  therefore  no  contradiction  in  the  prefent 
cafe.  A  power  given  for  a  certain  end,  is  limited  by  that  very  end. 
The  fupreme  power  acknowledges  none  aboye  itfelf,  fo  long  as 

ths 


276  T^he  Principles  of 

the  fovereign  has  not  forfeited  his  dignity.  But  if  he  has  degcn- 
crated  into  a  tyrant,  he  can  no  longer  claim  a  right  which  he  has 
forfeited  by  his  own  inifcondudl. 

XXXIV.  Second  ObjsSîion.  But  who  (lull  judge  whether  the 
prince  performs  his  duty,  or  whether  he  governs  tyrannically  ? 
Can  the  people  be  judges  in  their  own  caufe  ? 

Anjwer.  It  certainly  belongs  to  thofe  who  have  given  any  per- 
fonapower,  which  he  had  not  of  himfelf,  to  judge  whether  he 
ufes  it  agreeably  to  the  end  for  which  it  was  conferred  on  him. 

XXXV.  Ihird  Oh]e5iion.  We  cannot,  without  imprudence, 
grant  this  right  of  judging  to  the  people.  Political  affairs  are  not 
adapted  to  the  capacity  of  the  vulgar,  but  are  lometimes  of  fo  deli- 
cate a  nature,  that  even  perfons  of  the  beft  fenfe  cannot  form  a 
jight  judgment  of  them. 

Anfwer.  In  dubious  cafe?,  the  prefumplion  ought  ever  to  be  in 
favour  of  the  fbvtreign,  and  obedience  is  the  duty  of  fubje£ts. 
They  ought  even  to  bear  a  moderate  abufe  of  fovereignty.  But 
in  cafes  of  manifeft  tyranny,  every  one  is  in  a  condition  to  judge 
vvhether  he  is  highly  injured  or  not. 

XXXVI.  Fourth  ObjeSîîon.  But  do  we  not  expofe  the  ftate 
to  perpetual  revolutions,  to  anarchy,  and  to  certain  ruin,  by  ma- 
king the  fupreme  authority  depend  on  the  opinion  of  the  people, 
and  by  granting  them  the  liberty  to  rife  on  particular  occafions 
againft  their  fovereign  r 

Anfwer.  This  objection  would  be  of  fome  force,  if  we  pre- 
tended that  the  people  had  a  right  to  oppofe  their  fovereign,  or  to 
change  the  form  of  government,  through  levity  or  caprice,  or  even 
for  a  moderate  abufe  of  the  fupreme  power.  But  no  .inconveni- 
cncy  will  enfue,  while  the  fubjedls  only  ufe  this  right  with  all  the 
precautions,  and  in  the  circumftances  above  fuppofed.  Befides, 
experience  teaches  us  that  it  is  very  difficult  to  prevail  on  a  nation 
to  change  a  government  to  which  they  have  been  accufloujed. 
We  are  apt  to  overlook  not  only  flight,  but  even  very  confiderable 
Tjiiftalces  in  ou  goyernours, 

XXXVII.  Ojr  hypothefis  does  not  tend  more  than  any  other, 
to  excite  diflurbances  in  a  flate  ;  for  a  people,  opprefTed  by  a 
tyrannic  government,  will  rebel  as  frequently  as  thofe  who  live 
under  eftabliflied  laws.     Let  the  abettors  of  defpotic  power  cry  up 

their 


Politic    Law.  277 

their  prince  as  much  as  they  pleafe,  let  them  fay  the  moil  magnifi- 
cent things  of  his  facred  perfon,  yet  the  people,  reduced  to  the  laft 
mifery,  will  trample  thefe  fpecious  rcafons  under  foot,  as  focn  as 
they  can  do  it  with  an  appearance  of  fuccefs. 

XXXVIII.  In  fine,  though  the  fuhjeasmight  abufe  the  liberty 
which  we  grant  them,  yet  lefs  inconveniency  would  arife  from  this, 
than  from  allowino-  alTto  the  fovereign,  fo  as  to  let  a  whole  nation 
perilh,  rather  than  grant  it  the  power  of  checking  the  iniquity  of 
its  governors. 


CHAP.     VIII. 

Of  the  duty  oj Jovere'igns, 

I.  rr\ 

J[_  HERE  is  a  fort  of  commerce,  or  reciprocal  return  of  the 
duties  of  the  fubjecls  to  the  fovereign,  and  of  his  to  them.  Hav- 
ing treated  of  the  former,  it  remains  that  we  take  a  view  of  the 
latter. 

II.  From  what  has  been  hitherto  explained  concerning  the 
nature  of  fovereignty,  its  end,  extent  and  boundaries,  the  duty  of 
fovereigns  may  eafily  be  gathered.  But  fince  this  is  an  affair  of 
the  laft  impottance,  it  is  necefiiiry  to  fay  fomething  more  particu- 
lar on  it,  and  to  coUedl  the  principal  heads  of  it  as  it  were  into  one 
view. 

III.  Thehigher  a  fovereign  is  raifed  above  the  level  of  other 
men.  the  more  important  are  his  duties  :  if  he  can  do  a  great  deal 
of  good,  he  can  alfo  do  a  great  deal  of  mifrhief.  It  is  on  the  good 
or  evil  conduél  of  princes  that  the  happinefs  or  mifery  of  a  whole 
nation  or  people  depends.  How  happy  is  the  fituation,  which,  on 
all  inftances,  furnifties  occafions  of  doing  good  to  fo  many  thou- 
fands  !  but  at  the  fame  time,  how  dangerous  is  the  poft  which  ex- 
pofes  every  moment  to  tl:e  injuring  of  millions  ;  befides,  the  good 
which  princes  do,  fometimes  extends  to  the  moft  remote  ages  ; 
as  the  evils  they  commit  are  multipHed  to  lateft  polterity.  This 
fufficiently  difcovers  the  importance  of  their  duties. 

IV,  In  order  to  have  a  proper  knowledge  of  the  duty  of  fove- 
reigns. 


278  The  Principles  oJ 

reigns,  wc  need  only  attentively  confuler   the  nature  and  end  o 
civil  focieties,  and  tlie  exercife  of  the  diiFerent  parts  of  fovereignty. 

V.  I**.  The  firfb  general  duty  of  prince?,  is  carefully  to  in- 
form themfelves  of  every  thing  that  falls  under  the  complete  dif- 
charge  of  their  truft  ;  for  a  perfon  cannot  y.'ell  acquit  himfelf  in 
that  which  he  has  not  firft  rightly  learnt. 

VI.  It  is  a  great  miflake  to  imagine  that  the  knowledge  of 
government  is  an  eafy  affair;  on  the  contrary,  nothing  is  more 
difficult,  if  princes  would  difcharge  their  duty.  "Whatever  talents 
or  genius  thty  may  have  received  from  nature,  this  is  an  employ- 
n-icnt  that  requires  the  u'hole  man.  The  general  rules  of  govern- 
ing well  are  few  in  number  ;  but  the  difficulty  is  to  make  a  juft 
application  of  them  to  times  and  circumflances  ;  and  this  demands 
the  greateft  efforts  of  diligence  and  human  prudence. 

VII.  2^.  When  a  prince  is  once  convinced  of  the  obligation 
he  is  under  to  inform  himfelf  exadly  of  all  that  is  neceffary  for 
the  difcharge  of  his  truft,  and  of  the  difficulty  of  getting  this  in- 
formation, he  will  begin  with  removing  every  obftacle  which  may 
oppofe  it.  And  firft  it  is  abfolutely  necefTary,  that  princes  fhould 
retrench  their  pleafures  and  ufelefs  diverfions,  fo  far  as  thefe  may 
be  a  hindrance  to  the  knowledge  and  practice  of  their  duty. 
Then  they  ough'  :o  endeavour  to  have  wife,  prudent  and  experi- 
enced perfons  about  them  ;  and,  on  the  contrary,  to  remove  flat- 
terers, buffoons,  and  other?,  whofe  Vv'hole  merit  coniifts  i«  things 
that  are  frivolous  and  unworthy  the  attention  of  a  fovereign.  Prin- 
ces ought  not  to  choofe  for  favourites  thofe  who  are  moft  proper  to 
divert  them,  but  fuch  as  are  moft  capable  of  governing  the  ftate, 

VIII.  Above  all  things,  they  cannot  guard  too  much  agàinft 
flattery.  No  human  condition  has  fo  great  an  occafion  for  true 
and  faithful  advice,  as  that  of  kings.  And  yet  princes,  corrupted 
by  flattery,  take  every  thing,  that  is  free  and  ingenuous,  to  be 
harfh  and  auftere.  They  are  become  {<:^  delicate,  that  every  thing, 
which  is  not  adulation,  offends  them  :  But  nothing  ought  they  to 
be  fo  greatly  afraid  of  as  this  very  adulation,  fmce  there  are  no 
mifsries  into  which  they  may  not  be  hurried  by  its  poifonous  infin- 
uation.  On  the  contrary,  the'  prince  is  happy,  even  if  he  has  but 
a  fingle  fuhje6l,  who  is  fo  generous  as  tofpeak  the  truth  to  him  j 
fuch  a  man  is  the  treafure  of  the  ftate.     Prudent  fovereigns,  who 

have 


P  O  L  I  T  I  C      L  A  W.  279 

have  their  true  interefts  at  heart,  ought  continually  to  imagine  that 
court  fycophants  only  regard  themfelves  and  not  their  mafter; 
whereas  a  fincere  counfellor,  as  it  were,  forgets  himfelf,  and  thinks 
only  on  the  advantage  of  his  mafter. 

IX.  3°.  Princes  ought  to  ufe  all  poffible  application  to  under- 
fland  the  conftitution  of  the  (late,  and  the  natural  temper  of  their 
fubjcils.  They  ought  not  in  this  refpedl  to  be  contented  with  a 
general  and  faperficial  knowledge.  They  fhould  enter  into  par- 
ticulars, and  carefully  examine  into  the  conftitution  of  the  ftate, 
into  its  eftablifhment  and  power,  whether  it  be  old  or  of  late  date, 
fucceflive  or  eledive,  acquired  by  legal  methods  or  by  arms  ;  they 
•fhould  alfo  fee  how  far  this  jurifdi6lion  reaches,  what  neighbours 
are  about  them,  what  allies,  and  what  ftrength  and  what  conven- 
iences the  ftate  is  provided  with.  For  according  10  thef;  confid- 
erations  the  fcepter  muft  be  fwayed,  and  the  rider  muft  take  care 
to  keep  a  ftiffer  or  flacker  rein. 

X.  4.°.  Sovereigns  ought  alfo  to  endeavour  to  excel  in  fuch  vir- 
tues as  are  moft  necefTary  to  fupport  the  weight  of  fo  important  a 
charge,  and  to  regulate  their  outward  behaviour  in  a  manner  wor- 
thy of  their  rank  and  dignity. 

Xr.  We  have  already  fhewn  that  virtue  in  general  confifts  in 
that  ftrength  of  mind,  which  enables  us  not  only  to  confult  right 
reafon  on  all  occafions,  but  alfo  to  follow  her  counfels  with  eafe, 
and  efFe£lually  to  refift  every  thing  capable  of  giving  us  a  contrary 
biafs.  This  fingle  idea  of  virtue  is  fufficient  to  fhew  how  necefTary 
it  is  to  all  men.  But  none  have  more  duties  to  fulfil,  none  are 
more  expofed  to  temptation,  than  fovereigns  ;  and  none  ot  courfe 
have  a  greater  necefTity  for  the  aflTiftance  of  virtue.  Befides,  virtue 
in  princes  has  this  advantage,  that  it  is  the  fureft  method  of  in- 
fpiYing  their  fubjedls  with  the  like  principles.  For  this  purpofe 
they  need  only  fliev/  the  way.  The  example  of  the  prince  has  a 
greater  force  than  the  law.  It  is,  as  it  were,  a  living  law,  of  mor« 
efficacy  than  precept.     But  to  defcend  to  particulars. 

XII.  The  virtues  moft  necefTary  to  fovereigns  are,  i^.  Piety, 
which  is  certainly  the  foundation  of  all  other  virtues  ;  but  it  muft 
be  a  folid  and  rational  piety,  free  from  fuperftition  and  bigotry. 
In  the  high  fituation  of  fovereigns,  the  only  motive,  which  can 
moft  furely  induce  them  to  the  diicharge  of  ^jieir  duty,  is  the  fear  of 

God.. 


2Zo  77:e  Principles  of 

God.  Without  that,  they  will  foon  run  into  every  vice  which  their 
partions  dié^Jtej  and  the  people  will  become  the  innocent  victims 
of  their  pride,  ambition,  avarice  and  cruelty.  On  the  contrary, 
we  may  cxped^  every  thing  that  is  good  from  a  prince,  who  fears 
and  refpefts  God,  as  a  fnpreme  Being  on  whom  he  depends,  and 
to  whom  he  muft  one  day  give  an  account  of  his  adminrftration. 
Nothing  can  befo  powerful  a  motive  as  this  to  engage  princes  to 
perform  their  duty,  nothing  can  fo  well  cure  them  of  that  danger- 
ous mi  (take,  that  being  above  other  men,  they  may  act  as  abfolute 
lords,  as  if  they  were  not  to  render  an  account  of  their  condu<Eï, 
autl  be  judged  in  their  turn,  after  having  pafled  fentence  on  others. 

XIII.  2°.  The  love  oï  Equity  and  'Jujitce,  The  principal 
end  a  prince  was  made  for,  is  to  take  care  that  every  one  fhould 
have  his  right.  This  ought  to  engage  him  to  ftudy  not  only  the 
fcjence  of  thofe  great  civilians  who  afcend  to  the  fitft  princij)les  of 
lawj  which  regulate  human  focicty,  and  are  the  bafis,  as  it  were, 
ol  government  and  politics  ;  but  alfo  that  part  of  the  law,  which 
defcends  to  the  affairs  of  particular  perfons.  This  branch  is  gen- 
erally left  for  the  gentlemen  of  the  long  robe,  and  not  admitted 
into  the  education  of  princes,  though  they  are  every  day  to  pafs 
judgment  upon  the  fortiuies,  liberties,  lives,  honour  and  reputa- 
tion of  their  fubjedls.  Princes  are  continually  talked  to  of  valour 
and  liberality;  but  if  juftice  does  not  regulate  thefe  two  qualities, 
they  degenerate  into  the  moft  odious  vices  :  without  juftice,  val- 
our does  nothing  butdeflroy  ;  and  liberality  is  only  a  foolifli  pro- 
fufenefs.  Juftice  keeps  all  in  order,  and  contains  within  bounds 
him  who  diftributes  it,  as  well  as  thofc  to  whom  it  is  diftributed, 

XIV.  3°.  Valour.  Butit  muft  be  fetin  motion  by  juftice,  and 
conduced  by  prudence.  .  A  prince  fhould  expofe  his  perfon  to  the 
greateft  perils  as  often  as  it  is  neccftary.  Fie  diihcnours  himfclf 
more  by  being  afraid  of  danger  in  time  of  war,  than  by  never  taking 
the  field.  The  courage  of  him  who  commands  others,  ought  not 
to  be  dubious  ;  but  neither  ought  he  to  run  headlong  into  danger. 
Valour  can  no  longer  be  a  virtue  than  as  it  is  guided  by  prudence, 
otherwife  it  is  a  ftupid  contempt  of  life,  and  a  brutal  ardour. 
Inconfiderate  valour  is  always  iniecure.  He,  who  is  not  tnafter 
of  himfelf  in  dangers,  is  rather  fierce  than  brave  ;  if  he  does  not 
fly,  he  is  at  leaft  confounded.  He  lofes  that  pref:;nce  of  mind 
which  would  be  neceftary  tor  him  to  give  proper  orders,  to  take 
advantage  of  opportunities,  and  to  rout  the  enemy .  The  true  way 
of  finding  glory,  is  calmly  to  wait  for  the  favourable  occafion.  Vir- 
tue 


Politic    Law.  281 

tue  IS  the  more  revered,  as  flis  fhews  herfelf  plain,  modeft,  and 
averfe  to  pride  and  oftentdtion.  In  proportion  as  the  neceliltyof 
cxpofing  yourfelf  to  danger  augments,  your  forefight  and  courage 
ought  alfo  to  increafe. 

XV.  4*^.  Another  virtue,  very  neceOTary  in  princes,  is  to  be 
extremely  referved  in  diicoverin^  their  thoughts  and  deluns. 
This  is  evidently  necdV-iry  to  thofi  who  are  concerned  in  govern- 
ment :   it  includes  a  wife  ditlidence,  and  an  innocent  diifimulation. 

XVI.  5**.  A  prince  mu.fîj  above  all  things,  accudom  himfu-If 
to  moderate  his  defirei.  For  as  he  has  th^  po'.ver  of  gritifyin^ 
them,  if  he  once  gives  v/.iy  to  them,  he  will  riin  t)  th^  greatell 
excefs,  and  by  deltroyin»  hi»  fubjeils  will  at  lift  complete  his 

own  ruin.     In  order  to  farm  himlelf  to  this  moderatio;!,  nothing  > 

is  mjre  proper  than  toaccullim  himl'elf  to  patience.  This  is  the 
moft  necelîiry  of  all  virtues  for  thofe  who  are  to  command.  A 
man  muft  be  patient  to  become  mafter  of  himf*lf  and  others. 
Impatienee,  which  feems  to  be  a  vijforous  ejcertibn  of  the  foul,  is 
only  a  wealcnefs  and  inability  of  fu.Tering  pain.  He  who  cannot 
wait  and fufFer,  is  like  a  pierfon  that  cannot  keep  a  fecret.  Both 
want  refolution  to  contain  themfclves.  The  more  power  an  im- 
patient man  has,  the  more  fatal  his  impatience  will  be  to  him. 
He  will  not  wait  ;  he  gives  himfelf  no  tim^  to  judge  ;  he  forces 
every  thing  to  pleafe  himfelf  ;  he  tears  off  the  boughs,  to  gather 
the  fruit  before  it  is  ripe  ;  he  breaks  down  thî  gates,  rather  thaa 
ftay  till  they  are  opened  to  hira. 

XVli.  ô'^.  Giodiiefs  2ini  Clemency  are  alfo  virtues  verynecef- 
fary  to  a  prince  :  his  oiHeeis  to  do  go:)dl,  and  it  is  for  this  end  thï 
fupreme  power  is  lodged  in  his  hand.  It  is  alfo  principally  by 
this  thaths  ought  to  dillinguilh  himfelf. 

XVIII.  7"^.  Liberality,  well  underftood  and  well  applied,  isfo 
much  the  more  elTential  to  a  prince,  as  avarice  fs  a  dif^race  to  \ 
perfon  whom  it  cofts  almoft  nothing  to  be  liberal.  To  take  ic 
exa£lly,  a  king,  as  a  king,  has  nothing  properly  his  own  ;  for  he 
owes  his  very  fclf  to  others.  But  on  the  other  hand,  no  perfon 
ought  to  be  more  careful  in  regulating  the  exercife  of  this  noble 
virtue.  It  requires  great  circumfpeillon,  and  fuppjfes,  in  the 
prince,  ajuftdifcernment  ànJ  a  good  tafte  to  know  ho//  to  beltow 
and  difjjenfe  favours  on  proper  perfons.  He  ought,  above  all 
thiji^s,  to  ufe  this-virtue  for  rewanling  merit  and  virtue. 

Mm  XIX,  But 


282  The  Principles  of 

XIX.  But  liberality  has  its  bounds,  even  in  the  mod  opulent 
princes.  The  ftate  may  be  compared  to  a  'amHy.  The  want  of 
forefight,  profiitîonof  treafure,  and  the  voluptuous  inclination  of 
pninces,  who  are  the  mailers  of  it,  do  more  mifchief  than  the  moft 
fkilful  rriinillers  can  repair. 

XX.  To  reimburfe  his  trcafures,  fquandered  away  without  ne* 
ccfliry,  and  often  in  criminal  excelTes,  he  m u ft  have  recourfe  to 
expedients  which  are  f.ital  to  the  fubjeiSls  and  the  date.  He  lo(es 
the  hearts  of  the  people,  and  caiifes  murmurs  and  difcontent?, 
which  are  ever  dangerous,  and  of  which  an  enemy  m.iy  take  ad- 
vantage. Thefe  are  inconveniences  that  even  common  fenfe 
might  point  out,  if  the  ftrong  propenfity  to  pleafure,  and  the  in- 
toxication of  power,  did  not  often  extinguifh  the  lii?ht  of  reafon 
in  princes.  To  what  cruelty  and  injurtice  did  not  the  extrava- 
gant profuHons  of  Nero  ca.-ry  him  ?  A  prudent  œconomy,  on 
the  contrary,  fupplies  the  deficiencies  of  the  revenue,  maintains 
families  and  ftaies,  and  preferves  them  in  a  flourifliing  condition. 
By  œconomy  princes  not  only  have  money  intime  of  need,  but 
a!fo  poflefs  the  hearts  of  their  fubjedls,  who  freely  open  their 
purfes  upon  any  unforefecn  emergency,  when  they  fee  that  the 
prince  has  been  fparing  in  his  expences  ;  the  contrary  happens 
v.'hcn  he  has  fquandered  away  his  treafures. 

XXr.  This  is  a  general  idea  of  the  virtues  moft  nccefl'ary  to  a 
fovereign,  birfides  thofe  which  are  common  to  him  with  private 
people,  and  of  which  feme  are  included  even  in  thofe  we  have 
been  mentioning.  Cicero  foll'ows  almoft  the  fame  ideas  in  the 
er.umeraiion  he  makes  of  the  royal  virtues.* 

XXII.  It  is  by  the  afiiftaace  of  th-fe  virtues,  of  which  we    here 
have  'j^lven  an  idea,  that  fovereigns  are  enabled  to  apply  themfelves 
■  with  fuccefs  to  the  functions  of  government,   and  to  fulfil  the  dif- 
ferent duties  of  it.     Let  us  fay  fomething  more  particular  on  the 
edliial  exercife  of  thofe  duties. 

XXIIÎ.  There  is  a  general  rule  which  includes  all  the  duties' 
of  a  fovereign,  and  bv  which  he  mayealily  judge  how  to  proceed 
under  every  circumft-mce.  Let  iL' fafcty  of  the  people  be  the  fu- 
hreme  laivl  This  ou /ht  to  be  the  chief  end  of  all  his  allions. 
^     '  The 


*  Fortem,  juftum,  feverum,  gravem.  niagnaninium,  largum,  beneficum,  iik- 
eralcm  dici,  hw  funt  regi»  laades,     Orat  pr9  rege  D'jotaro,  caf.  9. 


Po  L  I  T  I  C      L  AW.  28 

T  he  fupreme  authority  has  been  conferred  upon  him  with  this 
V  iew  ;  and  the  fulfilling  of  it  is  the  foundation  of  his  right  and 
p  owcr.  1'he  prince  is  properly  the  fcrvant  of  the  public.  He 
o  ught,  as  it  were,  to  forget  himfclf,  in  order  to  ihinlc  only  on  the 
ad  vantage  and  good  of  thofe  whom  he  governs.  lie  ought  not  to 
loc)k.  upon  any  thing  as  ufcful  to  himfelf,  v\hich  is  not  fo  to  the  Irate. 
This  was  trie  idea  of  the  heathen  philofophers.  They  dehiud  a 
good  prince,  one  who  endeavours  to  render  his  fubjedls  hajjpy  ; 
and  a  tyrant,  on  the  contrary,  one  who  aiiPiS  only  at  his  own  pri- 
vate advantage, 

XXIV.  The  very  interefl  of  the  fovereign  demands,  that  he 
fliotild  direct  all  his  adlions  to  the  public  good.  By  fuch  a  con- 
du(£l  he  wins  the  hearts  of  his  lubjedls,  and  Uys  the  foundation  of 
folid  happinefs  and  true  ghjry. 

XXV.  Where  the  government  is  moft  defpotlc,  there  fovereigns  ' 
are  leaft  powerful.  They  ruin  every  thing,  and  are  the  fole 
poirellbrs  of  the  whole  country;  but  then  the  ftate  languiflies, 
becaufe  it  is  exhaufted  of  men  and  money  ;  and  this  firft  lofs  is  the 
greatetl  and  molt  irreparable.  His  fuhjedts  feera  to  adore  him, 
and  to  tremble  at  his  very  looks  :  But  lee  what  will  be  the  con- 
fequence  upon  the  leaft  revolution  ;  then  we  find  ihp.t  this  rnon- 
ftrous  power,  puih^d  to  excefs,  cannot  long  endure,  becaufe  it  has 
no  refource  in  the  hearts  of  the  people.  On  the  firft  blow,  the 
idol  tumbles  down  and  is  trampled  under  foot,  l^he  king,  who, 
in  his  profperity,  found  not  a  man  who  durfl:  tell  him  the  truth, 
(haU  not  find  one,  in  his  adverfity,  that  will  vouchfafe  either  to 
excufe,  or  defend  him  againd  his  enemies.  It  is  therefore  equally 
effential  to  the  happinefs  of  the  people  and  of  fovereigns,  that  th* 
latter  (hould  Follow  no  other  rule  in  the  manner  of  governing,  thaa 
that  of  the  public  welfare. 

XXVI.  It  is  not  difficult,  from  this  general  rule,  to  deduce 
thofe  of  a  more  particular  nature.  The  functions  of  the  govern- 
ment relate  either  to  the  domeftic  intercits  of  the  ilate,  or  to  its 
foreign  concerns. 

XXVII.  A^  for  the  domeftic  interefts  of  the  (late,  the  firft 
care  of  the  fovereign  ought  to  be,  1°.  to  /orm  his  fubje(Els  to  good 
manners.  For  this  purpcfe  the  duty  of  fupreme  rulers  is,  not  only 
toprefcribe  good  laws,  by  which  every  one  may  know  how  he 
ought  to  behave,  in  order  to  promote  the  public  good  ;  but  efpe- 

cially 


/y 


28+  T'he  Principles  of 

cially  to  eftablifli  the  moft  perfc£l  manner  of  public  inftiu£lion, 
and  of  the  edtication  of  youth.  This  is  the  only  method  of  ma- 
king tne  fubjedls  conform  to  the  laws  both  by  reafcu  and  cultom, 
rather  than  through  tear  of  punifliment. 

XXVIII.  The  firft  care  of  a  prince  therefore  ought  to  be  to 
cred\  public  fchools  for  the  education  of  children,  2nd  for  training 
them  belimts  to  vvildom  and  virtue.  Children  are  the  hope  and 
Itrength  of  a  nation.  It  is  too  late  to  correél  them  v\ hen  they 
arefpoiled.  it  is  infinitely  better  to  prevent  the  evil,  than  lo  be 
obliged  to  punifh  it.  1'he  king,  who  is  the  father  of  all  his  peo- 
ple, is  more  particularly  the  father  of  all  the  youth,  who  are,  as  it 
were,  the  flower  of  the  whole  nation.  And  as  it  is  in  the  flower, 
that  fruits  are  prepared,  fo  it  is  one  of  the  principal  duties  of  the 
fovereign  to  take  care  of  the  education  of  youth,  and  the  inftruc- 
tion  of  his  fubjeâs,  to  plant  the  principles  of  virtue  early  in  their 
1'  inds,  and  to  maintain  and  confirm  them  in  that  happy  difpofition. 
It  is  not  laws  and  ordinances,  but  good  morals,  chat  properly 
regulate  the  (tat?. 

^i'ld  leges  fine  mor'ibut 
f^ana  prcficiiait,  * 

And  what  are  laws,  «nlefs  obey'd 

By  the  fame  moral  virtues  they  were  made  ? 

Francis. 

Thofe  who  have  had  a  bnd  education,  make  no  fcruplc  to  violate 
theb;-!}  political  conflitutions  ;  whereas  they  who  have  been  pro- 
perly tr.iined  up,  cheerfully  conform  to  all  good  inftitntions.  In 
fine,  noihmg  is  more  conducive  to  {o  good  an  end  in  Hates,  than  to 
iufpire  the  people  in  the  earlier  part  of  life  with  the  principles  of 
the  ChriflK'n  religion^  purt'ed  from  all  human  invention.  For 
this  religion  includes  the  moft  perfect  fcheme  of  morality,  the 
mixims  of  which  are  extremely  well  adapted  for  promoting  the 
happmefs  of  lociety, 

XXIX.  2^.  The  fovereign  ought  to  eftablifii  gooà  laws  for 
the  fettliig  of  fijch  affairs,  as  the  fubjeéls  have  moll  frequent  occa. 
fion  to  tranfa£t  with  each  other.  Thefe  laws  ought   to  be  jull, 

equitable, 

.  ■  .     ■      ■   '     ■         .        'f.  ' 
•  Horat,  lib,  jii.  pd.  14.  y.  3j,  36. 


Politic    Law.  285 

equitable,  clear,  without  ambiguity  and  contradidion,  ufeful,  ac- 
coinmod.ited  to  the  condition  ar.d  the  genius  of  the  people,  at 
Icaft  io  far  as  the  good  of  the  ftate  will  permit,  that,  by  their  means, 
differences  may  be  eafily  determined  :  but  they  are  not  to  be  mul- 
tiplied without  neceffity. 

XXX.  I  faid,  that  laws  ou»ht  to  hs  accommodated  to  the  condition 
and  genius  of  the  people  ;  and  for  this  reafon  1  have  before  obferved, 
that  tiie  fovcfcign  ought  to  be  thoroughly  in(lru6led  in  this  article  i 
otherwife  one  of  thefe  two  inconveniences  muft  happen,  either 
that  the  laws  arc  not  oHferved,  and  then  it  becomes  ncceffary  to 
punifh  an  infinite  number  of  people,  while  the  flate  reaps  no  ad- 
vantage from  it  ;  or  that  the  authority  of  the  laws  is  defpifed,  and 
then  Che  ibte  is  on  the  brink  of  dellrudtion. 

XXXI.  I  mentioned  alfo,  that  IcTiJUS  ought  net  to  be  mtdtiplied 
without  necej/tty  ;  for  this  would  only  tend  to  lay  fnares  for  the  fub- 
jeél,  and  expole  him  to  inevitable  punifhmentF,  v.'ithout  any  advan- 
tage to  the  fociety.  In  fine,  it  is  of  great  importance  to  regulate 
what  relates  to  the  adminiilration  and  ordinary  forms  of  jultice, 
fo  that  every  fubjeâ  may  have  it  in  his  power  to  recover  his  right, 
without  lofing  much  time,  or  being  at  a  great  expcnce. 

XXXII.  3°.  It  would  be  of  no  ufj  to  make  good  laws,  if 
people  were  fuffered  to  violate  ihem  with  impunity.  Sovereigns 
ought  therefore  to  fee  them  properly  executed,  and  to  punlfli  the 
delinquents  without  exception  of  perfons,  according  to  the  quality 
and  degree  of  the  offence.  It  is  even  fometimes  proper  to  punifn 
feverely  at  fini,  Tliere  are  circumlt mces  in  which  it  is  clemency 
to  maice  fuch  early  examples,  a?  (liai!  ftop  the  courfe  of  iniquity. 
But  what  is  chieily  necefliiry,  and  what  jultice  and  the  public  good 
abfolutcly  require,  is,  that  the  feverit)  of  the  laws  be  exercifed  not 
only  upon  the  (ubje6ls  of  moderate  fortune  and  condition,  but  aUl> 
upon  the  wealthy  and  powerful.  It  would  be  unjuft  that  reputa- 
tion, nobility,  and  riches,  fhould  authorize  any  one  to  infult  thofe 
who  are  deiliiute  of  thefe  advantages.  The  populace  are  often 
reduced  by  oppreifion  to  defpair,  and  their  fury  at  laft  throws  tlic 
ftatc  into  convulùons. 

XXXIH.  4°.  Since  men  firft  joined  in  civil  focieties  to  fkreeii 
rhemfelves  from  the  injuries  and  malice  of  others,  and  to  procura 
all  the  fweets  and  pleafures  which  can  render  life  commodious  and 
happy  i  the  fovereign  is  o'Ol  ged  to  hinder  the  fubje^s  from  wrong- 
ing 


286  The  Principles  of 

iiig  each  other,  to  maintain  order  and  peace  in  the  community  by  a 
ftridl  execution  ot  the  laws,  to  tac  end  that  his  fubje(î\s  may  ob- 
tain the   advantages  which  mankind  can  reafonably  propofe  to 
themfelves  by  joining  in  fociety.     When  the  Idbjedts  are  not  kept 
within  rule,  their  perpetual  intercourfe  eadly  turnifhcs  them  with 
opportunities  of  injurnigone  another.     But  nothing  is  more  con- 
trary to  the  nature  and  end  ot  civil  government,  than  to  permit 
fubjedstodo  themfelves  jullice,  and,  hy  their  own  private  force^ 
to  revenge  the  injuries  they  think  they  have  I'uflered,     We  Ihall 
here  add  a   beautiful  paflage  (rem   Mr.  de  la  Bruiere  upon  this 
fubjedl.  *    "  What  would  it  avail  me,  or  any  ofmy  tellow-fubjcdl?, 
*'  that  my  fovereign  was  fuccefiful  and  crowned  with  glory,  that 
"  my  country  was  powerful  and  the  terror  of  rieighbouring  nations, 
••  if  I  were  forced  to  lead  a  melancholy  and  mi(erable  life  under 
"  the  burthen  uf  oppreflion  and  indigence  :  If,  while  I  was  fecured 
•'  from  the  inciirfions  of  a  foreign  enemy,  I  found  royfclf  expofed 
"  at  home  to  the  fword  of  an  aflafTui,  and   was  lefs  in  danger  of 
*•  being  robbed  or  mairicred  in  the  dai  ke(t  nights,  and    in  a  thick 
*•  forett,  than  in  the  public  ftreets  .?  If  fafety,  clcanlintfs,  and  good 
'«  order,  had  not  rendered  living  in  towns  fo  pleafant,  and  had  not 
«'  only  furnifhed  them  with  the  necefTaries,  but  moreover  with  all 
••  the  fwects  and  conveniences  of  life  ?  If,  being  weak  and  defence^ 
•'  lefi,  I  were  encroached  upon  in  the  country,  by  every  neighbour- 
*'  ing  great  man  ?  If  fo  good  a  provifion  had   not  been   made. to 
•*  protect  me  againfl  his  nijuftice  \  If  I  had  not  at  hand  fo  many, 
*'  and  fuch  excellent  mafters,  to  educate  my  children  in  thofe  arts 
•'  and  fciences  which  will  one  day  make  iheir  fortune  ?  If  the  con- 
"  veniency  of  commerce  had  not  made  good  fubftantial  fluffs  for 
"  my  cloathing,  and  wholefome  food   for  my   nourifhment,  both 
*'  plentiful  and  cheap  ?  If,  to  conclude,  the  care  of  my  fuvereign 
**  had  not  given  me  reafon  to  be  as  well  contented  with  my  fortune, 
*'  as  his  princely  virtues  mufl  needs  make  him  with  his  r" 

XXXIV.  5°.  Since  a  prince  can  neither  fee  nor  do  every 
thing  himfelf,  he  mufl  have  the  afTiftance  of  rninifters  :  Butthele, 
as  they  derive  their  whole  authority  from  their  mafter,  all  the  good 
or  evil  they  do  is  finally  imputed  to  him.  It  is  therefore  the  duty 
.  of  fovereigns  to  chufe  perfons  of  integrity  and  ability  for  the  em- 
ployments with  which  they  entruft  thcnx.  They  ought  often  to 
examine  their  conduct,  and  to  punilh  or  rccompcnfe  them,  accord- 
ing 

*  Charaiflers  and  manacr*  of  the  prefcnt  age,"  chap.  x.  of  the  fovere'gn, 


Politic    Law.  287 

ing  to  their  merits.  In  fine,  they  ought  never  to  rcfufe  to  lend  a 
patient  ear  to  the  humble  rcmonftrances  and  complaints  of  their 
Tubjetts,  when  they  areopprciTcd  and  trampled  on  by  minillers  and 
fuburdinate  raagiftrates. 

XXXV.  6^.  With  regard  to  fubfidiesand  taxes,  fince  the  fub- 
je6ts  are  not  obliged  to  pay  them,  but  as  they  are  necefl'ary  to  àe- 
fray  the  expences  of  the  ftate,  in  war  or  peace  ;  the  fovereign 
ought  to  exa(5t  no  more  than  the  public  ncccfîitics,  or  the  fignal 
advantage  of  the  ftate,  fhiU  require.  He  ought  alfo  to  (ee  that 
the  fubjeits  be  incommoded  as  little  as  pofllble  by  the  taxes  laid 
upon  them.  There  fhould  beajuft  proportion  in  the  tax  of  every 
individual,  and  there  muft  be  no  exception  or  immunity  which 
may  turn  to  the  difadvantage  of  others.  The  money  colleéled 
ought  to  be  laid  out  in  the  neceflities  of  the  date,  and  not  wafted 
in  luxury,  debauchery,  foolilli  largefles,  or  vain  magnificence. 
Laftly,  the  expences  ought  to  be  proportioned  to  the  revenue. 

XXXVI.  '^^.  It  is  the  duty  of  a  fovereign  to  draw  no  further 
fupplies  from  his  fubjeéls  than  he  really  ftands  in  need  of:  the 
wealth  of  the  fubje*5ls  forms  tha  ftrength  of  the  ftate,  and  the  ad  van- 
tage of  families  and  individuals.  A  prince  therefore  ought  to  ncg- 
ledt  nothing  that  can  contribute  to  the  prefervation  and  increafe 
of  the  riches  of  his  people.  For  this  purpofe  he  fhould  fee  that 
they  draw  all  the  profit  they  can  from  their  lands  and  waters,  and 
keep  themfelves  always  employed  in  fome  induftrious  exercife  or 
other.  He  ought  to  further  and  promote  the  mechanic  arts,  and 
give  all  poiTible  encouragement  to  commerce.  It  is  likewife  his 
duty  to  bring  his  lubjedts  to  a  frugal  method  of  living  by  good 
fumptuary  laws,  which  may  forbid  fuperfîuous  expences,  and 
efpecially  thofe  by  which  the  wealth  of  the  natives  is  tranflated  to 
foreigners. 

XXXVII.  8°.  Laftly,  it  is  equally  the  intereft  and  duty  of  a 
fupreme  governor,  to  guard  againft  fa£lions  and  cabals,  from 
whence  feditions  and  civil  wars  eafily  arife.  But,  above  all,  he 
ought  to  take  care  that  none  of  his  fubjsds  place  a  greater  dépend- 
ance, even  under  the  pretext  of  religion,  on  any  other  power, 
either  within  or  without  the  realm,  than  on  his  lawful  fovereign. 
This  in  general  is  the  law  of  the  public  good  in  regard  to  the  do- 
meftic  imereits,  or  internal  tranquillity  cf  îhe  ftate. 

XXXVIII.  As 


288  7^^  Principles,  &c. 

XXXVIII.  As  to  foreign  concerns,  the  principal  duties  of 
the  king  are, 

I*.  To  live  in  peace  with  his  neighbours  as  much  as  he  pof- 
fibly  can. 

2^.  To  condu6l  himfelf  with  prudence  in  regard  to  the  allian- 
ces and  treaties  he  makes  with  other  powers. 

3°.  To  adhere  faithfully  to  the  treaties  he  has  made. 

4^.  NottofufFcr  the  courage  of  his  fubjecls  to  be  enervated, 
bat,  on  the  contrary,  to  maintain  and  augment  it  by  good  difcipline. 

S°'  In  due  and  feafonable  time  to  make  the  preparations  ne- 
celfary  to  put  himfelf  in  a  pofture  of  defence. 

6^.  Not  to  undertake  any  unjult  or  rafb  v/ar. 

7°*.  Laftly,  even  in  times  of  peace  to  be  very  attentive  to  the 
deligns  and  motions  of  his  neighbours. 

XXXIX.  We  fliall  fay  no  more  of  the  duties  of  fovereîgns. 
It  is  fufficientat  prefent  to  have  pointed  out  the  general  principles, 
and  collected  the  chief  heads  :  what  we  have  to  fay  hereafter  con- 
cerning the  different  parts  of  fovereignty,  will  give  the  reader  a 
more  diftincl  idea  of  the  particular  duties  attending  it. 


THE  END  OF  THE  SECOND  PAI^T. 


l^^^!^^^^^c^^^^^:^^c:^^^i^^^^^s^m 


^ 


OOOO  C  C90  09i;0  &09Q  9000(000  0O00O00J«9  JO  COM  JC  9^0000(006  0000 OCOO 


'^ 


THE 


PRINCIPLES 


O   F 


POLITIC     LAW. 


PART    III. 


yf  more  particular  examination  of  the  ejfeniial  parts  of fovereignty^  or 
of  the  different  rights  of  the  Jovereign^  with  refpeâî  to  the  internal 
aciminiji  ration  of  the  fiate^fuch  as  the  legijlative  power^  the  fu- 
preme  power  in  matters  of  religion^  the  right  of  infliiiing  punifl}^ 
ments^  and  that  which  thefovereign  ha:  over  the  Bona  Reipublicse, 
or  the  goods  contained  in  the  commonwealth. 


CHAP.      I. 

Of  the  legijlative  power,  and  the  civil  laws  which  arifejrom  it. 


I. 


WE  have  hitherto  explained  what  relates  to  the  nature 
of  civil  Ibciety  in  general,  of  government,  and  of 
fovereignty,  which  is  the  foul  of  it.  Nothing  re- 
mains to  compleat  the  plan  we  laid  down,  but  more 
particularly  to  examine  the  different  parts  of  fove- 
reignty,  ?s  well  thofe  which  diredly  regard  the  internal  adminif- 
tration  of  the  ftate,  as  thofe  which  relate  to  its  interefts  abroad,  or 
to  its  concerns  v/ith  foreign  powers,  which  will  afford  us  an  oppor- 
tunity of  explaining  the  principal  queflions  relating  to  thofe  fub- 
je6ls  }  and  to  this  purpofe  we  defi^n  this  and  the  fubfequent  part. 


Nn 


II.  Among 


290  ll)e  Principles  of 

ÎÎ.  Among  the  efTential  parts  of  fovercignty,  we  have  given  thô 
firft  lanlc  to  the  Icgijlativc  pruuer^  that  is  to  fay,  the  right  which  the 
fovereign  has  of  giving  laws  to  his  fubje£ls,  and  ot  directing  their 
adbions,  or  of  prefcribing  the  manner  in  which  they  ought  to 
regulate  their  condu6\  ;  and  it  is  from  hence  the  civil  laws  are 
derived.  As  this  right  of  the  fovereign  is,  as  it  were,  the 
cfTence  of  fovereignty,  order  requires  that  we  lliould  begin  with 
the  explication  of  whatever  relates  to  it. 

III.  We  Hiall  not  here  repeat  what  we  have  eliiewhere  faid  of 
the  nature  of  laws  in  general  :  but,  fuppofipg  the  principles  we 
have  eftabliihed  on  that  head,  we  fhall  only  examine  the  nature 
and  extent  of  the  Icgiftative  power  in  fociety.and  that  of  the  civil 
laws  and  decrees  of  the  fovereign  from  thence  derived. 

Î,V.  Civil  laws  then  arc  all  thofe  ordinances  by  which  the  fove- 
'  reign  binds  his  fubjeéts.  The  aircmblage  or  body  of  thofe  orc^i- 
nances  is  what  we  call  the  Civil  Law.  In  fine,  civil  jurifprudence 
is  that  fcience  or  art,  by  which  the  civil  laws  are  not  only  eftab- 
lifti-d,  but  explained  in  cafe  of  obfcurity,  afld  are  properly  applitU 
to  human  actions. 

V.  The  eflablifhment  of  civil  fociety  ought  to  be  fixed,  fo  as 
to  mike  a  fure  and  undoubted  provifion  ioz  the  happinefs  and 
tranquillity  of  man.  For  this  purpofe  it  was  necelTary  to  elfablifti 
a  confiant  order,  and  this  could  only  be  done  by  fixed  and  deter- 
minate laws. 

VI.  We  have  already  ob{ér%red,  that  it  was  necefTary  to  take 
proper  tncafures  to  render  the  laws  of  nature  as  effectual  as  they 
ought  to  be,  in  order  to  promote  the  happinefs  of  fociety  j  and  this 
is  efFeuled  by  means  of  the  civil  laws. 

For,  I*'.  They  ferve  to  make  the  laws  of  nature  better  known." 

2".  They  give  them  a   new  degree  of  force,  and  render  the 

cbffrvance  of  them  more  fecure,  by  means  of  their  fandtion,  and 

of  the   punifhmcnts  which  the  fovereign  inflicts   on  thofe   who 

defpifc  and  violate  them. 

3*^.  There  are  feveral  things  which  the  law  of  nature  prbfcribes 
only  in  a  general  and  indeterminate  manner  ;  fo  that  the  time,  the 
manner,  and  the  application  to  perfons,  are  left  to  the  prudence 
and  difcretion  of  every  individual.  It  was  however  necelVary,  for 
the  order  and  tranquillity  cf  the  ftate,  that  all  this  matter  fliould 
be  rcizdated  ;  which  is  d-aae  by  the  civil  laws. 

4".  They 


P  O  L  I  T  1  C      L  A  W.  291 


4^.  They  alfo  ferve  to  explain  any  obfcurity  that  may  arife  in 
the  maxims  of  the  law  of  nature. 

5°.  They  qualify  or  reftrain,  in  various  ways,  the  ufeof  thofe 
rights  which  every  man  naturally  pcfTeflts. 

6*^.  Laftly,  they  determine  the  lorms  that  are  to  be  obfervet}, 
and  the  precautions  which  ought  to  be  taken,  to  render  the  differ- 
ent engagements  that  people  enter  into  with  each  other  ef^e«5fual 
and  inviolable  ;  and  they  afcertaia  the  manaer  in  which  a  man  is 
to  profecute  his  rights  in  the  civil  court. 

VII.  In  order  therefore  toform  a  juft  idea  of  the  civil  laws,  we 
muft  fay,  that  as  civil  lociety  is  no  other  than  natural  fociety  itfclf, 
qualified  orreftrained  by  the  eftablilliment  of  a  fovereign  whofe 
bufinefs  it  is  to  maintain  peace  andoider  ;  in  like  manner  £«e  civil 
laws  are  thofe  of  nature,  pcrfcéled  in  a  manner  fuitable  to  the  flate 
and  advantages  of  fociety. 

y  in.  As  this  is  the  cafe,  we  may  very  properly  diftinguiG*  two 
forts  of  civil  laws.  Some  are  fuch  with  refpeél  to  their  authority 
only,  and  others  with  regard  to  their  original.  To  the  former 
clafs,  we  refer  all  the  natural  laws  wliich  ferve  as  rules  in  civil 
courts,  and  which  are  alfo  confirmed  by  a  new  fanction  of  the  fove- 
reign. Such  are  all  laws  which  determine  the  crimes  that  are  to 
be  punifkcd  by  the  civil  juftice  ;  and  the  obligations  upon  which 
an  adlion  may  commence  in  the  civil  court,  as:. 

As  to  the  civil  laws,  fo  called,  becaufeof  their  original,  thefe  are 
arbitrary  decrees,  which,  for  their  foundation,  have  only  the  v/ill  of 
the  fovereign,  and  fuppofe  certain  human  eftabli^hments  ;  or  which 
regulate  things  relating  to  the  particular  advantage  of  the  (late, 
though  indifferent  in  themfelves,  and  undetermined  by  the  law  of 
nature.  Such  are  the  laws  which  prefcribe  the  neceffary  forms  in- 
contrafts  and  teftaments,  the  manner  of  proceeding  in  courts  of 
jnfticc,  &c.  But  it  mud  be  obferved,  that  all  tliofe  regulations;, 
Ihould  tend  to  the  good  of  the  ftate  as  well  as  of  individuals,  fo 
that  they  are  properly  appendages  to  the  law  of  nature. 

ÎX.  It  is  of  great  importance  carefully  to  diftinguifli  in  the 
civil  laws,  what  is  natural  and  eflential  in  them,  from  what  is  cnly 
adventitious.  Thofe  laws  of  nature,  the  obfervance  of  which  is 
eflfentially  conducive  to  the  peace  and  tranquillity  of  mankind, 
ought  certainly  to  have  the  force  of  law  in  all  ftates  ;  neither  is  it 
in  the  power  of  the  prince  to  abrogate  them.  As  to  the  others, 
which  do  not  (0  eflcnti^lly  i.itçreft  the  happinefs  of  fociety,  it  lanoi 


292  T^e  Principles  of 

always  expedient  to  give  them  the  force  of  law,  becaufe  the  con- 
truverfies  about  the  violation  of  them  would  often  be  very  perplexed 
and  intricate,  and  likewife  lay  a  foundation  for  an  infinite  number 
of  litigious  fuits.  Befides,  it  wa?  proper  to  give  the  good  and  vir- 
tuous an  opportunity  of  diftinguifhing  thcmfelves  by  the  praâice 
of  thofe  duties,  the  violation  of  which  incurs  no  human  penalties. 

X.  What  we  have  faid  of  the  nature  of  civil  laws  fufKcicntly 
fhews,  that  though  the  legiilative  be  a  fupreme,  yet  it  is  not  an 
arbitrary  power  ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  it  is  limited  in  fcveral 
refp{<Sts. 

I  ".-And  as  the  fovereign  holds  the  Icgiflative  power  originally 
of  the  will  of  each  member  of  the  fociety,  it  is  evident,  that  no 
man  can  confer  on  another  a  right  which  he  has  not  himfelf  ;  ard 
confequemly  the  legiflative  power  cannot  be  extended  beyond  this 
limit.  The  fovereign  therefore  can  neither  command  nor  forbid 
any  other  a6\ions  than  fuch  as  are  either  voluntary  or  pofTible. 

1° .  Befides,  the  natural  laws  difpofe  of  human  allions  antece- 
dently to  the  civil  laws,  and  men  cannot  recede  from  the  author- 
ity of  the  former.     Therefore,  as  thofe    primitive  laws  limit  the 
%  power   of  the  fovereign,  he  can  determine  nothing  fo  as  to  bind 

%        .  the  fubjeél   contrary  to  what  they  either  exprefsly  command  or 
forbid. 

XI.  But  we  tnuftbe  careful  not  to  confound  two  things  entire- 
ly  diftind,  I  mean  the  State  of  Nature,  aud  the  Laws  of  Nature. 
The  primitive  and  natural  {late  of  man  may  admit  of  different 
changes  and  modification?,  whicli  are  left  to  the  difpofal  of  man, 
and  have  nothing  contrary  to  his  obligations  and  duties.  In  this 
refpe6t,  the  civil  laws  may  produce  a  few  changes  in  the  natural 
ftate,  and  confiquently  make  fome  regulations  unknown  to  the 
law  of  nature,  without  containing  any  thing  contrary  to  that  law, 
which  fuppofes  the  ftate  of  liberty  in  its  full  extent,  but  neverthelefs 
permits  mankind  to  limit  and  restrain  that  ftate,  in  the  manner 
which  appears  moll  to  their  advantage. 

XII.  We  are  however  far  from  being  of  the  opinion  of  thofe 
writers,*  who  pretend  that  it  is  impoffible  the  civil  laws  fhould 
be  repugnant  to  that  of  nature,  becaufey  fay  they,  there  is  nothing 
either juji  or  unjufl  antecedently  to  the  ejlablijhment  of  thofe  laws. 

What 

•  Hobbes.  " 


Politic    Law.  293 

What  we  have  above  advanced,  and  the  principles  we  have  eftab- 
lifheJ  in  the  whole  courfe  of  this  work,  fufficiently  evince  the  ab- 
furdity  ofthis  opinion. 

XIII.  It  is  as  ridiculous  to  aflert,  that  before  the  eflablifliment 
of  civil  law  and  fociety,  there  was  no  rule  of  juftice  to  which 
mankind  were  fubjeéi,  as  to  pretend  that  truth  and  reâitude 
depend  on  the  will  of  man,  and  not  on  the  nature  of  things.  It 
wonld  have  even  been  impoffible  for  mankind  to  found  focieties 
of  any  durability,  if,  antecedently  to  thofc  focieties,  there  had  been 
neither  juftice  nor  iniuftice,  an  J  if  they  had  not,  on  the  contrary, 
been  perfuaded  that  it  was  juft  to  keep  their  word,  and  unjuft  to 
break  it. 

XIV.  Such  in  general  is  the  extent  of  the  iegiflativc  power,  and 
the  nature  of  the  civil  laws,  by  which  that  power  exerts  itfelf. 
Hence  it  follows,  that  the  whole  force  of  civil  laws  conlifts  in  two 
things,  namely,  in  their  yiijilcezxxà  in  their  Authority. 

XV.  The  authority  of  the  laws  confids  in  the  force  given  them  f 
by  the  perfon,  who,  being  inverted  with  the  legiflative  power,  has 

a  right  toenatïï  thofe  laws  ;  and  in  the  Divine  Will  which  com- 
mands us  to  obey  him.  With  reg;ard  to  the  juftice  of  civil  laws, 
it  depends  on  their  relation  to  the  good  order  of  fociety,  of  which 
they  are  the  rule,  and  on  the  particular  advantage,  of  eftablilhing 
them,  according  as  different  conjundlures  may  require. 

XVI.  And  fince  the  fovcreignty,  or  right  of  commanding,  is 
naturally  founded  on  a  beneficent  Power,  it  neceiTarily  follows,  that 
the  Authority  :\\\à  Ju/îicc  ot  laws  are  two  charadteriftics  eflential  to 
their  nature,  in  default  of  v/hich  they  can  produce  no  re^l  obliga- 
tion. The  power  of  the  fovcrei^n  conftitutes  the  authority  of  his 
laws,  and  his  beneficence  permits  him  to  make  none  but  fuch  as 
are  conformable  to  equity. 

XVII.  However  certain  and  incontcRable  thefe  general  prin- 
ciples may  be,  yet  we  ought  to  take  care  not  to  abufe  them  in  the 
application.  It  is  certainly  eflential  to  every  law  that  it  fhoiild 
be  equitable  and  juft  ;  but  we  mufl:  not  from  thence  conclude, 
that  private  fubjeéts  have  a  right  to  refufe  obedience  to  the  com- 
mands of  the  fovereign,  under  a  pretence  that  they  do  not  think 
them  altogether  juft.  For,  befides  that  fome  allowance  is  to  be 
made  for  human  infirmity,  the  oppofing  the  legiflative  power  which 

COIlftitUtES 


294  ^'^^  Principles  of 

conftitutes  the  whole  fifcty  of  the  public,  muft  evidently  tend  to 
the  fubverfion  of  foclety  ;  and  fubjedts  are  obliged  to  Ibffer  the 
inconveniences  which  may  arife  from  fome  unjuft  laws,  rather 
than  expofc  the  ftate  to  luin  by  their  difobedience. 

XVIII.  But,  if  the  abufe  of  jthe  legiflative  power  proceeds  to 
cxcefs,  and  to  the  fubverfion  of  the  fiindainental  principles  of  the 
laws  of  nature,  and  of  the  duties  which  it  enjoins,  it  is  certain  that, 
under  fuch  circumftances,  the  fubjeéls  are,  by  the  laws  of  God» 
not  only  authorized,  but  even  obliged  to  refufe  obedience  to  a|l 
laws  of  this  kind. 

XIX.  But  this  is  not  fufHcient.  That  the  laws  may  be  able 
toimpcife  a  real  obligation,  and  reckoned  juft  and  equitable,  it  is 
necellary  the  fubjedts  ftiould  have  a  perfedt  knowledge  of  them  i 
now  they  cannot  of  themfelves  know  the  civil  laws,  at  leaft  thofe 
of  an  arbitrary  nature  ;  thefe  are,  in  fome  mtafure,  fa£^s  of  which 
the  people  may  be  ignorant.  The  fovcreign  ought  therefore  to 
(leclare  his  will,  and  toadmjnifter  laws  and  juftice,  not  by  arbitrary 
'àwé.  hatty  decrees,  but  by  mature  regulations,  duly  promulgated. 

XX.  Thefe  principles  furnifti  us  with.a  refle£lion  of  great  im- 
portance to  fovercigns.  Since  the  firH:  quality  of  laws  is,  that 
they  be  known,  fovcreigns  ought  to  publilh  them  in  the  cleareft 
manner.  In  particular,  it  is  abfolutely  necefTary  that  the  laws  be 
written  in  the  language  of  the  country  ;  nay,  it  is  proper  that  pub- 
lic profclTors  lliould  not  ufe  a  foreign  language  in  their  leftures 
on  jurifprudence.  For  what  can  be  more  repugnant  to  the  prin- 
ciple which  direds,  that  the  laws  fliould  be  perfeétly  known,  than 
to  make  ufe  of  laws,  written  in  a  dead  language,  which  the  gen- 
erality of  the  people  do  not  underftand  ;  and  to  render  the  know- 
ledge of  diofe  laws  attainable  only  in  that  language  ?  I  cannot  help 
faying,  that  this  is  an  abfurd  pracb'ce,  equally  contrary  to  the  glory 
of  fovereigns,  and  to  the  advantage  of  lubje<5ls. 

XXI.  If  we  therefore  fuppofe  the  civil  laws  to  be  accompnnied 
with  the  conditions  above-mentioned,  they  have  certainly  the 
force  of  obliging  thefubjedts  to  obferve  them.  Every  individual 
is  bound  to  fubmit  to  their  regulations,  fo  long  as  they  include 
nothing  contrary  to  the  divine  law,  whether  natural  or  revealed  ; 
and  this  is  not  only  from  a  dread  of  the  punifhments  annexed  to  the 
violation  of  them,  but  alfo  from  a  principle  of  confcience,  and  in 

confequence 


Politic    Law.  295 


«onfêqusnce  of  a  maxim  of  natural  law,  which  commands  us  ta 
obey  our  lawful  fovereign. 

XXII.  In  order  rightly  to  comprehend  this  effed  of  the  civil 
laws,  it  is  to  be  obferved,  that  the  obligation,  which  thoy  impcfe» 
extends  not  only  to  external  a£lioiis,  but  alfo  to  the  inward  fenti- 
ments.  The  fovereign,  by  prefcribing  laws  to  his  fubje£l5,  pro- 
pofes  to  render  them  wife  and  virtuous.  If  he  commands  a  good 
aflion,  he  is  willing  it  (hould  be  done  from  principle  ;  and  when 
he  forbids  a  crim;;,  he  not  only  prohibits  the  external  ailion,  but 
alfo  the  defign  or  intention. 

XXIII.  In  ù&ytnzn  being  a  free  agent-,  is  induced  toaéionly 
in  confequence  of  his  judgment,  by  a  determination  of  his  will. 
As  this  is  the  cafe,  the  moft  effectual  means,  which  the  fovereign 
can  employ  to  procure  the  public  happinefs  and  tranquillity,  is  to 
Woric  upon  the  mind,  by  difpofmg  the  hearts  of  his  fubjeds  to 
wifdom  and  virtue. 

XXIV.  Hence  it  is,  that  public  eftablifhmentsare  formed  for 
the  education  of  youth.  Academies  and  profellors  are  appointed 
for  this  purpofe.  The  end  of  thefe  inftitutions  is  to  iniorm  and 
inftru(n:  mankind,  and  to  make  them  early  acquainted  with  the 
rules  of  a  happy  and  virtuous  life.  Thus  the  fovereign,  by  means 
of  inftru«5lion,  has  an  effedlual  method  of  inftilling  juft  ideas  and 
notions  into  the  minds  of  his  fubject?  ;  and  by  thefe  means  his 
authority  has  a  very  great  influence  upon  the  internal  allions,  the 
thoughts,  and  inclinations  of  thofe  who  are  fubjedted  to  the  direc- 
tion of  his  laws,  fo  far  at  lead  as  the  nature  of  the  thing  will  permit. 

■XXV.  We  fliall  clofe  this  chapter  with  the  difcufïïonofa 
queftion  which  naturally  prcfents  itfelf  in  this  place. 

Some  aflc,  whether  a  fubje6l  can  innocently  execute  the  unjuft 
commands  of  a  fovereign,  or  if  he  ought  not  rather  to  refufe 
abfolutely  to  obey  him,  even  at  the  hazard  of  his  life  ?  PufFendorf 
feerus  to  anfwer  this  queftion  with  a  kind  of  hefitation,  but  at 
length  he  declares  for  the  opinion  of  Hobbes  in  the  following 
manner.  We  muft  diftinguilh,  fays  he,  whether  the  fovereign 
commands  us  in  our  own  name  to  do  an  unjuft  action^  which  may 
be  accounted  our  own  ;  or,  whether  he  orders  us  to  perform  it  in 
his  name,  as  inflruments  in  the  execution  of  it,  and  as  an  aâion 
which  he  accounts  hisoy/n       In  the  latter  cale,  he  pretends  that 

we 


2g6  T'hc  P  R  I  N  c  1  r  L  E  s  uj 

we  may,  without  fcruplc,  execute  tlie  a£lion  ordered  by  the  fovc- 
reign,  who  is  then  to  be  cotifidered  as  the  only  author  of  it. 
Thus,  for  example,  loldiers  ou^ht  to  execute  the  orders  of  their 
prince,  becaufc  they  do  not  adt  in  their  own  name,  but  as  inflru- 
ments  and  in  the  name  of  their  mafter.  But,  on  the  contrary,  it 
it  is  never  lawful  to  do  in  our  name,  an  adlion  that  our  confcience 
tells  us  is  unjud  or  criminal.  Thus,  for  inftance,  a  judge,  what- 
ever orders  he  may  have  from  the  prince,  ought  never  to  condemn 
an  innocent  perfon,  nor  a  witnefs  depofe  againft  the  truth. 

XXVI.  But,  in  my  opinion,  this  diflinflion  docs  not  remove 
the  difficulty  ;  for  in  whatever  manner  we  pretend  that  a  fubjedt 
acts  in  thofe  cafes,  whether  in  his  own  name,  or  in  that  of  his 
prince,  his  will  concurs  in  feme  manner  or  other  to  the  unjuftand 
criniinal  adtion,  which  he  executes  by  order  of  the  fovereign. 
We  muft  therefore  impute  either  both  aîlions  partly  to  him,  or 
elfe  none  at  all. 

XXVII.  The  fureft  way  then,  is  to  diflinguilh  between  a  cafe 
where  the  prince  commands  a  thing  evidently  unjuft,  and  where 
the  matter  is  doubtful.  As  to  tlie  former,  we  mu(t  generally,  and 
without  any  reftriflion,  maintain,  that  the  greatefl  menaces  ought 
never  to  induce  us,  even  by  the  order  and  in  the  name  of  the  fove- 
reign, to  do  a  thing  which  appears  to  r.s  evidently  unjuft  and 
criminal  ;  and  though  we  may  be  very  excufable  in  the  fight  of 
man  for  having  been  overcome  by  fuch  a  fevere  trial,  yet  we  fhall 
not  be  fo  before  the  the  Divine  tribunal. 

XXVIII.  Thus  a  parliament,  for  inflance,  commanded  by  the 
prince  to  regirter  an  edi<5l  maaifeflly  unjuft,  ought  certainly  to 
refufe  it.  Tlie  fame  I  fay  of  a  minifter  of  (bte,  whom  a  prince 
would  oblige  to  execute  a  tyrannical  or  iniquitous  order  ;  of  an 
ambaflador  whofc  mafter  gives  him  inftru£tions  contrary  to  hon- 
our and  juftice  ;  or  of  an  officer,  whom  the  fovereign  fhould 
command  to  kill  a  perfon  whofe  innocence  is  as  clear  as  the  noon- 
day. In  thofe  cafes  we  fhould  nobly  exert  our  courage,  and  with 
all  our  might  refift  injuftice,  even  at  the  peril  of  our  lives.  //  is 
letter  to  obey  God  than  men.  For,  in  promifing  obedience  to  the 
Ibvereign,  we  could  never  do  it  but  on  condition,  that  he  fhould 

,  not   order  any   thing   manifeftly  contrary  to  the  laws  of  God, 

whether  natural  or  revealed.  To  this  purpofe  there  is  a  beautiful 
pafTîge  in  a  tragedy  written  by  Sophocles.       <«  I  did  not  believe 

(fays 


Politic    L  aw.  297 

(fays  Antigone  to  Creon  king  of  Thebes)  •«  that  the  ediiS^s  of  a 
"  mortal  man,  as  you  are,  could  be  of  fuch  force,  as  to  fuperfede 
**  the  laws  of  the  gods  themfelves,  laws  not  written  indeed,  but 
"  certain  and  immutable  ;  for  they  are  not  of  yefl:c*Jay  or  to-day, 
*^  but  eftablifhed  perpetually  and  for  ever,  and  no  one  knows 
*'  when  they  befpn.  I  ought  not  therefore,  for  fear  of  any  man, 
"  to  expofe  myfelf,  by  violating  thom,  to  ihi  punifhmenc  of  ths 
«  gods."  * 

XXIX.  But  in  cafes  where  the  matter  is  doubtful,  the  beft 
refolution  is  certainly  to  obey.  The  duty  of  obediente,  being  a 
clear  obligation,  ought  to  fuperfede  all  doubt.  Oiherwife,  if 
the  obligation  of  the  fubjeds,  to  comply  with  the  commands  of 
their  fovercign,  per  nitted  them  to  fufpend  their  obedience  till 
they  were  convinced  of  the  juftice  of  his  commands  ;  this  would 
manifeftly  annihilate  the  authority  of  the  prince,  and  fubvert  all 
order  and  government.  It  would  be  neceffary  that  foldiers,  exe- 
cutioners, and  other  iaferiour  officers  of  court,  fhould  underftand 
politics  and  the  civil  law,  otherwife  they  might  excufe  themfelves; 
from  their  duty  of  obedience,  under  the  pretence  that  ihey  are  noC 
fufficic-ntly  convinced  of  the  juftice  of  the  orders  given  them  ;  and 
this  would  render  the  prince  incapable  of  exercifing  the  fun£lions 
of  government.  It  is  therefore  the  duty  of  the  fubjeil  to  obey  in 
thofe  circumfhnces  ;  and  if  the  a£lion  be  unjuft  in  itfelf,  it  cannot 
be  imputed  to  him,  but  the  whole  blame  falls  on  the  fovereign. 

XXX.  Let  us  here  collefl:  the  principal  views  which  the  fove- 
reign ought  to  have  in  the  enading  of  laws. 

i^.  He  fhould  pay  a  regard  to  thofe  primitive  rules  of  juftice 
which  God  himfelf  has  eftablifhed,  and  take  care  that  his  laws  ba 
perfeftly  conformable  to  thofe  of  the  Deity. 

2°.  The  laws  (hould  be  of  fuch  a  nature,  as  to  be  eafily  followed 
and  obferved.  Laws,  too  difficult  to  be  put  in  execution,  are  apt 
to  fhake  the  authority  of  the  ma^ftrate,  or  to  lay  a  foundation  for 
infurredions. 

3^.  No  laws  ought  to  be  made  in  regard  to  ufelefs  and  unne- 
ceflkry  things. 

4".  The  laws  ought  to  be  fuch,  that  the  fubjeds  may  be  in- 
clined to  obferve  them  rather  of  their  own  accord  than  through  * 
neceffity.     For  this  reafon,  the  fovereign  ftiould  only  make  fuch 
laws  as  are  evidently  ufeful,  or  atleaft  he  fhould  explain  and  make 
O  o                                                    known 

*  Sophocl.  Antigon.  vfr,  463,  &c. 


298  The  Principles  of 


known  to  the  fubjed?,  the  reâfons  and  motives  that  have  induced 
him  to  enadl  them. 

5".  He  ought  not  to  be  eafily  perfuaded  to  change  the  eftab- 
liflied  laws,  frequent  changes  in  the  laws  certainly  leficns  their 
authority,  as  well  as  that  of  the  fovcreign. 

.  6°.  The  prince  ought  not  to  grant  difpenfations  without  very 
good  reafun  ;  otherwife  he  weakens  the  law?,  and  lays  a  foundation 
lor  jealoufics,  which  are  ever  prejudicial  to  the  Hate  and  to  indi- 
viduals. 

7^.  Laws  (hould  be  fo  contrived  as  to  be  afTifting  to  each 
other,  that  is  to  fa^,  feme  fliould  be  preparatory  to  the  obfervance 
of  others,  in  order  to  facilitate  their  execution.  Thus,  for  exam- 
ple, the  fumptuary  laws,  which  prefcribe  bounds  to  the  expeiices 
of  the  fubjed,  contribute  greatly  to  the  execution  of  ihofe  ordin- 
ances, which  impofe  taxes  aud  public  contributions. 

8^.  A  prince,  who  would  make  new  laws,  ought  to  be  partic- 
ularly attentive  to  time  and  conjunctures. 

On  this  princip.illy  depends  the  fuccels  of  a  new  law,  and  the 
manner  in  which  it  is  received. 

9^.  Li  fiiîe,  the  moft  effectuai  flep  a  fovereîgn  can  take  to  en- 
force his  laws,  is  to  conform  to  them  himfelf,  and  to  Ihew  the  firfl 
example,  as  we  have  before  obferved. 


CHAP.     IL 

Of  the  right  ofji((Ighir  the  do^irincs  taught  in  thejlote  :  of  the  care 
ivbich  the  foverelgn  ought  to  take  to  form  the  manners  ofhisfuhjeSîs. 

Î.  T 

|_N  the  enumeration  of  the  cfTential  parts  of  fovereignty,  wc 
have  comprehended  the  right  of  judging  of  the  do£lrines  taught  in 
the  ft.ile,  and  particularly  of  every  thing  relating  to  religion. 
This  is  one  of  the  moR  confiderable  prerogatives  of  the  fovereign, 
which  it  behoves  him  to  exert  according  to  therulesof  jurtice  and 
prudence.  Let  us  endeavour  to  fhew  the  neceffity  of  this  prerog- 
ative, to  eftablilTj  its  foundations,  and  to  point  out  its  extent  and 
boundaries. 

IL  The  firfl:  duty  of  the  fovereign  ought  to  be  to  take  all  pofli- 
ble  pains  to  form  the  hearts  and  minds  of  his  people.  In  vain 
would  it  be  for  him  to  enadl  theb.*ft  laws,  and  to  preicribe  rules  of 

ecndut^ 


Politic    Law.  299 


condii£l  ia  every  thing  relative  to  the  good  of  fociety,  if  he  did  not 
moreover  take  proper  meafures  to  convince  his  people  of  the  jiif- 
tice  and  neceffity  of  thofe  rules,  and  of  the  advantages  naturally 
arifinçr  from  the  ftridt  obfervance  of  them. 

III.  And  indeed  fince  the  principle  of  all  human  allions  is 
the  will,  and  the  aéls  of  the  will,  depend  on  the  ideas  we  form  of 
good  and  evil,  as  well  as  of  the  rewards  and  punifhments,  which 
mull:  follow  thofe  act^,  fo  that  every  one  is  determined  by  his  own 
judgment;  it  is  evident  that  the  fovereign  ought  to  take  care  that 
his  fùbje«£ls  be  properly  inftrucled  from  their  infancy,  in  all  thofe 
principles  which  can  form  them  to  an  honeft  and  fcber  life,and  in  fuch 
joftrines  as  are  agreeable  to  the  end  atid  inftitution  of  fociety. 
This  is  the  molt  effectual  means  of  inducing  men  to  a  ready  and 
fure  obedience,  and  of  forming  their  manners.  Without  this,  the 
la.vs  would  nochavea  fufficient  force  to  reftrain  thefubjeél  with- 
in the  bounds  of  his  duty.  So  long  as  men  do  not  obey  the  laws 
from  principle,  their  fubmifTion  is  precarious,  and  uncertain  ;  and 
they  will  be  ever  ready  to  v/ithciraw  their  obedience,  when  they 
are  perfuaded  they  can  do  it  with  impunity. 

IV.  If  therefore  people's  manner  of  thinking,  or  the  ideas  and 
opinions  commonly  received,  and  to  which  they  are  accuftomed, 
have  fo  much  influence  on  their  condu£f,  and  foftrongly  contribute 
either  to  the  good  or  evil  of  the  ftate  ;  and  if  it  be  the  duty  of  the 
fovereign  to  attend  to  this  article,  he  ought  to  negledl  nothing  that 
can  contribute  to  the  education  of  youth,  to  the  advancement  of 
the  fciences,  and  to  the  progrefs  of  truth.  If  this  be  the  cafe,  we 
muft  needs  grant  him  a  right  of  judging  of  the  do<5lrines  publicly 
taught,  and  of  profcribing  all  thofe  which  may  be  oppofite  to  the 
public  good  and  tranquillity. 

V.  It  belongs  therefore  to  the  fovereign  alone  to  eftablifli  acade- 
mics and  public  fchools  of  all  kinds,  and  to  authorize  the  refpec- 
tive  profefTors.  It  is  his  bufmefs  to  take  care  that  nothing  be 
taught  in  them,  under  any  pretext,  contrary  to  the  fundamental 
maxims  of  natural  law,  to  the  principles  of  religion  or  good  poli- 
tics ;  in  a  word,  nothing  capable  of  producing  impreliions  preju- 
dicial to  the  happinefs  of  the  fbte, 

VI.  But  fovereigns  ought  to  be  particularly  delicate  as  to  the 
manner  of  ufmg  this  prerogative,  and  not  to  exen  it  beyond  its  juft 

bouudj, 


300  T^^  Principles^ 

bounds,  but  to  ufe  it  only  according  to  the  rules  of  juflice  and 
prud^^ncs,  oihenvife  great  abufes  will  follow.  Thus  a  particular 
point  or  article  may  be  ntiifapprehended,  as  detrimental  to  the  iiate, 
while,  in  the  main,  it  no  way  prejudices,  but  rather  is  advantage- 
ous to  fociety  ;  or  prince?,  whether  of  their  own  accord,  oral  the 
inftigation  of  wicked  minifters,  may  erc£l  inquifitions  with  refpecl 
to  the  mofl  indifferent  and  even  the  trueft  opinions,  efpecialiy  ;iO; 
matters  of  religion.  •     ■";'■ 

VII.  Supreme  rulers  cannot  therefore  be  too  much  on  their 
guard,  againft  fufTering  themfelves  to  be  impoftd  on  by  wicked 
men,  who,  under  a  pretext  of  public  good  and  tranquillity,  feet 
only  their  own  particular  interefts,  and  who  ufe  their  utmoft  ef- 
iorts  to  render  opinions  obnoxious,  only  with  a  view  to  ruin  men 
ci  greater  probity  than  themfelves. 

VIII.  The  advancement  of  the  fciences,  and  the  progrefs  of 
truth,  require  that  a  reafonable  liberty  fhould  be  granted  to  all 
thofe  who  bufy  themfelves  in  fuch  laudable  purfuits,  and  that  we 
fhould  not  condemn  a  man  as  a  criminal,  merely  becaufc  on  cer- 
tain fubjcéls  he  has  ideas  different  from  thofe  commonly  received. 
Befide?,  a  diverfity  of  ideas  and  opinions,  is  fo  far  from  obftru£ting, 
that  it  rather  facilitates,  the  progrefs  of  truth  ;  provided  however 
ihat  fovercigns  take  proper  meafures  to  oblige  men  of  letters  to 
keep  within  the  bounds  of  moderation,  and  thatjiifl  refpc^l  which 
mankind  owe  to  one  another  ;  and  that  they  exert  their  authority 
in  checicing  thofe  who  grow  too  warm  in  their  difputes,  and  break 
through  all  rules  of  decency,  fo  as  to  injure,  calumniate,  and  ren- 
der fufpc^led  every  one  that  is  not  in  their  way  of  thinking.     We 

;'  muft    admit,  as  an  indubitable  maxim,  thai  truth  is  of  itftlf  very 

advantageous  to  mankind,  and  to  fociety,  that  no  tiue  opinion  js 
contrary  to  peace  and  good  order,  and  that  all  thofe  notions,  which, 
of  their  nature,  are  fubverftve  of  good  order,  muft  certainly  be 
falfe -,  otherwife  wemuft  aflert,  that  peace  and  concord  are  repug- 
nant to  the  laws  of  nature. 


CHAP.     III. 

Of  the  power  ofihefovercign  in  matters  of  religion. 


T. 


^.    HE  power  of  the  fovereign,   in  matters   of  religion,   is  of 
the  kit  importance.     Every  one  knows  the  difputes  which  \\z\'q 


lons> 


Politic    Law. 

.long  fubfifted  on  this  topic  between  the  empire  and  the  priefthood, 
and  how  fatal  the  confcquences  of  it  have  been  to  ftates.  Hence 
it  is  equally  necelîary,  both  to  (overeigns  and  fubjeéts,  to  form 
jijft  ideas  on  this  article. 

IL  My  opinion  is,  that  the  fupreme  authority  in  matters  of 
religion,  ought  neceflTarily  to  belong  to  the  fovereign  j  and  the  fol- 
lowing are  my  reafons  for  liiis  afTertion. 

III.  I  obferve,  i'^.  that  if  the  intereft  of  fociety  requires  that 
laws  fliould  be  eftablifhed  in  relation  to  human  affairs,  that  is,  to 
things  which  properly  and  directly  intereft  only  our  temporal  hap- 
pinefs  ;  this  fame  interefl  cannot  permit,  that  we  (liould  altogether 
neglefl  our  fpiritual  concerns,  orthofe  which  regard  religion,  and 
leave  the-n  without  any  regulation.  This  has  been  acknowledged 
in  all  ages,  and  among  all  nations  ;  and  this  is  the  origin  of  the 
civil  Law  properly  fo  called,  and  of  the  faired  or  ecclefiajiic  Law. 
All  civilized  nations  have  eftabliflied  thefe  two  forts  of  law. 

IV.  But  if  matters  of  religion  have,  infeveral  refpefls,  need  of 
human  regulation,  the  risht  of  determining  them  in  the  laft  refort 
can  belong  onl\  to  the  fovereign. 

Firfi  Proof.  This  is  inconteitably  proved  by  the  very  nature 
of  fovereignty,  which  is  no  more  than  the  right  of  determining  in 
the  laft  refort,  and  confequently  admits  of  no  power  in  the  fociety 
it  governs,  either  fuperior  to,  or  exempt  from,  its  jurifdi^lion,  but 
embraces,  in  its  full  extent,  every  thing  that  can  intereft  the  hap- 
pinefs  of  the  flate,  both  facrcd  and  profane. 

V.  The  nature  of  fovereignty  cannot  permit  any  thing,  fufcep- 
tible  of  human  direction,  to  be  withdrawn  from  its  authority  ;  for 
what  is  withdrawn  from  the  authority  of  the  fovereign,  muft  either 
be  left  independent,  or  fubje£led  to  fome  other  perfon  different 
from  the  fovereign  himfelfw^.^''-{  JSflJ  . 

VI.  Were  no  rule  eflabliflisd  in  matters  of  religion,  this  would 
be  throwing  it  into  a  confufion  and  difordcr,  quite  contrary  to  the 
good  of  fociety,  the  nature  of  religion,  afid  the  views  of  theD>.nty, 
who  is  the  author  of  it.  But,  if  we  fubmit  thefe  matters  to  an 
authority  independent  of  that  of  theïm-ereign,  we  fall  into  another 
inconveniency,  fince  thus  W2  eftablifh,  in  the  fame  fociety,  two 
fovereign  powers  independent  of  each  other,  which  is  not  only 
incompatible  v/ith  the  nature  of  fovereigntv,  but  a  contradiâion  in 
itfclf. 

VIL  And 


3OX 


302  'The  Principles   of 

VII.  And  indeed,  if  there  were  feveral  fovereigns  in  the  fame 
fociety,  they  mightalfo  give  contrary  orders.  But  who  does  not 
perceive  that  oppolite  o.ders,  with  refpeâ  to  the  fame  affair,  are 
maniteftly  repugnant  to  the  nature  of  things,  and  cannot  have 
their  cffccl,  nor  produce  a  real  obligation  ?  How  wculd  it  be  pof- 
iible,  for  inltance,  that  a  man,  who  receives  different  orders  at  the 
fame  time  from  two  fuperiors,  fuch  as-  to  repair  to  the  camp,  and 
to  go  to  church,  fhouid  be  obliged  to  obey  both  ?  If  it  be  faid  that 
he  is  not  obliged  to  comply  with  both,  there  muft  therefore  be 
fome  fubordination  of  the  one  to  the  other,  the  inferior  will  yield 
to  the  fiipcrior,  and  it  will  not  be  true  that  they  are  both  fovereign 
and  independent.  We  may  here  very  properly  apply  the  words  of 
Chriji.  No  man  can  ferve  two  niaflers.  And  a  kingdom  divided 
agairifi  itfelf  cannot Jiand, 

VIII.  Second  Proof.  I  draw  my  fécond  proof  from  the  end  of 
civil  fociety  and  fovereignty.  The  end  of  fovereignty  is  certainly 
the  happinefs  of  the  people,  and  the  prefer vation  of  the  ftate. 
Now,  as  religion  may  feveral  ways  either  injure  or  benefit  the 
ftate,  it  follows,  that  ihe  fovereign  has  a  right  over  religion,  at 
leaR-  fo  far  as  it  can  depend  on  human  direction.  He,  who  has 
a  right  lo  the  endf  has,  undoubtedly,  a  right  alfo  to  the  meam. 

IX.  Now  that  religion  may  feveral  ways  injure  or  benefit  the 
ftate,  we  have  already  proved  in  the  firfl:  volume  of  this  work.    .;j 

I**.  All  men  have  conftantly  acknowledged,  that  the  Deity 
makes  his  favours  to  a  ftate  depend  principally  on  the  care  which 
the  fovereign  takes  to  induce  his  iubjecis  to  honour  and  ferve 
him. 

2**.  Religion  can  of  itfelf  contribute  greatly  to  render  mankind 
more  obedient  to  the  laws,  more  attached  to  their  country,  and 
more  honefl  towards  one  another. 

3^.  The  doctrines  and  ceremonies  of  religion  have  a  confider- 
able  influence  on  the  morals  of  people,  and  on  the  public  happinefs. 
The  ideas  which  mankind  imbibed  of  the  Deity,  have  often  tnifled 
them  to  the  mott  prepofterous  forms  of  worfliip,  and  prompted 
them  to  facrifice  human  viftims.  They  have  even,  from  thofe 
faîfe  idea?,  drawn  argumetits  in  juflification  of  vice,  crutlty,  and 
licentioufnefs,  as  we  may  fee  by  reading  the  ancient  poets.  Since 
religion  therefore  has  fo  rnuch  influence  over  the  happinefs  or 
mifery  of  fociety,  who  can  doubt  but  it  is  fubje«5l  to  the  diredion 
cf  thefovcrei'rn  ? 

X,  Third 


Politic    Law.  303 

X.  7hïrd  Proof.  What  we  have  been  affirming  evinces,  that 
it  is  incumbent  on  the  fovereign  to  make  religion,  which  includes 
the  moft  valuable  intcrefh  of  mankind,  the  principal  obje£l  of  his 
care  and  application.  He  ought  to  promote  the  eternal,  as  well  as 
the  prelent  and  temporal  happinefs  of  his  fubjedls  :  this  is  therefore 
a  point  properly  fubje(5l  to  his  jurifdiclion, 

Xr.  Fourth  Proof.  In  fine,  we  can  in  general  acknowledge  only 
two  fovereigns,  God  and  the  prince.  The  fovereignty  of  God  is 
a  tranfcendent,  univerfal,  and  abfolute  fupremacy,  to  which  even 
princes  thetnfelves  are  fubjedl  ;  the  fovereignty  of  the  prince  holds 
the  fécond  rank,  and  is  fubordinate  to  that  of  God,  but  in  fiich  a 
manner,  that  the  prince  has  a  right  to  regulate  everything,  which 
inîereds  the  happinefs  offociety,  and  by  its  nature  is  fufceptible  of 
human  direction. 

XII.  After  having  thus  eflabliflied  the  right  of  the  fovereign  in 
matters  of  religion,  let  us  examine  into  the  extent  and  bounds  of 
this  prerogative  ;  whereby  it  will  appear,  that  thefe  bounds  are  not 
different  trom  thofe  which  the  fovereignty  admits  in  all  other  mat- 
ters. We  have  already  obferved,  that  the  power  of  the  fovereign 
extended  to  every  thing  fufceptible  of  human  dire(5lion.  Hence  it 
follows,  that  the  firft  boundary  we  ought  to  fix  to  the  authority  of 
the  fovereign,  but  which  indeed  is  fo  obvious  as  fcarce  needs  men- 
tioning, is,  that  he  can  order  nothing  impoffible  in  its  nature, 
cither  in  religion,  or  any  thing  elfe  ;  as  for  example,  to  fly  into 
the  air,  to  believe  contradidtions,  &c. 

XIII.  The  fécond  boundary,  but  which  does  not  more  particu- 
larly intereft  religion  than  every  thing  elfe,  is  deduced  from  the 
Divine  laws  :  for  it  is  evident,  that  all  human  authority  being 
fubordinate  to  that  of  God  ;  whatever  the  Deity  has  determined 
by  fome  law,  whether  natural  or  poftt'ive,  cannot  be  changed  by 
the  fovereign.  This  is  the  foundation  of  that  maxim,  It  is  better 
to  obey  God  than  men. 

XIV.  It  is  in  confequence  of  thefe  principles,  that  no  human 
authority  can,  for  example,  forbid  the  preaching  of  the  gofpel,  or 
the  ufe  of  the  facraments,  nor  eftablifh  a  new  article  of  faith,  nor 
introduce  a  new  worfhip  :  for  God  having  given  us  a  rule  of  reli- 
gion, and  forbidden  us  to  alter  this  rule,  it  is  not  in  the  power  of 
man  to  do  it  ;  and  it  would  be  abfurd  to  imagine  that  any  perfon 
whatever  can  either  believe  or  pradice  a  thing  as  conducive  to  his 
falvation,  in  oppcfuionto  the  Divine  declaration. 

XV.  It 


304  ^^^  Principles  of 

XV.  It  is  alio  on  the  footing  of  the  limitations  here  eftablifliecJ, 
that  the  fovereign  cannot  lawfully  affume  to  himfelf  an  empire 
over  confcicnce?,  as  if  it  were  in  his  power  to  impofe  the  neccflity 
of  believing  fuch  or  fuch  an  article  in  the  matters  of  religion. 
Nature  itfelfand  the  divine  laws  are  equally  contrary  to  this  pre- 
tenfion.  It  is  therefore  no  lefs  abfurd  than  impious  to  endeavour 
to  conftrain  conlciences,  and  to  propagate  religion  by  force  of  arms. 
The  natural  punifhment  of  thof^i  who  are  in  an  error  is  to  be 
taught.*  As  for  the  refl,  we  mud  leave  the  care  of  the  fuccefs 
to  God. 

XVI.  The  authority  of  the  fovereign,  in  matters  of  religion, 
cannot  therefore  extend  beyond  the  bounds  we  have  afligned  to 
it  ;  butthele  are  the  only  bounds,  neither  do  I  imagine  it  polïïblc 
to  think  of  any  others.  But  what  is  principally  to  be  obferved,  is, 
that  thefe  limits  of  the  fovereign  power,  in  matters  cf  religion, 
are  not  different  from  thofe  he  ought  to  acknov.'ledge  in  every 
other  matter  ;  on  the  contrary,  they  are  precifely  the  fame  ;  and 
equally  agree  r.'iih  all  the  parts  of  the  fovereignty,  being  no  lefs 
applicable  to  common  fubjecls  than  to  thofe  of  religion.  For 
example,  it  would  be  no  more  lawful  for  a  father  to  negleft  the 
education  of  his  children,  though  the  prince  fhould  order  him  to 
neglect  it,  than  it  would  be  for  paftors  or  Chriftians  to  abandon. the 
fervice  of  God,  even  if  they  had  been  commanded  (o  to  do  by  an 
impious  fovereign.  The  reafon  of  this  is,  becaufe  the  hw  of 
God  prohibits  both,  and  this  law  is  fuperior  to  all  human  authority. 

XVII.  However,  though  the  power  of  the  fovereign,  in  matters  of 
religion,  cannot  change  what  God  has  determined,  we  may  affir^, 
that  thofe  very  things  are,  in  fome  meafure,  fubmitted  to  the  au- 
thority of  the  fovereign.  Thus,  for  example,  the  prince  has  cer- 
tainly a  right  to  remove  the  external  obflacles  which  may  prevent 
the  obfervance  of  the  laws  of  God,  and  to  make  fuch  an  obfer\'- 
ance  eafy.  This  is  even  one  of  his  principal  duties.  Hence  slfo 
arifes  his  prerogative  of  regulating  the  functions  of  the  clergy  and 
the  circumflances  of  external  worfhip,  that  the  whole  may  be  per- 
formed with  greater  decency,  io  far,  at  leaft,  as  the  law  of  God 
has  left  thefe  things  to  human  diredlion.  In  a  word,  it  is  certain 
that  the  fupreme  magiftrate  may  j.lfogive  an  additional  degree  of 
force  and  obligation  to  the  divine  laws,  by  temporal  rewards  and 
punilhments.     We  mud  therefore  acknowledge  the  right  of  the 

Ibv  ereiga 

*  Etrantis  p«cna  ed  doceri. 


Politic    Law.  305 

Sovereign  in  regard  to  religion,  and  that  this  right  cannot  belong  to 
any  power  on  earth. 

XVIII.  Yet  the  defenders  of  the  rights  of  the  priefthood  ftart 
many  difficulties  on  this  fubje£t,  which  it  will  be  proper  to  anfwer.  If 
God,  fay  they,  delegates  to  menthe  authority  he  has  over  his  church, 
it  is  rather  to  his  pallors  and  minifters  of  the  gofpel,  than  to  fove- 
reigns  and  tn.igi Urates.  The  power  of  the  magiflrate  does  not 
belong  to  th^  elT;ance  of  the  church.  God,  on  the  contrary,  has 
eftablilhed  paftors  over  his  church,  and  regulated  the  fundionsof 
their  miniflry  ;  and  in  their  ofRce  they  are  fo  far  from  being  the 
vicegerents  of  fovereigns,  that  they  are  not  even  obliged  to  pay 
them  an  unlimited  obedience.  Bufides,  they  exercife  their  func- 
tions on  the  fovereign,  as  well  as  on  private  perfons  ;  and  the 
fcripture,  as  well  as  church  hiftory,  attribute  a  right  of  government 
to  them. 

Anfwer.  When  they  fay  that  the  power  of  the  magiftrate  does 
not  belong  to  the  elTence  of  the  church,  they  would  explain  them- 
felves  more  properly,  if  they  faid  that  the  church  may  fubfift  though 
there  were  no  magistrates.  This  is  true,  but  we  cannot  from 
hence  conclude,  that  the  magiftrate  has  no  authority  over  the 
church  ;  for,  by  the  famereafon,  we  might  prove  that  merchants, 
phyficians,  and  every  perfon  elfe,  do  not  depend  on  the  fovereign  ; 
becaufe  it  is  not  eflential  to  merchants,  phyficians,  and  mankind 
in  general,  to  be  governed  by  magiftrates.  However,  reafon  and 
fcripture  fubjeâ  thetn  to  xhtfuperior  powers. 

XIX.  1^.  What  they  add  is  very  true,  that  God  has  eftablilh- 
ed pallors,  and  regulated  their  fun£lions,  and  that  in  this  quality 
they  are  not  the  vicegerents  of  human  powers  \  but  it  is  eafy  to 
convince  them  by  examples,  that  they  can  draw  no  confequeace 
from  thence  to  the  prejudice  of  the  fupreme  authority.  The  func- 
tion of  a  phyfician  is  from  God  as  the  Author  of  nature  ;  and 
that  of  a  pallor  is  derived  aUb  from  the  Deity  as  the  Author  of 
religion.  This  however  does  not  hinder  the  phyfician  from  ha- 
ving a  dépendance  on  the  fovereign.  The  fame  may  be  faid  of 
agriculture,  commerce,  and  all  the  arts.  Befides,  the  judges 
hold  their  offices  and  places  from  the  prince,  yet  they  do  not  re- 
ceive all  the  rules  they  are  to  follow  from  him.  It  is  God  himfelf  . 
who  orders  them  to  take  no  bribe,  and  to  do  nothing  through  ha- 
tred or  favour,  &c.  Nothing  more  is  requifite  to  Ihew  how  un- 
jufta  confequence  it  is  to  pretend,  that,  becaufe  a  thing  is  eftab- 
lifhsd  by  God,  it  fhould  be  independent  of  the  fovereign. 

.  P  P  XX.  3^3 


3o6  .  T&  Principles  of 


XX.  3°.  But,  fay  they,  paftors  are  not  always  obliged  to  otey 
thefupreme  magiftrate.  We  agree,  but  we  have  oblervcd  that 
this  can  only  take  place  in  matters  dire<Slly  oppofite  to  the  bw  of 
God  ;  and  we  have  fji.evvn  that  this  right  is  inherent  in  e\ery  per- 
fon  in  common  affairs  as  well  as  in  religion,  and  conftquci.tly 
does  not  derogate  from  the  authority  of  the  fovereign. 

XXr.  4^.  Neither  can  we  deny  that  the  pafloral  fuiié^ions  are 
exercifed  onking*?,  not  only  as  members  of  the  church,  but  alfo 
in  particular  as  pofl'efled  of  the  regal  power.  But  this  proves 
nothing  \  for  what  f\in6^ion  is  there  that  does  not  regard  the  fove- 
reign ?  In  particular,  does  the  phyfician  lefs  cxercife  his  profciîion 
on, the  prince,  than  on  other  people  ?  Does  he  not  equally  prefcrihe 
for  him  a  regimen  and  the  medicines  nect/larv  for  his  health? 
Does  not  the  office  of  a  counfellor  regard  alfo  the  lovcrcign,  and 
even  in  his  qu:iiity  of  chief  magiftrate  ?  And  yet  v.'ho  ever  thought 
of  exempting  thofe  pcrfons  from  a  fubjeftion  to  the  fuprcme  au- 
thority f 

XXIÎ.  5°.  Btit  laftly,  fay  they,  is  it  not  certain,  that  fcripture 
and  ancient  hiftory  afcribe  the  government  of  the  church  to  paftors  ? 
This  is  alfo  true,  but  we  need  only  examine  into  the  nature 
of  the  government  belonging  to  the  minifters  of  religion, 
to  be  convinced  that  it  does  not  at  all  diminilh  the  authority  of 
the  fovercign. 

XXIII.  There  is  a  government  o^  pmph  d'trcSl'wn^  and  a  gor- 
erninent  oï authority.  The  former  conflits  in  giving  counfel,  or 
teaching  the  rules  which  ought  to  be  followed.  But  it  fuppofes 
no  authority  in  him  who  governs,  neither  does  it  rc;ftrain  the  liber- 
ty oi  thofc  who  are  governed,  except  in  as  much  as  the  laws  incul- 
cated on  that  occafion  imply  an  obligation  of  thcmfelves.  Such  is 
the  government  of  phyficians  concerning  health,  of  lawyers  with 
regard  to  civil  affairs,  and  of  counfellors  of  date  with  refpt£t  to 
politics.  The  opinions  of  thofe  perfons  are  not  obligatory  in  re- 
gard to  indifferent  things  ;  and  in  neceflary  affairs  they  are  not 
binding  of  liiemfelves,  but  only  fo  far  as  they  inculcate  the  laws 
eftablilbed  by  nature,  or  by  the  fovereign,  and  this  is  the  fpecies  of 
government  belonging  to  pafîors, 

XXIV.  But  there  is  alfo  a  government  of  jiirifdlcîion  and  au^ 
tkc-rity,  which  implies  the  right  of  eflablifliing  regulations,  and 
really  obliges   the  fubjed.     This  government,  arifing  from  the 

ibvejcign 


Politic     Law. 

foverelgn  authority,  obliges  by  the  nature  of  the  authority  itfflf, 
which  conferii  the  power  of  compulfion.  liutitis  to  be  remarked, 
tha:  real  authority  is  infeparable  from  the  right  of  compeHing  and 
obliging.  Thcfe  are  the  criterion  by  whicn  alone  it  may  be  dif- 
tinguifhid.  It  is  this  hft  fpecies  of  government  which  we  afcribs 
to  the  fovereign  i  and  of  which  we  afîirm  that  it  does  not  belong 
to  palters.  * 

XXV.  We  therefore  fay,  that  the  government,  belonging  to 
paftors,  is  thatof  counfcl,  inftrudion  and  perfuafioii,  whofc  entire 
force  and  authority  confids  in  the  word  of  God,  which  they  ought 
to  teach  the  people  ;  and  by  no  means  in  a  perfonal  authority. 
Their  power  is  to  declare  the  orders  of  the  Deity,  and  goes  no 
farther. 

XXVI.  Ifatprefent  we  compare  thefe  different  fpecies  of  gov- 
ernment, we  fliall  eafily  pcrcirive  that  they  are  not  oppofue  to  each 
other,  even  in  matters  of  religion.  The  government  of  fun  pie 
dire6lion,  which  we  give  to  pallors,  does  not  clafn  v/ith  the  fove- 
reign authority  ;  on  the  contrary,  it  may  find  an  advantage  in  its 
aid  and  alTiftance.  Thus  there  is  no  contradiiftion  in  faying,  that 
the  fovereign  governs  the  paftors,  and  that  is  alfo  governed  by 
them,  provided  we  attend  to  the  different  fpecies  of  government. 
Thefe  are  the  general  principles  of  this  important  dodbine,  and  it 
is  eafy  to  apply  them  to  particular  cafes. 

—— lllfi  


07 


CHAP.     IV. 

Of  the  poiuer  cf  the  fovereign  over  the  lives  and  fortunes  of  his  fub- 
J£6îs  in  criminal  cofcs. 

I.  rp 

J[  HE  principal  end  of  civil  government  and  focicty,  is  to 
fecure  to  mmlcini  all  their  natural  advantages,  and  efpe- 
cially  their  lives.  This  end  neceflarily  requires  that  the  fovereign 
ihould  have  fome  right  over  the  lives  of  his  fubje6ts,  either  in  an 
indirect  manner^  for  the  defence  of  the  Hate,  or  in  a  dire^  manner  y 
for  the  punifliment  of  crimes, 

II.  The  power  of  the  prince  over  the  lives  of  the  fubjedls,  with 

refpeft  to  the  defence  of  the  (late,  regards  the  right  of  war,  of  which 

^____^^ we 

*  Ste  the  golpd  accorJlng  to  St.  l.iike,  chap.  xii.  ver.  14.  firft  epiflle  to  tho 
CorJntJiians,  chap,  X.  vcr.  4.  Ephcf.  chap.  vi.  vçr.  17.  Philip,  iii.  ver.    îO. 


3o8  The  Principles  of 

we  ftiall   treit  hereafter.     Here  we   intend    to    fpeak  only  of  the 
power  of  inflifting  puniflinnents. 

III.  The  fiift  qu.'ftion  which  prefents  itfelf,  is  to  know  th^ 
origin  and  foundation  of  this  part  of  the  fovereign  power  ;  a  qnef- 
tion,  which  cannot  be  anfwered  without  fome  difiiculty.  Punifti- 
ment,  it  is  fad,  is  an  evil  which  a  perfon  fufFcrs  in  a  compulfive 
Vv-ay  :  a  man  cannot  punifli  himfelf  ;  and  confequently  it  feems  that 
individuals  could  not  transfer  to  the  fovereign  a  right  which  they 
had  not  over  thcmfclves. 

IV.  Some  civilians  pretend,  that  when  a  fovereign  infli6ls  pun- 
ifliments  on  his  fubje£ts,  he  does  it  by  virtue  of  their  own  confent  ; 
becaufe,  by  fubmitting  to  his  authority,  they  have  promifed  to  ac- 
Ci  ieke  in  everything  he  fliould  do  with  refpefl  to  them  j  and  in 
p  rticular  a  fubjecSl,  who  determines  to  commit  a  crime,  confents 
thereby  to  fuffcr  the  punifhment  eftablifhed  againft  the  delinquent. 

V.  But  it  feems  difficult  to  determine  the  right  of  the  fovereign 
on  a  prefumption  of  this  nature,  efpecially  with  rtfpe6l  to  capital 
puwifhments  ;  neither  is  it  necelfary  to  have  recourfe  to  this  pre- 
tended confent  of  criminals,  in  order  to  eftablifh  the  vindicative 
power.  It  is  better  to  fay  that  the  right  of  punifhing  malefactors, 
derives  its  origin  from  that  which  every  individual  originally  had 
in  the  fociety  of  nature,  to  repel  the  injuries  committed  againft 
hiinfeir,  or  againft  the  members  of  the  fociety,  which  right  has 
been  yielded  and  transferred  to  the  fovereign. 

VI.  In  a  word,  the  right  of  executing  the  laws  of  nature,  and 
of  punifhing  thofe  who  violate  them,  belongs  originally  to  fociety 
in  general,  and  to  each    individual  in   particular  j  otherwife  the 

;'  ,  laws  which  nature  and  reafon  impofe  on  man,  would  be  entirely 

ufelefs  in  a  ftate  of  nature,  if  no  body  had   the  power  of  putting 
them  in  execution,  or  of  punifhing  the  violation  of  thtrn. 

VIÎ.  Whoever  violates  the  laws  of  nature,  teftifiesthcrebv,  that 
h^  tramples  on  the  maxims  of  reafon  and  equity,  which  God  has 
prefcribed  for  the  common  (afety  j  and  thus  he  becomes  an  enemy 
of  mankind  Since  therefore  every  man  has  an  inconteftable  right 
to  take  care  of  his  own  prefervation  and  that  of  fociety,  he  rnay, 
■without  doubt,  infli£t  on  fuch  a  perfon  punifhments  capable  of 
producing  repentance  in  him,  of  hindering  him  from  committing 
îhe  like  crimes  for  the'  future,  and  even  of  deterring  others  by  his 
«example.     In  a  word,  the  fame  laws  of  nature  which  prohibit  vice, 

do 


Politic    Law.  309 

do  alfo  confer  a  right  of  purfuing  the  perpetrator  of  it,  and  of  pun- 
ilhinghim  in  ajuft  proportion. 

VIII.  It  is  true,  inaftateofnatnre,  thefe  kinds  of  chaflifements 
are  not  afilicSted  by  authority,  and  the  criminal  might  happen  to 
flielter  himfelf  from  the  punifhments  he  has  to  dread  from  other 
men,  or  even  repel  their  attacks.  But  the  right  of  puniflimcnt  is 
not  for  that  either  lefs  real  or  lefs  founded.  The  difficulty  of 
putting  it  in  execution  does  not  deflroy  it  :  This  was  one  of  the 
inconveniences  of  the  primitive  ftate,  v^hich  men  have  efficacioufly 
remedied  by  the  eftablifliment  of  fovereignty, 

ÎX.  By  following  thefe  principles,  it  is  eafy  to  comprehend 
that  the  right  of  a  fovereign,  to  punifh  crimes,  is  no  other  than 
that  natural  right  which  human  fociety  and  every  individual  had 
originally  to  execute  the  law  of  nature,  and  to  take  care  of  their 
own  fafety  ;  this  natural  right  has  been  yielded  and  transferred  to 
the  fovereign,  who,  by  means  of  the  authority  with  which  he  is 
invefled,  exercifes  it  in  fuch  a  manner,  as  it  is  diflicult  for  wicked 
men  to  evade  it.  Befides,  whether  we  call  this  natural  right  of 
punifliing  crimes  the  vindicative  power,  or  whether  we  refer  it  to 
a  kind  of  right  of  war,  is  a  matter  of  indifrcrence,  neither  does  it 
change  its  nature  on  that  account, 

X.  This  is  the  true  foundation  of  the  right  of  the  fovereign 
with  refpefl  to  punifhments.  This  being  granted,  I  define  piin- 
ifhment  an  evil,  with  which  the  prince  threatens  thofe  who  are 
difpofed  to  violate  his  laws,  and  which  he  really  inflicls,  in  a  jufl: 
proportion,  whenever  they  violate  them^  independently  of  the 
reparation  of  the  damage,  with  a  view  to  fome  future  good,  and 
finally  for  the  fafety  and  peace  of  fociety. 

XI.  I  fay,  1°.  that  punidiment  is  an  evil,  and  this  evil  may  be 
of  a  different  nature,  according  as  it  affects  the  life  of  a  perfon, 
his  body,  his  reputation,  or  his  eftate.  Bcfides,  it  is  indifferent 
whether  this  evil  confifts  in  hard  and  toilfome  labour,  or  infuifcr- 
ing  fomething  painful. 

XII.  I  add,  in  the  fécond  place,  that  it  is  the  fovereign  who 
awards  punifhments  ;  not  that  every  punifhment  in  general  fup- 
pofc'S  fovereignty,  but  becaufe  we  are  here  fpeaking  of  the  right 
of  punilhing  in  fociety,  and  as  the  branch  of  the  fupreme  power. 
It  is  therefore  the  fovereign  alone  that  is  empowered  to  award 

puniiliments 


0 


I o  Ihe  Principles  of 

puniilimentsin  fociety  ;  butirdividunls  cannot  do  thcmfclves  juf- 
tice,  without  encroaching  on  tho  rights  of  the  prince. 

XIII.  I  f;iy,  3°.  with  which  the  fovereign  threatens^  (fc.  to  de- 
note the  chief  intention  of  the  prince.  He  thrtatens  firft,  and 
then  puni/lies,  if  menaces  be  not  fnfficient  to  prevent  the  crime. 
Hence  it  alfo  appears  that  puniflimeiit  ever  fuppofts  guilt,  and 
confequcntly  we  ouo^ht  not  to  reckon  cmor.g  pumfliments,  prop- 
erly fo  called,  the  different  evils  to  which  men  are  expolcd,  with- 
out having  antecedently  committed  a  crime. 

XIV.  I  add,  4°.  that  punifhment  is  infli£ted  hulepcndently  of 
the  reparation  of  the  damage ^xo  Ihew  thatthefe  are  two  things  very 
diuintft,  and  ought  not  to  be  confounded.  Every  crime  is  ?.ttend- 
ed  with  two  obligations  ;  the  firft  is,  to  repair  the  injury  commit- 
ted i  and  the  fécond,  to  fufFer  the  punifliment  ;  theretore  the  delin- 
quent ought  to  fatisfy  both.  It  is  alfo  to  be  obferved  on  this  occa- 
iiop,  that  the  right  of  punifhment  in  civil  fociety  is  transferred  to 
the  magiftrate,  who  may  by  his  own  authority  pardon  a  criminal  ; 
but  this  is  not  the  cafe  with  refpe6t  to  the  right  of  fatisfadtion  or 
reparation  of  damages.  The  magiftrate  cannot  acquit  the  offen- 
der in  this  article,  and  the  injured  perfon  always  retains  his  right  ; 
io  that  he  is  wronged,  if  he  be  hindered  from  obtaining  due  fatis-* 
f-cli  on. 

XV.  LaRIy,  5°,  by  (dy'iDg^  that  punijhmefit  is  injU^edu-ith  a 
i>ie-vj  to lornc  gc>id -,  we  point  out  the  end  which  the  prince  ouaht 
to  p;opofeto  himfelf  in  infliding  puniftiments,  and  this  ue  Ihall 
mors  particularly  explain. 

XVI.  The  fovereign,  as  fuch,  has  not  only  a  rig'nt,  but  is  alfo 
obliged  to  punilh  crimes.  The  ufj  of  punifhment  is  fo  far  from 
being  contrary  to  equity,  that  it  is  abfolutely  requifite  for  the  pub- 
lic tranquillity.  The  fupreme  power  would  be  ufelef-^,  were  it 
not  invefted  v/ith  a  right,  and  armed  with  a  force,  fufficient  to  de- 
ter the  wicked  by  the  npprehenfion  of  fome  evil,  and  to  make 
them  fufftr  that  evil,  when  they  injure  fociety.  It  was  even  ne- 
ceffjry  that  this  power  ihould  extend  fo  far,  as  to  make  them  fuf- 
fer  the  greatefl  of  natural  evils,  which  is  death  ;  in  order  efreflually 
to  reprefs  the  nioft  daring  audacioufnefs,  and,  as  it  were,  to  bal- 
ance the  different  degrees  cf  human  wickedncfs  by  a  lufficient 
counterpoife, 

XVII.  Such 


Politic    Law.  311 

XVII.  Such  is  the  right  of  the  fovereign.  But  if  he  has  aright 
to  puni(h,  the  criminal  muftbe  alfo  under  foriie  obligation  in  this 
relpedt  ;  for  we  cannot  poflibly  conceive  a  right  without  an  obli- 
gitioi  correfponding  to  it.  But  wherein  does  this  obhgation  of 
the  criminal  confift  ?  Is  he  obliged  to  betray  himfeif,  and  volun- 
tarily expofe  himfeif  to  punifhment  ?  I  anfwer,  that  this  is  not 
necciTary  for  the  end  propofed  in  the  eflablifliment  of  piinifhments  ; 
n'»r  can  we  reafonably  require  that  a  man  fhould  t'lus  betray  him- 
feif ;  but  this  does  not  hinder  him  from  being  under  a  real  obli- 
gation. 

XVIII.  i^.  It  is  certain,  that  when  there  is  afimple  pecunia- 
ry pnnilhment,  to  which  a  man  has  been  lawfully  condemned,  he 
ought  to  pay  it  without  being  forced  by  th^  magiflrate  ;  not  only 
prudence  requires  it,  but  aUo  the  rules  of  jultice,  according  to 
which  we  are  bound  to  repair  any  injury  we  have  committed, 
and  to  obey  lawful  judges. 

XIX.  2°.  What  relates  to  corporeal,  and  efpeciaily  to  capita), 
punifliments,  is  attended  with  greater  difiicuUy.  Such  is  our  nat- 
ural fondnefs  for  life,  and  averlion  to  infancy,  that  a  criminal  cannot 
be  uader  an  obligation  ofaccufini  himfeif  voluntarily,  and  prefsnt-» 
ing  himfeif  to  punifhment  ;  and  indeed  neither  the  public  good, 
nor  the  rights  of  the  perfon  intrufted  with  the  fupreme  authority, 
demand  it. 

XX.  3°.  In  confequence  of  this  fame  principle,  a  criminal 
may  innocently  feek  his  fjfety  in  flight,  and  is  not  obliged  to  remain 
in  prifon  if  he  perceives  the  doors  open,  or  if  he  can  eafily  force 
them.  But  it  is  not  lawful  for  him  to  procure  his  liberty  by  the 
comraifiion  of  a  new  crime,  as  by  cutting  the  throats  of  the  jailors, 
or  by  killing  thofe  fent  to  apprehend  him. 

XXI.  4**,  But,  in  fine,  if  we  fuppofethat  the  criminal  is  known 
that  he  is  taken,  that  he  cannot  make  his  efcape  from  prifon,  and 
that,  after  a  mature  examination  cr  trial,  he  is  convicted  of  the 
crime,  and  confequently  condemned  to  condign  punifhment  ;  he  is 
in  this  cafe  certainly  obliged  to  undergo  the  punifhment,  and  to 
acknowledge  the  lawful  nefs  of  his  fentence  ;  fo  that  there  is  no 
injury  done  him,  norcanhersaf^'nably  complain  of  any  one  but  him- 
feif :  muchlefs  can  he  withdraw  from  punifhment  by  violence,  and 
oppofe  the  magKirate  in  the  exercife  of  his  right.  In  this  prop- 
erly confifts  the  obligation  of  the  criminal  with  refpedt  to  puniili- 

ment. 


31 2  îZXg  Principles   of 

ment.     Let   us  now  inquire  more  particularly  into  the  end  tliC 
fovereign  ought  to  propofe  to  himfelf  in  inflidting  them. 

XXII.  In  general,  it  is  certain  that  the  prince  never  ought  to 
infliét  punifhments  but  with  a  view  to  fome  public  advantage. 
To  make  a  man  fuffer  merely  becaufe  he  has  done  a  thing,  and  to 
attend  only  to  what  has  paffed,  is  a  piece  of  cruelty  condenuied  by 
reafon  \  for,  after  all,  it  is  impoiTible  thai  the  fàd  fhould  be  undone. 
In  (hort,  the  right  of  punilhing  is  a  part  of  fovereignty  ;  now  fove- 
reignty  is  founded  ultimately  on  a  beneficent  power  :  it  follows 
therefore,  that  even  when  the  chief  ruler  makes  ufe  of  his  power 
of  the  fword,  he  ought  to  aim  at  fome  advantage,  or  future  good, 
agreeably  to  what  is  required  of  him  by  the  very  nature  and  foun- 
dation of  his  authority. 

XXIII.  The  principal  end  of  puni  (hment  is  therefore  the  wel- 
fare ot  fociety  ;  but  as  there  may  be  different  means  of  arriving  at 
this  end,  according  to  different  circurrftances,  the  fovereign  alfo, 
in  inflifling  punifhments,  propofes  different  and  particular  views, 
ever  fubordinate,  and  all  finally  reducible  to  the  principal  end 
above-mentioned.  What  we  havcfaid,  agree?  with  the  obfervation 
of  Grotius.  *  "  In  puniihments,  we  nnift  either  have  the  good 
*'  of  the  criminal  in  view,  or  the  advantage  of  him  whcfe  iniereft 
"  it  v/as  that  the  crime  fliould  not  have  been  committed,  or  the 
*'  good  ol  all  indifferently." 

XXIV.  Hence  the  fovereign  fometimes  propofes  to  correal  the 
criminal,  and  make  him  lofe  the  vicious  habit,  fo  as  to  cure  the 
evil  by  its  contrary,  and  to  take  away  the  fweets  of  the  crime  by 
the  bitternefs  of  the  punifhment.  This  punifh:iient,  if  the  criminal 
is  reformed  by  it,  tends  to  the  public  good.  But  if  he  Ihould  per- 
feverein  his  wickednefs,  the  fovereign  muft  have  recourfe  to  more 
violent  remedies,  and  even  to  death. 

XXV.  Sometimes  the  chief  ruler  propofes  to  deprive  criminals 
of  the  means  of  c-ommitting  new  crimes  ;  as  for  example,  by  taking 
from  them  the  arms  which  they  might  ufe,  by  fhutting  them  up 
in  prifon,  by  banifhing  them,  or  even  by  putting  them  to  death. 
At  the  fame  time  he  takes  care  of  the  public  fafety,  not  only  with 
rcfpedl  to  the  criminals  themfelves,  b'Jt  alfo  with  regard  to  thofe 
inclined  to  commit  the  like  crime,  in  deterring  them  by  thofe  ex- 
amples.    For  this  reafon,  nothing  is  more  agreeable  to  the  end  of 

punifhmtnr, 

*  Lib.  ii,  cap.  xx.  §  6.   N.  %, 


P  O  L  I  T  I  C      L  A  \V.  3I|J 

punifhment,  than  to  infli£l  it  wlih  fuch  a  folemiiity  as  is  moll 
proper  to  make  an  imprcflion  on  the  minds  of  the  vulgar. 

XXVI.  All  the fe  particular  ends  of  punifhment  ought  to  be 
conllantly  fubordinate,  and  relerred  to  the  principal  end,  namely, 
the  fafety  of  the  public,  and  the  fovereign  ought  to  ufe  them  all 
as  means  of  obtaining  that  end  }  (o  that  he  fh;)uld  not  have  re- 
courfe  to  the  moft  rigorous  puniihments,  till  thofe  of  greater  lenity 
are  infufficient  to  procure  the  public  tranquillity^ 

XXVII.  But  here  a  queftion  arifes,  whether  all  acStions,  con- 
trary to  the  laws,  can  be  lawfully  punifhed  ?  I  anfwcr,  that  the 
vet)  end  of  punifhment,  and  the  conftitution  of  human  nature, 
evince  there  may  be  adions,  in  themfelves  evil,  which  however  it 
is  not  neccil'ary  for  human  juftlce  to  puniih. 

XXVIII.  And,  1°.  adls  purely  internal,  or  fimple  thoughts 
which  do  not  difcover  themfelves  by  any  external  adls  prejudicial 
to  fociety  j  for  example,  the  agreeable  idea  of  a  bad  adtion,  the 
defire  of  committing  it,  the  defign  of  it  without  proceeding  to  the 
execution,  &c.  all  thefc  are  not  fubjedl  to  the  feverity  of  human 
punifhment,  even  though  it  Ihould  happen  that  they  are  afterwards 
difcovered. 

XXIX.  On  this  fubje£l  we  mud  however  make  the  foUowine; 
remarks.  The  firft  is,  that  if  this  kind  of  crimes  be  not  fubje(5l  to 
human  punifhment,  it  is  becaufe  the  weaknefs  of  man  does  not 
permit,  even  for  the  good  of  fociety,  that  he  fhould  be  treated  with 
the  utmoft  rigour.  We  ought  to  have  a  juft  regard  for  humanity 
in  things,  which,  though  bad  in  themfelves,  do  not  greatly  afFeiSt 
the  public  order  and  tranquillity.  The  fécond  remark  is,  that" 
though  a£ls,  purely  internal,  are  not  fubje£t  to  civil  punifhment,  we 
muft  not  for  this  reafon  conclude,  that  thefe  a£ls  are  not  under  the 
diredlion  of  the  civil  laws.  We  have  before  eftablifhed  the  con- 
trary.* In  a  word,  it  is  evident  that  the  laws  of  nature  exprellly 
condemn  fuch  allions,  and  that  they  are  punifhed  by  the  Deity. 

XXX.  2^.  It  would  be  too  fevere  to  punifli  every  peccadillo  ; 
lince  human  frailty,  notwithflanding  the  greatefl  caution  and  atten- 
tion, cannot  avoid  a  multitude  of  flips  and  infirmities.      This  is  a 
confequence  of  the  toleration  due  to  humanity. 
Qa XXXI.  3^. 

*  Chap.i.  5   S2,  &c. 


314  T^he  Principles  of 


XXXI.  3'*'.  In  a  word,  we  mufl  nccefTarily  leave  unpunifhcdf 
thofe  common  vices  which  are  the  confL-quences  of  a  general  cor- 
ruption ;  as  for  inftance,  ambition,  avarice,  inhua>anity,  ingraii- 
tude,  hypocrify,  envy,  pride,  wrath,  &c.  for  if  a  fovereigii  wanted  to 
punilh  fiich  dilpofitions  with  rigour,  he  would  be  reduced  to  the 
neceflity  of  reigning  in  a  defert.  It  is  fufficient  to  puniili  thufc 
vices  when  they  prompt  men  to  enormous  and  overt  a6\s. 

XXXII.  It  is  not  even  always  necefTary  to  punifh  crimes  in 
themfelves  punifhable,  for  there  are  cafes  in  which  the  fovereiga 
may  pardon  j  and  of  this  we  may  judge  by  the  very  end  of  pun- 
jflitrient. 

XXXIII.  The  public  good  is  the  ultimate  end  of  all  punifh- 
ment.  If  therefore  there  are  circumflance?,  in  which,  by  pard- 
oning, as  much  or  more  advantage  is  procured  than  by  puniihing, 
then  there  is  no  obligation  to  puniOi,  and  the  fovereign  even 
ought  to  (hew  clemency.  Thus  if  the  crime  be  concealed,  or 
be  only  knovirn  to  a  few,  it  is  not  always  neceffary,  nay  it  would 
fometimes  be  dangerous,  to  make  it  public  by  punifhment  j  for 
many  abflain  from  evil,  rather  from  their  ignorance  of  vice,  than 
from  a  knowledge  and  love  of  virtue.  Cicero  obferve?,  with  regard 
to  Solon's  having  no  law  againfl  parricide,  that  this  filence  of  the 
legiflator  has  been  looked  upon  as  a  great  mark  of  prudence  ;  for- 
afmuch  as  he  made  no  prohibition  cf  a  thing  of  which  there  had 
been  yet  no  example,  lef},  by  fpeaking  cf  it,  he  f[)ould  feem  to 
give  the  people  a  notion  of  committing  it,  rather  than  deter  them 
from  it. 

Wemayalfo  confider  the  perfonal  fervices  which  the  criminal, 
or  fome  of  his  family,  have  done  to  the  Hate,  and  whether  he  can 
fliil  be  of  great  advantage  to  it,  fo  that  the  imprefTion  made  by  the 
light  of  his  punifhment  be  not  likely  to  produce  fo  much  good  as 
hehimfelfis  capable  of  doing.  Thus  at  fea,  when  the  pilot  has 
committed  a  crime,  and  there  is  none  on  board  capable  of  navigating 
the  fhip,  it  would  be  defîroying  all  thofe  in  the  vellel  to  punifh 
him.    This  example  may  alfo  be  applied  to  the  general  of  an  army. 

In  a  word,  the  public  advantage,  which  is  the  true  meafure  of 
puniOiment,  fometimes  requires  that  the  fovereign  fhould  pardon, 
becaufe  of  the  great  number  of  criminals.  The  prudence  of  gov- 
ernment demands  that  the  juRice,  eflablifhed  for  the  prefervation 
of  (ociety,  lliould  not  be  exercifed  in  fuch  a  manner  as  to  fubvert 
she  flaic, 

XXXIV.  All 


Politic     Law.  315 

XXXIV.  All  crimes  are  not  equal,  and  it  is  but  equity  there 
ihouîd  be  a  due  proportion  between  the  crime  and  the  punifhment. 
We  may  judge  of  the  greatnefs  of  a  crime  in  general  by  its  object, 
by  the  intention  and  malice  of  the  criminal,  and  by  the  prejudice 
ariling  to  fociety  from  it  ;  and  to  this  latter  con(equence,  the  two 
others  muft  be  ultimately  referred. 

XXXV.  According  to  the  dignity  of  the  objtdl,  the  a£lion  is 
more  or  l.^fs  criminal.  We  mult  place,  in  the  firft  clafs,  thofc 
crimes  which  intereft  fociety  in  general  ;  the  next  are  tho(e  which 
diilurb  the  order  of  civil  fociety  ;  and  laft  of  all  thofe  which  relate 
to  individuals  :  the  latter  are  more  or  Icfs  heinous,  according  toth^i 
value  of  the  thing  of  v/hich  they  deprive  us.  Thus  he,  who  Hays 
his  father,  commits  a  more  horrid  murder  than  if  he  had  killed  a 
Granger.  He  who  infuks  a  magiftrate,  is  more  to  blame  than  if 
he  had  infulted  his  equal.  A  perfon  who  adds  murder  to  robbery, 
is  more  guilty  than  he  who  only  drips  the  traveller  of  his  money. 

XXXVI.  The  greater  or  lefTer  degree  of  malice  alfo  contributes 
very  much  to  the  enormity  of  the  crime,  and  is  to  be  deduced  from 
feveral  circumfiianceî. 

1°.  From  the  motives  which  en2:a2:e  mankind  to  commit 
a  crime,  and  which  may  be  more  or  lefs  eafy  to  refift. 
Thus  he,  who  robs  or  murders  in  cold  blood,  is  more  culpable 
than  he  who  yields  to  the  violence  of  fomc  furious  paflion. 

2".  From  the  particular  caaraéter  of  the  criminal,  which,  be- 
fides  the  general  reafon?,  ought  to  retain  him  in  his  duty  :  "  The 
"  higher  a  man's  birth  is,  fays  Juvenal,  or  the  more  exalted  he  is 
*' in  dignity,  the  more  enormous  is  the  crime  he  commits.  * 
<'  This  takes  place  efpecially  with  refpe<fl  to  princes,  and  fo  much 
**  the  more,  bccaufethe  conf-quences  of  their  bad  a£lions  are  fatal 
♦'  to  the  ftate,  from  the  number  of  perfons  who  endeavour  to  imi- 
"  tate  them."     This  is  the  judicious  remark  made  by  Cicero,  f 

Th« 

*    Ou:r)e  animi  •uilium  tanlo  conJfeSJiut  tn  ft 
Crhiien  bitbtt,  quanta  major  qui  pec  tat  èaH/eturé 


■     ■  ■ — More  public  fcandal  vice  attend». 
As  he  is  great  and  noble,  who  offonds. 


Jov.  Sat.  viii.  140,  i.-jr. 


f  De  Leg.  lib.  iii.  cap.  14.  N'ec  enim  f.infum  tnalî eji  fitceare  principes  quji- 
quam  ijl  magnum  hoc  per  felpfam  malum;  quantum  iiluJ,  quod  permulti  imitutcra 
prlncipum  exijiunt  :  quo  pirnUiofiut  de  repuhlica  merentur  •vit'wft  principes,  i^uod non  folum 
'jitia  concipiunt  ipji,  fed  ea  infundunt  incivitatem.  Neque  fo'um  ohjunt,  quoi  ipj%  tur, 
tuispuntur,fed etian  quod  ;crruir.p:ijit\  plufi^ue  o.cmplo,  quam  piccatd  r.oce.tt> 


316  The   Principles  of 


The  fame  obfervation  may  alfo  be  applied  to  magiflrates  and  cler- 
gymen. 

3°.  We  muft  alfo  confider  the  circumftances  of  time  and  place, 
in  which  the  crime  has  been  committed,  the  manner  ofcommitting 
itj  the  inftrumenis  ufed  for  that  purpofe,  &:c. 

4°.  L  ilUv-j  we  are  to  confider  whether  the  criminal  has  made  a 
cuftom  ofcommitting  fiich  a  crime,  ©r,  if  he  is  but  rarely  guilty  of 
it  J  whether  he  has  committed  it  ot  his  own  accord,  or  been  fedu- 
ccd  by  others,  &c. 

XXXy  II.  We  may  cafily  perceive  that  the  difference  of  thefe 
circumftances  interefts  the  happinefs  and  tranquillity  of  fociety, 
and  confequently  either  augments  or  diminifhes  the  enormity  of 
the  crime, 

XXXVill.  There  are  therefore  crimes  lefTer  or  greater  than 
others  ;  and  confequently  they  do  not  all  deferve  to  be  punifhed 
with  equal  f^^verity  ;  but  the  kind  and  prccife  degree  of  puniflimcnt 
depends  on  the  prudence  of  the  fovereign.  The  following  are  the 
principal  rules  by  which  he  ought  to  be  directed, 

1°.  The  degree  of  punifliment  ought  ever  to  be  proportioned  to 
the  end  of  inflifling  it,  that  is,  to  reprefs  the  infolence  and  malignity 
of  the  wicked,  and  to  procure  the  internal  peace  and  (nfcty  of  the 
ftate.  It  is  upon  this  principle  ihat  we  muft  augment  or  diminifli 
the  rigour  of  punifhment.  The  punilliment  is  too  rigorous,  if  we 
can,  by  milder  means,  obtain  the  end  propofed  ;  and,  on  the  con- 
trary, it  is  too  moderate  when  it  has  not  a  force  fufficient  to  produce 
thefe  effects,  and  when  the  criminals  thcmfelves  defpife  it. 

2*^.  According  to  this  principle,  every  crime  may  be  punifhed 
as  the  public  good  requires,  without  confidering  whether  there  be 
an  equal  or  lefler  punifnment  for  another  crime,  which  in  itfelf 
appears  more  or  lefs  heinous  :  thus  robbery,  for  inttance,  is  of  its 
own  nature  n  lefs  crime  than  murder  ;  and  yet  highwaymen  may, 
without  injuftice,  be  punilhsd  with  death,  as  v/ell  as  murderers. 

3'^.  The  equality  which  the  fovereign  ought  ever  to  obferve 
in  the  exercife  ofjuftice,  confifts  in  punifhing  thofe  alike  who 
have  trefpafîed  alike  ;  and  in  not  pardoning  a  perfon,  without  very 
good  rc-afon,  who  has  committed  a  crime  for  which  others  have 
been  punidied. 

4°.  It  mull  be  alfo  obferved,  that  we  cannot  multiply  the  kinds 
nnd  degrees  of  punifliment  in  infinitum  \  and  as  there  is  no  greater 
punifîjmcnt  than  death,  it  is  necefFary  that  certain  crimes,  though 

unequal 


Pol  I  T  I  c    L  A  w.  317 

unequal  in  themfelves,  fliould  be  equally  fubjeft  to  capital  punifh- 
i/hment.  All  tliat  can  be  faid,  is,  that  death  may  be  more  or  lefs 
terrible,  according  as  wc  employ  a  milder  or  (horter  method 
to  deprive  a  perfon  of  life. 

5'^.  We  ought,  as  much  as  pofîlble,  to  incline  to  the  merciful 
fide,  when  there  are  not  flrong  reafons  for  the  contrary.  This  is 
the  fécond  part  of  clemency.  The  firft  confifts  in  a  total  exemp- 
tion from  punilliment,  when  the  good  of  the  ftate  permits  it. 
This  is  alfo  one  of  the  rules  of  the  Roman  law.  * 

ô'^.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  fomctimes  ncceflary  and  convenient 
to  heighten  the  punifliment,  and  to  fet  fuch  an  example  as  may 
intimidate  the  wicked,  when  the  evil  can  be  prevented  only  by 
violent  remedies  f. 

7°.  The  fame  punifhment  does  not  make  the  fame  impreflion 
on  all  kinds  of  people,  and  confeqjently  has  not  the  fame  force  to 
deter  them  from  vice.  We  ought  therefore  to  confider,  both  in 
the  general  penal  fandion  and  in  the  application  of  it,  the  perfon  - 
of  the  criminal,  and,  in  that,  all  thofe  qualities  of  age,  fex,  ftate, 
riches,  (irength,  and  the  like,  which  may  either  increafe or  diminifh 
thefenffof  ptmilhment.  A  particular  fine,  for  inftance,  will  dif- 
trefs  a  beggar,  while  it  is  nothing  to  a  rich  man  :  the  fame  mark 
of  ignominy  will  be  very  mortifying  to  a  perfon  of  honour  and 
quality,  which  would  pafs  for  a  trifle  with  a  vulgar  fellow.  Men 
have  more  ftrength  to  fupport  punifhments  than  women,  and  full- 
grown  people  more  than  thofe  of  tender  years,  &c.  Let  us  alfo 
obfcrve,  that  it  belongs  to  the  jnftice  and  prudence  of  government, 
always  to  follow  the  order  oi  judgment  and  of  the  judiciary  pro- 
cedure in  the  infliction  of  puniftiments.  This  is  necefTary,  not 
only  that  we  may  not  commit  injuflice  in  an  affair  of  fuch  impor- 
tance, but  alfo  that  the  fovereign  may  be  fecured  againft  all  fufpi- 
cion  of  injuftice  and  partiality.  However,  there  are  fomctimes 
extraordinary  and  ptefling  circumlUnces,  where  the  good  of  the 
ftate  and  the  public  fafety  do  not  permit  us  exaâly  to  obfcrve  all 
the  formalities  of  the  criminal  procedure  ;  and  provided,  in  thofe 
circumftances,  the  crime  be  duly  proved,  the  fovereign  may  judge 
fummarily,  and  without  deliy  punifti  a  criminal,  whofe  punifh- 
ment  cannot  be  deferred  without  imminent  danger  to  the   ftate. 

Laftl)', 

♦  In  pœnilibus  caufis,  beni'gnus  interpretandumcfl.  Lib  cv.  §  z.  ff.  de  Reg-. 
Jur.     Vid.fup,  §  ^3. 

f  Nonnunquam  evenît,  ut  aliquorum  maleficiorum  fupplicia  cxacerbantur, 
quoties  nimùum,  niultis  perfonis  graflantibus,  cxemplo  opus  Ct.  Lib.  j,v\  5  lo, 
ff.  de  pœni?.  • 


3iS  ,    iToe  Principles  of 

Laftly,  it  is  alfo  a  rule  of  prudence,  that  if  we  cannot  chaftife  a 
criininal  without  expofing  the  ftate  to  great  danger,  the  fovereign 
ought  not  only  to  grant  a  pardon,  but  aifo  to  do  it  in  fuch  a  manner 
as  that  it  may  appear  rather  to  be  the  effedl  of  clemency  than  of 
nccejfity. 

XXXIX,  What  we  have  faid  relates  to  punifhrnents  infli<f^^ed 
for  crimes  of  which  a  perfon  is  the  fole  and  proper  author.  With 
rcfpeâto  crimes  commit  ted  by  feveral,  the  following  obfervations 
may  ferve  as  principles. 

i''.  It  is  certain  that  thofj,  who  are  really  accomplices  in  the 
cricne^  ought  to  be  punifhed  in  proportion  to  the  fhare  they  have 
in  it,  and  according  as  they  ought  to  be  confidered  as  principal 
caufes,  or  fubordinate  and  collateral  inftruments.  In  thefe  cafes, 
fuch  perfons  fufFer  rather  for  their  own  crime  than  for  that  of 
another. 

2**.  As  for  crime>  committed  by  a  body  or  connmunity,  thofe 
only  are  really  culpable  who  have  given  their  a6lual  confent  to 
them  ;  but  they,  who  have  been  of  a  contrary  opinion,  are  abfo- 
lutely  innocent.  Thus  Alexander,  having  given  orders  to  fell  all 
the  Thebans  after  the  talcing  of  their  city,  excepted  thofe,  who, 
in  the  public  deliberations,  had  oppofed  the  breaking  of  the  alli^ 
ance  with  the  Macedonians. 

3°.  Hence  it  is,  that,  v.ith  refpe£t  to  crimes  committed  by  a 
multitude,  reafons  of  fta^'  2nd  humanity  dire£V,  that  we  fhould 
principally  punilli  thofe  who  are  the  ring-leaders,  and  pardon  the 
red.  The  feverity  of  the  fovereign  to  fome  will  reprefs  the  auda- 
cioufnefs  of  the  moft  refolute  ;  and  his  clemency  toothers  will  gain 
him  the  hearts  of  the  multitude.* 

4°.  If  the  ring-leaders  have  flieltered  themfelves  by  flight,  or 
otherwife,  or  if  they  have  all  an  equal  fhare  in  the  crime,  we  mud 
have  recourfs  to  a  decimation,  or  other  means,  to  punifh  fome  of 
them.  By  this  method  the  terror  reaches  all,  while  but  few  fall 
under  the  punifhment. 

XL.  BefiJes,  it  is  a  certain  and  inviolable  rule,  that  no  perfon 
can  be  lawfully  punifhed  for  the  crime  of  another,  in  which  he 
has  had  no  fliare.  All  merit  and  demerit  is  intirely  perfonal  .and 
incommunicable  ;  and  we  have  no  right  to  punifh  any  but  thofe 
who  deferve  it. 

XLI.  It 

t  I  .III  »  ■——4  I  I     I  11,; 

*  QMintil.  Dsclam.  cap.  vii.  p.  m.  237. 


Politic    Law.  319 

XLl.  It  fometlmes  happens,  however,  that  innocent  perfons 
fufFer  on  account  of  the  crimes  of  others  ;  but  we  muft  make  two 
remarks  on  this  fubJ£(5t. 

I*'.  Not  every  thing  that  occafions  uneafinef?,  pain,  or  lofs  to  a 
perfon,  is  properly  a  punifhment  ;  for  example,  when  fubjedls  fuf- 
fer  fome  grievances  from  the  milcarriages  and  crimes  cf  ihfir 
prince,  it  is  not,  in  refpeâ:  to  them,  a  puni(hment,  but  a  misfortune. 

The  fécond  remark  is,  that  thele  kinds  of  evils,  orindiredl  pun- 
ifhments,  if  we  may  call  them  fo,  are  infeparable  from  the  coiiftitu- 
tion  of  human  affairs. 

XLII.  Thus  if  we  confifcate  the  efFefts  of  a  perfon,  his  chil- 
dren fuffer  indeed  for  it;  but  it  is  not  properly  a  punilhment  to 
them,  fince  thofe  effects  ought  to  belong  to  them  only  on  fuppo- 
fition  their  father  had  kept  them  till  his  death.  In  a  word,  we 
muft  either  almoft  intirely  abolilh  the  ufe  of  punifhments,  or  ac- 
knowledge, that  thefe  inconveniences,  infeparable  from  theconlli- 
tution  of  human  affairs,  and  from  the  particular  relations  Vtihich 
men  have  to  each  other,  have  nothing  in  themfelves  unjuft. 

XLIII.   Laftly,  it  is  to  be  obferved,  that  there  ?.re   crimes  fo 
enormous,  fo  effentially  affciSling  in  regard  to  fociety,  that  the  pub- 
lic good  authorizes  the  fovereign  to  take  the  ftrongeft  precautions 
againft  them,  and  even,  if  neceffary,  to  make  part  of  the  punifh- 
ment  fall  on  the   perfons  moft  dear  to  the  criminal.     Thus  the 
children  of  traitors,  or  ftate   criminals,  may  be  excluded   from 
honours  and  preferments.     The  father  is  feverely  punifhed  by  thifs 
method,   fince  he  fees  he    is  the  caufe   why    the  perfons    deareft 
to  him  are  reduced  to  live  in  obfcurity.     But  this  is  not  properly 
a  punifhment  in  regard  to  the  children  ;  for  the  fovereign,having  a 
right  to  give  public  employments  to  whom  he  pleafes,  may,  when 
the  public  good  requires  it,  exclude  even  perfons  v^ho  have  done 
nothing  to  render  themfelves  unworthy  of  thefe   preferments.     I 
confefs  that  this  is  a  hardlliip,  but  neceffity  authorizes  it,  to  the  end 
that  the  tendernefs  of  a  parent  for  his   off-pring  may  render  him 
more  cautious  to  undertake  nothing  againft  the  ftate.     But  equity 
ought  always  to  dired  thoic  judgments,  and  to  rnitigate  them  ac- 
cording to  circumftances. 

XLIV.  I  am  not  of  opinion  that  we  can  exceed  thefe  botmds, 
neither  does  the  public  good  require  it.  It  is  therefore  a  real  piece 
of  injuftice,  eftablifhed  among;  f.-veral  nations,  namely,  to  banifh 
Of  kill  the  children  of  a  tyrant  or  traitor,  Jind  foipelimes  all  his 

relations, 


2^0  The  Principles  of 

relations,  though  they 
is  fufficient  to  give  us  : 
the  Chriftian  emperor. 


relations,  though  they  were  no  accomplices  in  his  crimes.     This 
is  fufficient  to  give  us  a  right  idea  of  the  famous  lavi^  of  Arcadius* 


CHAP.     V. 


Of  the  power  of  the  foveretgns  over  the  Bona  Reipublic32,   o^  ihe 
goods  contained  hi  the  commonwealth. 

I.  rp 

J[  HE  right  of  the  fovereign  over  the  goods  contained  in 
the  commonwealth,  relates  either  to  the  goods  of  the  fubjedl,  or 
to  thofe  which  belong  to  the  commonwealth  itfelf  as  fuch. 

II.  The  right  of  the  prince  over  the  goods  of  the  fubje£l  may 
be  eftabliflied  two  different  ways  ;  for  ciiher  it  may  be  founded  on 
the  very  nature  of  the  fovereignty,  or  on  the  particular  manner  in 
which  it  was  acquired. 

III.  If  we  fuppofe,  that  a  chief  ruler  pofTeffes,  with  a  full  right 
of  property,  all  the  goods  contained  in  the  commonwealth,  and 
that  he  has  colleded,  as  it  were,  his  own  fubjeds,  who  originally 
hold  their  eflates  of  him,  then  it  is  certain  that  the  fovereign  has 
as  abfolute  a  power  over  thofe  eftates,  as  every  mafter  of  a  family 
has  over  his  own  patrimony  ;  and  that  the  fubje£ts  cannot  enjoy  or 
difpofe  of  thofe  goods  or  eftates,  but  fo  far  as  the  fovereign  permits. 
In  thefecircumftances,  while  the  fovereign  has  remitted  nothing  of 
his  right  by  irrevocable  grants,  his  fubjedts  pofTefs  their  eftates  in  a 
precarious  manner,  revocable  at  pleafure,  whenever  the  prince 
thinks  fit  ;  they  can  only  fupply  thcmfelves  with  fuftienance  and 
other  neceflaries  from  them  :  In  this  cafe  the  fovereignty  is  accom- 
panied with  a  right  of  abfolute  property. 

IV.  But,  1°.  this  manner  of  eftablifliing  the  power  of  the 
fovereign  over  the  goods  of  the  fubjeds  cannot  be  of  great  ufe  ;  and 
if  it  has  fometimes  taken  place,  it  has  only  been  among  the  oriental 
nations,  who  eafily  fubmit^o  a  defpotic  government. 

2".  Experience  teaches  us,  that  this  abfolute  dominion  of  the 

fovereign 

•  Cod.  «nd  L.  Jul.  Maj.  lib,  ix.  tit.  8.  leg.  5^ 


Politic  Law.  321 

fovcreign  over  ths  goods  of  the  fubjefldoes  not  tend  to  the  ad- 
vantage of  the  (bte.  A  modern  traveller  obferves,  that  the  coun- 
tries, wh;re  this  propriety  of  the  prince  prevails,  however  beauti- 
ful and  fertile  ofthemfelvss,  become  daily  more  defolate,  poor,  and 
barbarous;  or  that  at  lead  they  are  not  fo  flourifhing  as  moft  of 
the  kingdoms  of  Europe,  where  the  fubje<5ls  polTefs  their  eftates  as 
their  own  property,  exclufive  of  the  prince. 

3°.  The  fupreme  power  does  not  of  itfelf  require,  that  the 
prince  (hould  have  this  abfolute  dominion  over  the  eftates  of  his 
fubjedh.  The  property  of  individuals  is  prior  to  the  formation  of 
ftates,  and  there  is  no  reafon  which  can  induce  us  to  fuppofe  that 
thofe  individuals  intirely  transferred  to  the  fovereign  the  right 
they  had  over  their  own  eftates  ;  on  the  contrary,  it  is  to  fecure  a 
quiet  and  eafy  pofTefiton  of  their  properties,  that  they  have  infti- 
tuted  government  and  fovereignty. 

4°,  Bw-fides,  if  we  fhould  fuppofe  an  abfolute  fovereignty  ac- 
quired by  arms,  yet  this  does  not  of  itfelf  give  an  arbitrary  dominion 
over  the  property  of  the  fubjedl.  The  fame  is  true  even  of  a  pat- 
rimonial fovereignty,  which  confers  a  right  of  alienating  the 
crown  ;  for  this  right  of  the  fovereign  does  not  hinder  the  fubjedt 
from  enjoying  his  refpedivc  properties. 

V.  Let  us  therefore  conclude,  that,  in  general,  the  riglu  of  the 
prince  over  the  goods  of  the  fubje6ls  is  not  an  abfolute  dominion 
over  their  properties,  b'jta  right  founded  on  the  nature  and  end  of 
fovereignty,  which  invefts  him  with  the  power  of  difpofing  of  thofe 
eftates  in  difFerent  manners,  for  the  benefit  of  individuals  as  well 
as  of  the  ftate,  without  depriving  the  fubjecls  of  their  right  to 
their  properties,  except  in  cafes  where  it  is  abfolutely  neceflary  for 
the  public  good. 

VI.  This  being  premifed,  the  prince,  as  fovereign,  has  aright 
over  the  eftates  of  his  fubjedls  principally  in  three  difFerent  man- 
ners. 

The  firft  confifts  in  regulating,  by  wife  laws,  the  ufe  which  ev- 
ery one  ought  to  make  of  his  goods  and  eftate,  for  the  advantage  of 
the  ftate  and  that  of  individuals. 

The  fécond,  in  railing  fubfidies  and  taxes. 

The  third,  in  ufing  the  rights  of  fovereign  or  tranfcendejital 
property.* 

VII.  To  the  firft  head  we  muft  reduce  all  fumptuary  lawsj  by 

R  r  which 


^  Dominium  emioens. 


o 


2 2  7^/je  Principles  of 

which  bounds  are  fct  to  unnecefTary  expenfes  which  ruin  ''amilies, 
and  coiifcquently  impovcrifti  the  Itate.  Nothing  is  more  condu- 
cive to  the  happintfs  ot  a  nation,  or  more  worthy  of  the  care  ofihe 
fovereign,  than  lo  obh^e  the  fubje^ts  to  ceconomy,  frugahty,  and 
labour. 

When  hixury  has  once  prevailed  in  a  nation,  the  evil  becomes 
almoft  incurable.  As  too  ^reat  authoilty  fpoils  kings,  fo  luxury 
poilons  a  whole  people.  The  niott  {'upcrfluous  things  are  looked, 
upon  as  neccfl'<iry,  and  new  neceffities  are  daily  invented.  Thus 
families  are  ruined,  and  individuals  difabled  from  contributing  to 
theexpences  ncceflaiy  for  the  public  good.  An  individual,  for 
inftancc,  who  fpends  only  three  fifths  of  his  income,  and  pays  one 
fiûh  for  the  public  f^rvice,  will  not  hurt  himleU,  fmce  he  lays  up 
a  fifth  to  incre/»fchis  ftock.  But  if  he  fpends  all  his  income,  he 
cither  cannot  pay  the  taxes,  or  he  muft  break  in  upon  his  capitalt 
Anolhtr  inconveniency  is,  that  not  only  the  eflatcs  of  individuals 
are  fquandered  away  by  luxury,  but,  what  is  ftill  worfe,  they  are 
generally  carried  abroad  into  foreign  countries,  in  purfuit  of  thofe 
things  which  flatter  luxury  and  vanity. 

The  impovcrilhing  of  individuals  produces  alfo  another  evil  for  the 
flate,  by  hindering  marriages.  On  the  contrary,  people  are  more 
inclined  to  marriage,  wlien  a  moderate  expence  is  fufficientfor  thc- 
fupport  of  a  family. 

'i'his  the  emperor  Augufius  was  very  fenfible  of;  for  when  he 
wanted  to  reform  the  manners  of  the  Romans,  among  the  various 
cdiâs  which  he  either  made  or  renewed,  he  re-eftabliftied  both 
the  fumptuary  law,  and  that  which  obliged  people  to  marry. 

When  luxury  is  once  introduced,  it  foon  becomes  a  gener;!  evil, 
and  the  contagion  infenfibly  fpreads  froin  the  lirft  men  of  the  ftate 
to  the  very  dregs  of  the  people.  The  king's  relations  want  to 
imitate  his  magnificence  \  the  nobility  that  of  his  relations  ;  the 
gentry,  or  middle  fort  of  people,  endeavour  to  equal  the  nobility  ; 
and  the  poor  woukl  fain  pais  for  gentry:  thus  every  one  living 
beyond  hio  income,  the  people  arc  ruined,  and  all  orders  and  dif- 
tini5tii)ns  confounded. 

Hiftory  informs  us,  that,  in  all  agc^^  luxury  has  been  one  of  the 
caufes  which  hrs  more  or  lefs  contributed  to  the  ruin  and  decay 
even  of  the  moft  powerful  ftates,  becaufe  it  fenfibly  enervates  cour- 
age, and  deltroys  virtue.  Suctoinus  obferves,  that  Julius  Csfar 
invaded  the  liberties  of  his  country  only  in  confequence  of  not 
knowing  how  to  pay  the  debts  he  had  contracted  by  his  excefllve 
prodigality,  nor  how  to  fupport  his  expenfive  way  of  living.  Many 
fided  with  him,  bccaufc  they  had  not  wherewith  to  fupply  that 

luxury 


Politic     Law.  323 

luxury  to  which  they  hail  been  accullomed,  and  th^^y  were  in  hopes 
of  getting  by  the  civil  wars  enou^^h  tJ  maintain  their  former  ex- 
travagance. * 

We  mufl:  obferve,  in  fine,  that,  to  render  the  fiimptuary  l-.iws 
more  effedlaal,  princes  and  magillrates  ought  by  the  example  of 
their  own  moderation,  to  put  thofe  out  of  countenance  who  love 
extravagance,  and  to  encourage  the  prudent  who  would  eafily  fub- 
init  to  follow  tlie  pattern  of  a  good  œconomy  and  honcU  frugalify. 

VIII.  To  this  right  of  the  fovercign  of  directing  the  fuhjccSls 
in  the  ufe  of  their  eftates  and  goods,  we  mull  alfo  reiiuce  the  laws 
againft  gaining  and  prodigality,  thofe  which  fet  bounds  to  grants, 
legacies,  and  teilaments  ;  and,  in  fine,  thofe  againft  idle  and  lazy 
people,  and  againlî  pe;lbns  that  fuffer  their  eftates  to  run  to  ruin, 
purely  by  carelefTnefs  and  neglect. 

IX.  Above  all,  it  is  of  great  importance  to  ufe  every  endeavour 
to  banifh  idlenefs,  that  fruitful  fourcc  of  diforders.  The  want  cf 
a  ufeful  and  honed  occupation  is  the  foundation  of  an  infinite 
number  of  mifchiefs.  The  human  mind  cannot  remain  in  a  ftatc 
of  inaftion,  and  if  it  be  not  employed  on  fomethlng  good,  it  will 
inevitably  apply  itfelf  to  fomething  bad,  as  the  experience  of  all 
ages  demondrates.  It  were  therefore  to  be  wiflied,  that  there 
were  laws  againft  idlenefs,  to  prevent  its  pernicious  effc6l>,  and 
that  no  perfon  was  permitted  to  live  without  fome  honeft  occupa- 
tion either  of  the  mind  or  body.  Efpccially  young  people,  who 
afp ire  after  political,  ecclefia(fical,  or  military  employments,  ought 
not  to  be  permitted  to  pafs  in  (hameful  idlenefs,  the  time  of  their 
lifemoft  proper  for  the  ftudy  of  morality,  politics,  and  religion. 
It  is  obvious  th2t  a  wife  prince  may,  front  thefe  reflections,  draw 
vtry  important  in(lru<5tions  for  goveniment. 

X.  The  fécond  minner,  in  which  the  prince  can  difpofe  of  the 
goods  or  edatcs  of  his  fubjedlis,  is,  by  demanding  taxes  or  fubfidies 
of  them.  That  the  fovereign  has  this  right,  will  evidently  appear, 
if  we  confider  that  taxes  are  no  more'than  a  contribution  which 
individuals  pay  to  the  ftate  for  the  prefervation  and  defence  of 
their  lives  and  propertied',  a  contribution  abfolutely  necefl'ary  both 
for  the  ordinary  and  extraordinary  expences  of  government,  which 
the  fovereign  neither  can  nor  ought  to  furniili  out  of  his  own 
fund  :  he  mufl:  therefore,  for  ilut  end  and  purpofe,  have  a  right  to 

tako 

•  See  Sill.  adCsfcir.  dcRepub.  erdir.jR4. 


3 24  ^^  Principles  of 

take  away  part  of  the.  goods  of  the  fuhjedl  by  way  of  tax.     / 

XI.  Tacitus  relates  a  memorable  {lory  on  this  fubjedl.  "  Nero, 
*'  he  fays,  once  thought  to  abolifh  all  taxes,  and  to  make  this  mag- 
*'  nificent  grant  to  the  Roman  people  ;  but  the  fenate  moderated 
*'  his  ardour  ;  and,  after  having  commended  the  emperor  for  his 
"  generous  defign,  they  told  him  that  the  empire  would  inevitably 
*'  fail,  if  its  foundations  were  fapped  ;  that  molt  of  the  taxes  had 
*'  been  effabliflied  by  the  confiils  and  tribunes  during  the  very 
^'  height  of  liberty  in  tlie  times  of  the  republic,  and  that  they  were 
"  the  only  means  of  fupplying  the  immenfc  cxpenccs  necell'ary  for 
"  the  fupport  of  fo  great  an  empire." 

XII.  Nothing  is  then  generally  more  unjuft  and  unreafonabîe 
than  the  complaints  of  the  populace,  who  frequently  afcribe  their 
mifery  to  taxes,  v/ithout  refledingthat  thefe  are,  on  the  contrary, 
the  foundation  of  the  tranquillity  and  fafcty  of  the  (late,  and  that 
they  cannot  refufe  to  pay  them  wiihout  prejudicing  ihcir  own 
inter  efts. 

XIII.  Hcvever,  the  end  and  prudence  of  civil  government 
require  notonly  that  the  people  Ihould  not  be  overcharged  in  this 
refpec^,  but  alio  th.nt  the  taxes  Ihould  be  raifed  in  as  gentle  and 
imperceptible  a  manner  as  pofllble. 

XIV.  And,  i*^.  the  fubjetfls  muft  be  equally  charged,  that  they 
may  have  no  jult  rcafon  of  complaint.  A  burden  equally  fupported 
by  all.  is  lighter  to  every  individual  ;  but  if  a  conftdcrable  number 
relealë  or  excufe  themfelvcs,  it  becomes  much  more  heavy  and 
jnfupportable  to  the  reff.  As  every  fuhjedt  equally  enjoys  the 
prote«51ion  of  the  government,  and  the  fafety  which  it  procures  ;  it 
is  jiilf  that  they  lliould  all  contribute  to  its  fupport  in  a  proper 
equality. 

XV.  2°.  It  is  to  be  obferved  however,  that  this  equality  does 
TiOt  confift  in  paying  equal  fums  of  money,  but  in  equally  bearing 
the  burden  impofed  for  the  good  of  the  ftate  ;  that  is,  there  mult 
be  a  juft  proportion  between  the  buraen  of  the  tax  and  the  benefit 
of  peace  ;  for  though  all  equally  enjoy  peace,  ytt  the  advantages, 
which  all  reap  from  it,  are  not  equal. 

XVI.  3^.  Every  man  ought  therefore  to  be  taxed  in  proportion 
to  his  income,  both  inordinary  and  c2itraordinary  exigencies. 

XVII.  4°. 


Pol  I  T  I  c    L  A  w.  325 

XVII.  4^.  Experience  lliews,  that  the  beft  method  of  raifing 
taxes,  is  to  lay  them  on  things  daily  confumed  in  life. 

XVI II.  5°.  As  to  merchandizes  imported,  it  is  to  be  obferved, 
that  if  they  are  not  necelTary,  but  only  fubfcrvient  to  luxury,  very 
great  duties  may  juRly  be  laid  on  them. 

XIX.  6°.  When  foreign  merchandizes  confift  of  fuch  things 
as  may  grow,  or  be  manufailurcd  at  home,  by  the  induftry  and 
application  of  our  own  people,  the  impoils  ought  to  be  raifed  higher 
upon  thofe  articles. 

XX.  7.  With  regard  to  the  exportation  of  commodities  of  our 
own  growth,  if  it  be  the  intereft  of  the  ftate  that  they  fhould  not 
go  out  of  the  country,  it  may  be  right  to  raife  the  cuftoms  upon 
then  ;  but  on  the  contrary,  if  it  is  for  the  public  advantage  that 
they  Qiould  he  fent  to  foreign  markets,  then  theduty  of  exporta-  - 
tion  ought  to  be  diminifticd,  or  abfolutely  taken  away.  In  fome 
countries,  by  a  wife  piece  of  policy,  rewards  are  given  to  thefub- 
jefls,  who  export  fuch  commodities  as  are  in  too  great  plenty,  and 
far  furpaffing  the  wants  of  the  inhabitants. 

XXI.  8°.  In  a  word,  in  ûxz  application  of  all  thefe  maxims,  the 
fovereign  muft  attend  to  tlie  good  of  trade,  and  take  all  proper 
meafurcs  to  make  it  fiourifti. 

XXII.  It  is  unneccfTary  to  obferve,  that  the  right  of  the  fove- 
reign, with  refpecl  to  taxes,  being  founded  on  the  wants  of  the 
itate,  hz  ought  never  to  raife  them  but  in  proportion  to  thofe 
wants;  neither  fhouIJ  he  employ  them  but  with  that  view,  nor 
apply  them  to  his  ov.n  private  ufes. 

XXIII.  He  ought  alfo  to  attend  to  the  condu(5l  of  the  officers 
who  coUedl  them,  lb  as  to  hinder  their  importunity  and  oppreffion. 
Thus  Tacitus  commends  a  very  wife  ediiSl  of  the  emperor  Nero, 
"  who  ordered  that  the  magiftrates  of  Rome  and  of  the  provinces 
"  fliDuld  receive  complaints  sgainil  the  publicans  at  all  times,  and 
''  regulate  them  upon  the  fpot." 

XXIV.  The  fivereign  or  trcuifcenclentai  property,*  which,  as 
we  have  fiid,  conititutes  the  third  part  of  the  fovercign's  power 
over  the  efbtes  of  his  fubje£ls,  confiils  in  the  right  of  making  ufe 

of 

*  Dominium  emincns. 


326  Ihe  Principles  of 


of  every  thing  the  fubjetft  poffclTe?,  in  order  to  anfvvcr  the  necefll- 
tics  oi  the  Ibte.  '\ 

XXV.  Thus,  for  example,  if  a  town  is  to  be  fortified,  he  mr.y 
take  the  gardens,  lands,  or  houfes  of  private  fubjeds,  fituated  in 
the  place  where  ttie  ramparts  or  ditches  are  to  be  raifed.  In 
iicges,  he  may  beat  down  houfes  and  trees  belonging  to  private 
perfons,  to  the  end  that  the  enemy  may  not  be  fheltcred  by  them, 
or  the  garrifon  irxommoded. 

XX  Vr.  There  are  great  difputes,  among  politicians,  concerning 
this  iranfcendcntal  property.  Some  abfolutcly  will  not  admit  of  it  ; 
but  the  difpute  turns  more  upon  the  word  tharv  the  thing.  It  is 
certain  that  the  very  nature  of  fovereignty  authorizes  a  prince,  in 
cafe  of  necelîîty,  to  make  ufe  of  the  goods  and  fortunes  ot  his  fub- 
jcfts  J  fince  in  conferring  the  fuprenie  authority  upon  him,  they 
have  at  the  fame  time  given  him  the  power  of  doing  and  txaâing 
every  thing  neceffary  for  the  prefervation  and  advantagt-  of  the  (late. 
Whether  this  be  called  traufcendental  property^  or  by  fome  other 
name,  is  altogether  indifferent,  provided  v/e  are  agreed  about  the 
right  itfelf. 

XXVII.  To  (-àj  fomething  more  particular  concerning  this 
iranfcendental property,  we  nuili  obferve  it  to  be  a  maxin^  of  nat» 
ural  equity,  that  when  contributions  are  to  be  raifed  for  the 
exigencies  of  the  ftate,  and  for  the  prefervalion  of  fome  particular 
objc;£t,  by  perfons  who  enjoy  it  in  common,  every  man  ought  to 
pay  his  quota,  and  lliould  not  bs  forced  to  bear  more  of  the  burden 
than  another. 

XXVIII.  But  fince  it  m,ay  happen  that  the  prefflng  wants  of 
the  ftate,  and  particular  circumffances,  will  not  permit  this  rule  to 
be  literally  followed,  there  is  a  ncccffity  that  the  fovercign  fliould 
have  a  right  to  deviate  from  it,  ar.d  to  fcize  on  the  property  of  a 
private  fubj tel,  the  ufe  of  which,  in  the  prefent  circumftances,  is 
become  necefT.iry  to  the  public.  Hence  this  right  tiikcs  place 
oily  in  the  cafe  of  a  neceility  of  ftate,  which  ought  not  to  have  too 
great  ati  extent,  but  fhould  be  tempered  as  much  as  poflible  with 
the;  rules  of  equity. 

XXIX.  It  is  therefore  juft  in  that  caff,  that  the  proprietors 
iliotild  be  indemnified,  as  near  aspoiîible  either  by  their  fcllow-fub- 


Politic    Law.  327 

j€6\?,  or  by  the  exchequer.  Butifthefubje£lshave  voluntarily  expo- 
fed  themfelves,  by  building  houfcs  in  a  place  where  they  are  to  bo 
pulled  down  in  time  of  war,  then  the  ftate  is  not  in  rigour  obliged 
to  indemnify  them, .and  they  may  be  realonably  thought  to  have 
confentcd  to  this  lofs.  This  is  fufficient  for  what  relates  to  the 
right  of  the  fovereign  over  the  eftates  of  the  fubje<5t. 

XXX.  But,  befules  thefe  rights,  the  prince  has  alfo  originally  a 
power  of  dii'pofing  of  certain  places  called  public  goods  ^  becaufe  they 
belong  to  the  Rate  as  fiich  :  but  as  thefe  public  goods  are  not  all  of 
the  lame  kind,  the  right  of  the  fovereign  in  this  refpedt  alfo  varies. 

XXXI.  There  are  goods  intended  for  the  fupport  of  the  king 
and  the  royal  family,  and  others  to  defray  the  expences  of  the  gov- 
ernment. The  former  are  called  the  crown  lands,  or  the  patrimo- 
ny of  the  prince  j  and  the  latter  the  public  treafure,  or  the  revenue 
of  the  Hate. 

XXXII.  With  regard  to  the  former,  the  fovereign  has  the  full 
and  intire  profits,  and  may  difpofe  of  the  revenues  arifing  from 
them  as  he  abfolutely  pleafes.  So  that  what  he  lays  up  out  of  his 
income  makes  an  acceflion  to  his  own  private  patrimony,  unlefs 
the  laws  of  the  land  have  determined  otherwife.  With  regard  to 
the  other  public  goods,  he  has  only  the  fimple  adminiftration  of 
them,  in  which  he  ought  to  propofe  only  the  advantage  of  the 
ftate,  and  to  exprefs  as  much  care  and  fàdelity  as  a  guardian  with 
refpe<5l  to  theeftate  of  his  pupil. 

XXXIII.  By  thefe  principles  we  may  judge  to  whom  the  ac- 
quifitions  belong,  which  a  prince  has  made  during  his  reign;  for 
if  thefe  acquifitions  arife  from  the  goods  intended  to  defray  the 
public  expences,  they  ought  certainly  to  accrue  to  the  public,  and 
not  to  the  prince's  private  patrimony.  But  if  a  king  has  underta- 
ken and  fupportcd  a  war  at  his  own  expence,  and  without  engaging 
or  charging  the  ftate  in  the  leaft,  he  may  lawfully  appropriate  the 
acquifitions  he  has  made  in  fuch  an  expedition. 

XXXIV.  From  the  principles  here  eftabliflied  it  follov/s  alfo, 
that  the  fovereign  cannot,  without  the  confent  of  the  people  or  their 
reprefentativcF,  alienate  the  leaft  part  either  of  the  public  patrimo- 
ny, or  of  the  crown  lands,  of  which  he  has  only  the  ufe.  But 
we  muft  diftinguifh  between  the  goods  thenifelves  and  the  profits 
or  produce  of  them.-  The  king  may  difpofe  of  the  revenues  or 

nrofitf? 


3^2B  The  Principles  of 

profits  as  he  thinks  proper,  though  he  cannot  alienate  the  principal. 

XXXV.  A  prince  indeed,  who  has  a  right  of  laying  taxes  if  he 
thinks  meet  and  juft,  may,  when  the  neceffities  of  the  common- 
wealth require  it,  mortgage  a  part  of  the  public  patrimony  :  for  it 
is  the  (ame  thing  to  the  people,  whether  they  give  money  to  pre- 
vent the  mortgage,  or  it  be  levied  upon  them  afterwards  in  order 
to  redeem  it. 

XXXVI.  This  however  is  to  be  underflcod  upon  fuppofition, 
that  things  are  not  otherwife  regulated  by  the  fundamental  laws  of 
the  ftate. 

XXXVII.  In  refpeil  to  the  alienation  of  the  kingdom,  or 
fome  part  of  it  ;  from  the  principles  hitherto  eflabliihed,  we  may 
eafily  form  a  judgment  of  the  matter. 

And,  i''.  if  there  be  any  fuch  thing  as  a  patrimonial  kingdom, 
it  is  evident  that  the  fovereign  may  alienate  the  whplc,  and  flill 
more  fo,  that  he  may  transfer  a  part  of  it.* 

XXXVIII.  2".  But  if  the  kingdom  be  not  pofTefTcd  as  a  pat- 
rimony, the  king  cannot,  by  his  ov;n  authority,  transfer  or  alienate 
any  part  of  it  ;  for  then  the  confent  of  the  people  is  neccfl'ary. 
Sovereignty  of  itfelf  does  not  imply  the  right  oi  alienation,  and 
as  the  people  cannot  take  the  crown  from  the  pruKc  againfl  his 
will,  neither  has  the  king  a  power  of  fubftitu'ting  another  fovereign 
in  his  place  without  their  conf;nt. 

XXXIX.  3*^.  But  if  only  a  part  of  the  kingdom  is  to  be  alie- 
fiated,  befides  the  approbation  of  the  king  and  that  of  the  people, 
it  is  neccITary  that  the  inhabitants  of  the  part  which  is  to  lie  alien- 
ated, fliouldalfo  ccnfent  ;  and  the  latter  feems  to  be  the  mod:  ne- 
cefTary.  It  is  to  no  purpofe  that  the  other  parts  of  the  kingdom 
agree  to  the  alienation  of  this  province,  if  the  inhabitants  them- 
felves  oppofe  it.  The  right  of  the  plurality  of  fuffrages  docs  not 
extend  fo  far,  as  to  cut  off  from  the  body  of  the  Rate  thofi  wiio 
have  not  once  violated  their  cng<igements,  nor  the  laws  of  fociety. 

XL.  And  indeed  it  is  evident,  that  the  perfons  who  frrfl  eretSIed 
the  cornmonwealth,  and  thofe  who  voluntarily  came  into  it  after- 
wards, bound  themfelves,  by  mutual    compadl,  to  form  a  perma- 
nent 

•  Sec  Grctiiis,  lib,  ij.  cap.  6. 


Politic    L  aw.  329 

hsnt  body  or  fociety,  under  one  and  the  fame  government,  fo  long 
at  leaft  as  they  inclined  to  remain  in  the  territories  of  the  fams 
ftate  J  and  it  is  with  a  view  to  the  advantages  which  accrued  to 
them  in  common  from  this  reciprocal  union,  that  they  fîrft  ere6led 
the  ftate.  This  is  the  foundation  of  their  compacts  in  regard  to 
government.  Therefore  they  cannot,  againft  their  will,  be  de- 
prived of  the  right  they  have  acquired  of  being  a  pare  of  a  certain 
body  politic,  except  by  way  of  punilTiment.  B^-Tides,  in  this  cafe, 
there  is  an  obligation  correfponding  to  the  above  right.  The  (late, 
by  virtue  of  the  fame  compadt,  has  acquired  a  right  over  each  of  its 
members,  fo  that  no  fubjedl  can  put  himfelf  und^r  a  foreign  gov- 
ernment, nor  difclaim  the  authority  of  his  natural  fovereign. 

XLI.  4°.  It  is  however  to  be  obferved,  that  there  are  tv/o 
general  exceptions  to  the  principles  here  eftablillied,  both  of  them 
founded  on  the  right  and  privileges  arifing  from  necefliry.  The 
firft  is,  that  though  the  body  of  the  ftate  has  not  the  right  of  alien-  - 
ating  any  of  its  parts,  fo  as  to  oblige  that  part,  againft  its  will,  to 
fubmit  to  a  new  matter,  the  ftate  however  may  be  juftified  in  abin- 
doning  one  of  its  parts,  when  there  is  an  evident  danger  of  perilli- 
ing  if  they  continue  united. 

XLII.  It  is  true  that  even  under  thofe  circumftances,  thefove- 
reiga  cannot  diredtiy  oblige  one  of  his  towns  or  provinces  to  fub- 
mit to  another  government.  He  only  has  a  power  to  withdraw 
his  forces,  or  abandon  the  inhabitants  ;  but  they  retain  the  right  of 
defending  themfelves  if  they  can  :  fo  that  if  they  find  they  have 
ftrength  fufficient  to  refift  the  enemy,  there  is  no  reafon  why  they 
(hould  not  ;  and  if  they  fucceed,  they  may  ere£t  themfelves  into  a 
diftinâ;  commonv/ealth.  Hence  the  conqueror  becomes  the 
lawful  fovereign  of  that  particular  country  only  by  the  confent  of 
the  inhabitants,  or  by  their  fwearing  allegiance  to  him. 

XLIII.  It  may  be  faid,  that,  properly  fpeaking,  the  ftate  or 
the  fovereign  do  not  alienate,  in  this  cafe,  fuch  a  part,  but  only 
renounce  a  fociety  whofe  engagements  are  at  an  end  by  virtue  of 
a  tacit  exception  arifmg  from  neceflity.  After  all,  it  would  be  in 
vain  for  the  body  to  perfift  in  defending  fuch  a  part,  fince  we  fup- 
pofe  it  unable  to  preferve  or  defend  itfelf.  It  is  therefore  a  mere 
misfortune  which  muft  be  fufFered  by  the  abandoned  part. 

XLIV.  5°.  But  if  this  be  the  right  of  the  body  with  refpe£lto 
S  s  the 


33^  Ihô  Principles,  Me. 

the  part,  the  part  has  alfo,  in  like  circumftances,  the  fame  right 
with  regard  to  the  body.      Thus  we  cannot  condemn  a  to\A'n, 
4  which,  after  having  made  the  heft  rcliftance  it  could,  chufes  rather 

to  furrender  to  the  enemy,  than  be  pillaged  and  expofed  to  fire  and 
fword. 

XLV.  In  a  word,  every  one  has  a  natural  right  to  take  care  of  his 
ovvn  prefjrvation  by  all  poHible  means  ;  and  it  is  principally  for  the 
better  attainment  of  this  end,  that  men  have  entered  into  civil  fo- 
cieties.  If  therefore  the  ftate  can  no  longer  defend  and  proteél  the 
fiibjedts,  they  are  difcngaged  from  the  tics  they  were  under,  and  re- 
fume  their  original  right  of  taking  care  of  themftlves,  indepen- 
dently of  the  ftate,  in  the  manner  they  think  molt  proper.  Thus 
things  are  equal  on  both  fides  ;  and  the  fentiment  of  Grotius,  who 
refiifes  the  body  of  the  Itate,  with  refpeâ:  to  the  part,  the  fame 
riglu  which  he  grants  the  part  with  rcfpecl  to  the  body,  cannot  b« 
maintained. 

XLVI.  We  fhall  conclude  this  chapter  with  two  remarks. 
The  iirft  is,  that  the  maxim  which  feme  politicians  inculcate  (b 
Itrongly,  namely,  that  the  goods  appropriated  to  the  crown  are  ab- 
folutely  unalienable,  is  not  true,  except  on  the  terms, and  agreeably 
to  the  principles  here  eftablifhed.  What  the  fame  politicians  add, 
that  an  alienation,  fucceeded  by  a  peaceable  pofleiTion  fora  long 
courfe  of  years,  does  not  hinder  a  future  right  to  what  belonged  to 
the  crown,  and  the  rcilimption  of  it  by  main  force,  on  the  firft  occa- 
lion,  is  altogether  unreafonable. 

The  fécond  cbfervation  is,  that  fince  it  is  not  lawful  for  a  king, 
independently  of  the  will  of  the  people  or  of  their  reprefentatives, 
to  alienate  the  whole  or  any  part  of  his  kingdom,  it  is  not  right  fur 
liim  to  render  it  feudatory  to  another  prince  ;  for  this  is  evidently  a 
kind  of  alienation. 


THE  END   OF   THE  THIRD  PART. 


^c^  fi^  <^:s^  '.i^ZA  :  ^:2^  }*^i  ,>f:^<  'rc^  r^^x  >^2>i  }f^  :*^:s^i  >^^  ^^^  ^ 


THE 


PRINCIPLE 


Q 


O    F 


POLITIC     LAW. 


-'^'^'^■ 


PART    IV. 

/«  7y/:>/V;^  are  conftdered  the  different  rights  offovercignty  zviih  refpecl 
to  foreign  Jlates  ;  the  right  of  ivar^  mid  every  thing  relating  to  it  ; 
public  treaties.^  and  the  right  of  ambaffadors, 

: *^-^4* 

CHAP.     I.* 

Of  vjar  in  general^  and  frfl  of  the  right  of  the  fovereign,   in  this 
refpeSî^  over  his  fubjeSîs. 

Î.  ^"ir  "T  H  ATE  VER  has  been  hitherto  f  aid  of  the  effential 
parts  of  fovereignty,  properly  and  direélly  regards 
the  internal  adminiftration  of  the  ftate.  Butas 
the  happi  nefs  and  profperity  of  a  nation  demands 
not  only  that  order  and  peace  fhould  be  maintained 
at  home, but  alfo  that  the  Itace  fRnUttHiCproteHed  From  the  infults 
^gfXUSmiei-aljroaci,  and  obtain  all  the  advantages  it  can  from  other 
nations  ;  we  Ihall  proceed  to  examine  thofe  parts  of  fovereignty 
which  direclly  regard  the  fafcty  and  external  advantages  of  the 
iiate,  and  difcufs  the  moft  elFential  queflions relating  to  this  fubje6l. 

II.  To  trace  things  from  their  original,  we  muft  flrft  obferve, 
that  mankind  being  divided  into  feveral  focieties  calledy?<?/i?j  or 
nations,  ■ànà  thofe  pohtical  bodies  forming  a  kind  of  fociety  among 

themfclves^ 


332  'The  Principles   of 

themfelves,  are  alfo  fubjected  to  ihofe  primitive  and  general  law», 
which  God  has  given  to  all  mankind,  and  confequently  they  are 
obliged  to  pra(flire  certain  duties  towards  each  other. 

III.  It  is  the  fyrtem  or  affcmblage  of  thofe  laws  that  is  properly 
called  the  law  ot  nations  :  and  thefe  are  no  rrore  than  the  laws  of 
nature,  which  men,  confidered  as  menribers  of  fociety,  in  general, 
ought  to  pradice  towards  each  other  ;  or,  in  other  words,  the  law 
of  nations  is  no  more  than  the  generalMaw  oï  fociabllitj^  applied 
not  to  individuals  compofing  a  fociety^  b'imo~BreR7  as  forming 
different  bodies  called  ftates  or  nations. 

IV,  The  natural  ftate  of  nations,  with  refpe£l  to  each  other,  is 
certainly  that  of  focietyand  peace.     Such  is  the  natural  and  prim- 

nrwitîPri 


itive  l^ateof  one  man  wimreTpè^ï  to  another  ;  and  whatever  alter- 
ation mankind  may  have  in  regard  to  their  original  ftate, 
they  cannot,  without  violating  their  duty,  break  in  npon  that  flate 
of  peace  and  fociety,  in  which  nature  has  placed  them,  and  which, 
by  hsr  laivs^ihc  hasfo  ftrongly  recommended  to  their  obfervance. 

V.  Hence  proceed  feveral  maxims  of  the  law  of  nations  ;  for 
example,  that  all  ftates  ought  to  look  upon  themfelves  as  naturally 
equal  and  independent,  and  to  treat  each  other  as  fuch  on  all  occa- 
fions  :  likewife  that  they  ought  to  do  no  injury  to  any  other,  hut, 
t)n  the  contrary,  repair  that  which  they  may  have  committed. 
Hence  alfo  arifes  their  right  of  endeavouring  to  provide  for  their 
fafcty  and  happinefs,  and  of  employing  force  and  arms  againfl: 
thofe  who  declare  th^^mfelves  their  enemies.  Fidelity  in  treaties 
and  alliances,  and  the  refpecl  à\\&  to  ambaiïadors,  are  derived  from 
the  fame  principle.  This  is  the  idea  we  ought  to  form  of  the  law 
of  nations  in  general. 

VI.  We  do  not  here  propijj^  to  enter  into  all  the  political 
queftions  which  may  be  ftarted  concerning  the  law  of  nations  ;  we 
Ihall  only  examine  the  following  articles,  which,  being  the  moft 
confiderable,  include  alnwft  all  the  rtO,  I  mean  thg  fi^ht'^ivai\ 
that  oijrcûties andalliances^  and  that  of  amba£adors,  i^^j.; y? 

VII.  Thefubje£l  of  the  right  of  war  being  equally  important 
and  extenfive,  merits  to  be  treated  with  great  exaânefsl  We 
have  already  obferved,  that  it  is  a  fundamental  maxim  of  the  law 
of  nature  and  nation?,  that  individuals  and  ftates  ought  to  live  in  a 

itatc 


P  o  L  I  T  I  c    L  A  w.  333 

ilate  of  union  and  fociety,  that  they  (houlti  not  injure  each  other, 
but,  on  the  contrary,  they  ihould  mutj?i^[]jf  f^yi^rfiff.  tlii».  dutif;  xjf„ 
humanity. 

VIII.  Whenever  men  praflife  thefe  duties,  they  are  faid  to  be 
in  a  ftate  of  peace.  This  ftate  is  certainly  the  moft  agreeable  to 
our  nature,  as  well  as  the  mod  capable  ol  promoting  happinefs  ; 
and  indeed  the  law  of  nature  was  intended  chiefly  to  eftablifh  and 
preferveit. 

IX.  The  ftate  oppofite  to  that  of  union  and  peace,  is  what  we 
call  vjar,  v  hich,  in  the  mofi:  general  fenfe,  is  no  more  than  the 
ftate  ot'thofe  who  try  to  determine  their  differences  by  the  ways  of  ■ 
force.  I  fay,  this  is  the  moft  genera!  fenfe,  for,  in  a  more  limited 
fignification,  common  life  has  rcftrained  the  word  war  to  that 
carried  on  between  fovcreign  powers.  * 

X.  Though  a  ftate  of  peace  and  mutual  benevolence  is  cer- 
tainly moft  natural  to  man,  and  moft  agreeable  to  the  laws  which 
ought  to  be  his  guide,  war  is  neverthelefs  permitted  in  certain 
circumft.jnces,  and  fometimes  necefTary  both  for  individuals  and 
nations.  This  we  have  fufHcicntly  fhev/n  in  the  fécond  part  of 
this  work,  bv  eftablifhing  the  rights  with  which  nature  has  inveft- 
ed  mankind  for  their  own  prefc-rvation,  and  the  means  they  may 
lawfully  employ  for  attaining  that  end.  The  principles  of  this 
kind,  which  we  have  eftaiviiflied  with  refpeilto  particulars,  equally, 
and  even  for  ftronger  reafons,  are  applicable  to  nations. 

XI.  The  law  of  God  no  lefs  enjoins  a  whole  nation  to  take 
care  of  their  prefervation,  than  it  does  private  men.  It  is  there- 
fore juft  that  they  ihould  employ  force  againft  thofe,  who,  declar- 
ing themfclves  their  enemies,  violate  the  law  of  fociability  towards 
them,  refufe  them  their  due,  feel»i  to  deprive  them  of  their  adv;m- 
tages,  and  even  to  defhoy  them.  It  is  therefore  for  the  good  of 
fociety,  that  people  ftioulJ  be  able  to  reprefs  the  malice  and  efforts 
of  thofe  who  fubvert  the  foundations  of  it  ;  otherwife  the  hunr.m 
■fpecics  would  become  the  vidlims  of  robbery  and  licenticufnefs  : 
for  the  right  of  making  war  is,  properly  fpeaking,  the  moil  pow- 
erful means  of  maintainirig  peace. 

XII.  Hence  it  is  certain  that  the  fovereign,  inwhofe  hands  the 

intc-rtft 

*  See  lower  down,  chap.  iii. 


334"  ^^  Principles  of 

intereft  of  tlie  whole  focicty  is  lodged,  has  a  right  to  make  war  ; 
but  if  it  be  {o,  we  mui\  of  courfe  allow  him  the  right  of  employ- 
ing the  feveral  means  neceffary  for  that  end.  In  a  word,  we  niufl: 
grant  him  the  power  of  levying  troops,  and  obliging  them  to  per- 
form the  mcjit  dangerous  duties  even  at  the  peril  of  their  lives. 
And  this  is  one  branch  of  the  right  of  life  and  death  which 
manifeftly  belongs  to  the  fovercign. 

XI 1 1.  But  as  the  firength  and  valour  of  troops  depend,  in  great 
meafure,  on  their  being  well  difciplined,  the  fovereign  o\ight,  even 
in  times  of  peace,  to  train  the  fubjefts  up  to  martial  exercifes,  to 
the  end  that  they  may,  when  occafion  requires,  be  more  able 


able  to 


fuftaiii  the  fatigues,  and  perform  the  different  duties  of  war 

XÎV.  The  obligation,  under  which  fubjecfls  are  in  this  refpec^, 
is  fo  rigorous  and  ftrong,  that,  ftridiy  fpcalcing,  no  man  can  be 
exempted  from  taking  up  arms  when  his  country  calls  upon  him 
for  aflillance  ;  and  his  refufal  would  be  a  juft  reafon  not  to  tolerate 
fuch  a  perfon  any  longer  in  the  fociety.  If  in  moft  governments 
there  are  foms  fubjecTts  exempted  from  military  exercifes,  this 
imnuinity  is  nota  privilege  that  belongs  to  thttn  by  right  i  it  is 
only  a  toleration  that  has  no  force,  but  vvhen  there  are  troops  fuf- 
ficicnt  for  the  defence  of  the  cotiimonvvealth,  and  the  perfons  to 
whom  it  is  gran:  d  follow  forae  other  ufeful  and  nectflary  em- 
ployment. Exce ring  this  cafe,  in  time  of  need  all  the  members 
of  the  ftate  ought  to  take  the  field,  and  none  can  be  lawfully 
exempted. 

XV.  In  confeqnence  of  thefe  principle?,  military  difcipline 
fîiould  be  very  rigorous;  the  fmalleft  ncgleft,  or  the  leafl  fault,  is 
often  of  thf  lift  importance,  and  for  that  reafon  may  be  feverely 
puniflied.  Othei  judges  make  fome  allowance  for  the  weakncfs  of 
hum^n  nature,  or  the  violence  of  pallions  ;  but  in  a  council  of 
v/ar,  there  is  not  fo  much  indulgence  ;  death  is  often  infli6led  on  a 
folJicr,  whom  the  dread  of  that  very  evil  has  induced  to  quit  his  pofV. 

XVi.  It  is  therefore  the  duty  of  thofe  who  are  onceenlifled,  to 
maintain  the  pofl  where  the  general  has  placed  them,  ami  to  fight 
bravely,  even  though  they  run  a  rifque  of  lofing  their  lives.  To 
conquer  or  die,  is  the  law  of  fuch  engagements  ;  and  it  is  certainly 
much  better  to  lofe  one's  life  glorioully,  by  endeavouring  to  deftroy 
that  of  the  enemy,  than  to  die  in  a  cowardly  manner.  Hence 
lo.iic  iuJoisnt  may  be  formed  of  what  wc  ought  to  think  of 
"  thofc 


Politic    Law.  335 

thofe  captains  of  {hips,  who,  by  the  orders  of  iheir  fupcrior,  blow 
themfelves  up  into  the  air,  rather  than  fail  into  the  hands  of  the 
enemy,  Suppofe  the  number  of  fhips  equal  on  both  fides,  if  one 
of  our  vefTels  is  taken,  the  enemy  will  have  two  more  than  we  ; 
wher.'as  if  one  of  ours  is  funic,  they  will  have  but  one  more  j  and 
if  the  vefl'^l,  which  wants  to  take  ours,  finks  with  it,  which  often 
happens,  the  forces  will  remain  equal. 

XVII.  In  regard  to  the  queftion,  whether  fubje6ls  are  obliged 
to  take  up  arms,  and  ferve  in  an  urjuft  war,  we  muit  judge  of  it  by 
the  principles  already  eftablifhed  at  tiie  end  of  the  firft  chapter  of 
the  third  part,  which  treats  of  the  legîjlative  power. 

XVIII.  Thefe  are  the  obligations  of  fubjc6ls  with  refpe£l  to 
war  and  to  the  defence  of  government  j  but  this  part  of  the  fu- 
preme  power  being  of  great  importance,  the  utmoft  precaution  is 
required  in  the  fovereign  to  exercife  it  in  fuch  a  manner  as  may 
prove  advantageous  to  the  {late.  We  {hall  here  point  out  the 
principal  maxims  on  jhis  article  of  politics. 

XIX.  Fir{l  then  it  is  evident,  that  the  force  of  a  (late,  with  ref- 
peft  to  war,  confifls  chiefly  in  the  number  of  its  inhabitants  ;  fove- 
reigns  therefore  ought  to  negledl  nothing  that  can  either  fupportor 
augment  the  number  of  them. 

XX.  Among  the  other  means,  which  may  be  ufed  for  this  pur- 
pofe,  there  are  three  of  great  efficacy.  The  {ir{l:  is,  eafily  to 
receive  all  ftrangers  of  a  good  charaâer,  who  want  to  fettle  among 
us  ;  to  let  them  tafle  the  fvveets  of  government  j  and  to  make  them 
fliare  the  advantages  of  civil  liberty.  Thus  the  {late  is  filled  with 
fubjeds,  who  bring  with  them  the  arts,  commerce,  and  riches  ;  and 
among  whom  we  may,  in  time  of  need,  find  a  confiderable  number 
©f  good  foldiers. 

XXL-  Another  thing,  conducive  to  the  fame  end,  is  to  favour 
and  encourage  marriages,  which  arc  the  pledges  of  the  {late  ;  and 
to  make  good  laws  for  this  purpofe.  The  miUinefs  of  the  gov- 
ernment may,  among  other  things,  greatly  contribute  to  incline 
the  fubjefls  to  join  together  in  wedlock.  People  loaded  with 
taxes,  who  can  hardly,  by  their  labour,  {ind  wherewithal  to  fupply 
the  wants  of  life  and  the  public  charges,  are  not  inclined  to  marry, 
left  their  children  fliould  {larvcfor  hunger. 

XXII.  Laftly, 


336  7^^  Principles  of 


XXII.  Laftly,  another  means,  very  proper  for  maintaining  and 
augmenting  the  number  of  inhabitants,  is  liberty  of  confcience. 
Religion  is  one  of  the  greateft  advantages  of  mankind,  and  all  men 
view  it  in  that  light.  Every  thing  tending  to  deprive  them  of 
this  liberty,  appears  infupportible.  They  cannot  eafily  accuflom 
themfelves  to  a  government  which  tyrannizes  over  them  in  this 
article.  France,  Spain  and  Holland,  prefent  us  v^ith  fenfible 
proofs  of  the  truth  of  thcfe  obfervations.  Perfecutions  have  de- 
prived the  firfl  of  a  great  part  of  her  inliabitants  j  by  which  means 
the  has  been  confidcrably  weakened.  The  fécond  is  almoft  un- 
peopled ;  and  this  depopulation  is  occafioned  by  the  barbarous 
and  tyrannical  eftablifliment  called  the  Inquifition^  an  eftab'ifhment 
equally  affronting  to  God  and  pernicious  to  human  fociety,  and 
which  has  made  a  kind  of  defert  of  one  of  the  finefl  countries  in 
Europe.  The  third,  in  confequence  of  an  intire  liberty  of  con- 
fcience, which  (lie  offers  to  all  the  world,  is  confiderably  improved 
even  amidft  wars  and  difafters.  She  has  raifed  herfeif,  as  it  were, 
on  the  ruin  of  other  nations,  and  by  the  number  of  her  inhabitants, 
who  have  brought  power,  commerce  and  riches  into  her  bofoift, 
ïhe  enjoys  a  high  degree  of  credit  and  profperity. 

XXIIÏ.  The  great  number  of  inhabitants  is  therefore  the  prin- 
cipal ttrength  of  a  country.  But,  for  this  end,  the  fubjeifls  muft 
alio  be  inured  betimes  to  labour,  and  trained  to  virtue.  Luxury, 
effeminacy,  and  pieafure,  impair  the  body  and  enervate  the  mind. 
A  prince  therefore,  who  defires  to  put  the  military  eftablifhment  on 
a  proper  footing,  ought  to  take  p:irticular  care  of  the  education  of 
youth,  fo  as  to  procure  his  fubjcds  the  means  of  forming  them- 
felves,  by  a  ftricidifcipline,  to  bodily  exercifes,  and  to  prevent  lux- 
ury and  pleafures  from  debauching  their  manners,  or  weakening 
their  courage. 

XXIV-  Lafily,  one  of  the  mofi  cfRiflual  means  of  having  ç,ood 
troops,  is  to  make  them  obferve  the  military  order  and  dilcipline 
with  all  pofTible  care  and  exaflnefs  ;  to  take  particular  care  that 
the  foldiers  be  pundlua'ily  paid  ;  to  fee  that  the  fick  be  properly 
looked  after,  and  to  furnifh  them  with  the  afTiftance  they  fland  in 
need  of;  lalHy,  to  preferve  among  them  a  knowledge  of  religion 
and  of  the  duties  it  prefcribcs,  by  procuring  them  the  means  of 
inffruflion.  Thefeare  the  principal  maxims  which  good  policy 
fuggefts  to  fovereigns,  by  means  of  which  they  rnay  reafonably 
hope  always  to  find  good  troops  among  their  fubjefïs,  fuch  as 
fliall  bedifpofed  to  fpill  the  lafl  drop  of  their  blocd  in  defence  of 
thsîr  country. 

CHAP. 


Politic  Law»  337 


CHAP.    II. 

Of  the  caufes  of  war, 

^  T 

\Y  war  be  fometimes  lawful,  and  even  receflafy,  as  we  have 
already  demonftrated  j  this  is  to  be  underllood  when  it  is  underta- 
ken only  for  jult  reafons,  and  on  condition  that  the  prince,  who 
undertakes  it,  propofes,  by  that  method,  to  obtain  a  folid  and  lad- 
ing peace.  A  war  mayi|ierefore  be  either  jud  or  unjuft,  accord- 
ing to  the  caufe  which  has  produced  it. 

11.  A  war  isjuf!  if  undertaken  for  jurt  reafons  }  and  unjaft  if  it  be 
entered  into  without  a  caufe,  or  at  leaft  without  ajuft  and  fufficient 
moti^'c. 

III.  To  illuftrate the  matter,  we  may,  with  Grotius,  diftinguifh 
between  the  juftifying  reafons,-  and  the  motives  of  the  war.  The 
former  are  thofe  which  render,  or  feem  to  render,  the  war  jufl  with 
refpedl  to  the  enemy,  fo  that  in  taking  up  arms  againft  him  we  do 
not  think  we  do  him  injuftice.  The  latter  are  the  views  of  inter- 
eft  which  determine  a  prince  to  come  to  an  open  rupture.  Thus 
in  the  war  of  Alexander  againft  Darius,  the  juftifying  reafon  of 
the  former  was,  to  revenge  the  injuries  which  the  Greeks  had 
received  from  the  Perfians.  The  motives  were,  the  ambition, 
vanity,  and  avarice  of  that  conqueror,  who  took  up  arms  the  more 
cheerfully,  as  the  expeditions  of  Xenophon  and  Agefilaus  made 
him  conceive  great  hopes  of  fuccefs.  The  juftifying  reafon  of 
the  fécond  Punie  war  was,  a  difpute  about  the  city  of  Saguntuna, 
The  motive  was,  an  old  grudge  entertained  by  the  Carthaginians 
againft  the  Romans  for  the  hard  terms  they  were  obliged  to  fub- 
mit  to  when  reduced  to  a  low  condition,  and  the  encouragement 
given  them  by  the  fuccefs  of  their  arms  in  Spain. 

IV".  In  a  war,  perfeflly  juft,  the  juftifying  reafons  muft  not 
only  be  lawful,  but  alfo  be  blended  with  the  motive  ;  that  is,  we 
muft  never  undertake  a  war  but  from  the  neceflity  of  defending 
ourfelves  againft  an  infuit,  of  recovering  our  undoubted  right,  or 
of  obtaining  fatisfaélion  for  a  manifeft  injury. 

V.  Thus  a  virar  may  be  vicious  or  unj'ift,  with  rcfpccl  to  the 
caufes,  four  different  ways, 

T  t  i^.  When 


3 3-3  ^^  Principles  of 

\^,  Whsn  we  undertake  it  without  any  jnfl:  reafon,  or  To 
much  as  an  apparent  motive  of  advantage,  but  only  from  a  fierce 
and  brutal  fury,  which  dcHghts  in  blood  and  flaughter.  But  it 
may  be  doubted,  whether  v/c  can  find  an  example  of  fo  barbarous 
a  war. 

VI.  2°.  When  we  attack  others  only  for  our  own  intcrefï, 
\vith)ut  their  having  done  us  any  iijury  \  tiiat  is,  whtn  we  have 
noj.iftifyingcaufcs  :  and  thefe  wars  are.  with  refpecSt  to  the  ag- 
^rtlTîjr,  downright  robberies. 

VII.  3*^.  When  wchave  forre  motives  founded  on  juftifyjng 
caufes,  but  which  have  ftill  only  an  apparent  equity,  and  when 
well  examined,  p.re  found  at  the  bottom  to  be  unla'A'lul. 

VIII.  4^.  Laftly,  we  may  fay  thnt  a  war  is  alfo  urjufl, 
xvhe'i,  though  we  have  good  juftifying  reafons,  ytt  we  undcrtde 
it  from  other  motives,  which  have  no  relation  to  the  iiijury  receiv- 
ed ;  as  for  inftance,  through  vain  glory,  sr  the  defire  of  extending 
our  dominions,  &c. 

IX.  Oftiiefe  four  forts  of  war,  the  undertaking  of  which  in- 
cludes injurtice,  the  third  and  htt  are  very  common,  for  there 
are  few  nations  fo  barbarous  as  to  take  up  arms  without  qllcdgiiig 
fome  (<)rt  of  juftifying  reafon?.  Tt  is  not  difficult  to  difcover  the 
tiie  injuRice  of  the  third  ;  as  to  the  fourth,  though  perhaps  very 
common,  it  is  not  fo  much  unjuft  in  itfelf,  as  with  refpeci  to  the 
view  and  defign  of  the  perfnn  who  undertakes  it.  But  it  is  very 
diiticult  to  convince  him  of  it,  the  motives  being  generally  impen- 
etrable, or  at  lealt  nioft  princes  taking  great  care  to  conceal  then].  * 

X.  From  the  principles  here  edabliflicd  we  may  conclude,  that 
every  juft  war  mu{t  be  made,  either  to  defend  ourfelves  and  our 
property  againft  thofe  who  endeavour  to  injure  us  by  alTauhing 
ow;  -|>erfons,  and  by  taking  avi'ay  or  ruining  our  eftates  ;  or  to  con- 
flrain  others  to  yidd  up  to  us  whit  they  ought  to  do,  when  we 
have  a  perf^cl  right  to  require  it  of  them  ;  or  laftly,  to  obtain  fat- 
iîfaclion  for  the  damages  v.?e  have  injudouily  fulbintd,  and  to 
force  thofe  who  did  the  injury  to  give  fecurity  for  their  good  beha- 
viour. 

XI.  From 

"  See  the  exolication  of  thefe  principles  in  Budcus's  Jurifprud.  hift.  fpecim. 
528,  &=.  * 


Politic    Law.  33g 

Xr.  FroTi  hen'c  we  er.niy  conceive  ^vhat  the  c.iufes  of  war 
m\y  be.  But  to  illuftr.ite  the  fnbjed  ilill  further,  sve  fliall  give 
fo)ne  examples  of  the  piirxipal  unjuft  caufcs  of  war. 

1°.  Thus,  for  example,  to  have  ajud  reafon  for  war,  it  is  not 
fuiiîcient  that  we  are  afraid  of  the  grov/ing  power  of  a  neighbour. 
All  we  can  do,  in  thofe  circumftances,  is  innocently  to  try  to  ob- 
Ulii  real  caution,  iliiLt  he  will  attempt  nothing  againft  us  ;  and  to 
put  ourfelves  in  a  pofture  of  defence.  But  acls  of  hoiliiity  are 
not  permitted,  except  when  neceflary,  and  they  ?re  never  ncccllary 
fo  Ions  as  we  are  not  morally  certain  that  the  neighbour  we  dread 
has  not  only  the  power,  but  alfo  the  inclination  to  attack  us.  We 
cannot,  for  inftance.jullly  declare  war  againft  a  neighbour,  purely 
becaufe  he  orders  citadels  or  fortifications  to  be  erected,  which  he 
may  foiiietime  or  other  employ  to  our  prejudice. 

XII.  2°.  Neither  does  utility  alone  give  the  fame  right  zs  ns- 
cci'fity,  nor  is  itfuincient  to  render  a  war  lauful.     Thus,  for  ex-   - 
ample,  we  are  not  allowed  to  take  up  arms  with  a  view  to  niake 
ourfeIy:s  mailers  of  a  place  which  lies  conveniently  for  us,  ar.d  is 
proper  to  cover  our  frontiers. 

XIII.  3^.  We  mud  fay  the  fame  of  the  defire  of  changing  our 
f.jrmer  feulements,  and  of  removing  from  marfliss  and  de(eris  to 
a  more  fertile  foil- 

4°.  Nor  is  it  lefs  unjufî  to  invade  the  rights  and  liberty  of  a 
people,  under  a  pretext  of  their  not  being  fo  poiilhcd  in  their  oian- 
ners,  or  of  fuch  quick  underftanding  as  ourfelves.  It  was  there- 
fore unjjil  in  the  Greeks  to  treat  thofe,  whom  they  called  Barba- 
rianSi^s  their  natural  enemies,  on  account  of  the  diverfiiyof  their 
manners,  and  perhaps  becaufe  they  did  not  appear  to  be  fo  ingenious 
as  thc-mfwlves. 

XIV.  5°.  It  wdulil  alfo  be  an  unjuil  v/ar  to  take  up  arms 
againft:  a  nation,  in  order  to  bring  ihcrn  under  fubjcilion,  under 
pretence  of  its  being  their  interef!:  to  be  governed  by  us.  Tl.ongh 
a  thing  may  be  advantageous  to  a  perfon,  yet  this  does  not  give  us 
a  right  to  compel  him  to  it.  Whoever  has  the  u(^  of  reafon, 
ought  to  have  the  liberty  of  choofing  what  he  thinks  advantageous 
to  hirnfelf. 

XV.  We  muft  alfo  obfervc,  that  the  duties  which  nations  ouglit 
to  p:a(f^ife  towards  each  other,  are  not  ail  equally  obligatory,  and 
that  their  deficiency  in  this  rcfps^t  doss  not  always  lay  a  founda- 
tion 


340  l.%e   Principles  of 


tion  for  a  juft  war.  Among  nations,  as  well  as  individuals,  there 
are  duties  atteruled  with  a  rigorous  and  perfc<St  obligation,  the 
violation  of  which  implies  an  injury  proper-ly  fo  called^  and  duties 
of  an  imperfect  obligation,  which  give  to  another  only  an  inîper- 
feft  right.  And  as  we  cannot,  in  a  difpute  between  individuals, 
have  recourfe  to  courts  of  law  to  recover  what  in  this  fécond  man- 
ner is  our  due  ;  fo  neither  can  we,  in  contefts  between  different 
powers,  conftrain  them  by  force  of  arms. 

XVI.  We  muft  however  except  from  this  rule,  the  cafes  of 
neccffity  in  which  the  imperfeéi  is  changed  into  the  perfeSî  right  ; 
fo  that,  in  thofe  cafes,  the  refufal  of  him,  who  will  not  give  us  our 
due,  furnifhes  us  with  a  juft  reafon  for  war.  But  every  war,  un- 
dertaken on  account  of  the  refufal  of  what  a  man  is  not  obliged  by 
the  laws  of  humanity  to  grant,  is  unjuft. 

XVII.  To  apply  thefe  principles,  we  (hall  give  feme  examples. 
The  right  of  palling  over  the  lands  of  another  is  really  founded  on 
humanity,  when  wedefign  to  ufe  that  permiflion  only  on  a 
lawful  account  ;  as  when  people,  expelled  their  own  country,  want 
to  fettle  elfewhere  ;  or  v/hen,  in  the  profecution  of  a  juft  war,  it  is 
ncceflary  to  pafs  through  the  territories  of  a  neutral  nation,  &c. 
But  this  is  only  an  office  of  humanity  which  is  not  due  to  another 
jn  virtue  of  a  perfe£l  and  rigorous  right,  and  the  refufal  of  it  dues 
not  authorife  a  nation  to  challenge  it  in  a  forcible  manner. 

XVIII.  Grotius  however,  examining  this  queftion,  pretends, 
*'  that  we  are  not  only  obliged  to  grant  apaifage  over  our  lands  to 
"  a  fmall  number  of  men  unarmed,  and  from  whom  we  have  con- 
*f  fequently  nothing  to  fear  ;  but  mioreovcr  that  we  cannot  refufe 
*'  it  to  a  large  artny,  notwithftanding  the  juft  apprchenfion  we  may 
*'  have  that  this  pafTige  will  do  us  a  conliderable  injury,  v/hich  is 
*•  like'y  to  arife  either  from  that  array  itfclf,  or  from  thofe  againft 
"  whom  it  marches  :  provided,  continues  he,  i?.  that  this  paifagç 
"  is  afked  on  a  juft  account.  2^.  That  it  is  afkcd  before  au 
*^  attempt  is  made  to  pafs  by  force." 

XIX.  This  author  then  pretends,  that,  under  thofe  circumftan- 
ces,  the  refufal  authorii'es  us  to  have  recourfe  to  arms,  and  that  we 
may  lawfully  procure  by  force,  what  we  could  not  obtain  by  favour, 
even  though  the  paifage  may  be  had  elfewhere  by  taking  a  larger 
circuit.  He  adds,  "  That  the  fufpicion  of  danger  from  the  paf- 
''  fmg  of  flgreat  number  of  armed  men,  is  not  a  fuflicicnt  reafon 

"  to 


Polit  iG    L  a  Wp  341 

«  to  refijfeit,  becaufe  good  precautions  may  betaken  againftit. 
<'  Neither  is  the  fear  of  provoking  that  prince,  againfl:  whom  the 
*'  other  marches  his  army,  a  fuliicient  reafon  for  refufing  him 
"  paflage,  if  the  latter  has  a  juft  reafon  for  undertaking  the  war." 

XX.  Grotius  founds  his  opinion  on  this  reafon,  that  theenab- 
lifhment  of  property  was  originally  made  with  the  tacit  refervaiioa 
of  the  right  of  ufmg  the  property  of  another  in  time  of  need,  fo 
far  as  it  can  be  done  without  injuring  the  owner. 

XXI.  But  I  cannot  embrace  the  opinion  of  this  celebrated 
writer;  ïor,  i^.  whatever  may  be  fuid,  it  is  certain  that  tiie  right 
of  pafling  through  the  territories  of  another  is  not  a  perfeft  right, 
the  execution  of  which  can  be  rigcroully  demanded.  If  a  private 
perfon  is  not  obliged  to  fuffer  another  to  pafs  through  his  ground, 
much  lefs  is  a  nation  obliged  to  grant  a  palfage  to  a  foreign  army» 
wid^iout  any  compadl  or  conceiîion  intervening. 

XXII.  1°.  Thé  great  inconveniences  which  may  follow  fuch 
a  permifTion,  authoriic  this  rcfufal.  By  granting  fuch  a  pailage^ 
we  run  a  vifque  of  making  our  own  country  the  feat  of  war. 
Befides,  if  they,  to  whom  we  grant  the  paflage,  are  repulfed  and 
vanquifhed,  let  the  reafons  they  had  for  making  war  be  ever  fo  juft, 
yet  will  not  the  enemy  revenge  himfelf  upon  us  who  did  not  hin- 
der thofe  troops  from  invading  him  ?  But  farther,  fuppofe  that  we 
live  in  friendfhip  with  both  the  princes  who  are  at  war,  we  cannot 
favour  one  to  the  prejudice  of  the  other,  without  giving  this  other 
a  fuiîicieiît  reafon  to  look  upon  us  as  enemies,  and  as  defecStive  in 
that.part  of  our  duty  which  we  owe  to  our  neighbours.  It  would 
be  in  vain,  on  this  occafion,  to  diftinguifli  between  a  juft  and  an 
unjurt  war,  pretending  that  the  latter  gives  a  right  of  refufing  the 
patfagc,  but  that  the  farmer  obliges  us  to  grant  it.  This  diltlnc- 
tion  does  not  remove  the  difficulty  -,  for,  befidcs  that  it  is  not 
always  eafy  to  decide  whether  a  war  be  juft  or  unjuft,  it  is  a  piece 
of  raflmefs  to  thrult  in  our  arbitration  between  two  armed  parties, 
and  to  intermeddle  with  their  differences. 

XXIII.  3°.  But  is  there  nothing  to  fear  from  the  troops  to 
whom  the  palTage  is  granted  ?  The  abettors  of  the  contrary  opin- 
ion agree  there  i«,  for  which  reafon  they  allow  that  many  precau- 
tions ought  to  be  obferved.  But  whatever  precautions  we  may 
take,  none  of  them  can  (ecure  us  againfl:  all  events  ;  and  fome  evils 
and  loffcs  are  irreparable.     Men  that  are  always  in  arms  are  eafily 

tempted 


342  7^^  Principles  cf 

tompted  to  abiife  them,  and  to  commit  outrages;  efpecially  if  they 
be  numerous,  and  find  an  opportunity  of  making  a  confiderablc 
booty.  How  often  have  we  feen  foreign  armies  ravage  and  ap- 
propriate to  themfclves  the  eltates  of  a  pfople  who  have  called 
them  to  their  afTiftance  r  Nor  have  the  moft  folemn  treaties  ar.d 
oaths  been  able  to  deter  them  from  this  black  perfidioufncfs.  * 
What  then  may  we  expc£t  from  thofe  who  are  under  no  f'uch 
ftridl  engagement  ? 

XXIV.  4°,  Another  obfervation  we  may  make,  which  is  of 
great  ufe  in  politics,  that  almoft  all  ftates  have  this  in  common, 
that  the  further  we  advance  into  the  heart  of  a  country,  the  weaker 
we  find  it.  The  Carthaginians,  otherwife  invincible,  were  vaii- 
quiflied  near  Carthage  by  Agathocles  and  Scipio.  Hannibal 
affirmed,  that  the  Romans  could  not  be  conquered  except  in  Italy. 
It  is  therefore  dangerous  to  lay  open  this  fecret  to  a  multitude  of 
foreignerSjwho,  having  arms  at  hand,  may  take  advantage  of  our 
weaknefs,  and  make  us  repent  our  imprudence. 

XXV.  5^.  To  this  we  mufl  add,  that  in  every  ftate  there  rrealmcA 
always  m.utinous  and  turbulent  fpiritf,  who  are  ready  to  ftir  up 
Itrangers  either  againft  their  fellow-citizens,  their  fovereign,  or  their 
neighbours.  Thefe  reafons  fufficiently  prove,  that  all  the  precau- 
tions which  can  be  taken  cannot  fecure  us  from  danger. 

6^.  LaRly,  we  any  add  the  example  of  a  great. many  nationp, 
who  have  been  very  ill  requited  for  letting  foreign  troops  pafs 
through  their  country. 

XXVI.  We  ftidl  finifh  the  examination  of  this  queRion  by 
making  two  remarks.  The  firfl:  is,  that  it  is  evident  from  the 
whole  of  what  has  been  faid,  that  this  is  a  matter  of  prudence  ; 
and  that  though  we  are  not  obliged  to  grant  a  palTage  to  foreign 
troops,  and  the  i'afell  way  is  to  refufe  it,  yet  when  we  are  not  ftrong 
enough  to  refiit  thofe  who  want  to  pafs  at  any  rate,  and  by  refiiU 
ing  we  muft  involve  ourfelves  in  a  troublefome  war,  we  ought 
certainly  to  grant  a  paflTage  ;  and  the  necefîity  to  v.'hich  we  are 
reduced,  is  a  fuiîicient  jultification  to  the  prince  whofe  territories 
thofe  troops  arc  going  to  invade. 

XX  Vn.  My  fécond  remark  is,  that  if  we  fuppofe,  on  one  hand, 
that  the  war  which  the  prince, -who  demands  a  pafi'age  through 

Dur 


*  î>cz  Juft.  lib.  iv.  cip.  \.  and  8.  aad  Liv.  lib.,  vii.  cii).  38. 


Politic    Lav/.  343 


our  country,  makes,  is  juft  and  neceffary,  and,  on  the  other,  that 
\vc  have  nothing  to  fear  either  from  him  that  is  to  pafs,  or  him 
againft  whom  ht;  marches  ;  we  are  then  indifpenlibly  obliged  to 
grant  a  palliige.  For  if  the  law  of  nature  obliges  every  man  to  aflift 
thofe  whom  be  fees  maniieiUy  opprtfl'ed,  when  he  can  do  it  with- 
out danger  and  with  hopes  of  fuccefs,  much  lefs  ou^^ht  he  to  be  a 
hinderance  to  fuch  as  undertake  their  own  defence. 

XXVIII.  By  following  the  principles  hereeftablifhed,  we  nay 
judge  of  the  right  of  trar.fporring  merchandizes  through  the  terri- 
tories of  another.  This  is  alfo  an  imperfedl  right,  and  a  duty  of 
humanity,  which  obliges  us  to  grant  it  to  others  ;  but  the  obliga- 
tion is  not  rigorous, and  the  refufal  cannot  be  a  jufl:  reafon  for  war. 

XXIX.  Truly  fpeaking,  the  laws  of  humanity  indifpenfibly 
oblige  us  to  grant  a  palFage  to  fuch  foreign  commodities  as  are 
abfoîutely  necefiary  for  life,  which  our  neighbours  cannot  procure 
by  themfe!vc3,  and  with  which  we  are  not  able  to  furnifli  them. 
But,  except  in  this  cafe,  we  may  have  good  reafons  for  hindering 
foreign  commodities  from  pafling  through  cur  country.  Too 
great  a  refort  ot  flrangers  is  fometimes  dangerous  to  a  f^ate  ;  and 
befides,  why  ihould  not  a  fovereign  procure  to  his  own  fubjc(£ts 
that  profit,  which  would  otherwifc  be  made  by  foreigners,  by 
means  of  the  pafligc  granted  them  ? 

XXX.  It  is  not  however  contrary  to  humanity  to  require  toll 
or  cuftotf^for  foreign  commodities  to  which  a  pafTage  is  granted. 
This  is  a  juft  reimburlemeut  for  the  expences  the  fovereign  is 
obliged  to  be  at  in  repairing  the  high  roads,  bridges,  harbours,  &c. 

XXXI.  We  mufl  reafon  in  the  fame  manner  in  regard  to 
commerce  in  general  between  difFerent  fiâtes.  The  fame  may  be 
faid  ot  the  right  of  being  fupplied  with  wives  by  our  neighbours  ;  a 
refufal  on  their  fide,  though  there  be  great  plenty  of  women  among 
tht.m,  does  not  authorize  us  to  declare  war. 

XXXII.  We  fliall  here  fubjoin  fomething  concerning  wars 
undertaken  on  account  of  religion.  The  law  of  nature,  which 
permits  a  man  to  defend  his  life,  his  fubftance,  and  all  the  other 
advantages  which  he  enjoys,  againft  the  attacks  of  an  unjuft  aggref- 
for,  certainly  grants  him  the  liberty  alfo  of  defending  himfelf  a^'ainft 
thofe  who  would,  as  it  were  by  force,  deprive  him  of  his  religion, 
by  hindering  him  to  profefs  that  which  he  thinks  the  befi,  or  by 
conftraining  him  to  embrace  that  which  he  thinks  to  be  falfe. 

XXXIIL  la 


244-  ^^  Principles  oJ 

XXXIII.  In  a  word,  religion  is  one  of  the  greateft  HefTinfgs 
man  can  enjoy,  and  includes  his  nioft  eflential  interefts.  Who- 
ever oppofes  him  in  this  relpe£l,  declares  himfelf  his  enemy  ;  and 
confequenily  he  may  juftly  ufe  forcible  methods  to  repel  the  injury, 
and  to  fecure  himfelf  againft  the  evil  intended  him.  It  is  therefore 
lawful,  and  even  juft,  to  take  up  arms,  when  we  are  attacked  for 
the  caufe  of  religion, 

XXXIV".  But  though  we  are  allowed  to  defend  ourfeives  in 
the  caufe  of  religion,  we  are  not  permitted  to  make  war  in  order 
to  propagate  that  which  we  profefs,  and  to  conftrain  thofe  who 
have  fome  principle  or  practice  different  from  ours.  The  one  is 
a  necelCiry  conf.quence  of  the  other.  It  is  not  lawful  to  attack 
him  who  has  a  right  to  defend  himfelf.  If  the  defenfive  war  isjuft, 
the  offenfive  inu(t  needs  be  criminal.  The  very  nature  of  religion 
does  not  permit  that  violent  means  (hould  be  ufed  for  its  propa- 
gation ;  it  confifts  in  the  internal  perfuafion.  The  right  of  man- 
kind, in  regard  to  the  propagation  of  religion,  is  to  inform  and  in- 
ftru£l  thofe  who  arc  in  an  error,  and  to  ufe  the  foft  and  gentle 
methods  of  conviction.  Men  muft  be  perfuaded,  and  not  compel- 
led. To  adl  othcrwife,  is  to  commit  a  robber)  on  them  ;  a  rob- 
bery  To  much  the  more  criminal,  as  thofe  who  commit  it  endeavour 
to  juftify  themfelves  by  facred  authority.  There  is  therefore  no 
lefs  folly,  than  impiety,  in  fuch  a  condu(!îî:. 

XXXV.  In  particular,  nothing  is  more  contrary  to  tnê  fpirit  of 
Chriitianity,  than  to  employ  the  force  ofarnrïs  for  the  propagation 
of  our  holy  religion.  Chrift,  our  divine  mafter,  inflru(fli.d  man- 
kind, but  never  treated  them  with  violence.  The  Apoftles  fol- 
lowed his  example  ;  and  the  enumerations  which  St.  Paul  makes 
of  the  arms  he  employed  for  the  converfton  of  mankindj  is  an  excel- 
lent leflbn  to  Chriilians.* 

XXXVI.  So  far  is  a  firnple  difference  of  opinion^  in  matters 
of  religion,  from  beingajuft  reafonfor  purfuing,  byforce  of  arms,  or 
difturbing  in  thelealt-,  tliofe  whom  we  think  in  an  error;  that, on 
the  contrary,  fach  as  a  et  in  this  manner,  furnilh  others  with  a  jiift 
rsafon  of  making  war  againft  them,  and  of  defending  thofe  whom 
they  iinjuftly  opprefp.  Upon  which  ocr:iflon  the  following  quet- 
tion  occurs  :  ÎVhether  protejlani  princes  may  not^  with  a  good  con- 

fat-JKCy  enter  into  a  corfcderacy  to  dedroy  the  Inquijition,  and  oblige 

thi 
■  '  11        I        111.      I       I        III  '        ■      I  ■  »^— ^— »»»^—— ^ 

•  2  Cor,  chap,  vi,  vcr,  4,  <kc,  and  chap,  x,  ver.  4, 


Po  L  I  T  I  C     L  A  w.  34-5 

thi  powers^  who  fuffcr  it  in  their  cbminions,  to  difarm  that  cahàly 
tinder  ivhich  Chri/iianit^  has  fo  long  groaned.,  and  which.,  under  a 
Jh'fe  pretence  to  zeal  and  piety,  exercifes  a  tyranny  moji  horrible  in 
itfe'f-,  and  mjji  contrary  to  human  nature  ?  Be  that  as  it  ma)',  it  is 
at  leaft  certain,  that  never  would  any  hero  have  fubducd  inoiifters 
more  furious  and  deftru6liveto  mankitid,  than  he  wh)  could  ac- 
complidi  the  defigti  of  purging  the  earth  of  thefe  v.'icked  nî^n,  who 
fo  impudently  ami  cruelly  abufe  the  fpccious  flievv  of  religion^ 
only  to  procure  wherewith  to  live  in  luxury  and  idlenefs,  and  to 
make  both  princes  and  fubjedts  dependent  on  them. 

XXXVII.  Thefe  are  the  principal  remarks  which  occur  on  the 
caufes  of  war.  To  which  let  us  add,  that  as  we  ought  not  to 
make  war,  which  of  itfclf  is  a  very  great  evil,  but  to  obtain  a  folid 
peace,  it  is  abfolutely  necelTary  to  confult  the  rules  of  prudence 
before  we-  undertake  it,  however  juft  it  may  othervvife  appear^ 
We  mufl,  above  all  thing?,  exi6l!y  weigh  the  good  or  evil,  which 
we  may  bring  upon  ourfelves  by  it  :  for  if  in  making  vi'ar,  there  is 
reafon  to  fear  that  we  fhall  draw  greater  evils  on  curfelve?,  or  thofe 
that  belong  to  us,  than  the  good  we  can  propofe  from  it  ;  it  is  bet- 
ter to  put  lip  with  the  injury,  than  toexpofe  ourfelves  to  more 
confiderable  evils,  than  for  that  which  we  feek  redreis  by  arms. 

XXXVIII.  In^  the  circumffances  here  mentioned  we  nnay  law- 
fully make  v/ar,  not  only  for  ourfelves,  butalfo  for  others  ;  provided 
that  he,  in  whofe  favour  v/e  engage,  has  jufl:  reafon  to  take  r.p 
arms,  and  that  we  arelikewife  under  fome  particular  tie  or  obliga- 
tion to  him,  which  authorizes  us  to  treat  as  enemies  thofe  v/ho 
have  done  us  no  injury. 

XXXIX.  Now  among  thofe,  whom  we  may  and  ought  to» 
defend,  we  muft  give  the  firfl  place  to  fuch  as  depend  on  the d:;Fend- 
er,  that  is,  to  the  fubj-£ls  of  the  ftate  ;  for  it  is  principally  with  this 
view  of  prote£tion  that  men,  before  independent,  incorporated 
themfelves  into  civil  fociety.  Thus  the  Gibeonites  having  fub- 
mitted  themfelves  to  the  government  of  the  Ifraelites,  the  latter 
took  up  arms  on  their  account,  under  the  command  of  Jofliua. 
Tiie  Romans  alfo  proceeded  in  the  fame  manner.  But  fovereigns 
in  thefe  cafes  ought  to  obferve  the  maxim  we  have  eftablifhed  in 
{'tOt.  37.  They  ought  to  beware  in  taking  up  artns  for  fome  of 
their  fubjeéls,  not  to  bring  a  greater  inconveniency  on  the  body  of 
the  ftate.  The  duty  of  the  fovereign  regards  firft  and  principally 
theintereft  of  the  whole,  rather  than  that  of  a  part  \  and  the  greater 
the  part  if,  the  nearer  it  approaches  to  the  v^hole. 

U  11  XL.  2^ 


346  iChe  Principles  of 


XL.  1° .  Next  to  fubjc'6ls  come  our  allies,  whom  wc  are  et- 
prelily  engaged  by  treaty  to  alfift  in  time  of  need  \  and  this,  uheiher 
ihey  have  put  themfclvcs  intirely  under  our  protccVion,  and  fu 
ilepend  upon  itj  or  whcihtr  airulance  be  agreed  upon  for  mutual 
iLCLirity. 

XLI.  But  the  v/ar  mud  be  juflly  undertaken  by  our  ally  ; 
for  we  cannot  innocently  engage  to  help  any  one  in  a  war,  which 
ismanifeîUy  unjuft.  L<!t  us  add  here,  that  we  may,  even  without 
prejudice  to  the  treaty,  defend  our  own  fubjcéls  preferably  to  our 
ailiv'?,  when  tlu're  is  no  poffibility  of  afiiiiing  them  b(jth  at  the 
fame  time  ;  for  the  engagements  of  a  government  to  its  fubjcdls 
always  fuperfede  thofe  into  which  it  enters  with  ftrangers. 

XLII.  As  to  what  Grotius  fays,  thaft  we  are  not  obliged  to 
aflirt  an  ally,  when  there  is  no  hope  offuccefs  ;  it  is  to  be  under- 
ft'ood  in  this  manner.  If  we  fee  that  our  imited  forces  are  not 
fuâkent  to  oppofe  the  enemy,  and  that  our  ally,  though  able  to 
treat  with  hirn  on  tolerable  terms,  is  yetobflinately  bent  to  expofe 
hirnfelf  to  certain  ruin  j  we  are  not  obliged,  by  the  treaty  of  alli- 
ance?, to  join  with  him  in  fo  extravagant  and  defpcrate  an  attempt. 
But  then  it  is  alfo  to  be  conlidered,  that  alliances  would  become 
ufelefs,  if,  in  virtue  of  this  union,  wc  were  not  obliged  to  expofe 
ourfelvcs  to  Tome  daiiger,  or  to  fuflain  fonve  lofs  in  the  defence  of 
an  ally. 

XLIIL  Hereit  may  be  enquired  ;  when  feveral  of  our  allies 
want  afiifirance,  which  ought  to  be  helped  firft,  and  preferably  to 
the  reft  r  Grotius  anfv/ers,  that  when  two  iillics  unjuftly  make 
war  upon  each  other,  we  ought  to  fuccour  neither  of  them  ;  but 
if  the  caufe  of  one  ally  be  juft,  v/e  muft  not  only  aOift  him  againft 
{Irangers,  btjt  aKo  againft  another  of  our  allies,  unlefs  there  be  fonie 
particular  claufein  a  treaty,  which  does  not  permit  us  to  dtfcml 
.  the  former  againft  the  latter,  even  though  the  latter  has  committed 
the  injury.  In  fine,  that  if  feveral  of  our  allies  enter  into  a  league 
againft  a  common  foe,  or  make  v.'ar  feparately  againft  particular 
enemies,  w,e  muft  affill  them  all  equally,  and  according  to  treaty  ; 
but  when  there  is  no  polTibility  of  aHi'ling  them  all  at  once,  we 
muft  give  the  preference  to  the  oldeft  confederate. 

XLIV.  3".  Friends,    or  thofe  with  whom  we  are  united  by 
particular  ties  of  ki.ndnefs  and  aftedion,  hold  the  third  rank.    For 

though 


Politic    Law.  34.7. 

thougii  we  have  not  promifed  them  afilftance,  determined  by  a  for- 
i  ul  treaty  ;  yet  the  nature  of  friendfliip  iifelf  implies  a  mutual  en- 
gagement to  help  each  (uher,  fo  far  as  the  ihi6ler  obligations  the 
friends  are  under  will  permit  ;  and  the  concern  for  each  other's 
faf-'ty  ought  to  be  much  ftronger,  than  that  which  is  deajanJ^'d  by 
the  iimple  connexion  of  humanity. 

XivV".  I  fay  that  we  may  take  up  artiis  for  our  friends,  who 
are  engaged  in  a  juft  war  ;  for  wc  are  not  under  a  (\:\&.  obligatioa 
to  affiit  them  :  and  this  condition  ought  to  be  imderftood,  if  we 
can  do  it  eafily,  and  without  any  great  inconveniency  to  ourfclves. 

XLVI,  4°.  In  fine,  we  may  affirm  that  the  fingle  relation,  in 
which  all  mankind  ftand  to  each  other,  in  confcquence  of  their 
common  nature  and  fociety, and  which  forms  the  mo(t  extenfivc 
connexion,  is  fjfHi-ient  to  authorife  us  in  affifting  thofe  who  are 
unju'iiy  «^pprelTcd  ;  at  leaft  if  the  injuftice  be  confiderable,  and 
manifeil,  and  the  party  injured  call  us  to  his  aflîftance  ;  fo  that  wc 
acl  rather  in  his  name,  than  in  our  own.  But  even  here  we  mult 
ITwkethis  remark,  that  we  have  a  right  to  fuccoar  the  diftrefled 
purely  from  humanjty,  but  that  we  are  not  under  a  f^ricl  obliga- 
tion of  doing  it.  It  is  a  duty  of  imperfect  obligation,  which  binds 
us  only  fo  lar  :^  we  can  pra£life  it,  without  bringing  a  confidera- 
ble inconveniency  upon  ourfelves  ;  for  all  circumliances  beiiîg 
equal,  we  may,  and  even  ouglu  to  prefer  our  own  prcfervation  to 
that  of  another. 

-  XL VII,  It  is  another  queftion,  whether  v/e  can  undertake  a 
war  in  defence  of  the  fubjc6ts  of  a  foreign  prince,  againft  his  inva- 
fions  and  opprefiions,  merely  from  the  principli  of  humanity  ?  I 
anfwer,  that  this  is  permitted  only  in  cafes  where  the  tyranny  is 
rifen  to  fuch  a  height,  that  the  fubjecfls  themf^lves  may  lawfully 
take  up  arm?,  to  ihake  ofF  the  yoke  of  the  tyrant,  according  to 
the  principles  already  elhblifiied. 

XLVm.  ïtis  true,  that  fince  the  inflitutioa  cf  civil  focieiie?, 
the  fovereign  has  acquired  a  peculiar  right  over  his  fubjecls,  in 
virtue  of  which  he  can  puni  Hi  them,  and  no  other  power  has  any 
bufinefs  to  interfere.  But  it  is  no  lefs  certain,  that  this  right  hath 
its  bounds,  and  that  it  cannot  be  lawfully  exercifed,  except  when 
the  fubjefls  are  really  culpable,  or  at  leaft  when  their  innocence  is 
dubious.  Then  the  prefumption  ought  to  be  in  favour  of  the 
fovereign,  and  a  foreign  power  has  no  right  to  intermeddle  with 
ivhat  paiies  in  another  ftatc. 

XUX.  Put 


3 4-8  ^he    Principles  of 

XLIX.  But  If  ihe  tyranny  be  arrived  at  its  greatefl  height,  if 
tl^e  oppreffion  be  maniftlt,  as  when  a  Bufiris  or  I'halaris  opprtTs 
tht-ir  fnbjcfl.  in  fo  cruel  a  manner,  as  mufl  be  condemned  by  every 
reafonable  m?n  living  ;  we  cannot  refufe  the  Iubje6t?,  thus  oppref- 
f;;d,  the  proC'.-6tii)ii  of  tlie  laws  of  focicty.  Every  man,  as  fuch, 
has  a  right  to  claim  the  tflifiance  of  other  rren  when  he  is  really 
in  necelilty  ;  and  every  one  is  obliged  to  give  it  hiiT!,  when  he  can, 
by  the  laws  of  humanity.  Now  it  is  certain,  that  we  neither  dn, 
nor  can  renounce  thofe  laws,  by  entering  into  fociety,  which  ccu!d 
never  hnve  been  tftablifhtd  to  the  prejudice  of  human  nature: 
though  we  may  be  juUly  fuppcfed  to  have  engaged,  not  to  implore 
a  f  :>reign  aid  for  flij^ht  ir.juries,  or  even  for  great  ones,  which  aitcdt 
only  a  few  p^^rfons. 

But  when  all  the  fubjccls,  or  a  confiderahle  part  of  then^,  groan 
indcr  the  opprefuon  of  a  tyrant,  the  fubjec^s,  on  the  one  hand, 
re-enter  into  thefeveral  rigi.ts  of  natural  liberty,  which  authorizes 
them  to  fttk  afliftance  wherever  they  can  find  it  ;  and,  on  the 
other  hand,  thofe  who  arc  in  a  condition  of  giving  it  ihem,  with- 
out any  coiiilderable  damage  to  thcnifelves,  not  only  may,  but 
ought  to  do  all  they  can  to  deliver  the  opprefltd,  for  the  fingle 
coufiJeration  of  piety  and  humanity. 

L.  It  appearr,  indeed,  from  an^  lent  and  modern   liiHory,   that 

the  defire  of  invading  the  fiâtes  of  others  is  often  covered  by  thofe 

pretexts  ;  but  the  bad  ufe  of  a  thing,  does  not  hinder  it  from  being 

jull.      Pirates  navigate  the  leas,  and  robbers  wear  (words,  as  v.eil 

■    as  other  people. 


CHAP.     III. 
Of  the  different  kinds  of-u^ar. 


'■W 


_^^y  ^SIDES  thedivifion  abjve-mentiond  of  war  into  jufî  and 
iiMjii  1,  rhereare  feveral  others,  which  it  is  proper  now  to  confider. 
And  111  If,  war  is  dillinguifhcd  into  offenfiye  and  defenfive. 

II.  De'tnfive  wars  arc  thofe  undertaken  for  the  defence  of  cur 
perlons,  or  the  preferv;nion  of  our  properties.  OfTcnfive  wars  are 
thofe  which  are  made  to  conftrain  others  to  give  us  our  due,  in 
Virtue  of  a  pcife£t  right  wc  have  to  exaâ  it  of  them  \  or  to  obtain 

fitisf«dion 


Politic    Law.  349 

fatisfia£lion  for  a  damage  unjuftly  done  us,  and  to  force  them  to  give 
caution  for  the  future. 

III.  i^.  We  muft  therefore  take  care  not  to  confound  this  with 
the  foriTier  diftindion  ;  as  if  every  defenfive  war  were  jurt,  and,  on 
the  contrary,  every  ofFcnfive  war  unjiift.  It  is  the  prefent  cuftom 
to  excufe  the  moft  anjuft  wars,  by  faying  they  are  purely  defenfive. 
Some  people  think  that  all  unjurt  wars  ought  to  be  called  ofFenfive, 
which  is  not  true;  for  if  fome  offenilve  wars  be  juft,  as  there  is 
no  doubt  of  it,  there  are  alfo  defenfive  warsunjuft;  as  when  we 
defend  ourfelves  againft  a  prince  who  has  had  fufficient  provocation 
to  attack  us. 

IV.  2^.  Neither  are  we  to  believe,  that  he  who  firft  injures 
another,  begins  by  that  an  ofFenfive  war,  and  that  the  other,  who 
demands  fatisfadlion  for  the  injury,  is  always  upon  the  defenfive. 
There  are  a  great  many  unjufl  a6ls  which  may  kindle  a  war,  and  . 
yet  are  not  the  war  ;  as  the  ill  treatment  of  a  prince's  annbafTador, 
the  plundering  of  his  fubjedls,  &c.  If  therefore  we  take  up  arms 
to  revenge  fuch  an  unjufl  aâ,  we  commence  an  ofîenfive,  but  a 
ju(l  war  ;  while  the  prince  who  has  done  the  injury,  and  will  not 
give  f^uisfadtion,  makes  a  defenfive,  but  an  unjuft  war.  An 
ofFenfive  war  is  therefore  unjuff  only,  when  it  is  undertaken  with- 
out a  lawful  caufe  ;  and  then  the  defenfive  war,  which  on  other 
occafions  might  be  unjuft,  becomes  ju(t. 

V.  We  mufl  therefore afîîrm,  in  general,  that  the  firft  who  takes 
up  arms,  vvhetherjuflly  or  uiijuflly,  commences  an  ofFenfive  war  ; 
and  he  Vi'ho  oppofes  him,  whether  with  or  without  a  rcafon,  begins 
a  defenfive  war.  Tliofe  who  look  upon  the  word  offenfive  war 
to  be  an  odious  term,  as  always  implying  (bmething  unjufl  ;  and 
who,  on  the  contrary,  confider  a  defenfive  war  as  infeparablefrom 
equity,  confound  ideas,  and  perplex  a  thing,  which  of  itfelf  feems  to 
be  fufHciently  clear.  It  is  with  princes  as  with  private  perfons. 
The  plaintifFwho  commences  a  fuit  at  law,  is  fometimeS  in  the 
wrong,  and  fometiroes  in  the  right.  It  is  the  fame  with  the  defend- 
ant. It  is  wrong  torefufe  to  pay  a  fum  which  is  juflly  dues  and 
ic  is  right  to  forbear  paying  what  v/e  do  not  owe. 

VI.  In  the  third  place,  Grotius  diflinguifhes  war  into  private^ 
public,  and  wu'V.  Public  war  he  calls  that  which  is  made  on  both 
Fides  by  the  authority  of  the  civil  power  ;  Private  war^  that  which 
is  made    between  private  perfons,  without  any  public  authority  ; 

and. 


n 


50  77je  Principles   of 

anil,  laflly,  mix'd  war,  that  which,  on  one  fide,  is  carried  on  by 
public  authority,  and,  on  the  other,  by  private  pcifons. 

VII.  We  may  obferve  concerning  this  divifion,  that  if  we 
take  the  word  war  in  the  tr.ofl:  gential  and  cxtenfive  leufe,  and 
underltand  by  it  alltaklng  unarms  %vithavlew  to  decide  a  quarrel^  in 
contradiftinition  to  the  way  of  deciding  a  difference  by  reconrfe 
to  a  common  judge,  then  this  diflindlion  may  be  admitted  j  but 
cuftom  feems  to  explode  it,  and  has  retrained  the  fignificaiion  of 
the  word  war  to  that  carried  on  between  fovercign  powers.  In 
civil  fociety,  private  perfons  have  not  a  right  to  make  war  :  and  as 
for  theftate  of  nature,  we  have  already  treated  of  the  right  which 
men  have  in  that  ftate  to  defend  and  preferve  their  perfons  and 
properties  j  fo  that  as  we  are  here  treating  only  of  tlie  right  of 
fovereigns,  with  regard  to  each  other,  it  is  properly  public,  and  not 
private  war,  that  falls  under  our  prcfent  confideration. 

VIII.  4^.  V/arisalfo  diflinoiiinied  hito  folemn  according  to  the 
laws  of  nations^  and  not  Jolcnin.  To  render  a  war  folemn,  two  things 
are  rtquifite  ;  the  firlt,  that  it  be  made  by  the  authority  of  the 
fovereign;  the  fécond,  that  it  be  accompanied  with  certain  formal- 
ities, as  a  formal  declaration,  &c,  but  of  this  we  fliaU  treat  more 
fully  in  its  proper  place.  War  not  foleinn,  is  that  which  is  made 
either  without  a  for  7ial  declaration,  or  againft  mere  private  perfons. 
We  fliallhereonlyhintat  this  divifion,  deferring  a  more  particular 
examination  of  it,  and  an  enquiry  itUo  its  cftcè^s,  till  we  come  lo 
treat  of  the  formalities  vvhich  ufually  precede  war. 

IX.  But  a  queftion  is  moved,  relating  to- this  fubje£^,  which  is, 
whether  a  niagiHrate,  properly  fo  called,  and  as  fi;ch,  has  a  power 
of  making  war  of  his  own  accord  ?  Grolius  anfwtrs,  that  judgmg 
independently  of  the  civil  laws,  every  magillrate  feems  to  have  as 
ITiuch  risht,  in  cafe  of  refiHance,  to  take  up  arms  in  order  to 
exercife  his  juiifdi61ion,  and  to  fee  his  commands  executed,  as  to 
defend  the  people  intrulfed  to  his  care.  Pulfendorf,  on  the  con- 
tr;iry,  takes  the  négative,  and  paflcs  ccnfure  on  the  opinion  of 
Grotius. 

X.  But  it  is  eafy  to  reconcile  thefe  two  authors,  the  difpute 
between  them  being  merely  about  words.  Grotius  fixes  a  more 
vague  and  general  idea  to  the  tertn  war:'^  according  to  him,therefore, 

when 

*  Sec  above,  feifl.  vii. 


Politic     Law.  351 

when  a  (ubordinate  magiftrate  takes  up  arms  to  maintain  his  au- 
thority, and  to  reduce  thofe  to  rcafon  who  refufe  to  fubmit  to  him, 
hi  is  liippofed  to  a6l  with  the  approbation  of  the  fovereign  ;  who, 
by  cnrrulling  hirti  with  a  fliare  in  the  government  of  the  Hate,  has 
at  the  faiTie  time  inverted  him  with  the  power  neceflary  to  exercife 
it.  And  thus  the  queftion  is  only,  whether  every  magiftrate,  as 
fuch,  has  need,  on  this  occafion,  of  an  exprefs  order  from  the  fove- 
reign; fo  that  the  conftitution  of  civil  focieties  in  general  require 
it,  independently  of  the  laws  of  each  particular  ftate. 

XI.  Now  if  a  magiftrate  can  have  recourfe  to  arms  for  the 
reduflion  of  one  perfon,  of  two,  ten,  or  twenty,  who  either  refufe 
to  obey  him,  or  attempt  to  hinder  the  exercife  of  his  jurifdi6tion, 
why  may  he  not  ufe  the  fame  means  againft  fifty,  a  hundred,  a 
thoufind  ?  &c.  The  greater  the  number  of  the  difcbedient,  the 
more  he  v,'ill  hav2  occafion  for  force  to  overcome  their  refiilance. 
Now  this  is  what  Grotius  includes  under  the  term  ivar, 

XIÎ.  Puffendorf  agrees  to  this  in  the  main  ;  but  he  pretends 
that  this  coercive  power,  which  belongs  to  a  magiftrate  over  difo- 
bedient  fubje£ls,  is  not  a  right  of  war  ;  war  feemingto  be  intirely 
between  equals,  or  at  leaft  fuch  as  pretend  to  equality.  The  idea 
ofPufFendorf's  is  certainly  more  regular,  and  agreeable  to  cuftom  ; 
but  it  is  evident,  that  the  difference  between  him  and  Grotius  con- 
fifts  only  in  the  greater  or  lelFer  extent  which  each  of  them  gives 
to  the  word  ivar. 

XIII.  If  it  be  obje£led,  that  it  is  dangerous  to  leave  fo  much 
power  to  a  fubordinate  magiftrate  ;  this  may  be  true  :  but  then  it 
proves  only  that  the  prudence  of  legiflators  requires  they  fliould  fet 
bounds  in  this  refpe£l  to  the  power  of  magiftrates,  in  order  to 
prevent  an  inconveniency  which  (hould  otherwife  arife  from  the 
inftitution  of  magiftracy. 

XIV.  But  to  judge  of  the  power  of  the  magiftrate?,  or  of  gen- 
erals and  leaders,  in  refpeft  to  war,  properly  fo  called,  and  which 
is  carried  en  againft  a  foreign  enemy,  we  need  only  to  attend  to 
their  commiflïons  ;  for  it  is  evident  that  ihey  cannot  lawfully 
undertake  any  aâ  of  hoftility  of  their  own  head,  and  without  a 
formal  order  of  the  fovereign,  at  leaft  realonably  prefurRed,  in  con- 
fequence  of  particular  circumftances. 

XV.  Thus,  for  example,  a  general  fent  upon  an  expedition 

with 


352  The  Principles  of 

wlih  ail  unlimited  authority,  may  a(£l  againft  the  enemy  nffcnfively, 
as  well  as  defenfively,  and  in  fuch  a  manner  as  he  fhall  judge  molt 
advantageous  ;  but  he  can  neither  levy  a  new  war,  nor  make  peace 
of  his  own  head.  But  if  his  power  be  limited,  he  ought  never  te 
pafs  the  bounds  prefcribed,  unlefs  he  is  unavoidably  reduced  to  it 
by  the  neceflity  of  feU-defence  ;  for  whatever  he  does  in  that  cafe, 
is  fuppofed  to  be  with  the  confent  and  approbation  of  the  fovereign. 
Thus,  if  an  admiral  has  orders  to  be  upon  the  defenfive,  he  may, 
notwrithftanding  fuch  a  reftraint,  break  in  upon  the  enemy's  fleet, 
and  Hnkand  burn  as  many  of  their  fliips  as  he  can,  if  they  come 
to  attack  him  ;  all  that  he  is  forbidden,  is  to  challenge  the  enemy 
firft. 

XVI.  In  general,  the  governors  of  provinces  and  cities,  if  they 
have  troops  under  their  command,  may  by  their  own  authority 
defend  themfclves  againft  an  enemy  who  attacks  them  ;  but  they 
ought  not  to  carry  the  war  into  a  foreign  country,  without  an  ex- 
prefs  order  from  their  fovereign. 

XVII.  It  was  in  virtue  of  this  privilege,  arifing  from  neceflity, 
that  Lucius  Pinarius,  *  governor  of  Enna  in  Sicily  for  the  Riinians, 
upon  certain  information  that  the  inhabitants  defigned  to  revolt  to 
the  Carthaginians,  put  them  all  to  the  fword,  and  thus  prefervcd 
the  place.  But,  except  in  the  like  cafe  of  neceflity,  the  inhabitants 
cf  a  town  have  no  right  to  take  up  arms,  in  order  to  obtain  fatis- 
fa£iionfor  thofe  injuries  which  the  prince  negledls  to  revenge. 

XVIII.  A  mere  prefumption  of  the  will  of  the  fovereign,  would 
not  even  be  fuHicient  to  excufe  a  governor,  or  any  other  officer, 
who  fhould  undertake  a  war,  except  in  cafe  of  neceflity,  without 
either  a  general  or  particular  order.  For  it  is  not  fufficient  to 
know  v.'hat  part  the  fovereign  would  probably  a£l,  ifhe  were  con- 
fulted,  in  fuch  a  particular  pofturc  of  afFairs  ;  but  it  fliould  rather 
be  confidered  in  general,  what  it  is  probable  a  prince  would 
defire  fhould  be  done  without  confuking  him,  when  the 
matter  will  bear  fome  delay,  and  the  affair  is  dubious.  Now 
certainly  fovereigns  will  never  confent  that  their  minifters  fhould, 
whenever  they  think  proper,  undertake,  without  their  order,  a 
thing  of  fuch  importance  as  an  ofîenfivs  war,  which  is  the  proper 
(ubjedlofthe  prefent  inquiry. 

XIX.  In 

•  Livy,  lib.xxi.  cap.  xviii. 


Politic    Law.  353 

XIX.  In  thefe  circumftances,  whatever  part  the  fovereiçn  would 
have  thought  pr(  p^r  to  a<^.i-,  if  he  had  been  co/ifulted  ;  and  whatever 
llicceis  the  war,  undertaken  without^  his  orders,  may  have  h^x\', 
it  is  left  to  the  fovercign  whether  lie  will  ratify,  or  condemn  the 
afl  of  his  minifter.  If  he  ratiHes  it,  this  approbation  ;cnders  the 
war  folemn,  by  reflecting  back,  as  it  were,  an  aiith jrity  np(ni  it, 
fo  that  it  obliges  the  whole  commonwealth.  But  if  ths  fov-'reign 
fhoulJ  condemn  the  aél:  of  the  governor,  the  hoftilities  committid 
by  the  latter  ought  to  pafs  for  a  fort  of  robbery,  the  fault  of  which 

by  no  means  affeéls  the  ftatc,  provided  the  governor  is  delivered  " 

up,  orpunilhed  according  to  the  laws  of  the  country,  and  proper 
faiislaé^ion  be  made  for  the  damages  fuftaincd. 

XX.  We  may  fuither  obferve,  that  in  civil  focieties,.when  a 
particular  member  has  done  yn  injury  to  a  ftranger,  the  governor 
of  the  commonwealth  is  fometimes  refiionfible  for  it,  fo  that  war 
may  be  declared  againft  him  on  that  account.  But  to  ground  this 
kind  of  imputation,  v/e  mud  neceflarily  fuppofe  one  of  thefe  two  ■ 
things,  fufferance,  or  reception  ;  viz.  either  that  the  fovereign  has 
fufFered  this  harm  to  be  done  to  the  flranger,  or  that  he  afForded  a 
retreat  to  the  criminal. 

XXI.  In  the  former  cafe  it  mufl  be  laid  down  as  a  maxim,  that 
a  fovereign,  who  knowing  the  crimes  of  his  fubjeiSls,  as  for  example, 
that  they  pradtife  piracy  on  ftrangers  j  and  being  alfo  able  and 
obliged  to  hinder  it,  does  not  hinder  it,  renders  himfelf  criminal, 
becaufe  he  has  confented  to  the  bad  action,  the  commifîion  of 
which  he  has  permitted,  and  coniequently  fnrniflied  a  juft  reafoa 
of  war. 

XXII.  The  t\Vo  conditions  above-mentioned,  I  mean  the 
knowledge  and  fufFerance  of  the  fovereign,  are  abfolutely  neceflTjry, 
the  one  not  being  (ufficient  without  the  other,  to  communicate  any 
fhare  in  the  guilt.  Now  it  is  prefum.ed,  that  a  foverei^jn  knows 
what  his  fubje£ls  openly  and  frequently  commit  j  and  as  to  his 
power  of  hindering  the  evil,  this  likewife  is  always  prefumed,  unlefs 
the  want  of  it  be  clearly  proved. 

XXIII.  The  other  way,  in  which  a  fovereign  renders  himfelf 
guilty  of  the  crime  of  another,  is  by  allowing  a  retreat  and  admit- 
tance to  the  criminal,  and  fkreening  him  from  punifbment.  Puf- 
fendorf  pretends,  that  if  we  are  obliged  to  deliver  up  a  criminal 
who  takes  fh?lter  among  us,  it  is  rather  in  virtue  of  fome  treaty  on 

W  w  this 


354  ^^^   Principles  (?/' 

this  head,  than  in  confequcnce  oï  a  common  and  inJirpenfibîe 
obligation. 

XXIV.  But  PufFendorf,  I  tfiink,  ha?,  without  fufficient  reafon»-, 
abandoned  the  opinion  of  Grotius,  which  fecms  to  be  belter  found- 
ed. The  principles  of  the  latter,  in  rei^ard  to  the  prefent  queflion, 
may  be  reduced  to  thefe  following. 

i^.  Since  the  eftab'.iflirrent  of  civil  fccieiies,  the  right  of  punifh- 
ing  public  offences,  which  every  pcrfon,  if  not  chargeable  himfclf 
with  fuch  a  crime,  had  in  the  (tate  of  nature,  has  been  transferred 
to  the  fovereifin,  To  that  the  latter  alone  hath  the  privilege  of  pun- 
iOiing,  as  he  think?  proper,  thofe  tranf^^reiTions  of  his  fubjedls, 
which  properly  intsreft  the  public. 

XXV.  But  this  right  of  punifliing  crimes  is  not  fo  excltifively 

theirs,  but  that  eitlier  public  bodies,  or  their  governors,  have  a  righc 
to  procure  the  punifhment  of  them  in  the  lame  manner,  as  the 
laws  of  particular  countries  allow  private  people  the  profecutidn 
of  crimes  before  the  civil  tribunal. 

XXVI.  3°.  This  right  b  flill  (Ironger  with  rcfpcfl:  to  crimes, 
by  which  ihey  are  dircdtly  injured,  and  which  they  have  a  perfecSl 
right  of  puni  filing,  for  the  fupport  of  their  honour  and  fafcty.  In 
fuch  circumf^anccs,  the  fîate,  to  v.'hich  the  criminal  retires,  otight 
nottoobftruft  the  right  that  belongs  to  the  other  power. 

XXVII.  4".  Now  as  one  prince  does  not  generally  permit 
another  to  fend  armed  men  into  his  territories,  upon  the  fcore  of 
exailing  punifhment  (for  this  would  indeed  be  attended  with  ter- 
rible inconveniences)  it  is  reafonable  the  tovereign,  in  whofe 
dominions  the  offender  lives,  or  has  taken  flielter,  fliould  either 
punifli  the  criminal  according  to  his  demerit?,  or  deliver  him  up, 
to  be  punilhed  at  tlie  difcrction  of  the  injured  iovereign.  This  is 
that  delivering  up,  of  which  we  have  fo  many  examples  in  hiflory. 

XXVni.  5^.  The  principles  here  laid  down,  concerning  the 
obligation  of  punifhing  or  delivering  up,  regard  not  only  the 
criminals  who  have  always  been  fubje(5ls  of  the  government  they 
now  live  under,  but  alfo  thofe  who,  after  the  commifTion  of  a 
crirne,  have  taken  fhelter  in  the  country. 

XXTX.  6".  In  fine,  we  muft  obferve  that  the  right  of  demand- 
'"'"•^  fngitivc  delinquents  to  punifhment,  has  not  for  fome  ages  lafl 

paft 


Politic    Law.  355 

pad  been  infilled  upon  by  fovereign?,  in  mod  parts  of  Europe, 
except  in  crimes  againll  the  (late,  or  thufe  of  a  very  heinous  nature. 
As  lo  IclTer  crimes,  they  are  connived  at  on  both  fidec,  unlefs  it  is 
otiicrwile  agreed  on  bylbme  particular  treaty. 

XXX.  Befides  the  kinds  of  war,  hitherto  mentioned,  we  may 
alfo  diilinguilh  them  into  perfei^  and  imperfcùt.  A  pcrtcft  war,  is 
that  which  entirely  interrupts  the  tranquillity  of  the  (late,  and  lays 
a  foundation  for  all  poflible  a6ls  ofhoftility.  An  imperftdl  war,  on 
the  contrary,  is  that  which  does  not  intirely  interrupt  the  [)cace, 
but  only  in  certain  particulars,  the  public  tranquillity  being  in 
other  rcfpscls  undilturbcd. 

XXXI.  This  lafl  fp-'cics  of  war  is  generally  called  reprifals,  of 
the  nature  of  which  we  iliall  give  here  fome  account.  By  reprifals 
then  we  inean  that  imperfeB  kind  of  war^  or  thofe  afls  of  hoJiUity 
•ujhifh  fovereigns  exerafe  again/}  each  other ^  or-^  tuith  their  confcnt, 
their  fuhje  Sis  ^  byfeixing  the  per  fans  or  effeSli  oftheJuhjeSls  of  a  foreign  - 
commonivealth,  that  refujeth  to  do  us  jufîice  ;  with  a  vieiu  to  obtain 
fecurity^  and  to  recover  our  right^  a^id  in  cafe  of  refufal^  to  do  ju/îice 
to  Qiirfclves^  ivithout  any  other  interruption  oj  the  public  tranquillity, 

XXXII.  G.'otius  pretends,  that  reprifals  are  not  founded  on  the 
law  of  nature  anJ  necellity,  but  only  on  a  kind  of  arbitrary  law  of 
nations,  by  which  molt  of  them  have  agreed,  that  the  goods  be- 
longing to  the  fnbjedls  of  a  loreign  (late  Ihould  be  a  pledge  or 
fecurity,  as  it  were,  for  what  that  ftate,  or  the  governor  of  it,  might 
owe  us,  either  direclly  anJ  in  their  own  names,  or  by  rendering 
themfclvcs  rcfponfiblc  for  the  a«5liûns  of  others,  upon  rcfufing  to 
admiuifterjudicc. 

XXXIII.  Rut  this  is  far  from  being  an  arbitrary  right,  founded 
upon  a  pretended  law  of  nations,  whof^  cxidcnce  we  cannot  prove, 
depending  on  the  greater  or  lefs  extent  of  cudom  no  way  binding 
in  the  nature  of  a  law.  The  right  we  here  fpeak  of,  is  a  confe- 
quenceof  the  conditution  of  civil  focietics,  and  an  application  of 
trie  majdms  of  the  law  of  nature  to  that  conditution. 

XXXIV.  During  the  independence  of  the  date  of  nature,  and 
before  the  inditution  of  civil  grA'ernment,  if  a  perfon  hid  been  in- 
jured, he  could  come  upon  thofe  only  who  had  done  the  wrong,  or 
upon  their  accomplices  ;  becaufe  tlierc  was  then  no  tie  between 
ijaen,  in  virtue  of  which  a  perfon  might  be  deemed  to  have  con« 

fçnted, 


3 5^  The  Principles  oj 

fented,  in  fome  manner,  to  what  others  did  even  without  his  parti- 
cipation. 

XXXV.  Butfincc  civil  fccietics  have  been  formed,  that  is  to 
fay,  eommunities,  whoie  nicrmbers  are  all  united  together  for  their 
corr.mon  defence,  there  has  neccflarily  arifen  from  thence  a  con- 
j'ji)6tion  of  interefts  and  v^ills  ;  vihich  is  the  reafon,  that  as  the 
lociety,  or  the  powers  uhich  govern  it,  engage  to  defend  each  other 
againll  every  infult  ;  fo  each  individual  may  be  deemed  to  have 
engaged  to  anfwer  for  theconduftof  the  fociety,  of  which  he  is  a 
member,  or  of  the  powers  which  govern  it. 

XXXVI.  No  human  eftablifliment  can  fu])erfede  the  obliga- 
tion of  that  general  and  inviolable  law  of  nature,  that  the  damage 
zve  have  clone  to  another  jhoidd  he  repaired  \  except  thofc,  who  are 
thereby  injured,  have  manifeflly  renounced  thcirright  of  demanding 
it-paration.  And  when  fuch  eftablifhments  hinder  thofe  who  are 
injured,  from  obtaining  fatisfaélion  fo  ealily  as  they  might  without 
them,  this  difficulty  muft  be  made  up,  by  furnifhing  the  pcrfons 
interefted  with  all  the  other  poffible  methods  of  doing  themfelves 
juftice. 

XXXVII.  Now  it  is  certain  that  focieties,  or  the  powers  which 
govern  them,  by  being;  armed  with  the  force  of  the  whole  body, 
are  fometimes  encouraged  to  laugli  with  in?.punity  at  Grangers, 
who  come  to  demand  their  due  ;  and  that  every  fubjedf  contributes, 
one  way  or  other,  to  enable  them  to  aifl  in  this  manner  ;  fo  that  he 
may  be  fuppofed  in  fo. nc  meafure  to  confent  to  it.  But  if  he  dees 
not  in  reality  confent,  there  is  after  all,  no  other  manner  of  facilita- 
ting, to  injured  ftrangers,  the  profecution  of  their  right;;,  v/hich  is 
rendered  difficult  by  the  united  force  of  the  whole  body,  than  to 

■  authorize  them  to  ccme  upon  all  thofe  Vrho  are  members  cf  it. 

XXXV^III.  Let  us  therefore  conclude,  that  by  the  confritution 
of  civii  focieties,  every  fubjeft,  fo  long  as  he  continues  fucii,  is 
refponfiole  to  (irangert>  fcr  the  conduit  of  the  fociety,  or  of  him 
who  governs  it  ;  with  this  claufe,  however,  that  he  may  demand 
ind'.mniHcation,  when  there  is  any  fault  drlnjufiice  on  the  part  of 
his  fuperiors.  But  if  it  fliould  be  any  man's  misfortune  to  be 
diftppuinred  of  this  indemnification,  he  muft  Icoic  upon  it  as  one 
of  thcfe  inconveniences  which,  in  a  civil  ftate,  the  conftitution  of 
hum  HI  affairs  renders  almoif  inevitable.  If  to  all  thefe  we  add  the 
reafons  alledged  by  Gr-jiiu?,  W(?  Ihall  plainly   f:e,  that  thcie  is  no 

nectfîitv 


Politic  Law.  357 

neceflity  for  fuppofing  a  tacit  confent  of  the  people  to  found  the 
right  ot  reprifals. 

XXXIX.  As  reprifals  are a(5ls  of hoflility,  and  often  theprelude 
or  foreriiinier  of  a  coniplete  and  perfect  war,  it  is  plain  that  none 
but  the  fovereign  can  lawfully  ufe  this  right,  and  that  the  fubjcds 
can  make  no  reprifals  but  by  his  order  and  authority. 

XL.  Befides,  it  is  proper  that  the  wrong  or  injuftice  done  us, 
and  which  occafions  the  reprifals,  fliould  be  clear  and  evident,  and 
that  the  thing  in  difpute  be  of  great  conltquence.  For  if  the 
injury  be  dubious,  or  of  no  importance,  it  would  be  equally  unjuft 
and  dangerous  to  proceed  to  this  extremity,  and  to  expofe  ourfelves 
to  all  the  calamities  of  an  open  war.  Neither  ought  we  to  ccme 
to  reprifals,  before  we  have  tried,  by  the  ordinary  means,  to  obtain 
juftice  for  the  injury  committed.  For  this  purpofe  we  muft  ap- 
ply to  the  prince,  whofe  iubjefls  has  done  us  the  injuftice  ;  and  if 
the  prince  takes  no  notice,  or  rcfufes  fatisfadlion,  we  may  then 
make  reprifals,  in  order  to  obtain  it. 

XLL  In  a  word,  we  mufl  not  have  recoiirfe  to  reprifals,  ex- 
cept when  all  the  ordinary  means  of  obtaining  fatisfadtion  have 
failed  ;fo  that,  for  inftance,  if  a  fiibordinate  magiftrate  has  refufed 
us  juftice,  we  are  not  permitted  toufc  reprifals  before  we  apply  to 
the  fovereign  himfelf,  who  will  perhaps  grant  us  fatisfaélion.  In 
fuch  circumitances,  we  may  therefore  either  detain  the  fubjecStsof  a 
foreign  {late,  if  they  withhold  ours  ;  or  we  may  feize  their  goods 
and  effects.  But  whatever  jull  rcafon  we  may  have  to  make  re- 
prifals, we  can  never  direiflly,  and  for  that  reafon  alone,  put  thofe  to 
death  whom  we  have  fcizcd  upon,  but  only  fecure  them,  and  not 
ufe  them  ill,  till  we  have  obtained  fatisfaftion  ;  fo  that,  during  all 
thatt^me,  they  are  to  be  confidered  as  hodages. 

-  XLÎL  In  regard  to  the  goods  feized  by  the  right  of  reprifals, 
we  muft  take  care  of  them  till  the  time,  in  which  (atisfa6tion  ought 
to  be  mad.',  is  expired  ;  after  which  we  may  adjudge  them  to  the 
creditor,  or  f.;ll  them  for  the  payment  of  the  debt  ;  returning  to 
him,  from  whom  they  were  taken,  the  overplus,  when  all  charges 
are   dedudled. 

XLIII.  We  muft  alfo  obferve,  that  it  is  not  permitted  to  ufe 
reprifals,  except  with  regard  to  fubje£ls,  properly  fo  called,  and 
their  cfFciSls  j  for  as  to  ftrangers,  who  do  but  pafs  through  a  country, 

or 


3 5 s  ^«?  Principles  of 

or  only  come  to  make  a  fliorl  (lay  in  it,  they  have  not  a  fufHcient 
connexion  with  the  llatc,  of  which  they  ate  only  raenibtrt.  but  for 
a  time,  and  in  an  impeifedl  manner  j  fo  that  we  cannot  indemnify 
curfeîves  by  the:::,  for  the  lofs  we  have  fudaincd  by  any  native  of 
the  country,  and  by  the  refufal  of  the  fovercign  to  render  us  juftice. 
We  niufi:  farther  except  anjbailadors,  who  are  facred  perfonf,evcu 
in  the  height  of  war.  But  as  to  women,  clergymen,  men  of  leiterf, 
^c.  the  law  of  nature  grants  them  no  privilege  in  this  cafe,  if  they 
have  not  otherwile  acquired  it  by  virtue  of  fume  treaty. 

XLIV.  Lafl.'y,  fome  political  writers  diftinguiili  thofc  wars 
which  are  carried  on  between  tuu  or  more  fovereigns,  from  thofe  of 
the  fubje£ts  againfl  their  governois.  But  it  is  plain,  that  when 
fubjeils  take  up  arms  againfl:  their  prince,  they  either  do  it  for  ju(l 
reafons,  and  accoïding  to  the  principles  elfablillied  in  this  work,  or. 
without  a  juft  and  lawful  caufs.  In  tlie  latter  cafe,  it  is  rather  a 
revolt  or  )ufurre<5lion,  than  a  war,  properly  fo  called.  But  if  the 
fubjccH  have  juft  reafon  to  refift  the  fovereign,  it  is  ftridly  a  war  \ 
fmce,  in  fuch  a  crifis,  there  are  neither  fovercign  nor  fiibje6ls,  all 
ticpendance  and  obligation  having  cci^fed.  The  two  oppofite  par- 
tics  are  then  in  a  ftate  of  nature  and  equality,  trjingto  obtain  juf- 
tice  by  their  own  proper  flrergth,  which  corflitutcs  what  we  uu-» 
UerHand  properly  by  the  term  war.  » 

CHAP.    IV. 

Of  thofe  things  which  ought  to  precede  icar. 

I  TT 

i  JLO^^EVER  jufl  reafon  vre  may  have  to  make  war,  yet  as 
it  inevitably  brings  along  with  it  an  incredible  number  ofoalrmities, 
and  otterrtimes  aéis  of  injuftice,  it  is  certain  that  we -ought  not  to 
proceed  too  eafily  to  a  dangerous  extrenfiity,  which  may  perhaps 
prove  fatal  to  the  conqueror  himfclf. 

II.  The  following  are  the  meafures  which  prudence  direcEls  to 
be  obferved  in  thcTe  circumliances. 

1**.  Snppofingthe  reafon  of  the  war  is  juft  in  itfc'.f,  yet  the  dif- 
pute  ought  to  be  about  ft)mething  of  great  confequence;  finceit  is 
better  even  to  relinqui/h  part  of  our  right,  when  the  thing  is  not 
confiderable;  thaii  to  have  recomfc  to  arms  to  defcr.d  it. 

.  a"'.  We 


Po  L  î  T  I  C     L  AW.  359 


2^.  We  ought  to  have,  at  leafi-,  a  probable  appearance  of  fuccefs  ; 
for  it  wouM  be  a  criminal  temerity,  to  expofe  ourfelvcs  to  certain 
deftruftion,  and  to  run  into  a  greater,  in  order  to  avoid  a  Icfler 
evil. 

3°.  Laftly,  there  fhould  be  a  real  necefltty  for  taking  up  arms  ; 
that  is,  v/e  ought  not  to  have  recourfe  to  force,  but  when  we  can 
employ  no  milder  method  of  recovering  our  right,  or  of  defending 
omfelves  from  the  evils  with  which  we  are  menaced. 

Iir.  Thefe  meafures  are  agreeable  not  only  to  the  principles 
of  prudence,  but  alfo  to  the  fundamental  maxims  of  fociaOility,  and 
the  love  of  peace  j  maxims  of  no  lefi  force,  v/ith  refpcdl  to  nations, 
than  iiidividuals.  By  thefc  a  fovereign  rnuft  therefore  be  necefTa- 
rily  direfted  ;  juftice  obliges  him  to  it,  in  confequence  of  the  very 
nature  and  end  of  government.  For  as  he  ought  to  take  partic- 
ular care  of  the  (fate,  and  of  his  fubjefts,  he  fliould  not  expofe  them 
to  the  evils  with  which  war  is  attended,  except  in  the  laft  extrem- 
ity, and  when  there  is  no  other  expedient  left  but  that  of  arms. 

IV.  It  is  not  therefore  fiifficient  that  the  war  be  jurt  jn  itfelf, 
with  refpedl  to  the  enemy  ;  it  mufl  alfo  be  fo  with  refpefl  toour- 
felvep,  and  our  fubjedts.  Plutarch  informs  us,  "  that  among  the 
*'  ancient  Romans,  when  the  Féciales  had  determined  that  a  v/ar 
*'  might  be  juftly  undertaken,  the  fenate  afterwards  examined 
*'  whether  it  would  be  advantageous  to  engage  in  it." 

v.  Now  among  the  methods  of  deciding  differences  between 
nations  without  a  war,  there  are  three  mofl:  confiderable.  The 
firft  is  an  amicable  conference  between  the  contending  parties  ; 
with  refpect  to  which  Cicero  judicioufly  obferves,  "  that  tJiis 
•*  method  of  terminating  a  difFerence  by  a  difcuffion  of  reafons  on 
*'  both  fides,  is  peculiarly  agreeable  to  the  nature  of  man  ;  that 
"  force  belongs  to  brutes,  and  that  we  never  ought  to  have  recourfe 
♦*  to  it,  but  when  we  cannot  rcdrefs  our  grievances  by  any  other 
•'  method." 

VI.  The  fécond  way  of  terminating  a  difference  between  thofe 
who  have  not  a  common  judge,  is  to  put  the  matter  to  arbitration. 
The  more  potent  indeed  often  negle(!!l  this  method,  but  it  ought 
certainly  to  be  followed  by  thofe  who  have  any  regard  to  juftice 
and  peace  ;  and  it  is  a  way  that  has  been  taken  by  great  princes 
and  people. 

VII.  The 


jôo  72^  Principles  ç/" 

VII.  The  third  method,  in  fine,  which  may  be  fometimos  ufed 
withfucccfs,  is  thatofcafting  lots.  I  fay,  we  may  fometlmes  ufe 
this  way  ;  for  it  is  not  always  lawful  to  refer  the  ifTue  of  a  differ- 
ence, or  of  a  war,  to  the  dccifion  of  lots.  This  method  canrot  be 
taken,  except  when  the  difpute  is  about  a  thing,  in  which  wc  have 
a  full  property,  and  which  we  may  renounce  whenever  we  pleafe. 
But  in  general,  the  obligation  of  the  fovereign  to  defend  the  lives, 
the  honour,  and  the  religion  of  his  fubjecls,  as  alfo  his  obligation, 
to  maintain  the  dignity  of  the  Rate,  are  of  too  flrong  a  nature  to 
fufferhim  to  renounce  the  molt  natural  and  moft  probable  means 
of  his  own  fecurity,  as  well  as  that  of  the  public,  and  to  refer  his 
cafe  to  chance,  which  in  its  nature  is  entirely  precarious. 

VIII.  But  if  upon  due  examination  he,  who  has  been  unjuflly 
attacked,  finds  himfelf  fo  weak,  that  he  has  no  probability  of 
making  any  confiderable  refinance,  he  may  reafonably  decide  the 
difference  by  the  way  of  lot,  in  order  to  avoid  a  certain,  by  cxpofing 
himfelf  to  an  uncertain  danger  ;  which,  in  this  cafe,  is  the  leaft  tf 
two  inevitable  evils. 

IX.  There  is  alfo  another  method,  which  has  feme  relation  to 
lots.  This  confifts  in  fmgle  combats,  which  have  often  been  ufed 
to  terminate  fuch  differences  as  vv'ere  likely  to  produce  a  war  be- 
tween two  nations.  And  indeed,  to  prevent  a  war,  and  its  con- 
comitant evils,  I  fee  no  reafon  that  can  hinder  us  frcm  referring 
matters  to  a  combat  between  a  certain  number  of  men  agreed 
upon  by  both  parties.  Hiflory  furnifhes  us  with  feveral  examples 
of  this  kind,  as  that  of  Turnus  and  Eneas,  Menclaus  and  Paris,  the 
Horatii  and  the  Curiatii. 

X.  It  is  a  queftion  of  fome  importance,  to  know  whether  it  be 
lawful  thus  to  expofe  the  intereft  of  a  whole  /late  to  the  fate  of 
thcfe  combats.  It  appears  on  the  one  hand,  that  by  fuch  means 
we  fpare  the  efFiifion  of  human  blood,  and  abridge  the  calamities 
of  war  ;  on  the  other  hand,  it  promifeth  fairer,  and  looks  like  a  bet- 
ter venture,  to  ffand  the  fhock  even  of  a  bloody  war,  than  by  one 
blow  torifque  the  liberty  and  fritty  of  theffatc'by  a  decifive  com- 
bat ;  fincc,  after  the  lofs  of  one  or  two  battles,  the  war  may  be  fet 
on  foot  again,  and  a  third  perhaps  may  prove  fuccefsful. 

XI.  However,  it  may  be  faid,  that  if otherwife  there  is  no  prof- 
ped  cf  making  a  good  end  of  a  war,  and  if  the  liberty  and  fafety 

of 


Politic    Law.  361 

of  the  flite  are  at  ftake,  there  feems  to  be  no  reafon  againfl  taking 
this  rtep,  as  the  lealt  of  two  evils. 

XII.  Grotius,  in  examining  this  queftion,  pretends  that  thefe  com- 
bats areapt  reconcileable  to  internaljuftice,  though  they  areappro- 
vedby  the  external  right  of  nations  ;  and  that  private  perfons  cannot 
innocentlycxpofe  their  lives,  of  their  own  accord,  to  the  hazard  of  a 
lingle  combat,  though  fuch  a  combat  may  be  innocently  permitted  by 
thellateorfovereign,to  prevent  greater  m.ifchiefs.  But  it  has  been 
juftly  obferved,  that  the  arguments  ufed  by  this  great  man,  either 
prove  nothing  at  all,  or  prove,  at  the  fame  time,  that  it  is  never 
lawful  to  venture  one's  life  in  any  combat  whatever. 

XIII.  We  may  even  affirm,  that  Grotius  is  not  very  confident 
with  himfelf,  fince  he  permits  this  kind  of  combats,  when  other- 
wifrt  there  is  the  greatett  probability  that  he  who  profecutes  an 
unjuft  caufe  will  be  vidlorious,  and  thereby  deftroy  a  great  number 
of  innocent  perfons  :  for  this  exception  evinces  that  the  thing  is 
not  bad  in  itfelf,  and  that  all  the  harmj  which  can  be  in  this  cafe, 
confifts  in  expofing  our  own  life,  or  that  of  others,  without  necef- 
fity,  to  the  hazard  ofafingle  combat.  The  defire  of  terminating,  or 
preventing  a  war,  which  nasal  ways  terrible  confequences,even  to  the 
vidlorious,  is  fo  commendable,  that  it  may  excufe,  if  not  iiuirsly 
juftify  thofe,  who  engage  either  themfelvesor  others  even  inipru-  . 
dently  in  a  combat  of  this  kind.  Be  this  as  it  may,  it  is  certain 
that  in  fuch  a  cafe,  thofe  who  combat  by  the  order  of  the  ftate,  are 
intirely  innocent;  for  they  are  no  more  obliged  to  examine  v/hether 
the  ftate  afls  prudently  or  not,  than  when  they  are  fent  upon  an 
aflault,  or  to  fight  a  pitched  battle. 

XIV.  We  muft  however  obferve,  that  it  was  a  foolilli  fuper- 
ftition  in  thofe  people  who  looked  upon  a  fet  combat  as  a  lawful 
method  of  determining  all  differences,  even  between  individuals, 
from  à  perfuafion  that  the  Deity  gave  always  the  victory  to  the 
good  caufe  ;  for  which  reafon  they  called  this  kind  of  combat  the 
judgmsnt  of  God. 

XV.  But  if,  after  having  ufed  all  our  endeavours  to  terrriinat© 
differences  in  an  amicable  manner,  there  remains  no  further  hope, 
and  we  are  abfolutely  conftrained  to  undertake  a  war,  we  ought 
Hrftto  declare  it  in  form. 

XVI.  This  declaration  of  war  confidored  in  itfdf,  and  inde- 

X  X  pendently 


362  I'hc  Principles  of 

pendently  of  the  particular  formalities  of  each  people,  does  not 
fimply  belong  to  the  law  of  nations,  taking  this  word  in  the  fenfe  of 
Grotius,  but  to  the  law  of  nature  itfeif.  Indeed  prutlcncc,  and 
natural  equity,  equally  require,  that  before  we  take  up  arms  aguinft 
r.ny  ftate  we  fhould  try  all  amicable  methods,  to  avoid  con.in^',  to 
Inch  an  extremity.  We  ought  then  to  fummcn  him,  who  has 
injured  us,  to  n-ralce  a  fpeedy  Citisfadion,  that  we  may  fee  whether 
he  v/ill  not  have  regard  to  himfelf,  and  not  put  us  to  the  hard  necef- 
fity  of  puifuing  our  right  by  the  force  of  arms. 

XVII.  From  what  has  been  fald  it  follow?,  that  this  declara- 
tion takes  place  only  in  offenfive  wars  ;  for  whun  we  are  a6lually 
attacked,  that  alone  gives  us  reafon  to  believe  that  the  enemy  isrc- 
lolved  not  to  liften  to  an  accommodation. 

XVIII.  From  thence  it  alfofollows,  that  we  ooght  not  to  commit 
a£Is  of  hoftility  in7mediately  upon  declaring  war,  but  (hould  wait, 
fi»   long  at  leaft  as  we  can    without  doing  ourfelves  a  prejudice, 

.  until  he  v\ho  has  done  us  the  injury  plainly  refufes  to  give  us 
f^tisfaclion,  and  has  put  himfelf  in  a  condition  to  receive  us  with 
bravery  and  refolution  ;  otherwife  the  declaration  of  war  v.'ould  be  on- 
ly a  vain  ceremony.  For  we  ought  to  neglect  no  means  to  convince 
all  the  v/orld,  and  even  the  enemy  himfelf,  that  it  is  only  abfolute 
necelfity  that  obliges  us  to  take  up  arms,  for  the  recovery  or  deferKe 
of  our  juil  rights  j  after  having  tried  every  other  mcthcd,  and  given 
the  enemy  full  time  to  confider. 

XIX.  Declarations  of  war  ?.rc  diftinguiflied  into  condtticnal  and 
e^hfolute.  The  covd'.tiona]  is  that  which  is  j'jincd  with  a  folemrv 
demand  cf  reftitution,  and  with  this  condition,  that  if  the  injury 
be  rot,  repaired,  we  fli.ill  do  ourfelves  juftice  by  arms.  The 
abfolute  is  that  which  includes  no  condition,  and  by  which  we 
abfolutely  renounce  the  friendfhip  and  fxiety  of  Inm  againft  whom 
we  declare  war.  But  every  declaration  of  v/ar,  in  whatever  man- 
ner-it be  rnide,  is  of  its  own  nature  conditional  *'  for  we  ought 
always  to  be  difpofed  to  accept  of  a  reafonable  latisfacftion,  fo 
foon  ar,  the  enemy  offers  it  ;  and  on  this  account  fome  writers 
reject  this  diilinciiion  of  the  declaration  of  war  into  conditional 
and  abfolute.  But  it  may  neverthelefs  be  maintained,  by  fupp<^fing 
that  he,  againft  whom  war  is  declared  purely  and  fimply,  has 
already  fliewn,  that  he  had  no  defign   to  fpare  us  the  neceflity  of 

taking 

*  Sîc  above,  numb,  xviii. 


Politic    Law.  363 

taking  up  arms  againft  him.  So  fartherefDre  the  declaration  may, 
at  lealt  as  to  the  form  ot'  it,  be  pure  and  fimple,  without  any 
prejudice  to  the  difpofition  iti  wiiich  we  ought  always  to  be,  if 
the  enemy  will  hearken  to  reafon  :  but  this  relates  to  the  conclu- 
fion,  rather  than  the  coinniencemciit  of  a  war  ;  to  the  latter  ot 
which  the  diltindion  of  conditional  and  abfolute  declarations  prop- 
erly belongs. 

XX.  As  foon  as  war  has  been  declared  againfl  a  fovereign,  it 
is  -prefumed  to  be  declared  at  the  fame  time  not  only  againft  ail 
his  fubjeds,  who,  in  conjundion  with  him,  form  one  moral  per- 
son ;  but  alio  againft  all  thofe  who  fhall  afterwards  join  him,  and 
who,  with  refpect  to  the  principal  enemy,  are  to  be  looked  uj^wn 
only  as  allies,  or  adherents. 

XXI.  As  to  the  formalities  obferved  by  different  nations  in 
declaring  war,  thsy  are  all  arbitrary  in  themfclves.  It  is  therefore 
a  matter  of  inJiff.-rence,  whether  the  declaration  be  made  by  en- 
voys, heralds,  or  letters  ;  v/hether  to  the  fovereign  in  perfon,  or  to 
his  lubjecls,  provided  the  fovereign  cannot  plead  ignorance  of  it. 

XXII.  With  refpeâ  to  the  reafons  why  a  folemn  denuncia- 
tion was  required  into  fuch  a  war,  as  by  the  law  of  nation;  is 
called  juft  ;  Grotius  pretends  it  was,  that  the  people  might  be 
alfured  that  the  war  was  not  undertaken  by  private  authority,  but 
by  the  confentof  one  or  other  of  the  lîations,  or  of  their  fovereigns. 

XXIII.  But  this  reafon  of  Grotius's  feems  to  be  infufiScient  ; 
for  we  are  more  alTured  that  the  war  is  made  by  public  authority, 
when  a  herald,  for  inftance,  comes  to  declare  it  with  certain  cere- 
monies, than  v/e  fhould  be,  when  we  fee  an  army  upon  our  fron- 
tiers, commanded  by  a  principal  perfon  of  the  ftate,  and  ready 
to  enter  our  country  ?  Might  it  not  more  eafily  happen,  that  one, 
or  a  few  perfons,  fliould  allume  the  character  of  herald,  than  that 
a  fingle  man  fhould,  of  his  own  authority,  raife  an  army,  and  march 
at  the  head  of  it  to  the  frontiers,  without  the  fovereign's  know- 
Jedge  ? 

XXIV.  The  truth  is,  the  principal  end  of  a  declaration  of  w;r, 
oratleaft  what  has  occafioned  its  inffitution,  is  toletall  the  world 
know  that  there  y-'as  juft  reafon  to  take  up  arms,  and  to  fignify  to 
the  enemy  himfelf,  that  it  had  been,  and  ftil!  v/as,  in  his  power  to 
avoid  it.     The  declarations  of  war,  and  the  manifcftos  publifhei 

bv 


364  72^  Principles   of 

by  princes,  are  marks  of  the  due  refpeft  they  have  fur  each  other, 
and  for  fociety  in  general,  to  uhom  by  fuch  ineans  they  give  au 
account  of  their  conducSV,  in  order  to  obtain  the  public  approbation. 
This  appears  particularly  by  the  manner  in  which  the  Romans 
made  Liiofe  denunciations.  The  peribn  fent  for  this  purpole  took' 
the  gods  to  witnefs,  that  the  nation,  againft  whom  they  had  dijclared 
war,  had  a£led  unjudly,  by  refufmg  to  comply  with  what  law  and 
jultice  required. 

XXV.  Lnfily,  it  is  to  be  oblerved,  that  we  ought  not  to  con- 
found the  declaration  with  the  publication  of  war.  This  lalt  is 
made  in  favour  oi  the  fubje£ts  ot  the  prince  who  declares  the  war, 
and  to  inform  them,  that  they  are  henceforth  to  look  upon  fuch  a 
I  ation  as  their  enemies,  and  to  take  their  meafures  accordingly. 


I 


CHAP.     V. 

Gcaeral  rules  to  know  ivhat  is  aUowahk  //;  ivcr. 

T  is  not  enough  that  a  war  be  undertaken  with  juftice,  or 


erto  mentioned  ;  but  we  ought  alfo,  in  the  profecuiicn  of  it,  to  be 
directed  by  the  principles  cf  jufticc  and  humanity,  and  not  to  carry 
the  liberties  of  hoilility  beyond  thole  bounds. 

II.  Grotius,  in  treating  this  fubjccî,  eflablifhes  three  general 
rules,  as  fo  many  principles,  which  I'erve  to  explain  the  extent  of 
the  rig'its  of  war. 

III.  Thçf.-rjl  is,  that  every  thing  which  has  a  connexion  morally 
neceflary  with  the  end  of  the  war,  is  permitted,  and  no  more. 
For  it  Vv'ould  be  to  no  purpofe  to  have  a  right  to  do  a  thing,  if  wc 
could  not  make  ufe  of  the  necefTary  means  to  bring  it  about.  But, 
at  the  fime  time,  it  would  not  be  juft,  that,  under  a  pretence  of 
defending  our  right,  we  fliould  think  every  thing  lawful,  and 
proceed,  without  any  manner  of  neceffity,  to  the  lad' extremity. 

ÏV.  The  pconci  rule.  The  right  we  have  again  ft  an  enemy, 
and  which  we  porfuc  by  arm?,  ought  not  to  be  confidered  only 

with 


Po  L  I  T  1  C      L  A  W.  3^3 

with  refpea  to  the  caufe  which  gave  rife  to  the  war  ;  but  alfo 
with  refpea  to  the  frelh  caufes  which  happen  afterwards,  during 
the  profecution  of  hoftihties  :  juft  as  in  courts  of  law,  one  of  the 
parties  often  acquires  feme  new  right  before  the  end  of  the  fuit. 
This  is  the  foundation  of  the  right  we  have  to  aft  againfl  thofc 
who  join  our  enemy,  during  the  courfs  of  the  war,  whether  they 
be  his  dependants  or  not. 

V.  The  third  rule,  in  fine,  is,  that  there  are  a  great  many  thing?, 
which,  though  otherwife  unlawful,  are  yet  permitted  in  war, 
becauie  they  are  inevitable  confequences  of  it,  and  happen  coiv- 
trary  to  our  intention,  otherwife  there  would  never  be  any 
way  of  making  war  without  injuflice  ;  and  the  moft  innocent 
anions  would  be  looked  upon  as  crinninal,  fince  there  are  but  few, 
from  which  fome  evil  may  not  accidentally  arife,  contrary  to  the 
intention  of  the  agent. 

VI.  Thus  for  example,  in  recovering  our  ov/n,  if  jufl:  fo  much 
as  is  precifçjly  our  due  cannot  be  had,  we  have  a  right  to  take 
more,  but  under  the  obligation  of  returning  the  value  of  the  over- 
plus. Hence  we  may  attack,  a  fhip  full  of  pirates,  though  there 
may  be  women,  or  children,  or  other  innocent  perfons  on  board, 
who  muft  needs  be  expofed  to  the  danger  of  being  involved  in  the 
ruin  of  thofe  whom  we  may  juftly  deftroy. 

VII.  This  is  the  extent  of  the  right  we  haveagainft  an  enemy, 
in  confequence  of  a  ftate  of  war.  By  a  ftate  of  war,  that  of  fociety 
is  abolifhed  ;  fo  that  whoever  declares  himfelf  my  enemy,  gives 
me  liberty  to  ufe  violence  againft  him  in  infinitum-,  or  fo  far  as  I 
plcafe  ;  and  that  not  only  till  I  have  repulfed  the  danger  that  threat- 
eried  me,  or  till  I  have  recovered,  or  forced  from  him,  what  he 
either  unjuftly  deprived  me  of,  or  refufed  to  pay  me,  but  till  I  have 
further  obliged  him  to  give  me  good  fccurity  for  the  future.  It 
is  not  therefore  always  unjuft  to  return  a  greater  evil  for  a  lefs. 

VIII.  But  it  is  alfo  to  be  obferved,  that  though  thefe  maxima 
are  true,  according  to  the  flriil  right  of  war,  yet  the  law  of  human- 
ity fixes  bounds  to  this  right.  That  law  direéts  us  to  confider, 
not  only  whether  fuch  or  fuch  afts  of  hoftility  may,  without  injury,. 
be  committed  againft  an  enemy  :  but  alfo,  whether  they  are  worthy 
f-f  a  humane  or  generous  conqueror.  Thus,  fo  far  as  our  own 
defence  and  future  fecurity  will  permit,  we  muft  moderate  the 
evils  we  infîia  upon  an  enemy,  bv  the  princioles  of  humanity. 

IX.  As 


.-^ 


66  7ie  Principles  of 


IX.  As  to  the  manner  of  a(!^ing  lawfully  againft  an  enemy,  it 
is  evident  that  violence  and  terror  are  the  proper  charatSleriftics  of 
war,  and  the,  method  moft  commonly  uf*id.  Yet  it  is  alfo  lawiul 
to  einploy  (Iratagem  and  artifice,  provided  it  be  witliout  treachery, 
or  breach  of  promife.  Thus  we  may  dteceive  an  enemy  by  falfc 
news,  and  fiditious  relations,  but  we  ought  never  to  violate  our 
compacts  or  engagements  with  him,  as  we  fhall  fliew  more  par- 
ticularly hereafter. 

X.  By  this  we  may  judge  of  the  right  of  ftratagems  ;  neither  is 
it  to  be  doubted  but  we  qiay  innocently  ufe  fraud  and  artifice, 
wherever  it  is  lawful  to  have  recourfe  to  violence  and  force.  The 
former  means  have  even  the  advantage  over  the  latter,  in  thi?,  that 
they  are  attended  v/ith  lefs  mifchief,  and  preferve  the  lives  of  a 
great  many  innocent  people. 

XI.  It  is  true,  feme  nations  have  rejected  the  ufe  of  flrafngem 
and  deceit  in  war  ;  this,  however,  was  not  becaufe  they  thcught 
them  unjuft,  but  from  a  certain  magnanimity,  a;id  often  from  a 
confidence  in  their  own  ftrength.  TheRom:in?,  till  very  near  the 
end  of  the  fécond  Punk  wary  thought  it  a  point  of  honour  to  ufe 
no  ftratagem  againft  their  enemies. 

XII.  Thefe  are  'he  principles  by  which  we  may  judge  to  what 
degree  the  laws  of  h  ftility  may  be  carried.  To  which  let  us  add, 
that  moft  nations  have  fixed  no  bounds  to  the  rights  v\hich  the 
law  of  nature  gives  us  to  aît  againft  an  enemy  :  and  the  truth  is,  it 
is  very  difficult  to  determine,  prccifely,  how  far  it  is  proper  to 
extend  a£ls  of  hoftility  even  in  the  inoft  legitimate  wars,  in  defence 
of  our  perfons,  or  for  the  reparation  of  damages,  or  for  obtaining 
caution  for  the  future  ;  efpecially  as  thofe,  who  engage  in  war, 
give  each  other,  by  a  kind  of  tacit  agreement,  an  intire  liberty  to 
moderate  or  augment  the  violence  of  arms,  and  to  excrcife  all  a£ts 
of  hoftility,  as  each  ihall  think  proper. 

XIII.  And  here  it  is  to  be  obferved,  that  though  generals  ufually 
punifh  their  foldiers,  v/ho  have  carried  ads  of  hoftility  beyond  the 
orders  prefcribed  ;  yet  this  is  notbecaufe  they  fuppofe  the  enemy  is 
injured,  but  becaule  it  is  neceflary  the  general's  orders  fhould  be 
obeyed,  and  that  military  difcipline  fhould  be  ftrit^ly  obferved. 

XIV.  It  is  alloj  in  confeqtience  of  thefe  principles,  that  thofc 

\\ho, 


Politic    Law.  367 

who,  in  a  juft  and  folerr.n  war,  have  puflied  (laughter  and  plunder 
beyond  what  the  law  of  Dature  permits,  arc  not  generally  looked 
upon  as  murderers  or  robbers,  nor  punilhed  as  fuch.  The  cudom 
of  nations  is  to  leave  this  point  to  the  confcience  of  the  perfbns 
engaged  in  war,  rather  than  involve  themP-^lves  in  troublefomc 
broils,  by  taking  upon  them  to  condemn  either  party. 

XV.  It  may  be  even  faid,  that  this  cuflotn  of  nations  is  found- 
ed on  the  principles  of  the  law  of  nature-  Let  us  fuppofe,  that  in 
the  independanceof  the  (late  of  nature,  thirty  heads  of  families,  in- 
habitants of  the  fame  country,  fhould  have  entered  into  a  league 
to  attack  or  rcpulfe  a  body,  compofed  of  other  heads  of  families  ;  I 
fay,  that  neither  during  that  war,  nor  after  it  is  finifhed,  thofe  of 
the  Time  country,  or  elfewhere,  who  had  not  joined  the  league  of 
either  fide,  ought,  or  could  punilh,  as  murderersor  robbers,  any  of 
the  two  parlies  who  fhould  happen  to  fall  into  their  hands. 

XVI.  They  could  not  do  it  during  the  war  ;  for  that  would  be 
efpoufing  the  quarrel  of  one  of  the  parties  j  and  fince  they  con- 
tinued neuter  in  the  beginning,  they  had  clearly  renounced  the 
right  of  interfering  with  what  fhould  pafs  in  the  war  :  much  lefs 
coulJ  they  intermeddle  after  the  war  is  over  ;  becaufe,  as  it  could 
not  be  ended  without  feme  accommodation  or  treaty  of  peace,  the 
parties  concerned  were  reciprocally  difcharged  from  all  the  evils 
they  had  done  to  each  other. 

XVII.  The  good  of  foci ety  alfo  requires  that  we  fhould  follow 
thefc  maxims.  For  if  ihofe,  who  continued  neuter,  had  (till  been 
authorized  to  take  cognizance  of  the  atfls  ofhoflility,  exercifed  in 
a  foreign  war,  and  confequently  topunifli  fuch  as  they  believed  to 
have  committed  any  injuftice,  and  to  take  up  arms  on  that  account  ; 
inftead  of  one  war,  feveral  might  have  arifen,  and  proved  a  fourcc 
of  broils  and  troubles.  The  more  wars  became  frequent,  the 
more  necefTiry  it  was,  for  the  tranquillity  of  mankind,  not  to  efpoufe 
rafhly  other  people's  quarrels.  The  eftablifhment  of  civil  focieties 
only  rendered  the  pradîice  of  thofe  rules  more  necefTary  ;  becaufe 
a£ls  of  hoftility  then  became,  if  not  more  frequent,  at  lead  more 
extenfive,  and  attended  with  a  greater  number  of  evils. 

XVIII.  Laflly,  it  is  to  be  obferved,  that  all  acSts  of  hoflility, 
which  can  be  lawfully  committed  againft  an  enemy,  may  be  exer- 
cifed  either  in  his  territories,  or  ours,  in  places  fubjeil  to  no  jurif- 


di<îlion,  or  at  fea. 


XIX.  This 


368  I'he  Principles   of 

XIX.  This  does  nor  hold  good  in  a  neutral  country  ;  that  is  xq 
fay,  whofe  fovereign  has  taken  no  fliare  in  the  war.  In  fuch 
countries,  we  cannot  lawfully  exercife  any  aéts  of  hoftility  ;  neither 
on  the  perfons  of  the  enemy,  nor  on  their  eftcdls  j  not  in  virtue  of 
any  right  of  the  enemy  themfelvcs,  but  from  a  jult  rcfpe^l  to  the 
fovereign,  Vv'hohaving  taken  neither  fide,  lays  us  under  a  ncceflity  of 
refpedling  his  jurifdidlion,  and  of  forbearing  to  commit  any  a<Sts  of 
violence  in  his  territories.  To  this  we  may  add,  that  the  fove- 
reign, by  continuing  neuterj  has  tacitly  engaged  not  to  fuffer  either 
party  to  commit  any  hoftilities  within  his  dominions. 


CHAP.    VI. 


Of  the  rights  which  war  gives  over  the  perfons  of  the  enemy,  and 
of  their  extent  and  bounds, 

Y  y  E  fhall  now  enter  into  iheparticulars  of  the  different 
rights  which  war  gives  over  the  enemy's  perfonand  goods  ;  and  to 
begin  with  the  former. 

i^.  It  is  certain  that  wc  may  lawfully  kill  an  enemy;  I  fay 
lawfully,  not  only  according  to  the  terms  of  external  juftice,  which 
pafTes  for  fuch  among  all  nation?,  but  alfo  according  to  internal 
juftice,  and  the  laws  of  confcience.  Indeed  the  end  of  war  necef- 
farily  requires  that  we  Ihould  have  this  power,  otherwife  it  would 
be  in  vain  to  take  up  arms,  and  the  lav/  of  nature  would  permit  it 
to  no  purpofe. 

II.  If  we  confulted  only  the  culbm  of  countries,  and  what 
Grotius  calls  the  law  of  nations^  this  liberty  of  killing  an  enemy 
would  exterid  very  far  ;  we  might  fay  that  it  had  no  bounds,  and 
might  even  be  exercifed  on  innocent  perfons.  However,  though 
it  be  certain  that  war  is  attended  with  namberlefs  evils,  which  in 
themfelves  are  adîs  of  injuftice,  and  real  cruelty,  but,  under  partic- 
ular circumflances,  ought  rather  to  be  confidercd  as  unavoidable 
misfortunes  ;  it  is  neverthelefs  true,  that  the  right  which  war  gives 
over  theperfon  and  life  of  an  enemy  has  its  bounds,  and  that  there 
are  mealures  to  be  obferved,  which  cannot  be  innocently  neglcâcd. 

III.  In  general,  we  ought  always  to  be  diretSled  by  the  principles 
cftablifhed  in  the  preceding  chapter,  in  judging  of  the  degrees  to 

which 


Politic  Law.  369 

which  the  liberties  of  war  may  be  carried.  The  power  we  have 
of  taking  away  ihe  life  of  an  enemy,  is  not  therefore  unlimited  ; 
for  if  we  can  attain  the  legitimate  end  of  war,  that  is,  if  we  can 
defend  our  lives  and  properties,  aifert  our  rights,  and  recover  fatis- 
fadlion  for  damages  fuftained,  and  good  fureties  for  the  future, 
without  taking  away  the  life  of  the  enemy,  it  is  certain  that  Judice 
and  h'umanity  direds  us  to  forbear  it,  and  not  to  fhed  human  blood 
uanecefiarily. 

IV.  It  is  true,  in  the  application  of  thefe  rules  to  parrfciilar 
cafes,  it  is  fometimes  very  difficult,  not  to  fay  impoflîble,  to  B^ 
precifcly  their  proper  extent  and  bounds  ;  but  it  is  certain,  at 
leafi,  that  we  ought  to  come  as  near  to  them  as  poflible,  without 
prejudicing  our  real  interefts.  Let  us  apply  thefe  principles  to' 
particular  cafes, 

V.  I**.  It  is  often  difputed,  whether  the  right  of  tilling  an 
enemy  regards  only  thofe  whoare  adlually  in  arms  ;  or  whether  it 
extends  indifferently  to  all  thofe  in  the  enemy's  country,  fubjefls 
or  foreigners  ?  My  anfvver  is,  that  with  refpe(9t  to  thofe  who  arc 
fubjedls,  the  point  is  i neon teff able.  Thefe  are  the  principal  ene- 
mies, and  we  may  exercife  all  a6^s  of  h'oftility  againft  them,  by 
virtue  of  the  itate  of  war. 

VI.  As  to  ftrangers,  thofe  who  fettle  in  the  enemy's  couTitry 
after  a  war  is  begun,  of  which  they  had  previous  notice,  may  juftly 
be  looked  upon  as  enemieis,  and  treated  as  fuch.  But  in  regard 
to  fuch  as  went  thither  before  the  war,  juftice  and  humanity 
I'equire  that  we  fh'ould  give  them  a  reafonable  tinTc  to  retire  ;  and 
if  they  negledl  that  opportunity,  they  are  accounted  enemies. 

VII.  2^.  With  regard  to  old  men,  women  and  children,  it  is 
certain  that  the  right  of  war  does  not,  of  itfelf,  require  that  we 
ihould  pu(h  hoftilities  fo  far  as  to  kill  them  ;  it  is  therefore  a  bar- 
barous cruelty  to  do  fo.  I  fay,  that  the  end  of  war  does  not  require 
this  of  itfelf  i  but  if  women,  for  inftance,  exercife  ads  ofhoftility; 
if,  forgetting  the  weaknefs  of  their  [cxj  they  ufurp  the  offices  of 
men,  and  take  up  atms  againft  us,  then  we  are  certainly  excufed 
in  availing  ourfelves  of  the  rights  of  war  againft  them.  It  may 
alfo  befaid,  that  when  the  heat  of  adFion  hurries  the  foldiers,  as  it 
were  in  fpiteoflhemfelvesand  againit  the  order  of  their  fupcriors, 
to  commit  thofe  ads  of  inhumanity  ;  for  example,  at  the  fiegeof 
a  town,  which,  by  aa  obftinate  refiftance,  has  irritated  tlis  ti'oops  ; 

y  y  we 


370  "ïhe  Principles  of 

we  ought  to  look  upon  thr)fe  evils  rather  as  misfortunes,  and  the 
unavoitlablc  cotifequencfs  uf  war,  than  as  crimes  that  deferve  to 
be  puniihcd. 

VIII.  3°.  We  muft  reafon  almcfî  in  the  fame  manner,  with 
refpe£l  touriibners  of  war.  We  cannot,  generally  fpeaking,  put 
ihem  to  death,  withoirt  being  guilty  of  cruelty.  1  fay  generally 
ipeaking  ;  for  there  may  be  cafes  of  neceffity  fo  preffing,  that  the 
care  of  our  own  prefervation  obliges  us  to  proceed  to  extremities, 
which  in  any  other  circumttances  would  be  abfolutcly  criminal. 

ÏX.  In  general,  even  the  laws  of  war  require  that  we  fhould 
ablbin  from  flaughter  as  much  as  pciïîble,  and  not  fhed  hunian 
blood  without  neceffity.  We  ought  not,  therefore,  dire<^ly  and 
deliberately  to  kill  prifoners  of  war,  nor  thofe  who  afk  quarter,  or 
furrender  thenifelves,  much  lefs  old  men,  women  and  children;  in 
gener.^1,  we  (hould  fpare  all  thofe  whofeage  and  profeflion  render 
them  uniit  to  carry  arms,  and  who  have  no  other  fhare  in  the  war, 
than  their  being  in  the  enemy's  country.  It  is  eafy  alfo  to  con- 
ceive, that  the  rights  of  v/ar  do  not  extend  fo  far,  as  to  authorize 
the  outrages  committed  upon  the  honour  and  chadity  of  women  ; 
for  this  contributes  nothing  either  to  our  defence  or  fafety,  or  to 
the  fupport  of  our  rights,  but  only  ferves  to  fatisfy  the  brutality  of 
the  foldiers.  * 

X.  Again,  a  queftion  is  here  flartcd,  v.'hether  in  cafep,  where  it 
is  lawful  to  kill  the  enemy,  we  may  not,  far  that  purpofe,  ufe  all 
kinds  of  means  indifferently  i  I  anfwer,  that  to  confider  the  tiling 
in  itfelf,  and  in  an  abftraift  manner,  it  is  no  matter  which  way  we 
kill  an  enemy,  whether  by  openforce^or  by  traud  and  flratagem  ; 
by  the  fword,  or  by  poifon. 

XI.  It  is  however  certain  that,  according  to  the  idea  and  cufîom 
of  civilized  nations,  it  is  looked  upon  as  a  bafe  a6t  of  cowardice, 
not  only  to  caufe  any  poifonous  draught  to  be  given  to  the  enemy, 
but  alfo  to  poifon  wells,  fountains,  fprings,  rivers,  arrows,  darts, 
bullets,  or  ether  weapons  ufed  againfl  him.  Now  it  is  fufficient, 
that  this  cultom  of  looking  on  the  ufe  of  poifon  as  criminal,  is  re- 
ceived among  the  nations  at  variance  with  us,  tofuppofe  we  comply 
with  it,  when,  in  the  beginning  of  the  war,  we  do  not  declare  that 
wc  are  at  liberty  to  a6l  otherwife,  and  leave  it  to  our  enemy's 
option  to  di)  the  fame. 

XII.  We 

■■'■■■  I  I         «H       > H  J     >      I    I   ■'  ■  ■ 

*  Groliuî,  lib.  iii.  cap.  iv.  §  19. 


P  o  L  I  T  I  e    L  A  w.  371 

XII.  We  may  fo  much  die  more  fuppofc  this  tacit  agreement, 
as  humanity,  and  ihe  intereft  of  both  parties  equally  require  it  ; 
efpecially  fince  wjrs  arc  become  fo  frequent,  and  are  often  under- 
taken on  fiich  flight  occafions  ;  and  fince  the  human  mind,  inge- 
nious in  inventing  the  means  to  hurt,  has  fo  greatly  multiplied 
thofe  which  are  authorized  by  cuftom,  and  looked  upon  as  honeft. 
Befides,  it  is  beyond  all  doubt,  that  when  we  can  obtain  the  fame 
.end  by  milder  and  more  humane  meafures,  which  prtferve  the  lives 
of  many,  and  particularly  of  thofe  in  \vhofe  prtfervation  human 
fociety  is  interelled,  humanity  diredls  that  wc  fnouldtake  thisccurfe. 

XIII.  Thefe  are  therefore  jufi  precaution?,  which  men  ought 
to  follow  for  their  own  advantage.  It  is  for  the  common  benefit 
of  mankind,  that  dangers  (hould  not  be  augmented  without  end. 
]n  particular,  the  public  is  intcrcfled  in  the  prefervation  of  the 
Jives  of  kings,  generals  of  armieç,  and  other  pcrfons  of  the  firft 
rank,  on  whofe  fafety  that  of  focicties  generally  depends.  For  if 
the  lives  of  ihefe  perfonsare  in  greater  fafety  than  thofe  of  others,  ' 
when  attacked  only  by  arms  ;  they  are,  on  the  other  hand,  more 
in  danger  ofpoifon,  &c.  and  they  would  be  everyday  expofed  to 
perifh  in  this  manner,  if  they  were  not  prote£lcd  by  a  regard  to 
fomc  fort  of  law,  or  eftabliOied  cuftom. 

Xiy.  Let  us  add,  in  fine,  that  all  nations  that  ever  pretended 
tojufticeand  generofity,  have  followed  thefe  maxims.  The  Ro- 
man confuls,  in  a  letter  they  wrote  to  Pyrrlius,  informing  him  that 
one  of  his  people  had  offered  to  poifon  him,  »âid,  that  it  was  the 
intereft  of  all  nations  not  to  fet  fuch  examples. 

XV.  It  is  likewife  difputed,  whether  we  may  lawfully  fend  2 
perfon  to  afTafîînate  an  enemy  ?  1  anfwer,  1°.  that  he  who  for  this 
purpofe  employs  only  fome  of  his  own  people,  may  do  it  juftly. 
When  it  is  lawful  to  kill  an  eiiemy,  it  is  no  matter  whether  thofe 
employed  are  manyor  fewin  number.  Six  hundred  Lacedaemo- 
nians, with  Leonidas,  entered  the  enemy's  camp,  and  went  dire<5lly 
to  the  Perfian  king  (Xerxes's)  pavilion;  and  a  fmaller  number 
might  certainly  have  done  the  fame.  The  famous  attempt  of 
Mucius  Scevola  is  commended  by  all  antiquity  ;  and  Porfenna 
himfelf,  whofe  life  was  aimed  at,  acknowledged  this  to  be  an  a6t 
of  great  valour. 

XVI.  But  it  is  not  fo  cafy  to  determine  whether  we  may  for 
this  purpofe  employ  afTaffins,  who  by  undertaking  this  tafk  muft 

be 


372'  I'he   Principles  of 

be  guilty  of  falfliood  and  treafon  ;  fuch  as  fubje£\s  with  regard  to 
their  fovereign,  and  foldiers  to  their  genera).  In  this  refpe6l  there 
are,  in  my  opinion,  two  points  to  be  diftinguifhed.  Firft,  whether 
we  do  any  wrong,  even  to  the  entiny  himfLlI,  agairl^  whom  we 
employ  traitors  ;  and  fecondly,  whether  fuppofmg  we  do  him  no 
wrong,  we  commit  neverthelefs  a  bad  a£lion. 

XVII.  3°.  With  regard  to  the  firft  queftion,  to  confider  the 
thing  in  itfell,  and  according  to  the  rigorous  law  of  war,  it  feems, 
that,  admitting  the  wartobejufl,  no  wrong  is  done  to  the  enemy, 
whether  we  take  advantage  of  the  opportunity  of  a  traitor,  who 
freely  offers  himfelfjor  whether  we  feek  for  it,  and  bring  it  about 
ourfelves, 

XVIII.  The  ftate  of  war,  into  which  die  enemy  has  put  him- 
felt",  and  which  it  was  in  his  own  power  to  prevent,  permits  of 
itfelf  eve  method  that  can  be  ufed  againft  him  ;  fo  that  he  has  no 
reafon  to  complain,  whatever  we  do.  Befides,  we  are  no  more 
obliged,  f}ri6lly  fpeaking,  to  refpe<Sl:  the  right  he  has  over  his  fub- 
je(5ts,  and  the  fidelity  they  owe  him  as  fuch,  than  their  live?  and 
ibrtunes,  of  which  we  may  certainly  deprive  them  by  the  right 
of  war. 

XIX.  4°.  And  yet  I  believe  that  this  is  not  fufficient  to  render 
an  afTafTmation,  under  fuch  circumflances,  intirely  innocent.  A 
fovereign  who  has  the  lead  tendernefs  of  confcience,  and  js  con- 
vinced of  the  juftice  of  his  caufe,  will  not  endeavour  to  find  otit 
perfidious  methods  to  fubdue  his  enemy,  nor  be  fo  ready  to  embrace 
thnfe  which  may  prefcnt  themfelves  to  him.  Thejull  confidence 
he  has  in  the  protedlion  of  heaven,  the  horror  he  C(>nceives  at  the 
traitor's  perfidy,  the  dread  of  becoming  his  accomplice,  and  of  ftt- 
ting  an  example,  which  may  fall  again  on  himfelf  and  others,  wijl 
make  him  defpifc  and  reje£l  all  the  advantage  he  might  propofe  to 
himfelf  from  fuch  means. 

XX.  5°.  Let  usalfo  add,  tfiat  fuch  means  cannot  always  be 
looked  upon  as  intirely  innocent,  even  with  refpeé^  to  the  perfon 
who  employs  the  afiafTin.  The  ftate  of  hoftility,  which  fuperfedes 
the  intercoiirfe  of  good  offices,  and  authorizes  to  hurt,  does  not 
therefore  diflolve  all  ties  of  humanity,  nor  remove  our  obligation 
to  avoid  as  much  as  pofijble,  the  giving  room  for  fome  bad  actions 
cfthe  enemy,  or  his  people  ;  efpecially  thcfe,  who  of  themfelves 
bave  had  no  part  in  the  occafion  of  the  war.  Now  every  traitor 
"certainly  commits  an  adlion  equally  fhameful  and  criminal. 

XXI.  6^. 


Politic    Law.  373 

XXI.  6".  Wc  muft  therefore  conclude  with  GrotHis,  that  we 
can  never  in  conicience  feduce,  or  (olicit  the  lubjedb  of  an  enemy 
to  connmit  treafon,  becaufe  that  is  pofitively  and  direélly  inducing 
them  to  perpetrate  a  heinous  crime,  which  otherwifs  would,  in  all 
probability,  have  been  very  remote  from  their  thoughts. 

XXII.  7°.  It  is  quite  another  thing,  when  we  only  take  ad- 
vantat,e  of  the  occafion  and  the  difpolitions  we  find  in  a  perfon, 
who  has  had  no  need  to  be  folicited  to  commit  treafon.  Here,  I 
think,  the  infamy  of  the  perfidy  does  not  fall  on  him  who  finds  it 
intirely  formed  in  the  heart  of  the  traitor  ;  efpecially  if  we 
confider,  that,  in  this  cafe  between  enemies,  the  thing,  with 
refped  to  which  we  take  advantage  of  the  bad  difpofition  of  ano- 
ther, is  of  fuch  a  nature,  that  we  may  innocently  and  lawfully  do  it 
ourfelves. 

XXIII.  8°.  Be  that  as  it  may,  for  the  reafons  above  alledged, 
we  ought  not  to  take  advantage  of  a  treafon  which  ofFered  itfelf, 
except  in  an  extraordinary  cafe,  and  from  a  kind  of  necefilty.  And 
though  the  culfom  of  feveral  nations  has  nothing  obligatory  in 
itfelf,  yet  as  the  people,  with  whom  we  are  at  variance,  look  upon 
the  very  acceptance  of  a  certain  kind  of  perfidy  to  be  unlawful,  as 
that  of  aflifïinating  one's  prince  or  general,  we  arc  reafonabiy 
fuppofed  to  comply  with  it  by  a  tacit  confent. 

XXIV.  9°.  Let  us  obferve,  however,  that  the  law  of  nations 
allows  fome  difference  between  a  fair  and  legitimate  enemy,  and 
rebels,  pirates,  or  highwaymen.  The  moft  religious  princes  make 
no  difficulty  to  propofe  even  rewards  to  thofe  who  will  betray  fuch- 
pcrfons  ;  and  the  public  odium  of  all,  which  men  of  this  (lamp  lie 
under,  is  the  caufe  that  nobody  thinks  the  meafure  hard,  or  blames 
the  conduit  of  the  prince  in  ufing  every  method  to  deftroy  them. 

XXV.  Laftly,  it   is  permitted  to  kill  an  enemy  wherever  we 
find  him,  except  in  a  neutral  country  ;    for  violent  means  arc  not 
fufFored   in  a  civilized  fociety,    where  we  ought  to  implore  the 
affilfance  of  the  magifirate.     In  the  time  of  the  fécond  Punic  war^*  ' 
(even  Carthaginian  galleys  rode  in  a  harbour  belonging  to  Svphax, 

who  was  then  in  peace  both  with  the  Romans  and  Carthaginians, 
and  Scipio  came  that  v/ay  with  two  galleys  only.  The  Cartha- 
ginians immediately  prepared  to  attack  the^Roman  galleys,  which 

they 

-•^•-     -■-■ J 

'  Livy,  lib.  xxviii.  cap.  xviî.  numb.  12,  &  fcq. 


374  ^^   Principles  oJ 

they  might  eafily  have  taken  before  they  had  entered  the  port  ; 
but  being  forced  by  a  ftrong  wind  into  the  harbour,  before  the 
Carthaginians  had  time  to  weigh  anchor,  they  durft  not  attack 
them,  becaufe  it  was  in  a  neutral  prince's  haven.  • 

XXVI.  Here  it  may  be  proper  to  fay  fomcthing  concerning 
prifoners  of  war.  In  former  times,  it  was  a  cuflom  almoft  uni- 
vcrfally  eftablilhcd,  that  thofe  who  were  made  prifoners  in  a  juft 
andfolcmn  war,  whether  they  had  furrendcred  themfelves,  or  been 
taken  by  main  force,  became  flaves,  the  moment  they  were  con- 
ducted into  feme  place  dependent  on  the  conqueror.  And  this 
right  was  exercifed  on  all  perfons  whatfoever,  even  on  thofe 
who  happened  unfortunately  to  be  in  the  enemy's  country,  at  the 
time  the  war  fuddenly  broke  out. 

XXVII.  Further,  not  only  the  prifoners  themfelves,  but  their 
poRerity,  were  reduced  to  the  fame  condition  ;  that  is  to  fay,  thofe 
born  of  a  woman  after  (he  bad  been  made  a  {lave. 

XXVIII.  The  efFe6ls  of  fuch  a  flavery  had  no  bounds  ;  every 
ihing  was  permitted  to  a  mafter  with  rcfpeél  to  his  Have,  he  had 
the  power  of  life  and  death  over  him,  and  all  that  the  flave  polTef- 
fed,  or  could  afterwards  acquire,  belonged  of  right  to  the  mafter. 

XXIX.  There  is  fonie  probability,  that  the  reafon  and  end  for 
which  nations  hai  eftabliihed  this  cuftom  of  making  Haves  in 
war,  was  principally  to  induce  the  captors  to  abftain  from  (laugh- 
ter, from  a  view  of  the  advantages  they  reaped  from  their  flaves. 
Thus  hiftorians  obferve,  that  civil  wars  were  more  cruel  than 
others,  the  general  pra6lice  in  that  cafe  being  to  put  the  prifoners 
to  the  fword,  becaufe  they  could  not  make  flaves  of  them. 

XXX.  But  Chriftian  nations  have  generally  agreed  among 
themfelves,  to  abolifli  the  cullom  of  making  their  prifoners  yield 
perpetual  fervice  to  the  conqueror.  At  prefentit  is  thought  fuf- 
iicient  to  keep  thofe  that  are  taken  in  war,  till  their  ranforn  is 
paid,  the  eftitnation  of  which  depends  on  the  will  of  the  conquer- 
or, unlefs  there  be  a  cartel,  or  agreement,  by  which  it  is  fixed. 


CHAP. 


Politic    Law*  375 

CHAP.    VII. 

Of  the  rights  of  war  over  the  goods  of  an  enemy, 

^-  A 

^~\_S  to  the  goods  of  an  enemy,  it  is  certain  that  the  ftate  of  v/ar 
permits  us  to  carry  them  off,  to  ravage,  to  fpoil,  or  even  intirely 
to  deftroy  them  ;  for,  as  Cicero  very  well  obferves,  *  It  is  not  con- 
trary  to  the  law  of  nature.,  to  plunder  a  perfon  whom  zue  may  law^ 
fully  kill  :  and  all  thofe  mifchiefs,  which  the  law  of  nations  allows 
us  to  do  to  the  enemy,  by  ravaging  and  waiting  his  lands  and 
goods,  are  called  fpoil  or  plunder. 

II.  This  right  of  fpoil,  or  plunder,  extends  in  general  to  all 
things  belonging  to  the  enemy  ;  and  the  law  of  nations,  properly 
fo  called,  does  not  exempt  even  (acred  things  ;  that  is,  things  con- 
fecrated  either  to  the  true  God,  or  to  falle  deities,  and  defigned  for 
the  ufe  of  religion. 

III.  Itis  true,  the  praflices  and  cu  Horns  of  nations  do  not  agree 
in  this  refpeiSl  ;  fome  having  permitted  theplunder  of  things  facred 
and  religious,  and  others  having  looked  upon  it  as  a  profa- 
nation. But  whatever  the  cuftoms  of  different  people  vûzy  bcj 
they  can  never  conftitute  the  primitive  rule  of  right.  In  order, 
therefore,  to  be  affured  of  the  right  of  war  in  regard  to  this  article, 
we  muff  have  recourfe  to  the  law  of  nature  and  nations. 

IV.  I  obferve  then,  that  things  facred  are  not  in  themfelves 
different  from  thofe  we  call  profane.  The  former  differ  from  the 
latter,  only  by  the  religious  ufe  to  which  they  were  intended.  But 
this  application  or  ufe  does  not  inveft  the  things  with  the  quality 
of  holy  and  facred,  as  an  intrinfic  and  indelible  charaéter. 

V.  The  things  thus  confecrated  ftill  belong  either  to  the  ftate, 
or  to  the  fovereign  ;  and  there  is  no  reafon  why  the  prince,  who 
has  devoted  them  to  religious  purpofes,  may  not  afterwards  apply 
them  to  the  ufes  of  life  i  for  they,  as  well  as  all  other  public  mat- 
ters, are  at  his  difpofal. 

VI.  It  is  therefore  a  grofs  fuperftition  to  believe,  that  by  the 
confecration,  or  deftination  of  thofe  things  to  the  fervice  of  God, 

they 

•  Cic.  de  Off.  lib.  iii.  cap.  vi. 


76  T'he  P  R I  N  c  I  ?  L  E  s   ç^ 

they  change  mafter,  and  belong  no  more  to  men,  but  are  intirely 
withdrawn  trom  human  commerce,  and  the  property  of  them  is 
transferred  to  God.  This  is  a  dangerous  fupcrftiiion,  owing  to 
ihe  ambition  of  the  clergy. 

VII.  We  mufl  therefore  confider  facred  things  as  pubHc  goodsj 
which  belong  to  the  (iate  or  lovcreign.  All  the  liberty  which  the 
right  of  war  gives  over  the  goods  belonging  to  the  (late,  it  alfo 
gives  with  refped  to  things  called  facred.  Th^y  may  therefore 
be  fpoiled  or  wafted  by  the  enemy,  at  leaft  fo  far  as  is  nectlTary  and 
conducive  to  the  defign  of  the  war  ',  a  limitation  not  at  all  peculiar 
to  the  plunder  of  facred  or  religious  things. 

VIII.  For,  in  general,  it  certainly  is  not  lawful  to  plunder  for 
plunder's  fake,  but  it  is  }uft  and  innocent  only,  when  it  bears  fome 
relation  to  the  de:fign  of  the  war  ;  that  is,  when  an  advantage  diredly 
accrues  from  it  to  ourfeives,  by  appropriating  thofe  good?,  or  at 
leail,  when  by  ravaging  and  dcitroying  them,  we  in  fome  raeafure 
weaken  the  enemy.  It  would  be  a  madnefs,  equally  brutal  and 
criminal,  to  do  evil  to  another  withotrt:  a  prafpe6l  of  procuring 
fome  good,  either  diredlly  or  indiredly,  to  ouifelves.  It  very 
fcldom  happens,  for  inrtance,  that  after  the  taking  of  towns,  tbxre 
is  any  neceffity,  for  ruining  temples»  ftatues,  or  other  public  or 
private  ftruclures  ;  we  lliould  therefore  generally  fparc  all  ihcfc,  as 
well  as  the  tombs  and  fepulchres. 

IX.  It  may  however  be  obferved,  with  refpecito  things  facred, 
that  they  who  believe  they  contain  fomething  divine,  and  inviolable, 
are  really  in  the  wrong  to  meddle  with  them  at  all  \  but  this  is  only, 
becaufe  they  would  then  ailagainft  thar  confcience.  Aiul  here, 
by  the  way,  we  may  take  notice  cf  a  reaf^n  given  to  clear  the 
Pagans  of  the  imputation  offacrilege,  even  when  they  pillaged  the 
temples  of  the  gods,  whom  they  acknowledged  as  fuch  ;  which  is, 
they  imagined  that  when  a  city  was  taken,  the  guardian  deities  of 
that  place  quitted,  at  the  fame  time,  their  temples  and  altars,  efpe- 
cially  after  thofe  deities,  with  every  thing  elfe  that  was  facred,  had 
been  invited  out  with  certain  ceremonies.  This  is  excellently 
defcribed  by  Cocceius,  in  his  diflertaiion  De  Evocatione  Sacrorum. 

X.  The  learned  Grotius  furnifhes  us  with  wife  refletSlions  on  this 
fubje£l,  to  perfuade  generals  to  behave  with  moderation  in  regard 
to  plunder,  fl-Qni  the  advantages  which  may  accriiç  ta  ihcrafelves 

from 


Politic    Law.  377 

I'roni  fiîch  a  condu£l.  And  firft  he  fay;;,  "  by  thefe  means  we 
•*■  take  from  t!ie  enet-ny  one  of  the  nioft  powerful  weapons,  defpair. 
"  BefiJes,  by  fparing  the  enemy's  country,  we  give  room  to 
"  believe  that  we  are  pretty  confident  of  victory  :  and  clemjiicy 
"  is  of  itfelf  proper  to  foftJn  and  engage  the  minds  of  men.  All 
"  which  may  be  proved  by  feveral  illuftrious  examples." 

XI.  Befidesthe  power  which  war  gives  to  fpoil  and  deftroy  the 
goods  of  an  enemy,  it  likewife  confers  a  right  of  acquiring,  appro- 
priating, and  juftly  retaining  the  goods  we  have  taken  from  him, 
till  the  fum  due  to  us  is  paid,  including  the  expences  of  the  war,  in 
which  his  refufal  of  payinent  engaged  us  ;  and  whatever  elfe  we 
think  neceflTary  tofecure  to  ourfelves,  by  way  of  caution,  from  ths 
enemy. 

XII.  By  the  law  of  nations,  not  only  he  that  makes  war  for  a 
juil  reafon,  but  alfo  every  man,  in  a  juft  war,  acquires  a  properly  in 
what  he  takes  from  the  enemy,  and  that  without  rule  or  meafure, 
at  leali  as  to  the  external  efFedls,  with  which  the  right  of  property 
is  accompanied  :  that  is  to  fay,  neutral  nations  ought  to  regard  ths 
two  parties  at  war,  as  lawful  proprietors  of  what  they  can  take 
from  each  other  by  force  of  arms  ;  the  ftate  of  neutrality  not  per- 
mitting them  to  efpoufe  either  fide,  or  to  treat  either  of  the  contend- 
ing powers  as  an  ufurp<?r,  purfuant  to  the  principles  already 
eftablilhed. 

XIII.  This  is  generally  true,  as  well  with  refpcft  to  moveables,  as 
immoveables,  fo  longastheyareinthepofTeiîîonof  him  who  has  ac- 
quired them  by  the  right  of  war.  But  if  from  the  hands  of  the  conqueror 
they  have  paffed  into  th?  power  of  a  third,  there  is  no  reafon,  if 
they  are  immoveables,  why  the  ancient  owner  fhould  not  try  to 
recover  them  from  that  third,  who  holds  them  of  the  enen;y,  by 
what  tide  foever  ;  for  he  hasas^ood  alight  againft  the  new  pof- 
feflbr,  as  againft  the  enemy  himfelf. 

.  XIV".  I  faid,  i/  they  are  immoveables  ;  for  with  refpe£t  to 
moveable  efFeéls,  as  they  may  eafilv  be  transferred  by  commerce 
into  the  hands  of  thefubje£ts  of  a  neutral  flate,  often  without  their 
knowing  that  they  were  taken  in  war  ;  the  tranquillity  of  nations, 
the  good  of  commerce,  and  even  the  ftate  of  neutrality,  require 
that  they  (hould  ever  be  reputed  lawful  prize,  and  the  property  of 
the  perfon  of  whom  we  hold  them.  Bat  the  cafe  is  otherwife  with 
refpe6t  to  immoveables,  they  are  fuch  in  their  own  nature  ;  and 
Z  z,  ihofe 


378  'The  Principles  of 

thofe  to  whom  a  ftate,  which  has  taken  them  from  an  enemy, 
would  refign  thorn,  cannoi  be  ignorant  of  the  manner  in  which 
il  pcfTelTcs  them. 

XV.  Here  a  queftion  arifes,  when  is  it  that  things  are  faid  to  be 
taken  by  the  right  of  war,  and  juftly  deemed  to  belong  to  him  who 
is  in  polTeluon  ot  them  ?  Groiius  anlwers  as  a  civilian,  that  a  man 
is  deemed  to  have  taken  moveable  things  by  the  right  ol  war,  fo 
foon  as  they  are  f'cicu red  from  the  purfuit  of  the  enemy  ;  or  when 
he  has  made  himfelf  mafter  of  them  in  fuch  a  manner,  that  the 
firft  owner  has  loft  all  probable  hopes  of  recovering  them.  Thus, 
fiys  he,  at  fea,  fliips  and  other  things  arr:  not  faid  to  be  taken,  titt 
they  are  brought  into  feme  port  or  harbour  belonging  to  us,  or  to 
iomc  part  of  the  fea  where  our  fleet  rides  ;  for  it  is  only  then  that  the 
enemy  begins  to  defpair  of  recovering  his  property. 

XV^I.  But,  in  my  opinion,  this  manner  of  anfvvering  the  quef- 
tion  is  altogether  arbitrary.  I  fee  no  reafon  why  theprizt-f,  taken 
from  the  en -my,  Ihould  not  become  our  property  fo  focn  as  they 
are  taken.  For  when  two  nations  are  at  war,  both  of  them  have 
all  the  requifites  for  the  acquifition  of  property,  ai  the  very  mo- 
ment they  take  a  prize.  They  have  an  intention  to  acquire  a 
title  of  juft  property,  namely,  the  right  of  war;  and  they  arc 
i^ually  m  poflciEon  of  the  thing.  But  if  the  principle,  which 
Grotius  fuppofes,  were  to  be  allowed,  and  the  prizes  taken  from 
the  enemy  were  not  deemed  a  lawful  acquifition,  till  they  afe 
Uanf{X)rted  to  a  place  of  fafety,  it  would  follow,  that  the  booty 
which  a  fmall  number  of  foluiers  has  taken  in  war,  may  be  retaken 
from  them  by  a  fironger  budy  of  troops  of  the  fame  party,  as  ftiîl 
belonging  to  the  enemy,  if  this  (Ironger  body  of  troops  has  attacked 
the  other  b-'fore  they  had  conveyed  their  booty  to  a  place  ot  fafety. 

XVII.  The  la' ter  circumftance  is  therefore  altogether  indif- 
ferent, with  refpedlto  the  prefent  queftion.  The  greater  or'lefier 
difficulty  the  enemy  may  find,  in  recovering  what  has  been  taken 
from  him,  does  not  hinder  the  capture  from  a£lually  belonging  to 
the  conqueror.  Every  enemy,  as  fudi,  and  fo  long  as  he  continues 
luch,  retains  the  will  to  recover  what  the  other  has  taken  from 
him  ;  and  his  jjrefent  inability  only  reduces  him  to  the  neceiîîty 
of  waiting  for  a  more  favourable  opportunity,  which  he  flill  fecks 
and  defires.  Hence,  with  refpect  to  him,  the  thing  ought  no 
more  to  be  deemed  taken,  when  in  a  place  of  fafety,  than  when 
he  is  flill  in  a  condition  of  purfuing  ic.     All  that  can  be  faid,  is, 

ihat 


.Politic    Law.  379 

that  in  the  latter  cafe,  the  pofleffion  of  the  conqueror  is  not  f) 
fecure  as  in  the  form-^r.  The  truth  ii^,  this  diftin(£lion  has  been 
invented  only  to  eftabliili  the  rules  of  the  right  of  pofUiminy,  or  the 
manner  in  which  the  fubje£ts  of  the  ftate,  from  whom  fomethinç; 
has  been  taken  in  war,  re-enter  upon  their  righh  ;  rather  than  ta 
determine  the  time  of  the  acquifition  of  things  taken  by  one  enemy 
from  another. 

XVin.  This  feems  to  be  the  determination  of  the  law  of 
nature  in  regard  to  this  point.  Grotius  obferves  alfo,  that  by  the 
cuftorjs  eitablilh  :d  in  his  tiine,  it  is  fufficient  that  the  prize  has 
been  twenty-four  hours  in  the  enemy's  pofl'eflion,  to  account  it  loft. 
Tbuanus,  in  the  year  1595,  gives  us  an  example,  that  tbiscuRom 
was  obfijrved  alfo  by  land.  The  town  of  Liere  in  Brabant  having 
been  taken  and  retaken  the  fame  day,  tbe  plunder  was  returned  to 
the  inhabitants,  becaufe  it  had  not  been  twenty-four  hours  in  the 
hands  of  the  enemy.  But  this  rule  was  afterwards  changed,  with 
refpedl  to  the  United  Provinces  -,  and  in  general  we  may  obferve, 
that  every  foverejgn  has  a  right  toeftablifh  fuch  rules,  in  regard  to 
this  point,  as  he  thinks  proper,  and  to  make  what  agreement  lis 
pleafes  with  other  powers.  There  have  been  feveral  made,  at 
different  times,  between  ths  Ditch  and  Spaniards,  the  Portuguese 
and  the  northern  ftates. 

..r  XIX.  Grotius  applies  thefe  principles  alfo  to  lands  ;  they  are 
'■not  to  be  reputed  loft  fo  foon  as  they  are  feized  on  ;  but  for  this 
cfFedl  they  are  to  be  fo  fecured  with  fortifications,  that,  without 
being  forced,  they  cannot  be  repoffefled  by  the  firft  owner.  But 
to  this  cafe  we  may  alfo  apply  the  reficdions  already  made.  A 
territory  belongs  to  an  enemy  as  foon  as  he  is  mailer  of  it,  and  fo 
long  as  he  continues  in  polfefTion  of  it.  The  greater,  or  Icfl'-r 
precautions  to  fecure  it,  are  nothing  to  thepurpofe. 

XX.  But  be  this  as  it  may,  it  is  to  be  obferved,  that  during  th? 
whole  time  of  the  war,  the  right  we  acquire  over  the  things  we 
have  taken  from  the  eneniy,  is  ot  force  only  with  refpe<fl  to  a  third 
difintcrefted  party;  for  the  enemy  himfelfmay  retake  what  he  has 
loil,  whenever  he  fi.ids  an  opportunity,  till  by  a  treaty  of  peace  he 
has  renounced  all  his  pretenûons. 

XXI.  It  is  alfo  certain,  that  in  order  to  appropriate  athingbytVe 
right  of  war,  it  tnuft  belong  to  the  ep^my  ;  for  things  bciuiigin^ 
to  p.;ople  who  are  neither  hisfubje(5\«^,  nr>r  animated  with  t!.;  fams 

fpirit^ 


380  T'he  Principles  (5/" 

fpir'.t  as  he  againft  u?,  cannot  be  taken  by  the  right  of  war,  even 
tl.oiigh  they  are  found  in  the  enemy's  country.  But  if  neutral 
ftrangers  furnifliour  eiieniy  with  any  thing,  and  that  with  a  defign 
to  pjii  him  into  a  condition  of  hurting  us,  they  may  be  looked 
upon  as  taking  part  with  our  foe,  and  their  eftedls  may  confeauently 
be  taken  by  the  right  of  w;<r. 

XXII.  It  is  however  to  beobfsrved,  that  in  dubious  cafes  it  is 
always  to  be  prefumed,  that  what  we  find  in  the  enemy's  country, 
or  in  their  fhips,  is  deemed  to  belong  to  them  j  for  befides  that  this 
prefumption  is  very  natural,  were  the  contrary  maxim  to  take  place, 
it  would  lay  a  foundation  for  an  infinite  number  of  frauds.  But 
this  prefumption,  however  reafonable  in  itfelf,  may  be  deftroyed 
by  contrary  proofs. 

XXIII.  Neither  do  the  fliips  of  friends  become  lawful  prizes, 
though  Tome  of  the  enemy's  effects  are  found  in  them,  unlefs  it  is 
dene  by  the  confcnt  of  ihe  owners  ;  who  by  that  flep  ftem  to  vio- 
late the  neutral  it),  or  friendfhip,  and  give  us  aju(t  right  to  treat 
them  as  an  enemy. 

XXIV.  But  in  general  \ye  mufl  obferve,  with  refpeil  to  all 
thefe  queftions,  that  prudence  and  good  policy  require,  that  fove- 
reigns  (houldcome  to  fome  agreement  among  themfelves,  in  order 
|o  avoid  thedifputes  which  may  arife  from  thofe  different  cafes. 

XXV.  Let  us  alfo  take  notice  of  a  confequence  of  the  princi- 
ples here  eftablilhed:  which  is,  that  when  we  have  taken  things 
from  the  enemy,  of  which  he  himfeif  had  ffrippcd  another  by  the 
right  of  war,  the  former  pofl^rfTor  cannot  claim  tliem. 

XXyi.  Another  quedion  is,  whether  things,  taken  in  a  public 
and  folemn  war,  belong  to  the  (fate,  or  to  the  individuals  who  are 
members  of  it,  or  to  thofe  who  made  the  firft  feizurc  ?  I  anf*\tr, 
tbst  a-  the  right  of  war  is  lodged  in  the  fovertign  alone,  and  under- 
taken by  his  authority,  every  thing  taken  is  originally  and  primarily 
acquired  to  him,  whatever  hands  it  firfl  falls  into. 

XXVII.  However,  as  the  war  is  burdenfometo  the  fubjeiSls, 
both  equity  and  humanity  require  that  the  fovereign  fhould  make 
them  partiike  of  the  advantages  which  may  accrue  from  it.     This 
inay  be  done,  either  by  afTigning  to  tliofe  who  take  the  field  a  cer- 
tain 


Politic     Law.  38  x 

tain  pay  from  the  public,  or  by  flnring  the  booty  among  them. 
As  to  foreign  troops,  the  prince  is  ob)iged  to  give  tliem  no  more 
than  their  pay  ;  whiit  he  allows  them  above  that,  is  pure  liberality. 

XXVIII.  Grotius,  who  examines  this  queftion  at  large,  dif- 
tingullhes  between  acts  of  hoftiiity  tiuly  public,  and  private  a6ts 
that  are  done  upon  the  occaflon  of  a  public  war.  By  the  latter, 
according  to  him,  private  perfons  acquire  to  themfelves  principally, 
and  dire611y,  what  they  take  from  the  enemy  ;  whereas,  by  the 
former,  every  thing  taken  belongs  to  the  whole  body  of  the  people, 
or  to  che  fovereign.  But  this  deciiion  has  been  juftly  criticifed. 
As  all  public  v/ar  is  n^ade  by  the  authority  of  the  people,  or  of  their 
chief,  it  is  from  this  fource  we  muit  originally  derive  whatever 
right  individuals  may  have  to  things  taken  in  war.  In  this  cafe 
there  muft  always  be  an  exprefs  or  tacit  confeut  of  the  fovereign, 

XXIX.  It  is  alfo  to  be  obferved,  that  in  treating  this  point 
Grotius  has  confounded  different  things.  The  queflion  does  not 
relate  to  the  law  of  nations,  properly  fo  called  ;  for  in  whatever 
manner  that  law  is  underdood,  and  whatever  it  be  founded  on,  it 
ought  to  relate  to  the  affairs  in  difpute  between  two  different  ftates, 
Nqw  v/hether  the  booty  belongs  to  the  fovereign  who  makes  war, 
or  to  the  generals,  or  to  the  foldiers,  or  to  other  perfons,  that  is 
nothing  to  the  enemy,  nor  to  other  ftates.  If  what  is  taken 
be  a  good  prize,  it  is  of  fnrull  confequence  to  the  enemy  in  whofe 
hands  it  remains.  With  regard  to  neutral  people,  it  is  fufficient 
that  fuch  of  them  as  iiave  purchafed,  or  any  other  way  acquired 
a  moveable  thing  taken  in  war,  cannot  be  moiefted,  or  profecuted 
upon  that  account.  The  truth  is,  the  regulations  and  cuftoms, 
relating  to  this  fuhjedt,  are  not  of  public  right;  and  their  confor- 
mity, in  many  countries,  implies  no  more  than  a  civil  right,  com- 
mon to  feveral  nations  feparatelv. 

XXX.  As  for  what  in  particular  relates  to  the  acquifition  of 
incorporeal  things  hy  \\\e  right  of  war,  it  is  to  be  obferved,  that 
they  do  not  become  our  property,  except  we  are  in  poffeffion  of 
the  fubjeil  in  v.hich  they  inhere.  Now  the  fuhjedts  they  inhere 
in,  are  either  things  or  perfons.  We  often  annex,  for  inflance, 
to  certain  Iand>,  rivers,  ports  and  town?,  particular  rights,  which 
always  fjjlow  them,  whatever  poflelfors  they  come  to;  or  rather, 
thofe  who  pofRfs  them,  are  thereby  invefted  with  certain  rights 
over  other  thin^^s  .-.nd  pcrfoqs.  • 

XXXI.  Tl',s 


382  Tloc  Principles  of 


XXXI.  The  rights  which  belong  direiSly  and  immediately  to 
pcrfons,  regard  either  other  pcrfon.s,  or  only  certain  things.  Thofe 
which  are  annexed  to  perfons  over  other  perfons,  are  not  obtained 
but  with  the  confcnt  of  the  perfons  ihemfelvesi  who  are  fuppofed 
not  to  have  given  a  power  over  them  to  any  man  promifcuoufly, 
but  to  fome  certain  perfon.  Thu>,  for  inilance,  though  a  king 
happens  to  be  made  prifoner  of  war,  his  enerrues  have  not  there- 
fore acquired  his  kingdom  with  him. 

XXXII.  But  with  refpefl  to  perfonal  rights  over  things,  the 
bare  fcizure  of  the  perfon  of  the  enemy,  is  not  a  fufficient  title  to 
the  property  of  all  his  effects,  unlefs  we  really  take  polTcfTion  of 
thofe  effects  at  the  fame  time.  This  may  be  illuftrated  by  the 
example  given  byGrotiusand  Puffondorf  :  Alexander  the  Great 
having  deitroyed  the  city  of  Thebes,  made  a  prcfent  to  the  Thcf- 
falians  of  an  inftrument,  in  which  the  latter  acknowledged  that 
they  owed  the  Thtbans  a  hundred  talents. 

XXXIII.  Thefe  are  the  rights  which  war  gives  us  over  the 
effiicts  of  the  enemy.  But  Grotius  pretends,  that  the  right  by 
which  we  acquire  things  taken  in  war,  is  fo  proper  and  peculiar  to 
?  folomn  war,  declared  in  form,  that  it  has  n  o  force  in  others,  as  in 
civil  wars,  5cc,  and  thit  in  the  latter,  in  particular,  there  is  no  change 
of  property,  but  in  virtue  ot  the  fentence  of  a  judge. 

XXXIV.  We  may  obfirrve,  however,  upon  this  point,  that  in 
tnofl  civil  trars  no  common  judge  is  acknowledged.  If  the  (late 
is  monarchical,  the  difpute  turns  cither  upon  the  fuccefiion  to  the 
crown,  or  upon  a  conliderable  part  of  the  ftate's  pretending  that 
the  king  has  abufed  his  power,  in  a  manner  which  authorizes  the 
f'ubjeift  to  take  up  arms  againft  him. 

XXXV.  In  the  former  cafe,  the  very  nature  of  the  caufe,  for 
Vv-hich  the  war  is  undertaken,  occafions  the  two  parties  of  the  ftjçe 
to  form,  as  it  were,  two  diftincl  bodies,  till  they  come  to  agree 
upon  a  chief  by  fome  treaty.  Hence,  with  rcfpedl  to  the  two 
parties  which  were  zx.  war,  it  is  on  fiich  a  tre.-.ty  that  tlic  right 
depend"^,  which  perfons  may  have  to  that  which  has  been  t;iken 
on  either  fide  ;  and  nothing  hinders,  but  this  right  may  be  left  on 
the  fame  footing,  and  admitted  to  take  place  in  the  fame  nianner, 
as  In  public  wars  between  twoftates  always  didind. 

XXXVr.  As 


Politic    L  a  w«  383 

XXXVI.  As  to  other  nations,  who  were  notconcerned  in  the 
War,  they  have  no  more  authority  to  examine  the  validity  of  the 
acquifitions,  than  they  have  to  be  judges  of  a  war  mads  between 
two  different  ftates. 

XXXVII.  The  other  cafe,  1  mean  an  infurreâion  of  a  con- 
fiderabb  part  of  the  Ihite  againft  the  reigning  prince,  can  rarely 
happen,  except  when  that  prince  has  given  room  for  it,  cither  by  ^ 
tyranny,  or  by  the  violation  of  the  fundamental  laws  of  the  kingdom.      "^ 
Thus  the  government  is  then  diffolved,  and  the  ftate  is  actually 
divided  into  two  diitincland  independent  bodies  ;  fo  that  we  are  to 

form  here  the  fame  judgment  as  in  the  former  cafe. 

XXXVill.  For  much  ftronger  reafons  does  this  take  place  in 
the  civil  wars  of  a  republican  ftate  ;  in  which  the  war,  immediately 
ot  itftlf,  deftroys  the  fovereignty,  which  fubfifts  folely  in  the  union 
of  its  members. 

XXXIX.  Grotius  fcems  to  have  derived  his  ideas  on  this  fub- 
jeft  from  the  Roman  laws  j  for  thefe  decreed,  that  prifoners  taken 
in  a  civill  war  could  not  be  reduced  to  flavery.  This  was,  as 
Ulpian  the  civilian  *  remarks,  becaufe  they  looked  upon  a  civil 
war  not  properly  as  a  war,  but  as  a  civil  dijj'enfion  j  for,  adds  he,  a 
real  war  is  made  between  thofe  who  are  enemies,  and  animated 
v/ith  a  hoftile  fpirit,  which  prompts  them  to  endeavour  the  ruin  of 
each  other's  (late.  Whereas,  in  a  civil  war,  however  hurtful  it  — • 
often  proves  to  the  nation,  the  one  party  wants  to  fave  itfelf  in  one 
manner,  and  the  other  in  another.  Thus  they  are  not  enemies, 
and  every  perfon  of  the  two  parties  remains  always  acitizsnof  the 
ftate  fo  divided. 

XL.  But  all  this  is  a  fuppofition,  orjïâîion  of  rights  which  docs 
not  hinder  what  I  have  been  faying  from  being  true,  and  from 
taking  place  in  general.  And  if,  among  the  Romans,  a  perfon 
could  not  appropriate  to  himlèlf  the  piifoners  taken  hi  a  civil  war,  as 
real  flaves,  this  was  in  virtue  of  a  particular  law  received  among 
them,  and  not  on  account  of  any  defect  of  the  conditions,  or  for- 
malities, which,  according  to  Grotius,  are  required  by  the  law  of 
nations,  in  a  public  or  folemn  war. 

XLI.  LaHly,  as  to  the  wars  of  robbers  and  pirate?,  if  they  do 
not  produce  the  efFecSts  above-mentioned,  nor  give  to  thofc  pirates 

a 

"  Lib.  xxi.  fc(5l.  i,  ff  de  capt.  &  reverf. 


384  Ihe  P  R  I  xN  c  I  p  L  E  s  of 

a  right  of  appopriating  \vh£t  they  have  taken,  it  is  becaufe  they 
are  robbers,_  ani  enemies  to  mankind,  and  confcquently  perron's 
tvhofe  adiot  violence  are  manifcltly  unjufl,  which  authorizes  all 
nations  to  treat  thein  as  enemies.  Whereas,  in  other  kinds  of 
war,  it  is  often  difHcult  to  judge  on  which  fide  the  right  lies  ;  fo 
that  the  difpute  continues,  and  ought  to  continue,*^  undecided, 
Vvith  refpecl  to  thofe  who  are  unconcerned  in  the  war. 


CHAP.     VIII. 

Of  the  right  cfjovûreignty  acquired  over  the  conquered. 

IjESIDES  the  efFe£ls  of  war,  hitherto  mentioned,  thcr« 
remains  one  more,  the  mod:  important  of  all,  and  which  we  Ihall 
here  confider  ;  1  mean  the  right  oi  fovereignty  acquired  over  the 
conquered.  We  have  already  remarked,  when  explaining  the 
dift'erent  v/ays  of  obtaining  the  ftiprerne  power,  that  in  general  it 
may  be  acquired  either  in  a  violent  manner,  and  by  the  right  df 
conqueft,  &c.  j 

ÎI.  We  mufl  however  obferv?,  thst  war  or  corqucft  confidered 
in  itfclf,  is  not  properly  the  cauie  of  this  acquifition  ;  that  is,  ft  is 
j)ot  the  immediate  origin  of  fovereignty.  For  the  fupreme  powar 
is  founded  on  the  tacit  or  exprefs  confent  of  the  people,  without 
which  the  ftate  of  war  ftill  iubiifls  ;  for  we  cannot  conceive  how 
there  can  be  an  obligation  to  obey  a  perfon,  to  whom  we  have 
promiled  no  fnbjedtion.  War  then  is,  properly  fpeaking,  no  more 
than  the  occaiion  of  obtaining  the  fovereignty  ;  as  the  conquered 
chufe  rather  to  fubmit  to  the  viélor,  than  to  expofe  thenifelves  to 
total  defîi"u6lion. 

III.  Befides,  the  acquifition  of  fovereignty  by  the  right  of  con- 
queft  cannot,  ftricïly  fpeaking,  pafs  for  lawful,  unlefs  the  war  be 
juft  in  itfelf,  and  the  end  propofed  authorizes  the  conqueror  to  carry 
things  to  fuch  extremity,  as  to  acquire  the  fupreme  power  over 
the  vanquifhed  ;  that  is  to  fay,  either  our  enemy  muft  have  no 
C)ther  means  of  paying,  what  he  ov.'es  us,  and  of  indemnifying  us 
for  the  damages  he  has  committed  ;  or  our  own  fafety  mufl:  abfo- 
lutely  oblige  us  to  make  him  dependent  on  us.  In  fuch  circum- 
ftances,  it  is  certain  that  the  refr^ance  of  a  vanquifhed  enemy, 
authorizes  us  to  pufh  the  aéts  of  hoflility  againll  him  fo  far,  as  to 

reduce 


t^o  L  I  T  I  c  Law.  385 

reduce  him  intircly  under  our  power  ;  ana   we  may,  without  in- 

"Ju  ft  ice,  take  advantage  of  the  fiiperiority  of  our  arms,  to  extort 

from  him  the  confcnt  which  he  ought  to  give  us  of  his  own  accord. 

tV".  Thefeiare  ths  true  principles  on  which  fovereignty,  by  the 
right  of  conqueft,  is  grounded.  Hence  we  may  conclude,  that  if^ 
upon  this  foundation,  we  were  to  judge  of  the  different  acquifitions 
of  this  nature,  few  of  them  would  be  found  well  eftablifhed  ;  for  it 
rarely  happens,  that  the  vanquifhed  are  reduced  to  fuch  extremity, 
as  not  to  be  able  tofatisfy  the  juft  prctenfions  of  the  conqueror, 
otherwife  than  by  fubmitting  themfelves  to  his  dominion. 

V.  Let  us  however  obferve,  that  the  interefl  and  tranquillity  of 
tiations  require,  that  we  fhould  moderate  the  rigour  of  the  princi- 
ples above  eftablifhed.  If  he  who  has  conftrained  another,  by  the 
fupcriority  of  his  arms,  to  fubmit  to  his  dominion,  had  undertaken 
a  war  manifcftly  unjuft,  or  if  the  pretext,  on  which  it  is  founded, 
be  vifibly  frivolous  in  the  judgment  of  every  reafonable  perfon,  1 
freely  confcfs  that  a  fovereignty,  acquired  in  fuch  circumflance?, 
wouldbeunjull:  ;  and  I  fee  no  rcafon,  why  the  vanquifhed  people 
■ihould  be  more  obliged  to  keep  fuch  a  treaty,  than  a  man,  who  had 
lallen  into  the  hands  of  robbers,  would  be  udder  an  obligation  to 
pay,  at  their  demand,  the  money  he  had  promifed  them  for  the 
ranfom  of  his  life  and  liberty. 

VI.  But  if  the  conqueror  had  undertaken  a  war  for  fomefpecious 
reafon,  though  perhaps  at  the  bottom  not  ftri6lly  jufl,  the  common 
intereft  of  mankind  requires,  that  we  fliould  obferve  the  engage- 
ments we  have  entered  into  with  him,  though  extorted  by  a  terror 
in  itfelf  unjuft  ;  fo  long,  at  leaft,  as  no  new  reafon  fupervenes, 
which  may  lawfully  exempt  us  from  keeping  our  promife.  For  as 
the  law  of  nature  diredls  that  focieties,  as  well  as  individual?, 
fliould  labour  for  their  prefervation,  it  obliges  us,  for  this  reafon, 
not  indeed  to  confider  the  ads  of  hoftility  committed  by  an  unjuft 
conquei-or  as  properly  juft,  but  to  look  upon  the  engagement  of  an 
exprefs,  or  tacit  treaty,  as  neverthelefs  valid.  So  that  the  van- 
quifhed cannot  be  releafcd  from  obferving  it,  under  the  pretext  of 
its  being  caufed  by  an  unjuft  fear,  as  he  might  otherwife  do,  had  he 
no  regard  to  the  advantages  accruing  from  it  to  mankind. 

VII.  Thefe  confiderations  will  have  ftill  a  greater  weight,  if  we 
fuppofe  that  the  conqueror,  or  his  pofterity,  peaceably  enjoy  the 
fovereignty  which  be  has  acquired  by  right  of  conqueft,  and  be- 

A  a  3  fidis, 


386  T.he   Principles^/* 

fide?,  that  he  govern  the  vanquifhcd  like  a  humane  and  generous 
prince.  In  luch  circumPiances,  a  long  poirtflion,  accompanied 
with  an  equitable  government,  may  legitimate  a  conquelt,  in  its 
beginning  and  principle  the  mo(t  unjuft. 

VIII.  There  arc  modern  civilian?,  who  explain  the  thing  fome- 
v.hui  differently.  Thefe  maintain,  that  in  a  juft  war  the  vitlur 
acquires  a  full  right  of  fovcreignty  over  the  vanquiflicd,  by  the 
jingle  title  of  conqueft,  independently  of  any  convention  ;  and  even 
though  the  victor  has  othcrwile  obtained  all  the  fatistadticn,  and 
in  Jcmnification,  he  could  require, 

IX.  The  principal  argument  thefe  writers  make  life  of,  if,  that 
other  wife  the  conqueror  could  net  be  certain  of  the  peaceable  pcf- 
Icflion  of  what  he  has  taken,  or  forced  the  conquered  to  give  him, 
lor  his  ju(t  pretenfions  \  fmce  they  might  retake  it  from  him,  by 
the  fame  right  cf  war. 

X.  But  this  reafon  proves  only  that  the  conqueror,  who  has 
taken  poffeflion  of  the  enemy's  country,  may  command  in  it  while 
he  holds  it,  and  not  reUgn  it,  till  he  has  good  fecurity  that  he  fhall 
obtain  or  polf^rfs,  without  hazard,  what  is  neceflary  for  the  fatis^ 
ladlion  and  indemnity,  which  he  has  a  rjght  to  exadt  by  force. 
But  the  end  of  a  juft  war  does  net  always  demand,  that  the  con- 
queror iliould  acquire  an  abfolute  and  perpetual  right  of  fovcreignty 
over  the  conquered.  It  is  only  a  favourable  occafion  of  obtaining 
jt  ;  and  for  that  purpofe,  there  niiift  always  bean  exprefs  or  tacit 
tonfiiit  of  the  vanquiflied.  Otherwife,  the  ftate  of  war  ftill 
fubfilting,  the  fovcreignty  of  the  conqueror  has  no  other  title  than 
ihat  of  force,  and  lalls  no  longer  than  the  vanquilhed  are  unable  to 
throw  off  the  yoke. 

XI.  All  that  can  be  faid,  is,  that  the  neutral  powers,  purely 
becaufe  (hey  are  fiich,  may,  and  ought  to  look  upon  the  conqueror 
a?;  x\\z  lawful  po^}l'ffor  of  the  fovcreignty,  even  though  they  (hculd 
believe  the  war  unjuft  on  his  fide. 

XIÎ.  The  fovcreignty  thus  acquired  by  the  right  of  war,  is  gen- 
/  crallyof  the  abfolute  kind.     But   fometimes  the  vanquiflied  enter 
•J    into  certain    conditions  with  the  conqueror,  which  limit,  in  fome 
(      >r)eafure,  the  power  he  acquires  over  them.     Be  this  as  it  may,  it 
is  certain  that  no   conquelt  ever  authorizes   a   prince  to  govern  a 
people  tyrannically  ;  fmce,  as  we  have  before  (hewn,  the  moft  ab- 
folute 


>r 


Politic    Law.  387 

folutc  fovercignty  gives  no  ri^ht  to  opprefs  thcfe  who  have  furren- 
dered  ;  for  even  the  very  intention  of  government,  and  the  laws  of 
nature,  equally  confpire  to  lay  the  conqueror  iindr^r  an  cbligation, 
of  governing  thofe  whom  he  has  fubdued,  with  moderation  and 
cquiiy. 

XII r.  There  are,  tliereforc,  feveral  precautions  to  be  ufod  in 
the  exercife  of  the  fovereignty  acquired  over  the  vanquilhed  \ 
fuch,  for  inftance,  was  that  prudent  moderation  of  the  ancient 
Romans,  who  confounded,  in  fome  meafure,  the  vanquiflicd  v.ith 
the  vié^ors,  by  hallening  to  incorporate  thrm  with  thernfelves,  and 
to  m  ike  them  (lurers  of  their  liberty  and  advantages.  A  piece  of 
policy  doubly  falutary  ;  which,  at  the  fame  time  that  it  rendered 
the  condition  of  the  vanquiflied  more  agreeable,  confidtribly 
flrengthened  the  power  and  empire  of  the  Romms.  ''  What 
"  would  our  empire  now  have  been,"  fays  Seneca,  "  if  the  van- 
"  quifliedhad  not  been  intermixed  with  the  vi(51ors,  by  the  efFeél 
*'  of  a  found  policy  r"  "  Romulus,  our  founder,"  fays  Claudius  in 
Tacitus,  "  was  very  wife  with  refpeél  to  molt  of  the  peojilc  hj 
"  fubdued,  by  niaking  thofe,  who  were  his  ene(nies,  the  fame  day 
^'  citizens." 

XIV.  Another  moderation  in  vi<^ory,  confifts  in  leaving  to  the 
conquered,  either  kings  or  people,  the  fovereignty  which  they 
enjoyed,  and  not  to  change  the  form  of  their  government.  No 
better  method  can  be  taken  to  fecure  a  conqueft  :  and  of  this  we 
have  feveral  examples  in  ancient  hiftory,  efpecially  in  that  of  the 
Romans. 

XV.  But  if  the  conqueror  cannot,  without  danger  to  himfelfi 
grant  all  thefe  advantages  to  the  conquered  ;  yet  things  maybe  fo 
moderated,  that  fome  part  of  the  fovereignty  fhall  be  left  to  them, 
or  to  their  kings.  Even  when  we  ftrip  the  vanquilhed  intirely  of 
their  indepemhmcy,  we  may  ftil!  leave  them  their  ovyn  laws,  cuf- 
toms,  and  magiftrates,  in  regard  to  their  private  and  public  afFairSj 
of  fmall  importance. 

XVI.  We  muH-  not,  above  all  things,  deprive  the  vanquifbed 
of  the  exercife  of  their  religion,  unlefs  they  luppcn  to  be  convinced 
of  the  truth  of  that  which  the  conqueror  profcHes.  This  com.- 
pliiCmce  is  not  only  of  itfelf  very  agreeable  to  tlie  vanquifbed,  but 
the  conqueror  is  abfofutely  obliged  to  it  ;  and  he  cannot,  without 
tyranny,  opprefs  them  in  this  article.     Not  that  heou<;ht  not  to 

try 


388  I'he  Principles  oj 


try  to  bring  the  vanquiflied  to  the  true  religion  ;  but  hefhouldonly 
life  fuch  means,  as  are  proportioned  to  the  nature  of  the  thing,  and 
to  the  end  he  has  in  view  ;  and  fuch  as  have  in  ihemfelves  nothing 
violent,  or  contrary  to  humanity. 

Xyn.  Let  us  obferve,  laflly,  that  not  only  humanity,  but 
prudençealfo,  and  even  the  interell  ofthe  vidtor,  require  that  whafe 
we  have  been  faying,  with  refpe£t  to  a  vanquiflied  people,  fliouldi 
bsftriiSlly  praftifed.  It  is  an  important  maxim  in  politics,  that  it 
is  more  difficult  to  keep,  than  to  conquer  provinces.  Conquefts 
demand  no  more  than  force,  but  juftice  muft  preferve  them.  Thefe 
:ire  the  principal  things  to  be  obferved,  in  refpeâ:  to  the  different 
tffeds  of  war,  and  to  the  moft  eHTential  queftions  relative  to  that 
fubjeâ:.  Eut  as  we  have  already  had  occafion  to  make  mention 
il  the  article  of  neutrality,  it  will  not  be  improper  to  fay  fomeihing 
n,ore  pariicular  about  it. 

Ofncutraliiy. 

I.  There  is  2^ general^  and  a  particular  neuiraUty.  The  general 
is,  when  without  being  allied  to  either  of  the  two  enemies  at  war, 
v/e  are  difpofed  to  render  to  each  the  good  offices  which  every 
nation  is  naturally  obliged  to  perform  to  other  dates. 

II.  The  particular  neutrality  is,  when  we  are  particularly 
tngaged  to  be  neuter  by  fonie  compad,  either  tacit  orexprefs. 

III.  The  latter  fpecles  of  neutrality  is  either  full  and  intire, 
v./hen  we  iiehave  alike  towards  both  parties  ;  or  limited,  as  when 
we  favour  one  fide  more  than  the  other. 

IV.  We  cannot  lawfully  conflrain  any  perfon  to  enter  into 
a  particular  neutrality  ;  becaufe  every  one  is  at  liberty  to  make, 
or  not  to  make,  particular  treaties,  or  alliances  \  or  at  leafl,  they 
are  not  bound  to  do  it  but  by  virtue  of  an  imperfedi:  obligation. 
Eut  lie,  who  has  undertaken  a  juR  war,  may  oblige  other  nations 
to  obferve  an  exaft  and  general  neutrality  ;  that  is  to  fay,  not  to 
fiivour  his  enemy  more  than  himfelf. 

V.  We  fhall  give  here  an  ahftracl,  as  it  were,  of  the  duties  of 
neutral  nations.  They  arc  obliged  equally  to  put  in  pradice,  to- 
wards both  parties  at  war,  the  laws  of  nature,  as  well  abfolute  as 
conditional,  whether  thefc  impofc  a  perfctti  or  only  an  imperfect 
pb'igation. 

VI.  If 


P  O  L  I  T  I  C      L  A  W.  389 

VI.  If  ihey  do  the  one  any  ofHce  of  humanity,  they  ought  not 
to  rcfufe  the  hke  to  the  other,  unlefs  there  be  fume  manifelt  reafon 
vvhich  engages  them  to  do  fomcthing  in  favour  of  the  one,  which 
the  other  had  otherwife  no  right  to  demand. 

VII.  But  they  are  not  obliged  to  do  offices  of  humanity  to  one 
party,  when  thsyexpofe  themfeives  to  great  danger,  by  refufmg 
them  to  the  other,  who  has  as  good  a  right  to  demand  them. 

VIII.  They  ought  not  to  furnifli  either  party  with  things  which 
ferve  to  exercile  a£ts  of  hoftiiity,  unlefs  they  are  authorized  to  do 
it  by  Tome  particular  engagement  ;  and  in  regard  to  thofc  which 
are  of  no  ufein  war,  if  they  fupply  one  fide  with  them,  they  muft 
alfo  the  other. 

IX.  They  ought  to  ufe  all  their  endeavours  to  bring  matters  to 

an  accomn^.odation,  that  the  injured  party  may  obtain  fatisfa£lion> 
and  the  war  be  brou^i^ht  to  a  fpeedy  conclufion. 

X.  Rut  if  they  be  under  any  particular  engagement,  they  fIioul(J 
punftually  fulfil  it. 

XI.  On  the  other  fide,  thofe  who  are  at  war  muft  exaflly  ob- 

ferve,  towards  neutral  nations,  the  laws  of  fociaUiljty,  and  notex- 
ercife  any  acl  of  hoftility  againll  them,  nor  fuffer  their  country  to 
be  plundered. 

XII.  They  may  however,  in  cafe  of  neceflîty,  take  poflc/Iion  of 
a  place  fituated  in  a  neutral  country  ;  provided,  that  as  foon  as  the 
danger  is  over,  they  reftore  it  to  the  right  owner,  and  make  him 
fatisfadion  for  the  damages  he  has  received. 


C  H  A  P.     IX. 

Of  public  treaties  in  general. 

J_  HE  fuhjeft  of  public  treaties  conftitutes  a  confiderable 
part  of  the  law  of  nations,  and  deferves  to  have  its  principles  and 
rules  explained  with  fomecxaiStnefs.  By  public  treaties,  we  mean 
fucli  agreements  as  can  h;  mide  only  by  public  authority,  or  thofe 

which 


390  ^^  Principles  of 

which  fovereigns,  confidered  as  fiicli,  make  with  each  other,  con- 
cerning things  which  dire6lly  concern  the  welfare  of  the  ftate. 
This  is  what  diftinguillies  thefe  agreements,  not  only  from  thofe 
which  individuals  make  with  each  other,  but  alfo  from  the  con- 
trats of  kings,  in  regard  to  their  private  affairs, 

II.  What  we  have  before  obferved,  concerning  the  neceflîty  of 
introducing  conventions  betwixt  private  men,  and  the  advantages 
arifing  from  them,  may  be  applied  to  nations  and  difFercnt  ftatcs. 
Nations  may,  by  means  of  ireatie?,  nnite  themfelves  more  partic- 
ularly into  a  ff)ciety,  which  fhall  reciprocally  jifTure  them  of  fea- 
fonable  affiftance,  cither  for  the  neceflkries  and  conveniences  of 
life,  or  to  provide  for  their  greater  fecurity  upon  the  breaking  out 
of  a  war, 

HI.  As  this  is  the  cafe,  fovereigns  are  no  lefs  obliged,  than 
individuals,  inviolably  to  keep  their  word,  and  be  faithful  to  their 
engagements.  The  law  of  nations  renders  this  an  indifpenfible 
duty  ;  for  it  is  evident,  that  were  it  otherwife,  net  only  public  trea- 
ties would  bs  ufclefs  to  fîatcs,  but  moreover,  that  the  violation  of 
thefe  would  throw  them  into  a  ftate  of  diffidence  and  continual 
war;  that  is  to  fay,  into  the  nioft  terrible  fituation.  The  obliga- 
tion therefore  of  fovereigns,  in  this  refpe£t,  is  fo  much  the  flronger, 
as  the  violation  o  this  duty  has  more  dangerous  confcquences, 
which  intereft  the  oiblic  felicity.  The  fan6tity  of  an  or.th,  which 
generally  accompanies  folemn  treaties,  is  an  additional  motive  to 
engage  princes  to  obferve  them  with  the  utmoft  fidelity  ;  and  cer- 
tainly nothing  is  more  fliameful  for  fovereigns,  who  fo  rigoroufly 
punifli  fuch  of  their  fubjeifls  as  fail  in  their  engagements,  than  to 
fport  with  treaties  and  public  faith,  and  to  look  upon  thefe  only  as 
the  means  of  deceiving  each  other. 

The  royal  word  ou^i  therefore  to  be  inviolable,  and  facred. 
But  there  is  realon  to  apprehend,  that  if  princes  are  not  more 
attentive  to  this  point,  this  exprellion  will  foon  degenerate  into  an 
oppofite  fenfe,  in  the  fame  manner  as  formerly  Crtrthagtnian faith  * 
was  taken  for  perfidy. 

IV.  We  mufl  likewife  obferve,  that  the  fcveral  principles  already 

eflablillied  concerning  the  validity  of  conventions  in  general,  agree 

^  to  public  treaties,  as  well  as  to  the  contracts  of  individuals.      In 

both, 

"  Punica  fides. 


P  O  L  I  T  I  C      L  A  V/.  391 

both,  therefore,  there  muft  be  a  fcrious  confcnt,  properly  declared, 
and  exempt  from  error,  fraudy  and  violence. 

V.  If  treaties,  made  in  thofe  circumftances,  be  obligatory  be- 
tween the  refpe£live  dates  or  fovereigns,  they  are  alfo  binding 
with  regard  to  the  fubjecSls  of  each  prince  in  particular.  They 
obli-^e,  as  compadls  between  the  contrading  powers  j  but  they 
have  the  force  of  laws,  with  relpe£l  to  the  lubjefts  confidered  as 
fuch  i  for  it  is  evident  that  two  fovereigns,  who  conclude  a  treaty, 
lay  their  fubje(Sls  thereby  under  an  obligation  of  doing  nothing 
contrary  to  it. 

VI.  There  are  feveral  di(lin£lions  of  public  treaties;  and  1°. 
fome  turn  fimply  on  things,  to  which  we  were  before  obliged  by 
the  law  of  nature  ;  and  others  luperadd  fome  particulars  to  the 
duties  of  natural  law. 

VII.  Under  the  former  head  we  may  rank  all  thofe  treaties,  by 
which  we  are  purely  and  fimply  engaged  to  do  no  injury  to  others, 
but,  on  the  contrary,  to  perform  all  the  duties  of  humanity  towards 
them.  Among  civilized  nations,  who  profefs  to  follow  the  laws 
of  nature,  fuch  treaties  are  not  neceflTary.  Duty  alone  is  fufficient, 
without  a  formal  engagement.  But  among  the  ancients,  thefe 
treaties  were  thought  expedient,  the  common  opinion  being,  that 
they  were  obliged  to  obferve  the  laws  of  humanity  only  to  fellow- 
fubjecSls,  and  that  they  might  confiderall  ftrangers  as  foes,  and  treat 
them  as  fuch,  unlefs  they  had  entered  into  fome  engagement  to  the 
contrary  :  and  of  this  we  have  many  inftances  in  hiftory.  The 
profeffion  of  free- hooter,  or  pirate,  was  no  way  fhameful  among 
feveral  nations  ;  and  the  word  hojiis^  which  the  Romans  ufed  to 
exprefs  an  enemy,  originally  fjgnihed  no  more  than  a  ftranger. 

VIII.  Under  the  fécond  kind  I  comprehend  all  thofe  com  pails, 
by  which  two  nations  enter  into  fome  new,  or  more  particular 
obligation;  as  when  they  formally  engage  to  things  to  which  they 
were  not  bound,  but  in  virtue  of  an  imperfedt  obligation,  or  even 
to  which  they  were  no  ways  before  obliged. 

IX.  1°.  Treaties,  by  which  we  engage  to  fomething  more  than 
what  we  were  obliged  to,  in  virtue  of  the  law  of  nature,  are  alfo 
of  two  kinds  ;  fome  equaly  others  unequal. 

3^.  Both  are  made  either  in  time  of  war,  or  in  full  peace. 

X.  Equal 


39^  *ïhe  Principles  of 

X.  Equal  treaties,  are  thofe  contracleJ  with  an  intire  equality  orl 
both  fides;  that  is  to  fay,  when  not  only  the  engagements  and 
promifes  are  equal  en  both  fides,  either  purely  and  fimply,  or  in 
proportion  to  the  ftrength  of  each  contracting  party  \  but  alfo^ 
when  they  engage  on  the  fame  footing  ;  fo  that  neither  of  the  par- 
ties is  in  any  refpedl  inferior  to  the  other. 

XL  Thefe  treaties  are  made,  either  with  a  view  to  commerce ^  of 
to  confederacy  in  war,  or,  in  lliort,  to  any  other  matter.  With 
refpe6l  to  commerce,  for  example,  by  ftipulating  that  the  fubje£ls, 
on  either  fide,  (lull  be  free  from  all  cuftom  or  toll,  or  that  no  more 
fhall  be  demanded  of  them,  than  of  the  natives  of  the  country,  &c. 
Equal  treaties,  or  leagues  relating  to  war,  are,  when  we  flipulate, 
for  example,  that  each  fhall  furnifh  the  other  an  equal  number  of 
troops,  fhips,  and  other  things  ;  and  this  in  all  kinds  of  war, 
defcnfive  as  well  as  ofFenfive,  or  in  dcfenfive  only,  &c.  Laftly, 
treaties  of  equality,  may  alfo  turn  upon  any  other  matter  ;  as  when 
it  is  agreed,  that  one  fhall  have  no  forts  on  the  other's  frontiers  ; 
that  one  /hall  not  grant  protedlion  to  the  other's  fiihje<^s,  in  fume 
criminal  cafes,  but  order  them  to  be  feized  and  fent  back  ;  that 
one  fliall  not  give  the  other's  enemies  partage  through  his  country, 
end  the  like. 

XII.  What  we  have  been  faying,  fufficiently  fliews  the  mean- 
ing of  unequal  treaties.  And  thefe  arc,  when  the  promifes  arc 
cither  unequal,  or  fuch  as  lay  harder  conditions  on  one  of  the 
parties,  than  on  the  other.  The  inequality  of  the  things  ftipulated, 
is  fometimes  on  the  fide  of  the  mod  powerful  confederate,  as  when 
he  promifes  his  aflidance  to  the  other,  without  requiring  the  like  j 
agd  fometimes  on  the  fide  of  the  inferior  confederate,  as  when  he 
engages  to  do  morô  for  the  ftronger,  than  the  latter  promifes  in 
return. 

XIII.  All  the  conditions  of  unequal  treaties  are  not  of  the  fame 
nature;  fome  there  are,  which  though  burdenfome  tothe  infeiior 
ally,  yet  leave  the  fovereignty  intire  ;  other?,  on  the  contrary, 
include  a  diminution  of  the  indépendance,  and  fovereignty  oftne 
inferior  ally. 

Thus,  in  the  treaties  between  the  Romans  and  the  Carthaginians, 
at  the  end  of  the  fécond  Punk  wafy  it  was  ftipulatcd,  that  the 
Carthaginians  fhould  not  begin  any  war,  without  the  confent  of 
the  Roman  people;  an  article  which  evidently  diminifhed  the 
fovereignty  of  Carthage,  and  made  her  dependent  on  Rome. 

But 


/^ 


Politic    Law.  393 

But  the  fovereignty  of  the  inferior  ally  continues  intire,  though 
he  engages,  for  example,  to  pay  the  other's  army,  to  defray  the 
expences  of  the  war,  to  difmantle  fome  towns,  to  give  hoftages,  to 
look  upon  all  thofe  as  friends  or  enemies,  who  are  friends  or  ene- 
mies to  the  other,  to  have  no  forts,  or  ftrong-holds  in  certain  parts, 
to  avoid  failing  in  particular  f3as,  to  acknowleige  the  pre-eminence 
of  the  other,  and,  upon  occafion,  to  (hew  reverence  and  honour 
to  his  power  and  majefty,  &c. 

XfV.  However,  though  thefe,  and  other  fimilar  conditions,  do 
not  diminifh  the  fovereignty,  it  is  certain  that  fuch  treaties  of  ine- 
quality are  often  offo  delicate  a  nature,  as  to  require  the  greatefl 
circumfpe6lion  ;  and  that  if  the  prince,  who  is  fuperior  to  the  other 
in  dignity,  furpafTes  him  alfo  confiderably  in  ftrength  and  power, 
it  is  to  be  feared  that  the  former  will  gradually  acquire  an  abfolute 
fovereignty  over  him,  efpecially  if  the  confederacy  be  perpetual. 

XV.  4**.  Public  treaties  are  a.\Ço  divided  into  real  and perfonaL 
The  latter  are  thofe  made  with  a  prince,  purely  in  regard  to  his 
perfon,  and  expire  with  him.  The  former  are  fuch,  as  are  made 
rather  with  the  whole  body  of  the  ftate,  than  with  the  king  or 
government,  and  which  confequently  outlive  thofe  who  made 
them  and  oblige  their  fucceffors. 

XVI.  To  know  which  of  thefe  two  clafTes  every  treaty  belongs 
to,  the  following  rules  may  be  laid  down. 

ï**.  We  muft  fîrfl:  attend  to  the  form  and  phrafe  of  the  treaty, 
to  its  claufe',  ani  the  views  propofed  by  the  contradling  parties. 
Utrum  autem  in  rem^  an  in  perftnam  faSîum  e/îy  non  minus  ex  verbify 
quant  ex  mente  convenientium  ajîimandum  eji.  *  Thus,  if  there  be 
an  exprefs  claufe,  mentioning  that  the  treaty  is  perpetual,  or  for  a 
certain  number  of  years,  or  for  the  good  of  the  ftate,  or  with  the 
king  for  him  and  his  fucceffors,  we  may  conclude  that  the  treaty 
is  real. 

i°.  Every  treaty  made  with  a  republic,  is  in  its  own  nature 
real,  becaufe  the  fubjecV,  with  whom  we  contrail  it,  is  a  thing 
permanent. 

3°.  Though  the  government  fliould  happen  to  be  changed  from 
a  republic  into  a  monarchy,  the  treaty  is  ft  ill  in  force,  becaufe  the 
body  is  ftill  the  fame,  and  has  only  another  chief. 

B  b  b  4°-  Wc 

♦  Leg.  vii,  §  viii.  ff,  do  pRâie. 


394-  ^'^^   -P  R  I  N  C  I  P  L  E  s     OJ 


4.^.  We  mufl  however  mak^  an  exception  here,  which  is,  when 
it  appears  that  the  pref^rvaticm  of  the  republican  government  was 
the  true  caufe  of  the  treaty  ;  as  when  two  republics  enter  into  an 
alliance,  by  which  they  agree  to  afliil  one  another,  againfl:  fuch  as 
OuU  endeavour  by  force  to  alter  their  conltitution,  and  deprive 
them  of  their  liberties. 

5'^.  In  cafe  of  doubt,  every  public  treaty  made  with  a  king  ought 
to  be  deemed  real,  bccaufe,  in  dubious  cafes,  the  king  is  fuppofed 
to  aft  as  chief,  and  for  the  good  of  the  date. 

6^.  Hence  it  follow?,  that  as  after  the  change  of  a  democracy 
into  a  monarchy,  the  treaty  is  iiill  in  fo;:ce,  in  regard  to  the  new 
fovereign  ;  fo  if  the  government,  from,  a  monarchy,  becomes  a  re- 
public, the  treaty  made  with  the  king  does  not  expire,  unlefs  it 
was  manifeflly  perfbnal, 

7°.  Every  treaty  of  peace  is  real  in  its  own  nature,  and  ought  to 
be  kept  by  the  fucctllor  ;  for  fofoon  as  the  conditions  of  the  treaty 
have  been  pundtually  fulfilled,  the  peace  effectually  effaces  the 
injuries  which  excited  the  war,  and  reftores  the  nations  to  their 
natural  fituation. 

S^'.  If  one  of  the  confederates  lias  fulfilled  what  the  treaty  obli- 
ged him  to,  and  the  other  (hould  die  before  he  perfonr.s  the  en- 
gagements on  his  part,  the  fuccelTor  of  the  decc^fed  king  is  obli- 
ged either  intircly  to  indenmifj  the  other  party  for  what  he  has 
performed,  or  to  fulfil  his  predeceflur's  engagement. 

9**.  But  if  nothing  is  executed  on  either  part,  or  the  perform- 
ances on  both  fides-are  equal,  then  if  the  treaty  tends  dircclly  to 
thepetfonal  advantage  of  the  king,  or  his  family,  it  is  evident,  that 
io  foon  as  he  dies,  or  his  family  is  extii.cft:,  the  treaty  muft  alio 
expire. 

10"'.  Laflly,  we  muil  obferve  that  it  is  grown  into  a  cuftom 
ior  fucceifors  to  renew,  at  leait  in  general  terms,  even  the  treaties 
manifeftly  acknowledged  for  real,  that  they  may  be  the  more 
Itrongly  bound  to  obferve  them,  and  may  not  think  thernfelves 
difpenfed  from  that  obligation,  under  a  pretext  that  they  have 
different  ideas. concerning  the  intereffs  of  the  ftate,  from  thofe  of 
îheir  predeceflbrs. 

XVIÎ.  Concerning  treaties,  or  alliance?,  it  is  often  difputcd, 
whether  they  may  be  lawfully  made  with  thofe  who  do  not  profefs 
the  true  religion  I  I  anfwer,  that  by  the  law  of  nature  there  is  no 
difficulty  in  this  poi;it.  The  right  of  makifîg  alliances  'is  com- 
incvn  to  all  men,  and  has  nothing  oppofite  to  ti"iC  prit;c:iples  ot  true 

religion  ; 


Politic    Law.  395 

religion  ;  which  is  fo  far  from  condemning  prudence  and  human- 
ity, that  it  Urongly  recommends  boih.  ••■ 

XVIII.  To  judge  rightly  of  the  caufes  which  put  an  end  to 
pubhc  treaties,  we  muit  carclully  aftend  to  the  rule  of  conventions 
in  genera!. 

1°.  A  treaty,  concluded  fora  certain  time,  expires  at  the  end  ol 
the  term  agreed  on. 

2^.  When  a  treaty  is  once  expired,  it  muft  not  be  fuppofed  to 
be  tacitly  renewed  -,  fora  new  obligation  is  not  cafiiyprefumed. 
'  3**.  And  therefore,  if  after  the  treaty  expires,  foine  aéls  are 
continued,  which  feem  conformable  to  the  terms  of  the  preceding 
alliance,  tliey  ought  rather  to  be  looked  upon  as  fiinple  marks  of 
friendihip  an  J  benevolence,  than  as  a  tacit  renovation  of  the  treaty. 

4".  We  mu(t  however  make  this  exception,  unlefs  fuch  a6ts 
intervene,  as  can  bear  no  other  conftruflion,  than  that  of  a  tacit 
renovation  of  the  preceding  compaft.  Thus,  for  example,  if  one 
ally  has  engaged  to  pay  another  a  certain  fum  annually,  and  after  . 
the  expiration  of  the  term  of  the  alliance,  the  fame  fum  be  paid  the 
following  year,  the  alliance  is  tacitly  renewed  for  that  year. 

5^.  It  is  in  the  nature  of  all  compatis  in  general,  that  when  one 
of  the  parties  violates  the  engagements  into  which  he  had  entered 
by  treaty,  the  other  is  freed,  and  may  refufe  to  (land  to  the  agree- 
ment ;  for  generally  each  article  of  the  treaty  has  the  force  of  a 
condition,  the  want  of  which  renders  it  void. 

C*^.  This  is  generally  the  cafe,  that  is  to  fay,  when  there  is  no 
agreement  othcrwife  ;  for  fometimes  this  claufe  is  inferted,  that  the 
violation  of  any  fingle  article  of  the  treaty  fhall  not  break  it  intirely, 
to  tfie  end  that  neither  party  fliould  fly  from  their  engagements 
for  every  (light  offence.  But  he  who,  by  the  ailion  of  another, 
fuffers  aiy  damage,  ought  to  be  indemnified  in  fume  fliape  or 
another. 

XIX.  Nofi5  but  the  favereign  can  make  alliances  and  treaties, 
either  by  himfelf,  or  by  his  miiiiflers.  Treaties  concluded  by 
minifters,  oblige  the  fovereign  and  the  ftate,  only  when  the  min- 
ifters  have  been  duly  authorized  to  make  them,  and  have  done 
nothing  contrary  to  their  orders  and  inftruélions.  And  here  it 
may  be  obferved,  that  among  the  Romans  the  word  fcedus^  a  pub- 
lic compa^,  orfolcmn  agreement,  Hgnified  a  treaty  made  by  order  of 

the 

♦  3çc  Grotius  on  war  aid  peice,  book  ii.  cJiap.  xv.  5  8,  9,  10,  11,  ii. 


39^  7^^  Principles  of 

the  fovereign  power,  or  that  had  been  afterward?;  ratified  ;  but 
when  public  perfons,  or  minifters  of  (late,  bad  promifed  fotnething 
relating  to  the  fovereign  power,  without  advice  and  command 
from  it,  this  was  cAXtàfponftOy  or  a  fimple  promife  and  engagement. 

XX.  In  general  it  is  certain,  that  when  minifters,  without  the 
order  of  their  fovereign,  conclude  a  treaty  concerning  public 
affairs,  the  latter  is  not  obliged  to  ffand  to  it  ;  and  the  minifter,  who 
has  entered  into  the  négociation  without  inftrudfions,  may  be 
punifhed  according  to  the  exigency  of  the  cafe.     However,  there 

,  may  be  circumltances  in  which  a  prince  is  obliged,  either  by  the 
rules  of  prudence,  or  even  thofe  of  juftice  and  equity,  to  ratify  a 
treaty,  though  concluded  without  his  orders, 

XXI.  When  a  fovereign  is  informed  of  a  treaty,  made  by  one 
of  his  minifters  without  his  orders,  h\sfilence  alone  does  rot  imply 
a  ratification,  unlefs  it  be  accompanied  with  fome  ad,  or  other 
circumffance,  which  cannot  well  bear  another  explication.  And 
much  more,  if  the  agreement  was  made  upon  condition  of  its  being 
ratified  by  the  fovereign,  it  is  of  no  force  till  he  has  ratified  it  in  a 
formal  manner. 


CHAP.     %, 
Ofcompa£is  made  zuitli  an  enemy > 

^'  A 

XjL^QÎ^G  public  compa£ls,  thofe  which  fuppofc  a  [late  of 
war^  and  are  made  with  an  enemy,  deferve  particular  attentipn. 
Of  thefe  there  are  two  kinds  ;  fome  which  do  not  put  an  end  \o  the 
war,  but  only  moderate  or  fufpend  the  ads  of  hoftility  j  and  others, 
which  end  the  war  intirely.  But  before  we  confider  thefe  com- 
'  pads  in  particular,  let  us  inquire  into  the  validity  of  them  in  general. 

Whether  we  ought  to  keep  our  jaith  given  to  an  enemy  ? 

ÎI.  This  queftion  is  certainly  one  of  the  moft  curious  and  im- 
portant belonging  to  the  law  of  nations.  Grotius  and  Puftendorf 
are  not  agreed  in  this  point.  The  former  maintains,  that  all  corn- 
pads  made  with  an  enemy  ought  to  be  kept  with  an  inviolable 
f!..iù:ty.     But  Puffendorf  is  fomewhat  dubious  with  rcfped  lo  thofe 

compads, 


Politic    Law.  397 

comp:icls,  which  leave  us  in  a  (late  of  war,  without  a  deflgn  to 
remove  it.  Let  us  therefore  endeavour  to  eftablilh  feme  princi- 
ples, by  means  of  which  we  may  determine  with  refpefSt  to  thefe 
two  opinions. 

III.  I  obferve,  i°.  Thai  though  war  of  itielf  deflroys  the 
ftate  of  fociety  between  two  nations,  we  muft  not  thence  conclude 
that  it  is  fubjeded  to  no  law,  and  that  all  right  and  obligation  are 
abfolutely  at  an  end  between  enemies. 

2*^.  Oil  the  contrary,  every  body  grants  that  there  is  a  right  of 
war,  obligatory  of  itfelt,  between  enemies,  and  which  they  cannot 
violate,  without  being  defedive  in  their  duty.  This  is  what  wc 
have  proved  before,  by  Ihewing  that  there  arejuft  and  unjuft  wars  ; 
and  that  even  in  the  jufteft,  it  is  not  allowable  to  pulh  acls  ot 
hoItiUty  to  the  utmoli:  extremity,  but  that  we  ought  to  keep  within 
certain  bounds  j  and  confcqueJitly,  that  there  are  things  unjujl  and 
unlawful^  even  with  refpeét  to  an  enemy.  Since  therefore  war  does  not, 
of  itfelf,  fubvert  all  the  laws  of  fociety,  we  cannot  from  this  alone 
conclude,  that  becaufc  two  nations  are  at  war  with  each  other,  they 
are  difpenfcd  from  keeping  their  word,  and  from  fulfilling  the  en- 
gagements they  have  made  with  each  other,  during  the  courfe  of 
the  war. 

3°.  As  war  is  in  itfelf  a  very  great  evil,  it  is  the  common  interefl 
of  nations,  not  to  deprive  thcmfelves  voluntarily  of  the  means  whicli 
prudence  fuggefts  to  moderate  the  rigour,  and  to  fufpend  the  efteiSls 
of  it.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  their  duty  to  endeavour  to  procure 
luch  means,  and  to  make  ufe  of  them  upon  occafion  ;  fo  far  at  lead, 
as  the  attainment  of  the  lawful  end  of  war  will  permit.  Now  there 
is  noiWing  but  public  faith  that  can  procure  to  the  parlies  engi-.ged 
in  war,  the  liberty  to  take  breath  ;  nothing  but  this  can  fecure  to 
towns,  that  have  furrendered,  the  feveral  rights  which  they  have 
referved  by  capitulation.  What  advantage  would  a  nation  gain, 
or  rather,  what  is  it  they  would  not  lofe,  if  they  were  to  have  no 
regard  to  their  faith  given  to  an  enemy,  and  it  they  looked  upon 
compacts,  made  in  fuch  circumftances,  only  a*  the  means  of 
circumventing  one  another  ?  Surely  it  is  not  to  be  fuppofed,  that 
the  law  of  nature  approves  of  maxims  fo  marifeftly  oppofite  to  the 
common  good  ol  mankind.  Bcfide?,  we  ought  never  to  vva^e 
war,  merely  for  the  fake  of  it,  but  only  through  necelTity,  in  order 
to  obtain  a  juft  and  reafonable  fatisflié^ion,  and  a  folid  peace  ;  from 
whence  it  evidently  follows,  that  the  right  of  war  between  enemies 
cannot  extend  fo  far,  as  to  render  hoftilities  perpetual,  and  to  cre- 
ate an  invincible  obftacle  to  the  rc-eftablilhmcnt  of  the  public 
tranquillity. 

4^^.  Ar.d 


398  "I'he  Principles   of 

4°,  And  yet  this  would  certainly  be  the  ccnfequence,  if  ihc 
law  of  nature  did  not  lay  us  under  sn  indifpenlible  obliaation  of 
performing  v\'hatever  agreement  we  have  voluntarily  made  with 
the  enemy  during  the  war  ;  v\  hether  thefe  agreements  tend  only 
to  fufpend,  or  moderate  ad;  of  hoftility,  or  whether  they  are  dclign- 
ed  to  make  them  ceafe  iniirely,and  to  re-eftablilh  peace. 

For,  in  fhort,  there,  are  only  two  ways  of  obtaining  peace. 
The  hrll  i«,  the  total  and  intire  deftrudicn  of  our  enemy  ;  and 
the  fc-cond  is,  the  entering  into  articles  of  treaty  v/ith  him.  If 
therefore  treaties  and  compa£ls,  made  beta'cen  cnemie?,  were  not 
in  themfelves  facred  and  inviolable,  there  would  be  no  other  means 
cf  procuring  a  folid  peace,  than  carrying  on  the  war  to  the  utmoft 
«xtremity,  and  to  the  total  ruin  of  our  enemies.  But  who  does 
not  fee  that  a  principle,  which  tends  to  the  d^firuclion  of  mankird, 
is  direélly  contrary  to  the  law  of  nature  and  nations,  whofe  princi- 
pal end  is  the  prefervation  and  iiappinefs  of  human  fociety  ? 

5^.  There  is  no  difHn£\ion,  in  this  refpeél,  between  the  differ- 
ent treaties  that  wc  may  enter  into  with  an  enemy  ;  for  the  obli- 
gation which  the  laws  of  nature  lay  upon  us,  to  obferve  them  in- 
violably, relates  as  well  to  thofe  which  do  not  put  an  end  to  the 
war,  as  to  thofe  which  tend  to  re-elcablifli  peace.  There  is  no 
medium,  and  we  mufi  lay  it  down  as  a  general  rule,  that  all  corn- 
pails  wiih  an  ene  ny  are  obligatory,  or  that  none  of  them  are 
really  fuch. 

And,  indeed,  if  it  were  lawful,  for  Inftance,  to  break  a  folemn 
truce,  and  to  detain,  without  any  reafon  for  it,  people,  to  whom  we 
had  given  paffports,  &;c.  what  harm  would  there  be  in  circum- 
venting an  enemy,  under  a  pretext  of  treating  of  peace?  When 
we  enter  into  a  négociation  of  this  kind,  we  are  ftill  enemies  ;  and 
it  is  properly  but  a  kind  of  truce,  which  we  agree  to,  in  order  to 
fee  if  there  be  any  means  of  coming  to  an  accommodation.  If 
the  négociations  prove  unfuccef&ful,  it  is  not  then  a  new  war  which  w  c 
begin,  fince  the  differences,  that  occahoned  our  taking  up  arms, 
are  not  yet  cdjufted  ;  wc  only  continue  the  a6ls  of  hodility  which 
had  been  fufpcnded  for  fome  time  :  fo  that  we  could  no  more  rely 
on  the  enemy's  finccrity,  with  refpect  to  compacts  which  tend  to 
re-ellablifii  peace,  than  to  thofe  vvhofe  end  is  only  to  fufpend,  or 
moderate  a(Sis  of  hofîility.  Thus  diftrufts  would  be  continual, 
wars  eternal,  and  a  folid  peace  unattainable. 

6*^.  The  more  frequent  unneccfTary  wars  arc  become,  through 
the  avarice  and  ambition  of  fovercigns,  the  more  a  fteady  adherence 
tp  the  principles,  here  elhblil]}?d,  isindifpenfibly  ncceftary  for  the 
:  ■  intcreft 


Politic    Law.  399 

intereft  of  mankind.  Cicero  therefore  juftly  affirm?,  that  there  is 
a  rieht  of  war,  which  ought  to  be  obferved  between  tlie  contending 
parties,  and  that  the  enemy  retains  certain  rights,  notwithftanding 
the  war.  * 

Nor  is  it  fufficient  to  fay,  as  PuiFendorf  doe?,  that  it  is  a  cuftom  which, 
among  other?,  has  obtained  among  civilized  nations,  out  of  particular 
refpccS  to  military  bravery,  that  all  compatis  made  with  anenemy 
ought  to  be  looked  upon  as  valid, He  (hould  alfo  have  added,that  this  is 
an  indifpenfibleduty,  that  juftice  requires  it,  that  it  is  not  in  the  power 
of  nations  to  eftablifh  things  on  another  footing,  and  that  they  can- 
not judly  deviate  from  the  rules  which  the  law  of  nature  prefcribes, 
in  this  cafe,  for  their  common  advantage. 

IV.  It  will  not  be  difEcuIt,  by  means  of  the  principles  herç 
cflablilhed,  to  anfwer  the  arguments  by  which  PufFendorf  pretends 
to  fliew,  that  all  compacts  made  with  an  enemy,  are  not  of  them* 
felves  obligatory.  VVefiuUbe  content  with  obferving,  i*^.  that 
thofe  arguments  prove  nothing,  becaufe  they  prove  too  much,  &c. 
and  2°.  all  ihat  can  be  concluded  from  them  is,  that  v.'e  ought  to 
a£l  prudently,  and  take  proper  precautions  before  we  pafs  our 
word,  or  enter  into  any  engagement  with  an  enemy  ;  becaufe 
mankind  are  apt  to  break  their  promifes  for  their  own  intereft-, 
efpecially  when  they  have  to  deal  with  people  whom  they  hate,  or 
by  whom  they  are  hated. 

V.  But  it  will  be  faid,  is  it  not  a  principle  of  the  law  of  nature,  that 
all  conventions  and  treaties,  extorted  by  injuftice  and  violence,  are 
void  of  themfelvcs  ;  and  confequently,  that  he  who  has  been 
forced  to  make  them  againft  his  will,  may  lawfully  break  his  word, 
if  he  thinks  he  can  do  it  with  fafety  ?     , 

Violence  and  force  are  the  charaiteriftics  of  war  ;  and  it  is  gen- 
erally the  conqueror  that  obliges  the  vanquifhed  to  treat  with  him, 
and  by  the  fuperiority  of  his  arms,  conftrains  them  to  accept  the 
conditions  he  propofes  to  them,  whether  the  war  he  has  undertaken 
be  juft  or  not.  How  then  is  it  poiïible,  that  the  law  of  nature  and 
nations  ftiould  declare  treaties,  made  in  thofe  circumftances,  to  be 
facred  and  inviolable  ? 

I  anfwer,  that  however  true  the  principle  on  which  this  objec- 
tion is  founded,  may  be  in  itfelf,  yet  we  cannot  apply  it,  in  all  its 
extent,  to  the  prefent  queftion. 

The  common  intereft  of  mankind  requires,  that  we  fhould  maks 

fomc 

*  EJi  etiamju;  l:slli;umifiJt:f2titjurhjuTandl/iil>e  cum  hcfic  fif'^.irjJa,  Off.  lib.  iv, 
cap.  29, 


400  ^h&  Principles  of 


fome  difference  between  promifes  extorted  by  fear,  among  privats 
perlons,  and  thofe  lo  which  a  lovereign  prince  or  people  is  con-^ 
ilraincd,  by  the  (uperiority  ol  the  arms  of  a  conqueror,  whofe  prc- 
tenfions  were  tuijult.  The  law  of  nations  then  makes  an  excep- 
tion here  to  the  general  rule  of  the  law  of  nature,  which  difannuls 
conventions  extorted  by  unju(t  fear  ;  or, in  other  words,  the  law  ot" 
nations  holds  for  jult  on  both  fides,  that  dread  or  apprchenfion 
which  induces  enemies  to  treat  with  each  other,  during  the  courfc 
of  a  war  \  for  otherwife,  there  would  be  no  method,  either  of  mod- 
erating its  fury,  or  of  putting  a  final  period  to  it,  as  we  have  already 
demonftrated. 

VI.  But  that  nothing  may  be  omitted,  relating  to  thisqueftion» 
we  fhill  add  fomething  for  the  further  illuftrationof  what  we  have 
been  faying. 

Firft  then,  it  is  neceflar)',  I  think,  to  didingulfli  here,  whether 
he,  who  by  the  fuperiority  of  his  arms  has  compelled  his  enemy  to 
treat  with  him,  had  undertaken  the  war  without  reafon  ;  or  whether 
he  could  alledge  fome  fpecious  pretext  for  it.  If  the  conqueror 
had  undertaken  the  war  for  fome  plaulible  reafon,  though  perhaps 
unjuft  at  bottom,  then  it  fs  certainly  the  intercft  of  mankind,  that 
the  law  of  nations  fliould  make  us  regard  the  treaties,  concluded 
m  fuch  circumftances,  as  valid  and  obligatory  j  fo  that  the  con- 
quered cannot  refufe  to  obferve  them,  under  a  pretext  that  they 
were  extorted  by  an  unjuft  fear. 

But  if  we  fuppofe  that  the  war  was  undertaken  without  reafon, 
Or  if  the  motive  alledged  b:;  minifeftly  frivolous,  or  unjuft,  as 
Alexander's  gtnng  to  fubdue  remote  nation?,  who  had  never  heard 
of  him,  Â:c.  AsTuch  a  wat-  is  a  downright  robbery,  1  confefs  I  do 
hot  think  the  vanquifhed  more  obliged  to  obferve  the  treaty  to 
which  they  were  compelled,  than  a  man,  fallen  into  the  hands  qf 
thievep,  is  bound  to  pay  a  fum  of  money,  which  he  had  promifed 
them,  as  a  ranfom  for  his  life  or  liberty. 

VII.  We  muft  alfo  add,  as  a  very  necelTiry  remark,  that  even 
fuppofing  the  war  v.'as  undertaken  for  fome  apparent  and  reafon- 
able  caufc,  if  the  treaty,  which  the  conqueror  impofes  on  the  van- 
quiHied,  includes  fome  condition  manifeftly  barbarous,  and  intirely 
contrary  to  humanity  ;  we  cannot,  in  thofe  circumftances,  deny 
the  vanqniflieda  right  of  receding  from  their  engagement,  and  of 
beginning  the  war  afrcfh,  in  order  to  free  thcmfelvcs,  if  they  can, 
from  the  hard  and  inhuman  conditions  to  which  they  were  fub- 
jccldj  by  the  abufe  their  cncmv  made  of  his  vidory,  contrary  to 

the 


Politic    Law.  40,1 

the  laws  of  humanity.  The  jufleft  war  does  not  authorize  the 
conq-aeror  to  keep  no  meafures,  or  to  ufe  all  liberties, with  refixdî: 
to  the  vanquifhed  ;  and  he  cannot  reafonably  comphin  of  the  brciilc- 
ing  of  a  treat)',  the  conditions  of  whiçli  are  both  uujuft  in  them- 
felves,  and  fuU  of  barbarity  and  cruelty. 

VIII.  The  Roman  hifîory  furniflie's  us  with  an  example  to  this 
purpof?,  which  deferves  our  notice. 

Tne  Privernates  h  id  been  feveral  times  fubdued  by  thtr  Romans, 
and  as  often  revolted  ;  but  their  city  was  at  laft  retaken  by  the 
conful  Plautins.  In  thefe  diiirefTed  circumflances,  they  fen t  am- 
baflTaJors  to  Rome  to  fus  for  pence.  Upon  a  fenator's  afkin^  them 
what  piinfhnent  they  thought  thev  defcrved  ;  one  of  th^m  ari- 
fwered,  That  which  is  due  to  men  who  think  ihemfehes  worthy  of 
liberty.  Then  the  conful  afked  them,  whether  there  was  any 
room  to  hope,  that  they  would  obferve  the  peace,  if  their  faults 
were  pardoned  ?  "  The  peace  (hill  be  perpetual  between  us,  re- 
"  plied  the  ambafTador,  and  we  fhall  faithfully  obferve  it,  if  the 
**  conditions  you  lay  upon  us  are  juft  and  reasonable  ;  but  if  they 
**  are  hard  and  difhonourable,  the  peace  will  not  be  of  long  con* 
*'  ti nuance,  and  we  (h.iU  very  foon  break  it." 

Though  fome  of  the  fenators  wore  offended  at  this  anfwer, 
yet  mofib  of  them  approved  of  it,  and  laid  that  it  was 
worthy  of  a  man,  and  of  a  man  who  was  born  free:  acknovv- 
led jing  therefore  the  rights  of  human  nature,  they  cried  out,  that 
thofe  aloae  deferved  to  be  citizens  of  Rome,  who  efteemcd  no-^ 
thing  in  comparifon  of  liberty.  Thus  the  very  perfons,  who  were 
at  fu ft  threatened- with  punifhment,  were  admitted  to  the  privilege 
of  citizens,  and  obtained  the  conditions  they  wanted  ;  and  the  gen- 
erous refufal  of  the  Privernates  to  comply  with  the  terms  of  a 
dilhonourable  treaty,  gained  them  the  honour  of  being  incorporated 
into  a  (fate,  which  at  that  time  could  boaft  of  the  braveft,  and  mod 
virtuous  fubje£ls  in  the  univerfe.  * 

Let  us  therefore  conclude,  that  a  due  medium  is  to  be  obferved, 
that  we  ought  inviolably  to  obferve  treaties  made  with  an  enemy, 
and  that  no  exception  of  an  unjuft  fear  fhould  authorize  us  to  break 
our  promife,  unlefs  the  war  was  a  downright  robbery,  or  the  con- 
ditions impofed  on  us  were  highly  unjuft,  and  full  of  barbarity  and 
cruelty. 

IX.  There  is  ftill  another  cafe,  in  which  We  may  avoid   the 

C  c  c  crime 

•  Livy  lib.  viii.  cap.  xx,  zsi. 


4-02  Tie  Principles   of 

cj-ime  of  pcrfidioufnefs,  and  yet  not  perform  what  we  have  prom- 
ifed  to  an  enemy  ;  which  is,  when  a  certain  condition,  fuppoCed  to 
be  the  bafis  of  the  engagement,  is  wanting.  This  is  a  confequence 
of  the  very  nature  of  compaas  ;  by  this  principle,  the  infidelity  of 
one  of  the  contracting  parties  fets  the  other  at  hberty  :  for,  accord* 
ing  to  the  common  rule,  all  the  articles  of  the  fame  agreement 
are  included  one  in  the  other,  in  the  manner  of  a  condition,  as  if 
a  perfun  were  exprefîîy  to  fay,  I  will  do  fuch  orfuch  a  things  provi- 
ded you  do  Jo  or  fo.* 


CHAP.     XI. 

f)f  compaSîî  wit/}  art  cnérrtj^  which  do  not  put  an  end  to  the  war. 


'A: 


^MONG  thofe  compadls  which  leave  us  in  a  flatcof  war, 
one  of  the  (ixincip.;!  is  a  truce. 

A  truce  is  an  a^reeaient,  by  which  we  engage  to  forbear  all  a£ls 
of  huftjlity  for  fome  lime,  the  war  ftili  continuing. 

IL  A  truce  is  not  therefore  a  peace,  f©r  the  war  continues.  But 
if  we  agree,  for  inllance,  to  certain  contributions  during  the  war, 
as  thefe  are  granted  only  to  prevent  a<5ls  of  hoflility,  they  ought  to 
ceafe  during  the  truce  ;  fince,  at  that  time,  fuch  afls  are  not  lawful. 
And,  on  the  contrary,  if  it  be  agreed  that  any  particular  thing  is  to 
take  place  in  time  of  peace,  the  time  of  truce  is  not  included. 

III.  As  every  truce  leaves  us  in  a  ftate  of  war,  it  follows,  that 
after  the  term  is  expired,  there  is  no  neceflity  that  war  fhould  be 
declared  again  ;  becaufe  we  do  not  commeiKe  a  new  war,  but 
oniy  continue  that  in  which  we  were  already  engaged. 

IV.  This  principle,  that  the  war  renewed  after  a  truce  is  not  a 
new  war,  may  be  applied  to  feveral  other  cafes.  In  a  treaty  of 
peace,  concluded  between  the  bifhop  of  Trent  and  the  Venetians, 
it  was  agreed, /^<2/  each  party  Jhould  be  put  iripaj/èffion  of  what  they 
enjoyed  before  the  lad  war. 

In  the  beginning  of  this  war  the  bifhop  had  taken  a  caftle  from 
tli^  Venetians,  which  they  afterwards  retook.  The  bifliop  refu- 
sed to  give  it  up,  under  a  pretext  that  it  had  been  retaken  after 

feveral 

•  Ses  abovt. 


Politic  Law.  403 

fcveral  tnices,  which  had  been  made  during  the  courre  of  that 
war.  The  difpute  was  evidently  to  be  decided  in  favour  of  the 
Venetians. 

-;  V.  There  are  truces  of  fcveral  kinds. 

:ni^.  Sometimes,  during  the  truce,  the  armies  on  both  fides  are 
in  the  field,  and  in  motion  ;  and  thefe  are  generally  hniited  to  x 
few  days.  At  other  times  the  parties  lay  dnwn  their  arms,  and 
retire  to  their  own  countries  j  and  in  this  cafe  the  truces  are  of 
longer  duration. 

2'*.  There  is  a  general  truce  for  all  the  territories  and  domin- 
ions of  both  parties  ;  and  a  particular  truce  reftrained  to  particular 
places  ;  as  for  example,  by  fea,  and  not  by  land,  &c. 

3°.  Laftly,  there  is  an  abfolute,  indeterminate,  and  general 
truce,  and  a  truce  limited  and  determined  to  certain  things;  for 
example,  to  bury  the  dead,  or  if  a  befieged  town  has  obtained  a 
truce,  only  to  be  fhsltered  from  certain  attacks,  or  from  particular 
aâs  of  hoftility,  fuch  as  ravaging  the  country. 

VI.  We  muflalfoobferve,  that,  ftri£lly  fpeaking,  a  truce  can 
be  made  only  by  exprefs  agreement  ;  and  that  it  is  very  difficult  to 
eliablifh  a  treaty  of  this  kind  on  the  footing  of  a  tacit  convention, 
unlefs  the  faâs  are  fuch  in  themfelves,  and  in  their  circumOances, 
that  they  can  be  referred  to  no  other  principle,  than  to  a  fincere 
defign  offufpending  a(5ls  of  hoftility  fora  time. 

Thus,  though  for  a  time  we  abftain  from  a(Sls  of  hoflility,  the 
enemy  cannot  from  that  alone  conclude,  that  we  have  coulented 
to  a  truce. 

VII.  The  nature  of  a  truce  fufficiently  fîiews  what  th2effe(ns 
of  it  are. 

i".  If  the  truce  be  general  and  abfolute,  all  aiEls  of  hofti'ity 
ought,  generally  fpeaking,  to  ceafe,  both  with  refpe£l  to  perfons 
and  things  ;  but  this  fhould  not  hinder  us,  during  the  truce,  to 
raife  new  troops,  ere6^  magazines,  repair  fortifications,  &c.  unlcfi 
there  be  fime  formal  convention  to  the  contrary  j  for  thefe  are  not 
in  themfelves  acls  of  hoftility,  but  defcnlive  precautions,  which 
may  be  taken  in  time  of  peace. 

2°.  It  is  a  violation  of  the  truce,  to  feize  on  any  place  pofTcired 
{)y  the  enemy,  by  corrupting  the  garrifon.  It  is  a!fo  evident,  that 
we  cannot  juftly,  during  a  truce,  take  poflTeflîon  of  pbces  defcrted 
by  the  eneniy,  but  really  belonging  to  him,  whether  t'^e  garrifon 
were  withdrawn  bc-fnre  or  after  the  truce. 


40^,  The   Principles  <?/* 

3^.  In  confequcnce  hereof,  we  mufl  reftore  thofe  things  belong- 
ing to  the  entmy,  which  during  the  truce  have  accidentally  fallen 
into  our  hands,  even  though  they  had  been  formerly  our  property. 

4^.  During  a  truce,  it  is  allou-ed  to  pafs  and  repafs  from  one 
place  to  another,  but  without  any  train  or  attendance  that  may  give 
umbrage. 

VIII.  And  here  it  may  be  afked,  whether  they  v.'ho,  by  any  un- 
cxpeded  and  inevitable  accident,  are  found  unfortunately  in  the 
enemy's  country,  at  the  expiration  of  a  truce,  can  be  detained 
prifoners,  or  ought  to  have  the  liberty  of  retiring?  Grotius  and 
PufFendorf  maintain,  that  by  the  right  of  war  we  may  detain  them 
as  prifoners  ;  but  Grotius  adds,  that  it  is  certainly  more  humane 
2nd  generous,  not  to  infift;  on  fuch  a  right.  I  am  of  opinion,  that 
3tis  the  confequence  of  a  treaty  of  truce,  that  we  (hould  fet  fuch 
perfons  at  liberty  :  for  flnce,  in  virtue  of  that  engagement,  we  are 
obliged  to  grant  them  free  egrefsand  regrefs.during  thetimeof  the 
truce  J  we  ought  alfo  to  grant  them  the  fame  permiflion  after  the 
truce  is  expired,  it  it  appears  manifeftly  that  a  fuperior  force,  or 
an  unexpected  accident,  has  hindered  them  from  making  ufe  of  it 
during  the  time  agreed  upon.  Otherwife,  as  thefe  accidents  may 
happen  every  day,  fuch  a  permiflion  would  often  become  a  fnare 
10  make  a  great  many  people  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 
Such  are  the  principal  eife£ls  ofanabfolute  and  general  truce. 

IX.  With  regard  to  a  particular  Irnce,  determined  to  certain 
things,  its  efFeds  are  limited  by  the  particular  nature  of  the  agree- 
ment. 

i*^.  Thus  if  a  truce  be  granted  only  for  burying  the  dçad,  we 
ought  not  to  undertake  any  thing  new,  which  may  alter  our  litua- 
tion  J  for  inftance,  we  cannot,  during  that  time,  retire  into  a  more 
iVcure  pofl,  nor  intrench  ourfelves,  &c.  for  he,  who  has  granted 
<\  fhort  truce  for  the  interment  of  the  dead,  has  granted  it  for  that 
purpofe  only,  and  there  is  no  reafon  to  extend  it  beyond  the  cafe 
agreed  on.  Hence  it  follows,  that  if  he,  to  whom  fuch  a  truce  has 
been  allowed,  Ihould  take  advantage  of  it  to  intrench  himfelf,  for 
example,  or  for  fome  other  ufe,  the  other  party  would  have  a 
right  to  prevent  him  by  force.  The  former  could  not  complain  ; 
for  it  never  could  be  .'•eafonably  pretended,  that  a  truce,  which 
Was  allowed  for  the  interment  of  the  dead,  and  reflrained  to  that 
f>ng'ea£l,  gives  a  right  to  undertake,  and  carry  on  any  other  thing 
uridiltuibcd.     The  ouly  obligation  it  impofes  on  the  perfon  who 

has 


Politic    Law.  405 

has  granted  it,  is,  not  forcibly  to  oppofe  the  interment  of  the  dead  ; 

thoui^h  Puff^ndorf,    indeed,  is  of  a  contrary  opinion  .  *  ' 

2*^.  It  is  in  confcquence  of  the  fume  principles,  that  if  we 
fiippolc  that  bv  the  truce  perfons  only,  and  not  things,  are  protedled 
from  adts  of  hodility  ;  in  this  cafe,  if  in  order  to  defend  our  goods 
we  wound  any  perfon,  it  is  not  a  breach  of  the  trnce  j  for  when  the 
fecurity  of  peifons,  on  both  fides  is  agreed  on,  the  right  of  defend- 
ing again(t  pillage  is  alfo  referved.  And  hence  the  fecurity  of 
perfons  is  not  genera!,  but  only  for  thofe  v/ho  go  and  come  with- 
out delign  to  take  any  thing  from  the  enemy,  with  whom  fuch 
limited  truce  is  made. 

X.  Every  truce  obliges  the  contracting  parties,  from  the  mo- 
ment the  agreement  is  concluded.  But  the  fubjedls  on  both  fides 
are  under  no  obligation  in  this  refpedt,  till  the  truce  has  been 
folemnly  notified.  Hence  it  follows,  that  if  before  this  notifica- 
tion the  (uhje£ls  commit  any  a£is  of  hoftility,  or  do  fomething 
-contrary  to  the  truce,  they  arc  liable  to  no  punifhment.  Ths 
powers,  however,  who  have  concluded  the  truce,  ought  toindeiîi- 
nify  thofe  that  have  fufFcrcd,  and  to  reftore  things,  as  much  as 
poflible,  TO  their  former  ftate. 

XI .  Laflly,  if  the  truce  fliould  happen  to  be  violated  on  one  fit'c, 
the  other  is  certainly  at  liberty  to  proceed  to  acts  of  hoftility,  with- 
out any  new  déclaration.  Yet  when  it  is  agreed,  that  he  who 
firfl  breaks  the  truce  fiiall  paya  ceitain  fine;  if  he  pays  the  fine, 
or  fufters  the  penalty,  the  other  has  not  a  right  to  begin  ails  of  hof- 
tility, before  the  expiration  of  the  term  ;  but  btfides  the  penalty 
flipulated,  the  injured  party  has  a  right  to  demand  an  indemnifica- 
tion of  what  he  has  fuiFered  by  the  violation  of  the  truce.  It  is  to 
be  obferved  however,  that  the  allions  of  pi  ivatc  perfons  do  not 
break  a  truce,  unlefs  the  fovereign  has  fomt:  hand  in  ihem,  either 
by  order,  or  by  approbation  ;  and  lie  is  fuppoled  to  approve  uhat 
has  been  done,  if  he  will  neither  punifh,  nor  deliver  up  the  offend- 
er, or  if  he  refufcs  to  reflore  the  thintis  taken  durin*^  the  ceflation 
of  arms. 

XII.  Safe  conduits  are  alfo  compafls  made  between  enemies, 
and  deferve  to  be  confidered.  By  a  fafe  coriduCl,  we  underlfand  a 
privilege  granted  to  foine  perfons  of  the  enemy's  party,  without  a 
ceflation  of  arms  ;  by  which  he  has  free  paiTage  and  return,  and  is 


in  no  danger  of  being  molellcd 


XIII.  The 


ice  the  law  of  nature  and  nations,  book  viii,  chap,  vii  §  9. 


4o6  7^^  Principles  of 

XIII.  The  feveral  queftions  relating  to  fafe  conducts  may  be 
decided,  either  by  the  nature  of  the  privilege  granted,  or  by  the 
general  rules  of  right  interpretation. 

1*^.  A  fafe  condud  granted  tofoldier?,  extends  not  only  to  in* 
ferior  ofHcers,  but  alio  to  thofe  who  command  in  chief;  becaufe 
the  natural  and  ordinary  ufe  of  the  word  has  determined  it  fo. 

2**.  If  leave  be  given  to  go  to  a  certain  part,  it  implies  one  alfo 
to  return,  otherwifc  the  former  permiflion  would  be  often  iifelefs. 
There  may,  however,  be  cafes,  in  which  the  one  does  not  imply 
the  other. 

3°.  He  that  has  had  leave  to  come,  has  not,  generally  fpeaking, 
liberty  to  fend  another  in  his  place  ;  and,  on  the  contrary,  he  who 
has  had  a  permiflion  to  fend  another  perfon,  cannot  come  himfclf  ; 
becaufe  thefe  are  two  different  things,  and  the  permilHon  ought  to 
be  naturally  reftrained  to  the  perfon  himfelf,  to  whom  it  was 
granted  ;  for  perhaps  it  would  not  have  been  given  to  another. 

4°.  A  lather  who  has  obtained  a  pafs-port,  cannot  take  his  fon 
with  him,  nor  a  hufband  his  wife. 

5^.  As  toferv'ants,  though  not  mentioned,  it  (hall  be  prefumed 
to  be  allowed  to  take  one  or  two,  or  even  more,  according  to  the 
quality  of  the  perfm. 

6^.  In  a  dubious  cafe,  and  generally  fpeaking,  licence  to  pafs 
freely,  does  not  ccafe  by  the  death  of  him  who  has  granted  it  ;  the 
fucceflbr,  however,  may  for  good  reafons  revoke  it  :  but  in  fuch  a 
cafe  the  perfon,  o  whom  the  pafs-port  has  been  granted,  ought 
to  have  notice  given  him,  and  the  neceflary  time  ail£>wed  bimiur^ 
betaking  himfelf  toa  place  of  fafety.  )' i  )e  '^j'  i!>w  3ff  ^i  tod;  Y^iedil 

7*^.  A  fafe  condud,  granted  during  pleâfuré,  Ympôfts  of  ftfètf  «' 
continuation  offafe  conducl:,  till  exprefsly  revoked  ;  for  oiherwiff, 
the  will  is  fiippofed  to  fubfift  flill  the  fame,  whatever  time  may  be 
elapfed  ;  but  fuch  a  fafe  condufl  expires,  if  the  perfon  who  has 
given  it,  is  no  longer  in  the  employment,  in  virtue  of  which  he 
was  impowered  to  grant  fuch  fecurity. 

.<-j:  i;lJ  n;  h-j}sii.'r]--j'  '/on  ?:.vv  ;;.;:f  ;oi  ,-; 

XIV.  The  redemptioti  of  Captives  is-alfo  a  cômpafl  ofrêri  made, 
without  putting  an  end  to  the  war.  The  ancient  Romans  were 
very  backward  in  the  ranfjmin^  of  prifoncrs.  Their  pradtice  was 
to  examine  whether  thofe,  who  were  taken  by  the  enemy,  had  ob- 
ferved  the  laws  of  military  difcipline,  and  confequently,  whether 
they  deferved  to  be  ranfamcd.  But  the  fide  o\  rigour  j^-nerally 
prevailed,  as  mofî  advantageous  to  the  republic. 

XV.  Yet 


Politic    Law.  407 

XV.  Yet  in  general,  it  is  more  agreeable,  both  to  the  good  of 
the  <lvtte>  and  to  humanity,  to  raufom  prifoners  ;  unlefs  experience 
convinces  us,  that  it  is  necelFary  to  ufe  that  feverity  towards  them» 
in  order  to  prevent  or  redrcfs  greater  evils,  which  would  other- 
vnifebcuaavoidable. 

'1  • 

XVI.  An  agreement  made  for  the  ranfom  of  a  prifoner  cannot 
be  revoked,  under  a  pretext  that  he  is  found  to  be  much  richer  than 
we  imagined  :  for  this  circumftance,  of  the  prifoner's  being  more 
or  lefs  rich,  has  no  relation  to  the  engagement  ;  fo  that  if  his  ran- 
fom were  to  be  fettled  by  his  worth,  that  condition  ihould  have 
been  fpecified  in  the  contrail, 

XVII.  As  prifoners  of  war  are  not  now  made  flaves,  the  captor 
has  a  right  to  nothing  but  what  he  adlually  takes  :  hence  money, 
or  other  things,  which  a  prifoner  has  found  means  to  conceal,  cer- 
tainly remain  his  property,  and  he  may  confequently  make  ufe  of 
them  to  pay  his  ranfom.  The  enemy  cannot  take  pofleflion  of 
what  they  know  nothing  of;  and  the  prifoner  lies  underno  obli- 
gation to  make  a  difcovery  of  all  his  effedls. 

XVIII.  There  is  alfo  another  queftion,  whether  the  heir  of  a 
prifoner  of  war  is  obliged  to  pay  the  ranfom,  which  the  deceafed 
had  agreed  upon  ?  The  anfwer  is  ^afy,  in  my  opinion.  If  the 
prifoner  died  in  captivity,  the  heir  owes  nothing,  for  the  promife 
of  the  deceafed  was  made  upon  condition,  that  he  fhould  be  fet  at 
liberty  :  but  if  he  was  fet  at  liberty  before  he  died,  the  heir  is  cer- 
tainly chargeable  with  the  ranfom. 

XIX.  One  queftion  more,  is,  whcAera  prifoner,  who  was  re- 
leafed  on  condition  of  releafing  another,  is  obliged  to  return  to 
prifon,  if  the  other  dies  before  he  has  obtained  his  releafement? 
I  aniwer,  that  the  releafed  prifoner  is  not  obliged  to  return  into 
cuftody,  for  that  was  not  ftipulated  in  the  agreement  ;  neither  is  it 
juft  that  hefliould  enjoy  his  liberty  for  nothing.  He  muft  there- 
fore give  an  indemnification,  or  pay  the  full  value  of  what  he  could 
not  perform. 


CHAP. 


4o8  72^  Principles  of 

CHAP.    XII. 

Of  cs7npaSh  made  during  the  war,  by  fubordhiate  power  s  y  as  generals 
of  armies,  or  other  commanders, 

^'  A 

/"^LL  that  has  been  hitherto  faid,  concerning  compa£ls 
betweca  enennies:,  relates  to  thofe  made  by  fovereign  powers. 
But  fince  princes  do  not  always  conclude  fuch  agreements  them- 
felve?,  we  murt  now  inquire  into  treaties  made  by  generals,  or 
other  inferior  commanders. 

n  In  order  to  know  whether  thefe  engagements  oblige  the 
fovereign,  the  following  principles  will  direct  us. 

i^.  Since  every  perfon  may  enter  into  an  engagement,  either 
by  himlelf  orby  another,  it  is  plain  that  the  fovereign  is  bound  by 
the  compadls  made  by  his  minifters  or  officer?,  in  confcquence  of 
the  full  powers  and  orders  exprejlly  given  them. 

2?.  He  that  gives  a  man  a  certain  power,  is  reafonably  fuppofed 
to  have  given  him  whatever  is  a  necefiary  confequence  and  appen- 
dage of  that  power,  and  without  which  it  cannot  be  exercifed. 
But  he  is  not  fuppofed  to  have  granted  him  any  thing  further. 

3°.  If  he,  who  has  had  a  commiffion  to  treat,  has  kept  within 
the  bounds  of  the  power  annexed  to  his  oiîice,  though  he  zt\% 
contrary  to  his  private  inftruCtions,  the  fovereign  is  to  abide  by 
what  he  has  done  ;  otherwife  we  could  never  depend  on  engage- 
ments contracSled  by  proxy. 

4".  A  prince  is  a!fo  obliged  by  the  a6^  of  his  miniflers  and  offi- 
cers, though  done  without  his  orders,  if  he  has  ratified  the  engage- 
ments they  have  made,  either  by  an  exprefs  confent,  and  then  there 
is  no  difficulty,  or  in  a  tacit  manner  ;  that  is  to  fay,  if  being  infor- 
med of  what  has  paflTed,  he  yet  permits  things  to  be  done,  or  does 
them  himfelf,  which  cannot  reafonably  be  referred  to  any  other 
caufe,  than  the  intention  of  executing  the  engagements  of  his  min- 
ifter,  though  contradled  without  his  participation. 

5*^.  The  fovereign  may  alfo  be  obliged  to  execute  the  engage- 
meats  contradïed  by  his  minifters  without  his  orders,  by  the  law 
of  nature,  which  forbids  us  to  enrich  ourfelves  at  another's  expenfe. 
Equity  requires,  that  in  fuch  circumftances  we  Ihould  exactly 
obferve  the  conditions  0/ the  contraiSl,  though  concluded  by  minif- 
ters who  had  not  full  powers. 

6^^.  Thefe  are  the  general  principles  of  natural  equity,  in  virtue, 
of  which  fovereigns  may  be  more  or  !efs  obliged  to  iland  to  the 

agreemeflt 


Politic    Law.  409 

agreement  of  their  minifters.  But  to  what  has  been  faid,  we  muft 
add  this  general  exception  :  unlefs  the  laws  and  cultoms  of  the 
country  have  regulated  it  otherwife,  and  thefe  be  fufiiciently  known 
to  the  perfons  with  whom  the  agreement  is  made. 

7*^.  Laftly,  if  a  public  minilter  exceeds  his  commiflion,  fo  that 
he  cannot  perform  what  he  has  promifed,  and  his  mafter  is  not 
obliged  to  it,  he  himfolf  is  certainly  bound  to  indemnify  theperfon 
with  whom  he  has  treated.  But  if  there  ihould  be  any  deceit  on 
his  part,  hs  may  be  puniihed  for  it,  and  his  perfon,  or  his  goods,  or 
both,  are  liable  to  be  feized,  in  order  to  make  a  rccompenfe. 

III.  Let  us  apply  thefe  general  principles  to  particular  examples. 

i^.  A  coTimander  in  chief  cannot  enter  into  a  treaty  that  re- 
gards the  caufcs  and  confequences  of  the  war  ;  for  the  power  of 
making  war,  in  whatever  extent  it  has  been  given,  does  not  imply 
the  power  of  finifhing  it. 

2°.  Neither  does  it  belong  to  generals  to  grant  truces  for  a 
confiderable  fpace  of  time  ;  for  i**.  that  does  not  necefifarily  depend 
on  their  commiffion,  2-  The  thing  is  of  too  great  confequence 
ro  be  left  intirely  to  their  difcretion.  3^.  And  laftly,  circumftances 
are  not  generally  fo  prefîîng,  as  not  to  admit  of  time  to  confult  the 
fovereign  ;  which  a  general  ought  to  do,  both  in  duty  and  prudence, 
as  much  as  pofïïble,  even  with  refpedl  to  things  which  he  has  a 
power  to  tranfadl  of  himfelf. 

Much  lefs,  therefore,  can  generals  conclude  thefe  kinds  of  truces, 
which  withdraw  all  the  appearance  of  war,  and  come  very  near  a 
real  peace. 

3**.  With  refpeil  to  truces  of  a  fhort  duration,  it  is  certainly  in 
the  power  of  a  general  to  make  them  j  for  example,  to  bury  the 
dead,  Sec. 

IV.  Lieutenant-generals,  or  even  inferior  commanders,  may  alfo 
make  particular  truces,  during  the  attack,  for  inftance,  of  a  body 
of  the  enemy  intrenched,  or  in  the  fiege  of  a  town  ;  for  this  being 
often  very  neceflary,  it  is  reafonably  prefumed,  that  fuch  a  power 
muft  needs  be  included  in  the  extent  of  their  commiflion. 

V.  But  a  queftion  here  arifes,  whether  thefe  particular  truces 
oblige  only  the  officers  who  granted  them,  and  the  troops  under 
their  command,  or  whether  they  bind  the  other  officers,  and  even 
the  commander  in  chief?  Grotius  declares  for  the  firft  opinion, 
though  the  fécond  appears  to  me  the  beft  founded  ;  for  1°.  fmce 
we  fuppofe  that  it  is  in  confequence  of  the  tacitconfent  of  the  fove- 
reign, that  fuch  a  truce  has  been  granted  by  an  inferior  commander, 

Ddd  no 


410  Ihe  Principles  (j/" 

no  other  officer,  whether  equal  or  fuperior,  can  break  the  agree- 
ment, without  indiredlly  wounding  the  authority  of  the  fovtreign. 
2^.  Belide^jthis  would  lay  a  toundation  for  fraud  and  diHrutts, 
\\hich  might  teiKl  to  render  the  ufe  ot  truces,  fo  neceliary  on 
fcveral  oecalions,  ufelefs  and  iuipraâieable* 

VI.  It  does  not  belong  to  a  general  to  releafe  perfons  taken  in 
war,  nor  to  difpofe  of  conquered  fovereignties  and  lands. 

VII.  But  It  is  certainly  in  the  power  of  generals  to  grant,  or 
leave  things,  which  are  not  as  yet  a<Stually  poliefled  :  becaule  in  war 
many  cities,  for  example,  and  often  men,  furrender  themfclves, 
upon  condition  of  preferving  their  lives  and  liberties,  or  fotnetimes 
their  goods  -,  concerning  which  the  prefent  circumOances  do  not 
commonly  allow  time  fuificient  to  confult  the  fovercign.  Inferior 
commanders  ought  alfo  to  have  this  right,  concerning  ihings  within 
the  extent  of  their  commiiTion. 

Vill.  In  fine,  by  the  principles  here  eftablifhed,  we  may  eafily 
judge  of  the  conduct  of  the  Raman  people,  with  refpect  to  Bituitu? 
king  of  the  Arverni,  and  to  the  affair  of  the  Caudine  Forks. 


I 


CHAP.     XIII. 

Of  compaSfs  made  with  an  enemy  by  private perfcns. 


T  fometimes  happens  in  war,  that  private  perfons,  whether 
foldiers  or  others,  make  compads  with  an  enemy.  Cicero  juftly 
remark?,  that  if  a  private  perfon,  conftrained  by  necefTity,  has 
'promifed  any  thing  to  the  enemy,  he  ought  religioufly  to  keep  his 
word.* 

11.  And,  indeed,  all  the  principles  hitherto  cftabliOied,  manifeftjy 
prove  the  juftice  andneceffity  of  this  duty.  Befules,  unlefs  this  be 
ailov.'ed,  frequent  obflacles  would  be  put  to  liberty,  and  an  occafioa 
given  for  maffacres,  &c. 

in.  But  though  thefe  compafts  are  valid  in  thetnfelves,  yet  it 
is  evident  that  no  private  perfon  has  a  right  to  alienate  public  prop- 
erty ;  for  this  is  not  allowed  even  to  generals  of  armies. 

IV.  With 


De  OlFic.  lib.  i.  C7p.  liii. 


Politic     Law.  -  41  x 

ÏV.  With  refpe(fl  to  the  actions  and  effefts  of  each  individual, 
though  the  covenants  made  with  the  enemy  on  thefe  affairs  may 
fometimes  be  prejudical  to  the  ftate,  they  are  binding  neverthe'.efs. 
Whatever  tends  to  avoid  a  greater  evil,  though  detrimental  in  it- 
felf,  ought  to  be  confiJered  as  a  public  good  ;  as  for  example,  when 
we  promife  to  pav  certain  contributions  to  prevent  pillage,  or  the 
burning  of  places,  &c.  Even  the  laws  of  the  (1  ite  cannot,  without 
injufîice,  deprive  individuals  of  the  right  of  providing  fur  their  own 
fafety,  by  impofing  too  burdenfome  an  obligation  on  the  fubjedls, 
intlrely  repugnant  to  nature  and  reafon. 

V.  It  is  in  confequence  of  thefe  principles  that  we  think  a 
captive  bound  io  perform  the  promife  he  has  made  of  returning 
to  prifon.  Without  this  he  would  not  be  fuffered  to  go  home  ; 
and  it  is  certainly  better  for  him,  and  for  the  ftate,  that  he  fliould 
have  this  permiffion  for  a  time,  than  that  he  remain  always  in 
captivity.  It  was,  therefore,  to  fulfil  his  duty,  that  Regulus  re- 
turned to  Carthage,  and  furrendered  himfelfinto  the  hands  of  the 
enemy.* 

VI.  We  muft  judge,  in  like  manner,  of  the  promife  by  which 
a  prifoner  engages  not  to  bear  arms  againjl  the  releajer.  In  vain 
would  it  be  obje£lc:d,  that  fuch  an  engagement  is  contrary  to  the 
duty  we  owe  to  our  country.  It  is  no  way  contrary  to  the  duty 
of  a  good  citizen,  to  procure  his  liberty  by  promihng  to  foibear  a 
thing  which  it  is  in  the  enemy's  power  to  hinder.  His  country 
lofes  nothing  by  that,  but  rather  gains  ;  fmce  a  prifoner,  lo  long 
as  he  is  not  releafcd,  is  as  ufeiefs  to  it,  as  if  he  were  really  dead. 

VII.  If  a  prifoner  has  prom i fed  Rot  to  make  his  efcapc,  he 
ought  certainly  to  keep  his  word  ;even  though  he  was  in  fetters 
when  he  made  it.  But  if  a  perfon  has  given  his  word,  on  con- 
dition that  he  /houM  not  be  confined  in  that  manner,  he  may  break 
it,  if  he  be  laid  in  irons. 

yill.  But  here  fome  will  afk,  whether  private  men,  upon  re- 
fufing  to  perform  what  they  have  promifed  to  the  enemy,  may  be 
compelled  to  it  by  the  fovereign  ?  I  anfwer,  certainly  :  otherw  ife  it 
would  be  to  no  purpofe,  that  they  were  bound  by  a  promife,  if  no 
one  could  compel  ihem  to  perform  it. 

CHAP, 

«  .11  u  »         ■  ]  fi         1 

*■  CIcer.  dc  Offic.  lib.  iii,  cap.  xxis. 


4^ 2  l^he  Principles   of 

CHAP.     XIV. 

OJ  public  compaéîs  which  put  an  end  to  war. 

Vu>lOMPACTS  which  putan  end  to  war,  are  either  principals 
or  accejjories.  Principals  are  tho'fe  which  terminate  the  war, 
either  by  themfelves,  as  a  treaty  ot  peace  ;  or  by  a  confequence  of 
what  has  been  agreed  upon,  as  when  the  end  of  the  war  is  referred 
to  the  decifion  of  lot,  to  the  luccefs  of  a  cornbat,  or  to  the  judg- 
ment of  an  arbitrator.  AccefTories  are  fuch,  as  are  fometimes 
joined  to  the  principal  compadls,  in  order  to  confirm  them,  and  to 
render  the  execution  of  them  more  certain.  Such  are  hoftages, 
pledges,  and  guarantees. 

II.  We  have  already  treated  of  fin gle  combats  agreed  on  by  both 
parties,  and  of  arbitrators,  confidered  as  means  of  hindering  or  ter- 
minating a  war  i  it  now  only  remains  that  we  fpeak  of  treaties  of 
peace.  ■  ■    .         •^    ■ 

III.  The  firfl:  queflion  which  prefents  itfelf  on  this  fubje6l  is, 
whether  compacts,  which  terminate  a  war,  can  be  difannulled  by 
the  exception  of  an  unjull  fear  which  has  extorted  them  ? 

After  the  principles  above  eflablifhed,  to  fhew  that  we  ought 
to  keep  our  faith  given  to  ^n  enemy,  it  is  not  necefTary  to  prove 
this  point  again.  Of  all  public  conventions,  treaties  of  peace  are 
ifhofe  which  a  nation  ought  to  look  upon  as  moft  facred  and  invio- 
lable, fince  nothing  is  of  greater  importance  to  the  repofeand  tran- 
quillity of  mankind.  As  princes  and  nations  have  no  common 
judge,  to  take  cognizance  of  their  differences,  and  to  decide  con- 
cerning the  juftice  of  a  war,  we  could  never  depend  on  a  treaty  of 
peace,  if  ttie  exception  of  an  unjuft  fear  was  in  this  cafe  to  be  gen- 
erally admitted.  I  fay  generally^  for  when  the  injuflice  of  the  con- 
ditions of  the  peace  is  highly  evident,  and  the  unjuft  conqueror 
nbufes  his  vidtory  fofar,  as  toimpofe  the  hardefl,  cruellefî,  and  moft 
intolerable  conditions  on  the  vanquiflied,  the  law  of  nations  cannot 
authorize  fuch  treaties,  nor  lay  an  obligation  on  the  vanquiflied 
tamely  to  fubmit  to  them.  Let  us  alfo  add,  that  though  the  law 
of  nations  ordains,,  that,  except  in  the  cafe  here  mentioned,  treaties 
of  peace  are  to  be  faithfully  obferved,  and  cannot  be  dTannulled, 
under  a  pretext  of  an  unjolt  conflraint  ;  it  is  neverthelefs  certain, 
that  the  conqueror  cannot  in  confcience  take  the  advantage  of  fuch 
a  treaty,  and  that  he  is  obliged,  by  internal  juflice,  to  reflore  all 
that  he  has  taken  in  ail  urjult  vvar. 

IV.  Another- 


Politic    Law.  413 

ÎV.  Another  queftion  i?,  to  know  whether  a  fovcrcîgn,  or  a 
ftate,  is  obliged  to  obferve  treaties  of  peace  which  they  have  made 
with  their  rebellious  fubjedls  ?  I  anfv/er,  i°.  that  when  a  fove- 
reign  has  reduced  rebellious  fubjeiSls  by  force  of  arms,  he  may  deal 
with  them  as  he  fees  beft.  2^.  But  if  he  has  entered  into  an  ac- 
commodation with  them,  he  is  thereby  fuppofcd  to  have  pardoned 
them  what  is  part  ;  fo  that  he  cannot  lawfully  refufe  to  keep  his 
word,  under  a  pretext  that  he  has  given  it  to  rebellious  fubje<Sts. 
This  obligation  isfo  much  the  more  inviolable,  as  princes  are  apt 
to  give  the  name  of  rebellion  to  a  refiltance,  by  which  the  fubjeâ: 
only  maintains  his  ju(t  rights,  and  oppofes  the  violation  of  the 
moft  effential  engagements  of  fovereigns.  Hillory  furniflies  but 
too  many  examples  of  this  kind. 

V.  None  but  he  who  has  the  power  of  making  war,  has  a  right 
to  terminate  it  by  a  treaty  of  peace.  In  a  word,  this  is  an  eflen- 
tial  part  of  fovereignty.  But  can  a  king,  who  is  a  prifoner,  make 
a  treaty  of  peace,  which  fhall  be  valid,  and  binding  to  a  nation  ?  I 
think  not,  for  there  is  no  probability,  that  the  people  would  have 
conferred  the  fupreme power  upon  one,  with  aright  toexercife  it, 
even  in  matters  of  thegreateft  importance,  at  a  time  when  he  is 
not  matter  of  his  own  perfon.  But  with  refpeél  to  contracfls 
which  a  king,  though  a  prifoner,  has  made  concerning  what  be- 
longs to  him  in  private,  they  are  certainly  valid,  according  to  the 
principles  eftabliflied  in  the  preceding  chapter.  But  what  fhall 
we  fay  of  a  king  who  is  in  exile  ?  If  he  has  no  dépendance  upon 
any  psrfon,  it  is  undoubtedly  in  his  power  to  make  peace. 

VI.  To  know  for  certainty  wtiat  things  a  king  can  difpofe  of 
by  a  treaty  of  peace,  we  need  only  confider  the  nature  of  the  fove- 
reignty, and  Uie  manner  in  which  he  pofTcires  it. 

i^.  In  patrimonial  kingdoms,  conlidercd  in  themfelves,  no- 
thing hinders  but  that  the  monarch  may  alienate  the  fovereignty. 
or  a  part  of  it. 

2*^.  But  princes,  who  hold  the  fovereignty  only  in  an  ufufruc- 
tUary  manner,  cannot  by  any  treaty  alienate  it,  either  in  whole  or  in 
part.  To  render  fuch  alienations  v.ilid,  the  confent  of  the  body  of 
the  people,  or  of  the  Hates  of  the  kingdom,  is  necefTary. 

3°.  With  refpedl  to  the  crown  domains,  or  the  goods  of  the 
kingdom,  it  is  not  generally  in  th.?  pov/er  of  the  fovereign  to  alien- 
ate them. 

•    4**.  With  regard  to  the  efFc;cls  of  private  fubjefls,  the  fovereign, 
as  ftich,  has  a  traijfcendintal  or  fupsreminent  right  Qver  the  goods 

and 


414-  ^^  Principles  of 

and  fortunes  of  private  men  ;  confequently  he  may  give  them  u  p, 
as  often  as  the  public  advantage  or  ncccfïîty  requires  it  ;  but  with 
this  confideration,  that  the  flat.;  ought  to  indemnify  the  fubjt£t  for 
the  lofs  he  has  fuftaincd  beyond  his  own  proportion. 

VII.  For  the  better  interpretation  of  the  articles  of  a  treaty  of 
peace,  we  need  only  attend  to  the  general  rules  of  interpretation, 
and  the  intention  of  the  contracting  parties. 

i^.  In  all  treaties  of  peace,  if  there  be  no  claufc  to  the  contrary, 
it  is  prefumed  that  the  parties  hold  ihenrifelves  reciprocally  dif- 
char£ied  from  all  damages  occafioned  by  the  war.  Hence  the 
claufes  of  general  amnefty  are  only  fi>r  the  greater  précaution. 

1^.  But  the  debts  between  individual!:,  contracted  before  thq 
war,  and  the  payment  of  which  could  not  be  exadled  during  the 
war,  are  not  to  be  accoutited  forgiven  by  the  treaty  of  peace. 

3°.  Unknown  ii^juries,  whether  committed  before,  or  during  the 
war,  are  fuppofed  to  be  comprehended  in  the  general  terms,  by 
which  weforgive  the  enemy  the  evil  he  has  done  us. 

4*^.  Whatever  has  been  taken  fince  the  conclufion  of  the  peace, 
mutt  certainly  be  reftored. 

5°.  If  the  time  be  limited,  in  which  the  conditions  of  peace  are 
to  be  performed,  it  muft  be  interpreted  in  the  ftricteft  i'enfe  ;  fo 
that  when  it  is  ex  ired,  the  leaft  delay  is  inexcufable,  unlefs  it 
proceeds  from  a  fuperior  force,  or  it  manifelUy  appe;;rs  that  it  is 
ovvinfTto  no  bad  defii;n. 

6*^.  Itis  laftly  to  be  obferved,  that  every  treaty  of  peace  is  of 
itfelf  perpetual,  and,  as  it  were,  eternal  in  its  nature  -,  that  is  to  fay, 
the  parties  are  fuppofed  to  have  agreed  never  to  take  up  arms  on 
account  of  the  differences  which  occafioned  the  war,  aiid  fur  the 
future  to  look  upon  them  as  intirely  at  an  end. 

VIÎI.  It  is  alfo  an  important  queftion  to  know,  when  a  peace 
may  be  looked  upon  as  broken. 

i".  Some  diftinguifh  between  breaking  a  peace^  and  giving  a 
new  occafton  of  war.  To  break  a  peace,  is  to  violate  an  article  of 
the  treaty  ;  but  to  give  a  new  occafion  of  war,  is  to  take  up  uvms 
for  anew  reafon  not  mentioned  in  the  treaty. 

1^ .  But  when  we  give  a  new  occafion  of  war  in  this  manner, 
the  treaty  is  by  fuch  means  indirectly  broken,  if  we  refufe  to 
make  fatisfaitioii  for  the  ofFence  :  for  then  the  offended  having  a 
right  to  take  up  arms,  and  to  treat  the  offender  as  an  enemy, 
againfl  whom  every  thing  is  lawful,  he  muft  alfo  certainly  difpenle 
v/iih  obferving  the  conditions  of  the  peace,  though  the  treaty  has 


Poli  T  I  c    L  A  w»  415 

mtbeen  formally  broken  with  refpc(5lto  its  tenor.  Befides,  lliis 
diftiin^ion  cannot  be  much  ufed  at  prefent  j  becaufe  treaties  of 
peace  are  conceived  in  fuch  a  manner,  as  to  include  an  engage- 
ment to  live  for  th^  future  in  good  friendfhip,  in  all  refp.-i^s.  We 
muff  therefore  conclude,  that  every  new  ait  of  unjuft  hoftllity  is  aa 
infringement  of  the  peace. 

3''.  As  to  thofe  who  only  repel  force  by  force,  they  by  no 
means  break  the  peace. 

4^.  When  a  peace  is  concluded  with  feveral  allies  of  him  with 
whom  the  treaty  has  been  made,  the  peace  is  not  broken,  if  one  c»f 
thofe  allies  takes  up  arms,  nnlefs  it  has  been  concluded  on  that 
footing.  But  this  is  what  cannot  be  prefumed,  and  certainly  they 
V/ho  thus  invade  us  without  the  aiïirtance  of  others,  fhall  be  con- 
fidered  as  the  breakers  of  the  peace. 

5**  A6ls  of  violence  or  hoftility,  which  fome  fubjefls  may 
commit  of  their  own  accord,  cannot  break  the  peace,  except  we 
fuppofe  that  the  fovereign  approves  them  ;  and  this  is  prefumed, 
if  he  knows  the  fa£l,  has  power  to  punifh  it,  and  neglects  to  do  fo. 

6^.  The  peace  is  fuppofed  to  be  broken,  when,  without  a  lawful 
reafon,  a6ts  of  hoftility  are  committed,  not  only  againft  the  whole 
body  of  a  ftate,  but  alfo  againft  private  perfons  ;  for  the  end  of  a 
treaty  of  peace  is,  that  every  fubje£l  (hould,  for  the  future,  live 
in  perfect  fecurity. 

j^.  The  peace  is  certainly  broken  by  a  contravention  to  the 
clear  and  exprefs  articles  of  the  treaty.  Some  civilians,  however, 
diftinguifli  between  the  zrndes  oï  great  importafice^  and  thofe  of 
/mail importance.  But  this  diftin£lion  is  not  only  uncertain  in  itfelf, 
but  alfo  very  difficult  and  delicate  in  its  application.  In  general, 
all  the  articles  of  a  treaty  ought  to  bz  looked  upon  as  important 
enough  to  be  obferved.  We  muft,  however,  pay  fome  regard  to 
what  is  required  by  humanity,  and  rather  pardon  flight  faults,  than 
purfue  the  reparation  of  them  by  arms. 

8°.  If  one  of  the  parties  is,  by  an  abfolute  neceffity,  reduced  to 
an  impoffibilitv  of  performing  his  engagements,  we  are  not  for 
that  to  look  upon  the  peace  as  broken }  but  the  other  party  ought 
cither  to  wait  fome  time  for  the  performance  of  what  has  been 
prornifed,  if  there  be  ftill  any  hope  of  it,  or  he  may  demand  a 
reafonable  equivalent. 

9°.  Even  when  there  is  treachery  on  one  fide,  it  is  certainljr 
at  the  choice  of  the  innocent  party  to  let  the  peace  fubfifl  ;  and  it 
would  be  ridiculous  to  pretend,  that  he  who  firft  infringes  the 
peace  can  difengage  himfelf  from  the  obligation  which  he  lay  under, 
by  afting  contrary  to  that  very  obligation. 

•  IX.  T» 


41 6  The  Principles  of 

IX.  To  treaties  of  peace,  for  the  fecurity  of  their  executionf 
are  fometitnes  joined  hoftages,  pledges,  and  guarantees.  Hoftages 
areof  feveral  forts  ;  for  they  either  give  thenilelves  voluntarily,  or 
are  given  by  order  of  the  fuvereign,  or  they  are  forcibly  taken  by 
the  enemy.  Nothing,  for  iultance,  is  at  prcfcnt  more  common, 
than  to  carry  ofFhoftages  for  the  fecurity  of  contributions. 

X.  The  fovereign  may,  in  virtue  of  his  authority,  oblige  fom? 
of  his  fubj-'6l-i  to  put  themfelves  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy  as 
homages  ;  for  if  he  has  a  right,  when  neceffity  requires  it,  to  expofe 
them  to  the  danger  of  their  lives,  much  more  may  he  engage  their 
corporal  liberty.  But  on  the  other  hand,  the  ftate  ought  certainly 
to  indemnify  the  holfages  for  the  lofll-s  they  may  have  fufiained  for 
the  good  of  the  fociety. 

XI.  Hoftages  are  demanded,  and  given,  for  the  fecurity  of  tlrs 
execution  of  fome  engagement  ;  therefore  it  is  neceilary  that  they 
fhould  be  retained,  in  fach  manner  as  fliall  be  judged  proper^ 
till  the  performance  of  what  has  been  agreed  on.  Hence  it  fol- 
lows that  an  hoftage,  who  has  made  htmfelf  fuch  voluntarily,  or  hs 
who  has  been  given  by  the  fovereign,  cannot  make  his  efcape. 
Grotius,  however,  grants  this  liberty  to  the  latter;  but  his  opinion 
does  not  feem  to  be  well  founded  :  for  either  it  was  the  intention 
of  the  ftate,  that  the  hoftage  lliould  not  remain  in  the  hands  of  the 
enemy;  or  the  fbtehad  not  the  pov/er  of  obliging  the  hoftage  to 
remain.  The  former  is  manifeftly  falfe,  forotherwife  the  hoftage 
could  be  no  fecurity,  and  the  convention  would  be  illufive.  Nor 
is  the  latter  more  true  ;  for  if  the  prince,  in  virtue  of  his  tranfccn- 
dental  property,  can  expofe  the  lives  of  the  citizens,  why  may  he 
not  engage  their  liberty?  Thus  Grotius  himfelf  agrees,  that  the 
Romans  were  obliged  to  return  Clelia  to  Porfenna.  But  the  cafe 
is*  not  precifely  the  fame,  with  refpe£l  to  hoftages  taken  by  the 
enemy  ;  for  thefe  have  a  right  to  make  their  efcape,  fo  long  as  they 
have  not  given  their  word  to  the  contrary.  ' 

XII.  It  isaqueftion  often  controverted,  whether  he,  to  whom 
hoftages  are  given,  can  put  them  to  death,  in  cafe  the  enemy  do 
not  perform  their  engagement  r  I  anfvver,  that  hoftages  themfelves 
cannot  give  the  enemy  any  power  over  their  lives,  of  which  they 
are  not  mafters.  As  to  tiie  flate,  it  has  certainly  the  power  of  ex- 
pofiog  the  lives  of  the  fuhjeéts,  when  the  public  good  requires  it. 
But  in  this  cafe,  all  that  the  public  good  requires,  is  to  engage  the 
corporal  liberty  of  the  hoftages  \  and  ihcy  can  no  more  be  rendered 

refponfible. 


PoliticLaw.  417 

refponfiWe,  at  the  peril  of  their  lives,  for  tli^  infidelity  of  the  fovereign, 
tha:!  an  innocent  perfon  can  be  treated  as  a  criminal.  Thus  the 
ftate  by  no  means  engages  the  lives  of  hoftages.  He,  to  whom 
they  are  given,  is  fiippofed  to  receive  them  on  thcfe  conditions  ;  and 
though  by  the  violation  of  the  treaty  they  are  at  his  mercy,  it  does 
not  follow  that  he  has  a  right  to  put  them  to  death  ;  he  can  only 
retain  them  as  prifoners  of  war. 

XI 11.  Hoftages,  given  for  a  certain  purpofe,  are  free  fo  foon  as  thnt 
purpofe  isaniwered,  and  confequently  cannot  be  detained  upon  any 
other  account,  ft)r  which  no  holt.iges  were  promifed.  But  if  we  have 
broke  our  fai  th  in  any  other  cafe,  or  contrailed  a  new  debt,  the  hcf- 
tages  then  may  be  detained,  not  as  hoftages,  but  in  confequence  o 
this  rule  of  the  law  of  nations,  which  authorizes  us  to  detain  the  per- 
fonsof  lubje6lsfor  the  deeds  of  their  fovereigns. 

XIV.  The  query  is,  whether  a  hoftage  is  at  liberty  by  the  death 
of  the  fovereign,  who  made  the  covenant  ?  This  depends  on  the 
nature  of  the  treaty,  for  the  fecurity  of  which  the  hoftage  was  given  ; 
that  is  to  fay,  we  muft  examine  whether  it  be  perfonalox  real. 

But  if  the  hoftage  becomes  fuccefTor  to  the  prince  who  gave  him 
up,  he  is  no  longer  obliged  to  be  detained  as  an  hoftage,  though  the 
treaty  be  real  ;  he  ought  only  to  put  another  in  his  place,  whenever  .  , 

it  is  demanded.  This  cafe  is  fuppofed  to  be  tacitly  excepted  ;  for 
it  cannot  be  prefumed  that  a  prince,  for  example,  who  has  given 
his  own  fon  ar.d  prelumptiveheir  as  an  hoftage,  ever  intended,  tlut 
rn  cafe  he  fliould  die,  the  ftate  ihould  be  without  its  chief. 

XV".  Sometimes  pledges  are  alfo  given  for  the  fecurity  of  a  treaty 
of  peace  ;  and  as  we  have  faid  that  hoftages  may  be  detained  for 
other  debts,  this  may  alfo  be  applied  to  pledges. 

XVI.  Another  way,  infine,of  fecuring  peace,  is,  when  princes 
or  ftates,  efpecially  thofe  who  have  been  mediators  of  the  peace, 
become  guarantees,  and  engage  their  faith,  that  the  articles  fh  dl  be 
obferved  on  both  fides  ;  which  engagement  of  theirs  implies  an  ob- 
ligation of  interpofing  their  good  offices,  to  obtain  a  reafonable 
fatisfadion  to  the  party  injured  contrary  to  treaty,  and  even  of  aflift- 
ing  him  againft  the  injurious  aggreiïîjr. 


E  e  e  CHAP. 


4.18  7^^  Principles  g/* 

CHAP.    XV. 
Of  the  right  of  atnbajfadon. 

\jr  remains  now  for  us  to  fay  fomething  of  ambaiTaJors»  arid 
of  ihs  privileges  which  the  law  of  nations  grants  them.  Thefuhjc£t 
naturally  leadi  us  to  it,  fince  it  is  by  means  of  thefe  miniitcrs 
that  treaties  are  generally  negociated  and  concluded. 

II.  Nothing  is  more  common  than  the  maxim,  which  eflab- 
liûies  that  the  perfons  of  amballidors  are  facred  and  inviolable, 
and  that  they  are  under  the  proteflion  of  the  law  of  nations.  We 
cannot  doubt  but  that  it  is  of  the  utrnoft  importance  to  ftiankind 
in  general,'  and  to  nations  in  particular,  not  only  to  put  an  end  to 
wars  and  difpute?,  but  alfo  to  ertablilli  and  maintain  comnfierc* 
and  friendfhip  with  each  other.  Now  as  afnb?.fl'adors  are  neccf- 
iary  to  procure  thyfe  advantages,  it  follows  that  God,  who  cer- 
tainly commands  every  thing  that  contributes  to  the  prcforvatioti 
and  happinefs  of  focicty,  cannot  but  forbid  the  doing  any  injury  to 
thofe  perfons  ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  he  orders  we  fliould  grant 
them  all  the  fecurity  and  privileges,  which  the  defign  and  nature 
of  their  employment  require. 

•  III.  Before  we  enter  into  the  application    of  ihe   privileges 

tvhich  the  law  of  nations  grants  to  aoibalfadors,  we  muft  obfervc 
with  Grotiu?,  that  they  belong  only  to  ambalTadors  font  by  fove- 
reign  powers  to  each  "other.  For  as  to  deputies  fent  by  cities  or 
provinces  to  their  own  fovereigns,  it  is  not  by  the  law  of  nations 
that  we  muft  judge  of  their  privileges,  but  by  the  civil  law  of  th« 
country.  In  a  v/ord,  the  privileges  of  ambafladors  regard  only 
foreigners  ;  that  is  to  fay,  fuch  as  have  no  dépendance  on  us. 

Nothing  then  hinders  an  inferior  ally  from  having  a  right  to 
fend  ambaffadors  to  a  luperior  ally  •,  for  in  the  cafe  of  an  unequal 
alliance,  the  inferior  does  not  ccafe  to  be  independent. 

It  is  a  queftion,  whether  a  king,  vanquilhed  in  war  and  ftript 
of  his  kingdom,  has  a  right  of  fending  ambalTadors  ?  But  indeed 
this  queftion  is  ufelefs,  with  refpcdl  to  the  conqueror,  who  will 
rot  even  fo  much  as  think  whether  he  ought  to  receive  ambafladors 
froiïî  a  perfon  whom  he  has  deprived  of  his  kingdom.  With 
regard  to  other  powers,  if  the  conqueror  has  entered  into  the  war 
forreafjns  manifeftly  unjuft,  they  ought  ftill  to  acknowledge  that 
perfon  for  the  true  king,  who  really  is  fo,  fo  long  as  they  can  do  it 
without  fonie  great  inconveniency  \  confequently  they  cannot 
.refufet»  receive  his  nmbaiTadorr. 

But 


Politic    Law.  419 

Bnt  in  civil  wars  the  cafe  is  extraordinary  ;  for  then  neceflîty 
fomctiines  makes  way  for  this  right,  fo  as  to  receive  ambaflaiiors 
on  both  fides.  The  f.ime  nation,  in  that  caf»,  is  for  a  tin^c  ac- 
counted two  diftinél  bo-.iies  of  people.  But  pirates  and  robber?, 
that  do  not  conftitute  a  fettled  government,  can  have  no  right  of 
nations  belonging  to  them,  nor  cor.fequently  that  of  fending  ani- 
bafladors,  unlcfs  they  have  obtained  it  by  a  treaty,  v./hich  has  fome- 
times  happened. 

IV.  The  ancients  did  not  diflinguifli  different  forts  of  perfons 
fent  by  one  power  to  another  ;  the  Romans  called  them  all  Ugati., 
or  oratores.  At  prcfent  there  are  various  titles  given  to  thefs 
public  minifters.  But  the  employment  is  in  the  main  the  fame  ; 
and  the  fevcral  diiTmvStions  are  founded  rather  on  the  greater  or  lef- 
fer  rpl.'nJjr  v/ich  v/hich  they  fupport  their  dignity,  and  on  the 
greatnefs  or  fmallnefs  of  their  falary,  than  on  any  other  reafjn 
derived  from  their  charatler. 

V.  The  moft  common  diftin£lion  of  ambafTadors,  at  prefent,  is 
into  cxtraordinm-y  anà  ordhtaj-y.  This  difference  was  intirely  un- 
known to  the  ancients.  With  them  all  ambafTadors  were  extra- 
ordinary, that  is  to  fay,  charged  with  only  a  particular  négociation  ;  . 
whereas  the  ordinary  ambafTadors  are  thofe  who  refide  among 
foreign  nations,  to  tranfa6l  all  kinds  of  political  concerns,  and 
even  to  obferve  what  pafTes  in  the  refpedlive  courts. 

The  fuuation  of  things  in  Europe,  fince  the  deftru£lion  of  the 
Roman  empire,  the  different  fovereignties  and  republics  that  have 
been  erefted,  together  with  the  increafe  of  trade,  have  rendered 
thefe  ordinary  ambafTadors  nectfTary.  Hence  feveral  hiftorians 
juflly  obferve,  that  the  Turks,  v/ho  keep  no  miniflers  in  foreign 
countries,  a£l  very  impoliticly;  foras  they  receive  their  news 
only  by  Jewifh  or  Armenian  merchants,  they  do  not  generally  hear 
of  things  till  very  late,  or  their  informations  are  bad,  which  often 
makes  them  take  imprudent  meafures. 

VI.  Grotius  obferves,  that  there  are  two  principal  maxims  of 
the  law  of  nations,  concerning  ambafTadors.  The  firft,  that  rue 
ought  to  admît  them  ;  the  ftcond,  that  their  perfons  are  f acred  and 
inviolable. 

VII.  With  regard  to  the  firft  of  thefe  maxims,  we  muft  obferve 
that  the  obligation  of  adtnitting  ambafTadors,  is  founded  in  general 
on  the  principles  of  humanity  :  for  as  all  nations  form  a  kind  of  fo- 
ciety  among  themfelves,  and  confequently  ought  to  affift  each  other 
by  a  mutual  interccnrfe  of  good  offices,  the  ule  of  ambafTadors  be-, 
comes  necefTary  between  them  for  that  very  reaîbn.     It  is  therefore 


420.  *ïhe  Principles   of 


p.  nilc  of  the  law  of  nations,  that  we  ought  to  admit  ambafTador?, 
and  to  rejcdt  none  without  a  juft  caufe. 

VII I .  But  though  we  are  obliged  to  adn-Ht  ambafTadors,  it  is  only 
a  bareduty  of  humanity,  which  produces  butanimperfedt  obligation. 
So  that  a  fimple  refufal  cannjt  be  regarded  as  an  injurious  aét,  fuf- 
ficient  to  lay  a  ju(t  foundation  for  a  war.  Befides,  the  obligation 
to  admit  atnbafTadors  regards  as  well  thofe  fent  to  us  by  an  enemy, 
Î1S  thofe  who  cpme  from  an  allied  power.  It  is  the  duty  of  princes, 
who  are  at  war,  tofetk  the  means  of  re-cftablifhing  a  ju(l  and  rca- 
fonable  peace  ;  and  they  cannot  obtain  it,  unltfs  they  are  difpoftd 
to  liflen  to  the  propofals  that  may  be  made  on  each  fide  \  which 
cannot  be  fa  well  negociated  as  by  employing  ambaffadors  or  min- 
ifters.  The  fame  duty  of  humanity  alfo  obliges  neutral,  or  in- 
(ffcrent  prince?:,  to  afford  a  pafTage  through  their  tefritories  to 
;  nibafTadors  fent  by  other  powers. 

IX.  I  mentioned  that  we  ought  not,  without  a  juft  caufe,  refufe 
admittance  to  an  ambaflador  ;  for  it  is  poffible  that  we  may  have 
Very  good  rer.fons  to  rejtdl:  him  :  for  example,  if  his  matter  has 
already  impofed  upon  us  under  pretext  of  an  embaffy,  and  we  have 
juff  reafon  to  fufpeél  the  like  fraud  j  if  the  prince,  by  whom  the 
nmbaflador  is  fent,  has  been  guilty  of  treachery,  or  of  fome  other- 
heinous  crime  againft  us  j  or,  in  fine,  if  we  are  fure  that,  under 
the  pretext  of  ncgcciuting,  the  ambaffador  is  fent  only  as  a  fpy,  to 
pry  into  our  affairs,  and  to  fow  the  feeds  of  fedition. 

Thus,  in  the  retreat  of  the  ten  thoufand,  the  hiftory  of  which 
has  been  written  by  Xenpphon,  the  generals  rciolved,  that  fo  long 
as  they  were  in  the  enemy's  country  they  would  receive  no  heralds  j 
and  what  moved  them  to  this  rcfolution,  was  their  having  found 
that  the  perfons  who  h^d  been  fent  among  them,  under  the  pretence 
t>f  enibafly,  came  really  to  fpy  into  their  affairs  and  to  corrupts  the 
iijldiers. 

It  may  alfo  be  a  jufl  reafon  for  refuflng  adn^itrance  to  an  ambaf- 
fador,  or  envoy  from  an  allied  power,  when  by  admitting  him  we 
are  likely  to  give  diffruft  to  fome  other  power,  with  whom  it  is 
proper  we  fhould  mufntain  a  good  underflanding.  Laffly,  the  per- 
fon  or  charaiSer  of  the  ambalfador  him.ftlf  may  furni(h  jufi  reafons 
for  our  not  admitting  him.  This  is  fufficient  concerning  the 
maxitn  relating  to  the  admittance  of  anibafîadors. 

X.  With  regard  to  the  other  rule  of  the  law  of  nations,  which 
<^irc6^>  that  the  perfons  of  ambaifadors  be  looked  upon  as  facrtd 
and  inviolable,  it  is  a  little  niore  diHicult  to  decide  the  fcveral 
quelllons  relating  to  it.    . 

*■  1^.  When 


Politic    Law.  -421^ 

î^.  When  we  lay  that  the  law  of  nations  forbids  any  violence 
to  ambaflaflors,  either  by  word  or  aclion,  we  do  not  by  this  give 
any  particular  privilege  to  thofe  minifters  ;  for  this  is  no  more  than 
•what  every  man  has  a  right  to  by  the  law  of  nature,  a  right  tliat 
his  life,  his  honour,  and  his  property,  b2  perfectly  fecure. 

2*^.  But  when  we  add,  that  the  perfons  of  ambafFadors  are  facrei 
and  inviolable  by  the  law  of  nation?,  we  attribute  fome  prerogatives 
and  privileges  to  them,  which  are  not  due  to  private  perfons,  Sec. 

2°'  When  we  fay  that  the  perfon  of  an  ambaflador  is  facred,  this 
fignifies  no  more  than  that  we  infiift  a  feverer  puniftimenton  thofe 
who  offer  violence  to  an  ambalTador,  than  on  fuch  as  commit  an 
injury  or  infult  to  private  perfons;  and  the  char?£ler  ofambafla- 
dors,  is  the  reafon  of  our  inflidling  fo  different  a  punifhment  for 
the  fame  kind  of  offence. 

4^.  L:iftly,  the  reafon  why  we  call  the  perfons  of  ambaflfadors 
facred,  is  becaufe  they  are  not  fubjed^  to  the  jurifdi£lion  of  the 
fovereign  to  whom  they  are  deputed,  either  in  their  perfons,  their 
retinue,  or  effeds  ;  fo  that  we  cannot  proceed  againft  them,  ac- 
cording to  the  ordinary  courfe  of  jufticej  and  it  is  in  this  that 
their  privileges  chiefly  confift. 

XI.  The  foundation  of  thefe  privileges,  which  the  law  of  nations 
grants  to  ambaffadors,  is,  that  as  an  ambaffador  reprefents  the  per- 
fon of  his  mafter,  he  ought  of  courfe  to  enjoy  all  the  privileges 
and  rights  which  his  mailer  himfelf,  as  a  fovereign,  would  have, 
were  he  to  come  into  the  ffates  of  another  prince,  in  order  to  tranf- 
acl  his  own  affùirs,  to  negociate,  for  inffance,  or  conclude  a  treaty, 
CH-  an  alliance,  to  regulate  fome  branch  of  commerce,  and  other 
things  of  a  fimilar  nature,  &c.  Now  wlven  a  fovereign  goes  into 
a  foreign  country,  we  cannot  imagine  that  he  lol'es  his  chara<^cr 
and  indépendance,  and  that  he  becomes  fubjeiSl  to  the  prince  whofc 
territories  he  vifits  :  on  the  contrary,  he  ought  to  continue  as  he 
was  before,  equal  and  independent  of  the  jurifditSlion  of  the  prince, 
whofc  territories  he  enters  ;  and  the  latter  receives  him  on  the 
fame  footing  as  he  would  choofe  to  be  received  himfelf,  if  he  went 
into  the  ether's  dominions.  Now  we  muft  grant  the  ambaffador 
the  fan>e  prerogative  and  immunities,  in  confequence  ofhisrepre- 
Tentative  charaéler. 

The  very  end  and  defign  of  ernbaffies  render  thefe  privileges  of 
amballadors  neceflary  ;  for  it  is  certain,  that  if  an  ambaffador  can 
treat  with  the  prince  to  whom  he  is  fent,  with  a  full  indépendance, 
he  will  hz  much  better  qualifivid  to  perform  his  duty,  andfervehis 
Kiaffer  efl'edlually,  than  if  he  were  fubje^t  to  a  foreign  jurifdiél ion, 
©r  ifhs  and  his  retinue  could  b;  configned  over  lojuftice,  and  his 

gpods 


42 2  ^'he   Principles  of 


goods  arrefted  and  feized,  &c.  Hence  it  is,  that  all  nations  have, 
in  favour  of  ambaffadors,  made  a  very  juft  exception  to  the  general 
cufîom,  which  require?,  that  people  uho  refide  in  a  foreign  prince's 
dominions,  fhall  be  (ubjc6l  to  that  prince's  laws. 

XII.  Thefe  principles  being  fuppofed,  I  aflirm, 

1°.  That  there  is  no  difficulty  with  refpeét  to  ambafTadcrs,  who 
are  deputed  to  a  pov/er  with  whom  their  matter  is  at  peace,  and 
have  injured  no  man.  The  mof\  evident  maxims  of  the  law  of 
nature  require  they  fiiould  be  perfectly  fccure.  So  that  if  we  af,- 
frontor  infult  fuch  a  minif^er,  in  any  manner  whatfocver,  we  give 
his  nîatter  jurt  reafon  for  declaring  war.  Of  this  king  David 
furnifhes  us  with  an  example.  * 

2^.  With  regard  to  ambafladors  who  come  from  an  enemy, 
înd  have  done  no  harm  before  they  are  admitted,  their  fàfety  de- 
pends intirely  on  the  laws  of  humanity  ;  for  an  enemy,  as  fuch, 
has  a  right  to  annoy  his  enemy.  Thus,  fo  long  as  there  is  no  par- 
ticular agreement  upon  this  article,  wc  are  obliged  to  fpare  the 
;imbaflador  of  an  enemy,  only  in  virtue  of  the  laws  of  humanity, 
which  we  ought  always  to  refpe£ï,  and  ;vhich  oblige  us  to  have  a 
regard  for  every  thing  tending  to  the  prefcrvation  of  order  and 
tranquillity. 

3'^.  But  when  we  have  promifed  to  admit,  or  have  atStually  r.d- 
mitted  the  amba  .ador  of  an  enemy,  we  have  thereby  maniledly 
engaged  t9  procure  him  intire  fecurity,  fo  long  as  he  behaves  well. 
We  muft  not  even  except  heralds,  who  are  fent  to  declare  war, 
provided  they  do  it  in  an  inofFenfive  manner. 

4*^.  With  regard  to  ambafTadors,  who  have  rendered  themfelves 
culpable,  either  they  have  done  the  injury  of  their  own  bead,  or  by 
their  mafter's  order. 

If  they  have  done  it  of  thtir  own  head,  they  forfeit  their  right  to 
fecurity,  and  to  the  enjoyment  of  their  privileges,  v/hen  their  crime 
is  manjfeft  and  heinous;  for  no  ambaflador  whatever  can  pretend 
to  more  privilege  than  lus  madtr  would  have  in  the  fame  cafe  \ 
now  fuch  a  crime  would  not  be  pardoned  in  the  mafler. 

By  heinous  crimes^  we  here  mean  fuch  as  tend  to  diflurb  tho  ftatCj 
or  to  deftroy  the  fnbje£ts  of  the  prince  to  whom  the  ambaflador  is 
deputed,  or  to  do  them  fome  confiderable  prejudice. 

When  the  crime  dircdly  affedtsthe  flate,  v^hether  the  ambaffa- 
dor  has  aiSlualiy  ufed  vioience"or  not,  that  is  to  fay,  whether  he  has 
ftirred  up  the  fubjefts  to  fedition,  orconfpired  himfelf  againft  the 
government,  or  favoured  the  plot  ;  or  whether  he  has  taken  arms 

with 

•  a  Sam.  chap.  x. 


Politic    La  w.  423 

with  the  rebels  cr  the  enemy,  or  engaged  kh  attendants  fo  to 
do,  Sec-  we  may  be  revenged  on  hinn,  even  by  killing  him,  not  as 
a  fubjeél,  but  as  an  enemy  ;  for  his  mafter  himfclt  would  have  no 
reafon  to  expedt  better  treatment.  And  the  end  of  embaffie?,  in- 
ftitJted  no  doubt  for  the  general  good  of  nations,  does  not  require 
that  we  Hiouid  grant  to  an  ambaflador,  who  firft  violates  the  law  of 
n.ïtion?,  the  privileges  which  that  lav/  allows  to  foreign  minifters. 
If  fuch  an  ambaflador  makes  his  efcape,  his  mafter  is  obliged  to 
deliver  him  up,  when  demanded. 

But  if  the  crime,  however  heinous  or  manifedj  affects  only  a 
private  pei Ton,  the  ambafTador  is  not  for  that  alone  to  be  reputed 
an  enemy  to  the  prince  or  ftate.  Suppofe  his  mafter  had  commit- 
ted a  crime  of  the  fame  nature,  we  ought  to  demand  fatisfa<5lion  of 
him,  and  not  take  unarms  againft  him  till  he  had  refufcd  it  ;  fo 
the  fame  reafon  of  equity  direds,  that  the  prince,  at  whofe  court 
the  ambaflador  has  committed  fuch  a  crime,  fhou'd  fend  him  back 
to  his  mader,  defiring  him  either  to  deliver  him  up,  or  to  puniflï 
him  :  for  to  keep  him  in  prifon  till  his  mafter  fhalS  recal  him,  in 
order  to  pur.ifh  !iim,  or  declare  that  he  has  abandoned  him,  would 
be  to  teftify  fome  diftruft  of  the  juftice  of  his  mafter,  and  by  that 
means  affront  him  in  fome  meafure,  becaufe  he  is  ftill  reprefented 
by  the  ambaflador. 

5*^.  But  if  the  crime  be  committed  by  the  mafter's  order,  it 
Would  certainly  be  imprudence  to  fend  the  ambaflador  back  ;  fince 
there  is  juft  reîfon  to  believe,  that  the  prince  who  ordered  the 
commiflion  of  the  crime,  will  hardly  furrender,  or  punifh  the  crim- 
inal. We  may,,therefore,  in  this  cafe,  fecure  the  perfon  of  the  am- 
baflador, till  the  mafter  fliall  repair  the  injury  done  both  by  his  am- 
baflador and  himfelf.  In  regard  to  thofe  who  do  not  reprefentthe 
perlon  of  the  prince,  fuch  as  common  mefTengers,  trumpets,  Scc^ 
we  may  kill  them  on  the  fpot,  if  they  come  to  infult  a  prince  by 
order  of  their  mafter. 

But  nothing  is  more  abfurd  than  what  fome  maintain,  namel}', 
that  all  the  evil  done  by  ambafladors,  by  order  of  their  mafter,  ought 
to  be  imputed  intirely  to  the  latter.  Were  it  fo,  ambafladors 
wouW  have  more  privilege  in  the  territories  of  another  prince,  than 
their  mafter  himfelf,  fhould  he  appear  there  :  and,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  fovereign  of  the  country  would  have  lefs  power  in  his  own 
dominions,  than  a  mafter  of  a  family  has  in  his  own  houfe. 

In  a  word,  the  fecurity  of  ambafladors  ought  to  be  underftood  in 
fuch  a  manner,  as  to  imply  nothing  contrary  to  the  (ecurity  of  ths 
powers  to  whom  they  are  fent,  and  v/ho  neither  would,  nor  could 
receive  them  upon  other  terms.     Now  it  is  plain,  that  ambafladors 

will 


424  Th^  Principles,  êPc. 

will  be  Icfs  bold  in  undertaking  any  thing  againft  the  fovcreigrjj 
or  againll  the  members  of  a  foreign  ftate,  if  they  areapprehenfive, 
that  in  cale  of  ticafon,  or  fome  other  heinous  crimes,  the  gcn'ern- 
ment  of  that  country  can  call  them  to  an  account  for  it,  than  if 
they  had  nothing  to  apprehend  but  correélion  from  thtir  mafter. 

6^.  When  the  ambaffador  himfcif  has  committed  no  crime,  it  is 
not  Liwiu!  to  ufe  him  ill,  or  to  kill  him  by  the  law  of  retaliation^ 
Gxreprijals  ;  for  by  admitting  him  under  that  charader,  wc  have 
renounced  our  right  to  any  fuch  revenge. 

In  vain  would  it  be  to  object  a  great  many  inftances  of  this  kind 
of  revenge,  which  are  mentioned  in  hiflory  ;  for  hiftorians  not  only 
relate  juft  and  lawful  anions,  but  alfo  divers  things  done  contrary 
to  juftice  in  the  heat  of  anger,  by  the  influence  of  fome  irregular 
and  tumultuous  paflion. 

7*^.  What  has  been  hitherto  faid  of  the  rights  of  ambafTadors, 
ought  to  be  applied  to  their  domeftic?,  and  all  their  retinue.  If  any 
of  the  ambafiador's  domeftics  has  done  an  injury,  we  may  defire 
his  matter  to  deliver  him  up.  If  he  does  not  comply,  he  makes 
himlelf  acceiï'ary  to  his  crime,  and  in  this  cafe  we  have  a  right  to 
proceed  againft  him  in  the  fame  manner,  as  if  he  had  commitied 
the  fad  himfelf. 

An  ambaflador,  however,  cannot  punifh  his  own  domeftics  ;  for 
as  this  is  not  conducive  to  the  end  of  his  employment,  there  is  no 
reafon  ta  prefume  that  his  raafter  has  given  it  him. 

8^.  With  refpedl  to  the  efFeds  of  a  foreign  minifter,  we  can 
neither  feize  them  for  payment,  nor  for  fecurity,  in  the  way  of 
juftice;  for  this  would  fuppofe,  that  hewasfubjedtothejurifdidlion 
of  the  fovereign  at  whofe  court  he  refides.  But  if  he  refufes  to 
pay  his  debts,  we  ought,  after  giving  him  notice,  to  apply  to  his 
mafter,  and  if  the  latter  refufes  to  do  us  juftice,  we  may  feize  the 
eftedts  of  the  ambaflador. 

g.  Laftly,  as  to  the  right  of  afylums  and  protégions,  it  is  by  no 
means  a  confequence  of  the  nature  and  end  of  embafTies.  How- 
ever, if  it  is  once  granted  to  the  ambafladors  of  a  certain  power, 
nothing  but  the  welfare  of  the  ftate,  authorizes  us  to  revoke  it. 

Neither  ought  we,  wuhout  good  reafons,  to  refufe  ambafTadors 
the  other  forts  of  rights  and  privileges,  which  are  eftabliftied  by 
the  common  confent  of  fovereigns  i  for  this  would  be  a  kind  of  an 
afiront  to  them. 

THE  END  OF  THE  FOURTH  AND  LAST  PART. 


x 


^■>W.l      B961F 


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